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Abstract
This article extends psychological methods and concepts into a domain that is as profoundly consequential as
it is poorly understood: intelligence analysis. We report findings from a geopolitical forecasting tournament
that assessed the accuracy of more than 150,000 forecasts of 743 participants on 199 events occurring over 2
years. Participants were above average in intelligence and political knowledge relative to the general
population. Individual differences in performance emerged, and forecasting skills were surprisingly consistent
over time. Key predictors were (a) dispositional variables of cognitive ability, political knowledge, and open-
mindedness; (b) situational variables of training in probabilistic reasoning and participation in collaborative
teams that shared information and discussed rationales (Mellers, Ungar, et al., 2014); and (c) behavioral
variables of deliberation time and frequency of belief updating. We developed a profile of the best forecasters;
they were better at inductive reasoning, pattern detection, cognitive flexibility, and open-mindedness. They
had greater understanding of geopolitics, training in probabilistic reasoning, and opportunities to succeed in
cognitively enriched team environments. Last but not least, they viewed forecasting as a skill that required
deliberate practice, sustained effort, and constant monitoring of current affairs.
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Modeling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation
George Loewenstein
Carnegie Mellon University
Ted O’Donoghue
Cornell University
Sudeep Bhatia
University of Warwick
Drawing on diverse lines of research in psychology, economics, and neuroscience, we
develop a model in which a person’s behavior is determined by an interaction between
deliberative processes that assess options with a broad, goal-based perspective, and
affective processes that encompass emotions and other motivational states. Our model
provides a framework for understanding many departures from rationality discussed in
the literature and captures the familiar feeling of being “of 2 minds.” Most important,
by focusing on factors that moderate the relative inﬂuence of the 2 processes, our model
generates a variety of novel testable predictions. We apply our model to intertemporal
choice, risky decisions, and social preferences.
Keywords: decision making, dual process, dual system, willpower, intertemporal choice, risk,
social preferences
From the writings of the earliest philosophers
to the present, there has been an almost unbro-
ken belief that human behavior is best under-
stood as the product of two interacting and often
competing processes. Many recent dual process
perspectives have focused on the differences
between two different modes of thinking—for
example, controlled versus automatic processes
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), symbolic and as-
sociative processes (Sloman, 1996; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000), impulsive and reﬂective pro-
cesses (Lieberman, 2003; Strack & Deutsch,
2004), and System I and II (Kahneman & Fred-
erick, 2002). In this article, we also propose a
dual-process framework; however, our focus is
on choice behavior rather than judgment. Fol-
lowing a long tradition of perspectives drawing
a distinction between, for example, “passion
versus reason,” “the id and the ego,” and more
recently, “emotion and cognition,” we argue
that choice behavior can be seen as the product
of two motivational processes, one more delib-
erative and focused on broader goals and the
other more reﬂexive and driven by emotions
and other motivational states.
Although both affect and deliberation have
been the focus of considerable research, when it
comes to formal modeling, one process—the
more deliberative of the two—has received the
lion’s share of attention. Considerable intellec-
tual time and energy has gone into formulating
what are sometimes referred to as cognitive or
rational-choice models of decision making,
such as the expected-utility model and the dis-
counted-utility model. Such models are conse-
quentialist in character; they assume that people
George Loewenstein, Department of Social and Decision
Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University; Ted O’Donoghue,
Department of Economics, Cornell University; Sudeep Bha-
tia, Department of Psychology and Warwick Business
School, University of Warwick.
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2choose between different courses of action
based on the desirability of their consequences.
Attempts to increase the realism of such mod-
els, many associated with the ﬁeld of behavioral
decision research, have generally adhered to the
consequentialist perspective but modify as-
sumptions about probability weighting, time
discounting, or the speciﬁc form of the utility
function.
A major reason for this focus is that the other
process—affect—has long been viewed as er-
ratic and unpredictable, and hence too compli-
cated to incorporate into formal models. In re-
cent years, however, there has been a renewed
interest in emotion, which has revealed a num-
ber of systematic properties of both the deter-
minants and consequences of affect. New re-
search by social psychologists (Epstein, 1994;
Sloman, 1996; Wilson et al., 2000), neuroscien-
tists (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp,
1998; Rolls, 1999) and decision researchers
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Loewenstein,
1996; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers et al.,
1997; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Pham, 1998;
Slovic et al., 2002) has led to a better under-
standing of the role that affect plays in decision
making, much of it lending new support to
historical dual-process views of human behav-
ior. As of yet, however, there have been few
attempts to develop formal models of behavior
that incorporate these insights, and in particular
to address how affect and deliberation interact
to determine human behavior.
We propose a formal dual-process model in
which a person’s behavior is the joint product of
a deliberative system that assesses options in a
consequentialist fashion and an affective system
that encompasses emotions such as anger and
fear and motivational states such as hunger, sex,
and pain. The model provides a new conceptual
framework for understanding many of the doc-
umented departures from the standard rational-
choice model discussed in behavioral decision
research, behavioral economics, and judgment
and decision making research. At the same time,
it captures the familiar feeling of being “of two
minds”— of simultaneously thinking one
should behave one way while actually behaving
in a different way (see, e.g., Milkman et al.,
2008). Most important, by focusing on factors
that moderate the relative inﬂuence of the two
processes, the model generates a number of
novel testable predictions.
A Dual-Process Model of Behavior
In psychology, the dual-process models that are
closest in spirit to our own are Metcalfe and Mis-
chel’s hot/cool model (1999) and Fazio and
Towles-Schwen’s (1999) MODE model. Metcalfe
and Mischel (1999) distinguish between a “hot
emotional system” and a “cool cognitive system”
and assume that a person’s behavior depends on
which system is dominant at a particular moment.
Fazio and Towles-Schwen’s (1999) MODE
model similarly distinguishes two types of atti-
tude-to-behavior processes, spontaneous process-
ing and deliberative processing, with implicit,
automatically activated attitudes guiding sponta-
neous processing, and explicit attitudes guiding
deliberative processing.
Economists, too, have developed dual-process
models of human behavior along these lines (Ben-
habib & Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004;
Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler,
1988; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; and an earlier ver-
sion of the current article, Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue, 2004). While our model overlaps
with these models in ways we will discuss, all of
these models (except the one on which the current
model is based) focus exclusively on intertempo-
ral choice. In this article, we apply our model to a
variety of decision-making domains, including in-
tertemporal choice, in which some of our assump-
tions—particularly affective myopia—overlap
with those made by these other economic ap-
proaches.
Our model is also informed and motivated by
evidence from neuroscience on the functional
speciﬁcity of different regions of the human
brain. Evolutionarily older brain regions, such
as the limbic system, which includes areas such
as the amygdala and the hypothalamus, evolved
to promote survival and reproduction, incorpo-
rate affective mechanisms (MacLean, 1990). In
contrast, the seemingly unique human ability to
choose deliberately, by focusing on broader
goals, relies on the prefrontal cortex (Damasio,
1994; Lhermitte, 1986; Miller & Cohen, 2001),
the region of the brain that expanded most dra-
matically in the course of human evolution
(Manuck et al., 2003). Indeed, these results have
led to dual-system frameworks for the neurosci-
ence of decision making. These focus on the
distinction between valuation-based choices
and goal-directed choices, with the former be-
ing processed primarily in areas such as the
56 LOEWENSTEIN, O’DONOGHUE, AND BHATIA
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
on
e
of
its
al
lie
d
pu
bl
is
he
rs
.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
r
th
e
pe
rs
on
al
us
e
of
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
us
er
an
d
is
no
tt
o
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
3 
amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex, and the latter being processed primarily in
areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Hare, O’Doherty,
Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; see also
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997
for an alternate but complementary approach to
studying the role of emotions in decision making).
Of course, there are many important distinctions
between different dual-process accounts, and both
the functional and neurobiological properties of
these different systems are still up for debate (see,
e.g., Kable & Glimcher, 2009).1
Our use of the term affect differs from many
lay deﬁnitions, which tend to focus on the sub-
jective feeling states associated with emotions.
In our usage, the deﬁning characteristic is that
affects carry “action tendencies” (Frijda,
1986)—for example, anger motivates us to ag-
gress, pain to take steps to ease the pain, and
fear to escape (or in some cases to freeze). This
perspective is consistent with accounts from
evolutionary psychologists (Cosmides &
Tooby, 2000), according to which affects are
“superordinate programs” that orchestrate re-
sponses to recurrent situations of adaptive sig-
niﬁcance in our evolutionary past (see Loewen-
stein, 2007 for a discussion of the utility of such
a deﬁnition).
Our use of the term affect is also related to
the distinction between expected emotions and
immediate emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner,
2003; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rick & Loew-
enstein, 2008). Expected emotions are emotions
that are anticipated to occur in the future as a
result of decisions but are not experienced in the
moment. As expected consequences of deci-
sions, to the extent that they are taken into
account, therefore, expected emotions will enter
into deliberation. Indeed, one interpretation of
the standard consequentialist model of decision
making is that people seek to create positive
expected emotions and avoid negative expected
emotions. Immediate emotions, in contrast, are
experienced at the moment of decision and
might be completely unrelated to the decision at
hand, in which case they are referred to as
“incidental” (Bodenhausen, 1993). Perhaps
most important, although they are experienced
while making a decision, immediate emotions
are not affected by the choice that is made, and
thus, under the usual rational-choice perspec-
tive, should be irrelevant to choices. But numer-
ous studies have found that immediate emotions
do inﬂuence decision making (Ariely & Loew-
enstein, 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner
et al., 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Wil-
son & Daly, 2003). A natural interpretation of
the affective system in our model is that it
captures the inﬂuence of immediate emotions.
Finally, our use of the term affect (in contrast
to deliberation) can be illustrated by the distinc-
tion that Kent Berridge (1996) draws between
“wanting” and “liking.” Wanting refers to an im-
mediate motivation to acquire something or en-
gage in some activity. Liking, in contrast, refers to
how much one actually ends up enjoying the good
or activity. Under this interpretation, our affective
system makes decisions based on wanting,
whereas our deliberative system makes decisions
based on liking. Berridge indeed ﬁnds that want-
ing and liking are mediated by different, albeit
overlapping, neural systems.
Note that our distinction between affect and
deliberation does not imply that basic cognitive
processes, such as those involved in object rep-
resentation, memory, and attention, are absent
in affective decision making. It is clear that
these processes must play a role in any type of
decision. We use the labels deliberation and
affect primarily as labels to help organize two
different types of motivations. Human behavior
is driven by many different motivations in the
brain, and restricting attention to two is clearly
a simpliﬁcation. Our point is that it can be a
useful simpliﬁcation to focus on two types of
motivations, some that are more reactive and
long-term goal-oriented (which we label “delib-
eration”), and others that are more reﬂexive and
inﬂuenced by emotions and short-term drives
(which we label “affect”).
To formalize our approach, we assume that
there are two “objective functions” operating
simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, consider an indi-
vidual who must choose an option x out of some
choice set X. On one hand, the affective system
1 Throughout this article, we will use ﬁndings in neuro-
science to motivate our framework of dual-process decision
making. However, it is important to note that brain pro-
cesses do not always map one-to-one onto psychological
processes or behaviors. A more rigorous link between these
ﬁndings, and the framework that we propose in this article,
needs to be based on a formal model of the neurobiological
basis of decision making (see, e.g., Yechiam, Busemeyer,
Stout, & Bechara, 2005, for a discussion).
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4is motivated to engage in certain behaviors, and
we capture these motivations with a motiva-
tional function, M(x, a). The variable a captures
the intensity of affective motivation. If the aff-
ective system alone were completely in charge
of behavior, the affective system would
“choose” xA  argmaxxXMx, a, which we
refer to as the affective optimum. On the other
hand, the deliberative system evaluates behav-
ior with a broader and more goal-oriented per-
spective, and we capture the desirability of ac-
tions as perceived by the deliberative system
with a utility function, U(x). If the deliberative
system alone were completely in charge of be-
havior, the deliberative system would choose
xD  argmaxxXUx, which we refer to as the
deliberative optimum. Typically, however, nei-
ther system is completely in charge of behavior.
Hence, to make predictions, we must incorpo-
rate sources of divergence between the two sys-
tems, and explain how the two systems interact
to generate behavioral outcomes.
Environmental Stimuli
Both systems are inﬂuenced by environmental
stimuli. In some cases, the two systems will re-
spond to the same stimuli with similar motiva-
tional tendencies. For example, during a break at a
conference, the availability of a snack might cre-
ate a surge of hunger in the affective system and
be perceived by the deliberative system as a wel-
come opportunity to recharge before the next ses-
sion. However, because the two systems operate
according to quite different principles, in other
situations the same stimulus can inﬂuence the two
systems differently. If the conferee is on a diet, for
example, the availability of the snack might also
remind her of that fact, leading to a divergence of
affective and deliberative motivation.
Existing research points to a number of fac-
tors that inﬂuence the strength of affective mo-
tivations while affecting the goals of the delib-
erative system much less if at all. Perhaps most
important is the temporal proximity of reward
and cost stimuli: Affective motivations are in-
tense when rewards and punishments are imme-
diate but much less intense when they are tem-
porally remote. Deliberation is, in contrast,
much less sensitive to immediacy. The impor-
tance of immediacy for affect has been docu-
mented in countless studies. Berns et al. (2006),
for example, scanned the brains of subjects as
they were waiting to receive electric shocks of
different intensities. They found that several
affective regions known to respond to the expe-
rience of pain (such as the posterior insula, the
amygdala, and the caudal anterior cingulate cor-
tex) also responded to the anticipation of pain,
and that the activation of these regions in-
creased dramatically as the shock approached in
time. Ichihara-Takeda and Funahashi (2006)
similarly found that the activity in the orbito-
frontal cortex, an area associated with the ex-
perience of affective reward, reached its peak
immediately prior to the arrival of the reward.
In contrast, deliberative areas, such as the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, did not show this
type of time dependence.
In addition to temporal proximity, various
forms of nontemporal proximity have similar
effects (Lewin, 1951). Thus, for example, a
tempting snack is more likely to evoke hunger
to the extent that it is nearby, visible, or being
consumed by someone else. Early evidence on
the role of nontemporal proximity comes from a
series of classic studies conducted by Walter
Mischel and colleagues (see, for instance, Mis-
chel et al., 1972, 1989, 2003). Children were
presented with a snack and told they could
receive a larger snack if they waited until the
experimenter returned. In a baseline treatment,
children had the larger delayed snack positioned
in front of them as they waited for the experi-
menter. Relative to this baseline treatment, chil-
dren were able to delay signiﬁcantly longer
when the larger snack was not present, or even
when the larger snack was present but covered.
Research on construal-level theory (Trope &
Liberman, 2003) also documents a distinction
between proximate and nonproximate factors
and provides evidence that level of construal
plays a role in the relationship between nontem-
poral proximity and affective responses.
A third factor is the vividness of stimuli, by
which we mean the ability to conjure the expe-
rience in mind. Researchers who study the im-
pact of incidental emotions have become in-
creasingly expert at evoking emotion, and many
of the manipulations play on vividness by, for
instance, showing people movies of an emotion-
evoking event (Lerner et al., 2004), having peo-
ple write essays in which they imagine them-
selves in a situation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000),
playing music (Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Halber-
stadt & Niedenthal, 1997), or even through the
58 LOEWENSTEIN, O’DONOGHUE, AND BHATIA
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5 
artful use of odors (Ditto et al., 2006; Zald &
Pardo, 1997). The ability to evoke emotion
through vividness suggests that vividness of
different choice object and different experi-
ences may play a crucial role in driving the
responses of the affective system (see, however,
Taylor & Thompson, 1982, for a discussion of
limits on the impact of vividness on judgment).
To incorporate these three effects into our
model, the motivational function, M(x,a), incor-
porates a variable a that captures the intensity of
affective motivations. In general, the larger is a,
the stronger will be the affective motivations. In
abstract terms, if the affective system prefers an
option x over an option x’, then an increase in
affective intensity increases affective motiva-
tion in the sense that the difference M(x, a) –
M(x’,a) increases with a. For some choice prob-
lems, there will be competing affective motiva-
tions, in which case a should be thought of as a
vector of good-speciﬁc affective intensities. For
instance, if one must make trade-offs between
money and cookies, it would be natural to as-
sume that a  (aM, aC), where aM is affective
intensity for money, and aC is affective intensity
for cookies. Each affective intensity inﬂuences
the motivation for its associated good.2
Behavioral Outcomes
A range of evidence suggests that the affec-
tive system holds a primacy in determining be-
havior—that is, the affective system has default
control of behavior, but the deliberative system
can step in to exert its inﬂuence as well. For
instance, Joseph LeDoux and his colleagues
(LeDoux, 1996) have demonstrated that fear
responses are inﬂuenced by two separate neural
pathways from the sensory thalamus to the
amygdala (a lower-brain structure that plays a
critical role in fear responses). One pathway
goes directly from the sensory thalamus to the
amygdala, and the second goes ﬁrst from the
sensory thalamus to the neocortex and from
there to the amygdala. Moreover, they also dis-
covered that the direct pathway is about twice as
fast as the indirect pathway. As a result, rats can
have an affective reaction to a stimulus before
their cortex has had the chance to perform more
reﬁned processing.
When deliberation gets involved, what deter-
mines the extent to which it inﬂuences behav-
ior? There is, in fact, compelling evidence that
deliberation does not easily take full control.
Rather, when in conﬂict with affect, delibera-
tive control, to the extent that it is possible,
requires an expenditure of effort. The most im-
portant evidence along these lines comes from
research by Baumeister and colleagues on will-
power (for a summary, see Baumeister & Vohs,
2003), by which they mean an inner exertion of
effort required to implement some desired be-
havior. Their basic contention is that such will-
power is a resource in limited supply (at least in
the short run), and that depletion of this re-
source by recent use will reduce a person’s
ability to implement desired behaviors.
Baumeister’s basic willpower paradigm in-
volves having subjects carry out two successive,
unrelated tasks that both require willpower and
comparing the behavior on the second task to
that of a control group that had not performed
the ﬁrst task. The general ﬁnding is that exerting
willpower in one situation tends to undermine
people’s propensity to use it in a subsequent
situation. In one representative study, for exam-
ple, subjects who sat in front of a bowl of
cookies without partaking subsequently gave up
trying to solve a difﬁcult problem more quickly
than did subjects who were not ﬁrst tempted by
the cookies.
Because the target behaviors in Baumeister’s
studies— for example, not eating cookies or
trying to solve a difﬁcult puzzle—typically in-
volve pursuit of broader goals, whereas not do-
ing these behaviors typically involves indulging
affective motivations, we believe there is a nat-
ural interpretation of these results for our mod-
el. Speciﬁcally, it is attempts by the deliberative
system to override affective motivations that
require an inner exertion of effort or willpower.
Subsequently, if a person’s willpower is de-
pleted by recent use, the deliberative system
will have less inﬂuence over behavior. Consis-
tent with this view, a related line of research
shows that simply making decisions can under-
mine willpower (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003).
Hence, one situation in which affect will have
more sway over behavior is when the delibera-
2 Both here and in the section on risky decision making,
we talk in terms of good-speciﬁc affective intensities. This
language, however, should be viewed as a shorthand for an
underlying model with (a) multiple types of affects (e.g.,
hunger, greed, fear, etc.) and (b) different types of goods
that are differentially affected by different types of affect.
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6 
tive system is “worn out” from past willpower
use. A second, related, situation is when the
deliberative system is currently occupied by
unrelated cognitive tasks. Research has shown
that having subjects perform simple cognitive
tasks—an intervention labeled “cognitive
load”—undermines efforts at self-control. In
one study, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) had sub-
jects memorize either a 7-digit number (high
cognitive load) or a 2-digit number (low cogni-
tive load) before presenting them with a choice
between cake (a high-calorie food) and fruit (a
low-calorie food). Fifty-nine percent chose the
cake in the high-load condition, but only 37% in
the low-load condition.
To formalize these ideas, we assume that the
deliberative system makes the ﬁnal choice, but it
must make this choice subject to having to exert
effort—willpower—to control affective motiva-
tions. We capture this cognitive effort by assum-
ing that, to induce some behavior different from
the affective optimum (i.e., to choose an x  xA),
the deliberative system must exert an effort cost,
in utility units, of h(W, )  [M(xA, a)M(x, a)].
This formulation assumes that the further the de-
liberative system moves behavior away from the
affective optimum, the more willpower is re-
quired. The factor h(W, ) 0 represents the cost
to the deliberative system of mobilizing
willpower—that is, the higher is h(W, ), the
larger is the cognitive effort required to induce a
given deviation from the affective optimum.
Based on our discussion, we incorporate two
factors that make it more costly for the deliber-
ative system to exert willpower. The ﬁrst is the
person’s current willpower strength, which we
denote by W. This variable is meant to capture
the current stock of willpower reserves; we as-
sume that h is decreasing in W, so that as one’s
willpower strength is depleted the deliberative
system ﬁnds it more difﬁcult (more costly) to
inﬂuence the affective system. Our analysis in
this article will focus on one particular implica-
tion with regard to willpower strength: The
more willpower a person has used in the recent
past, the more her current willpower strength
will be depleted, and hence exerting willpower
becomes more costly. The second factor that
makes it more costly for the deliberative system
to exert willpower relates to competing cogni-
tive demands (such as those induced by cogni-
tive load), which we denote by . Thus, we will
assume that h is increasing in : If a person’s
deliberative system is distracted by unrelated
cognitive tasks, exerting willpower becomes
more costly.
General Implications
We now combine the elements of our for-
malization to derive general implications of
our model. To make a choice, the deliberative
system trades off the desirability of ac-
tions—as reﬂected by its utility function
U(x)—against the willpower effort required
to implement them. Hence, the deliberative sys-
tem will choose the action x X that maximizes
Ux hW,  *  MxA, aMx, a. Because
the affective optimum xA is not affected by the
person’s actual choice, this is identical to maxi-
mizing:
V(x)  U(x) h(W,) * M(x, a) (1)
It follows that the person will choose an
option that is somewhere in between the delib-
erative optimum and the affective optimum
(when x is a scalar, either xD  x  xA or xA 
x  xD). Exactly where behavior falls will de-
pend on the cost of mobilizing willpower as
captured by h(W, ). As the cost of willpower
decreases, behavior will be closer to the delib-
erative optimum, and as it increases, behavior
will be closer to the affective optimum.
Although we interpret our model as reﬂecting
that the deliberative system chooses behavior
subject to willpower costs, there is a second
interpretation of our model that is more consis-
tent with our discussion of affective primacy.
Because the deliberative optimum xD and the
affective optimum xA, are not affected by the
person’s actual choice, maximizing V(x) is
equivalent to minimizing  UxD  Ux 
hW,  * MxA, a  Mx, a. Hence, our
model can be interpreted as the minimization of
a weighted sum of two costs: a cost to the
deliberative system from not getting its opti-
mum xD, and a cost to the affective system from
not getting its optimum xA. In this interpreta-
tion, h(W, ) captures the relative weights of the
two systems.
While we have motivated our model as a
dual-process approach, in the end behavior is
determined by a single “objective” function,
V(x). What is the value, then, of the dual-
process approach? One way in which the dual-
60 LOEWENSTEIN, O’DONOGHUE, AND BHATIA
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
on
e
of
its
al
lie
d
pu
bl
is
he
rs
.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
r
th
e
pe
rs
on
al
us
e
of
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
us
er
an
d
is
no
tt
o
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
7 
process approach is useful is that it provides a
natural interpretation of many behavioral out-
comes. When evaluating risky prospects, people
might cognitively believe that they should
weight probabilities linearly, but then make
choices that reﬂect an insensitivity to probabil-
ities. When weighing some intertemporal indul-
gence such as a tasty but highly caloric morsel
or a willing but forbidden sexual partner, people
might cognitively think that the indulgence is
not worth the future costs, but then indulge
nonetheless. Our model provides a natural in-
terpretation: People’s beliefs for what they
ought to do reﬂect only the objectives of the
deliberative system, whereas actual behavior is
inﬂuenced by affective motivations as well. In
other words, many deviations from the standard
prescriptive models of decision making can be
interpreted as coming from the motivations of
the affective system.
A second way in which the dual-process ap-
proach is useful is that it provides a template for
interpreting research from neuroscience. Recent
research in neuroscience, particularly in the
subdiscipline of neuroeconomics, often focuses
on where we see brain activity when people
make decisions. And, while neuroscientists are
often interested in more ﬁne partitions, a fre-
quent focus is on the extent to which activity
occurs in the prefrontal cortex or in evolution-
arily older brain systems, such as the amygdala,
the hypothalamus, and other parts of the limbic
system. To the extent that our deliberative sys-
tem is roughly meant to capture activity in the
prefrontal cortex whereas our affective system
is roughly meant to capture activity in the evo-
lutionarily older brain systems, according to our
model such research can be used to shed insight
on the different objectives of the two systems.
Indeed, we have already discussed some neuro-
scientiﬁc research in this way, and do so further
in the discussion of speciﬁc applications.3
But perhaps the most important value of the
dual-process approach is that it generates test-
able predictions. These predictions are perhaps
most clear when a person faces a binary choice
between two options. Suppose a person is
choosing between an option x and an option x’,
where option x is the deliberative optimum (i.e.,
U(x)  U(x’). According to our model, the
person will choose the former when U(x) 
h(W, )M(x, a)  U(x’)  h(W, )M(x’, a), or
U(x) – U(x’)  h(W, )[M(x’, a) – M(x, a)].
First note that if option x is also the affective
optimum, i.e., M(x, a)  M(x’, a), then the
person will clearly choose option x. Hence, as-
sume instead that option x’ is the affective op-
timum, i.e., M(x’, a)  M(x, a). From the in-
equality, two general predictions follow:
General Prediction #1: If a person faces a binary
choice between options x and x’ where option x is the
deliberative optimum while option x’ is the affective
optimum, then willpower depletion or unrelated cog-
nitive demands such as cognitive load increase the cost
of exerting willpower [increase h(W, )] and therefore
make it less likely that the person chooses the delib-
erative optimum (option x).
General Prediction #2: If a person faces a binary choice
between options x and x’ where option x is the delibera-
tive optimum and option x’ is the affective optimum, then
if increased affective intensity increases the affective
preference for option x’ over option x [i.e., if increased a
increases the difference M(x’, a) – M(x, a)], then affective
intensity makes it less likely that a person chooses the
deliberative optimum (option x). If, instead, affective
intensity decreases the affective preference for option x’
over option x[i.e., if increased a decreases the difference
M(x’, a) – M(x, a)], then an increase in affective intensity
makes it more likely that a person chooses the delibera-
tive optimum (option x).
In the next three sections, we apply our
model to three speciﬁc domains: intertemporal
choice, risky decision making, and social pref-
erences. In each domain, we make speciﬁc as-
sumptions about the objectives of the two sys-
tems and use these to derive speciﬁc predictions
of our model. In some cases, we ﬁnd existing
evidence that supports these predictions, but in
others we propose them as testable, but as yet
untested, predictions of the model.
Intertemporal Choice
The most straightforward application of our
model is to intertemporal choices—decisions
that involve tradeoffs between current and fu-
ture outcomes. Suppose that each option x in the
choice set X generates a stream of payoffs x1, x2,
3 Note of course that many fMRI studies in neuroscience
are correlational, and that activation in a particular brain
area cannot always justify inferences regarding the under-
lying psychological processes at play in observed behavior.
That said, we believe that our approach is a desirable ﬁrst
step in incorporating neuroscientiﬁc research into the study
of emotion and deliberation in preferential choice, and that
much of this research serves as a valuable complement to
the psychological and behavioral ﬁndings that we discuss in
this article.
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8 
. . . , xT, where payoff xt is received in period t,
and all payoffs involve the same type of choice
option. For simplicity, and for comparison to
standard approaches in economics, we assume
that both the affective and the deliberative sys-
tems display standard exponential discounting.
However, we additionally assume that the af-
fective system is more myopic than the delib-
erative system (and sometimes consider the spe-
cial case where the affective system cares only
about immediate outcomes), and we also as-
sume that increased affective intensity makes
the affective system more myopic.4
Formally, we assume that the deliberative
system’s utility function is U(x) x1 D x2
. . .  [D]TxT; that is, exponential discounting
with discount factor D. The affective system’s
motivational function is M(x, a)  x1 
A(a)x2  . . .  (A(a))TxT; that is, exponential
discounting with discount factor (a). We fur-
ther assume that A(a)  D, and that increased
affective intensity a implies a smaller A(a) and
thus more myopia. Putting these together, the
decision maker will choose x to maximize:
V(x) [x1Dx2 . . .[D]TxT] h(W,)
*[x1A(a)x2 . . .[A(a)]TxT]
(2)
Our assumption that the affective system is
driven primarily by short-term payoffs, whereas
the deliberative system cares about both short-
term and longer-term payoffs is similar to that
made by existing dual-process theories of inter-
temporal choice in economics (Benhabib & Bi-
sin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fuden-
berg & Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988;
Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). There is considerable
evidence in support of this assumption. On the
deliberative side, Frederick (2003) asked sub-
jects how they believed they should respond to
outcomes occurring at different times, and most
people generally believed that time discounting
is not normatively justiﬁed—that outcomes
should receive the same weight regardless of
when they occur. This suggests that people per-
ceive their own impulsivity as contrasting with
what they believe to be reasonable.
On the affective side, when animals are pre-
sented with intertemporal choices, they are ex-
tremely myopic. There is a long literature that
demonstrates extreme myopia in pigeons and
rats. Indeed, it has been found that species of
New World monkeys are willing to wait less
than 20 s for a food reward that is three times as
large (Stevens et al., 2005). Monkeys that are
closer, evolutionarily, to humans show less al-
though by human standards still extreme levels,
myopia (Tobin et al., 1996). In a related vein,
children have been shown to be more myopic
than adults, with children and teenagers exhib-
iting much steeper discount functions that indi-
viduals in their 20s and 30s (Steinberg et al.,
2009). To the extent that animal and child be-
havior can be used to shed insight on the moti-
vations of humans’ affective system, this evi-
dence suggests that the affective system is
myopic, and that concern for longer-term out-
comes are a product of the deliberative system.
More convincing evidence comes from neu-
roscience. McClure et al. (2004, 2006) scanned
subjects’ brains using fMRI while they made
choices between smaller-sooner rewards versus
larger-later rewards. All of these choices pro-
duced activation in prefrontal regions associ-
ated with deliberation (such as the dorsolateral
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex); however,
when one of the options involved an immediate
reward, brain regions associated with affective
processing, such as the ventral striatum and
medial orbitofrontal cortex, also became acti-
vated. Moreover, in situations in which an im-
mediate reward was one of the options, higher
relative activation of the affective regions in-
creased the likelihood that the subject would
choose the immediate reward.
Similar results are suggested by Bjork et al.
(2009), who found that delay discounting can be
predicted by the size of the decision maker’s
lateral prefrontal cortex. Figner et al. (2010)
also found that experimentally disrupting pre-
frontal areas associated with deliberation (par-
ticularly the lateral prefrontal cortex) led to an
increased choice of immediate rewards over
delayed rewards. This disruption did not, how-
ever, alter choices between delayed rewards,
suggesting that deliberative processing plays a
4 Our key predictions, I-1 and I-2, rely only on the as-
sumption that the affective system is more myopic than the
deliberative system, and not on the assumption of exponen-
tial discounting. We assume exponential discounting to
highlight how our framework can give rise to hyperbolic
discounting, even if neither system exhibits hyperbolic dis-
counting (as we discuss later).
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9 
fundamental role in directing nonmyopic
choice.
Last, considerable research on addiction and
self-control has documented a discrepancy be-
tween an addict’s short-term desires (involving,
e.g., the consumption of an addictive sub-
stance), and an addict’s long-term goals (which
seek to regulate cravings and stop the use of
these addictive substances; see, e.g., Goldstein,
2001 for a discussion). This pattern of behavior
strongly supports the assumptions of affective
myopia and deliberative far-sightedness that we
propose in this article.
Equation 2 yields several important predictions.
First, maximizing Equation 2 is equivalent to
maximizing V˜x  x1 t1 Dtx1t with:
D(t)
(D)t h(W,)A(a)t
1 h(W,)
.
Note that D(t) is a discount function reﬂect-
ing the discounting associated with a payoff
with delay t. This formulation (with D A(a))
implies both discounting (i.e., that D(0)  1 
D(1)  D(2) . . .) and declining discount rates
(i.e., D(0)/D(1)  D(1)/D(2)  D(2)/D(3) . . .).
In addition, in the special case where A(a)  0,
maximizing Equation 2 is equivalent maximiz-
ing x1  x2  . . .  TxT, where  
1/(1h(W, ))  1. This is the well-known
beta-delta function used by Laibson (1997) and
others, as an analytical tractable simpliﬁcation
of hyperbolic discounting.5
Hence, our model, with the assumption that
affective discounting provides a natural inter-
pretation— or reinterpretation— of (quasi)
hyperbolic discounting. Speciﬁcally, even if
the deliberative system discounts exponen-
tially, because behavior is also inﬂuenced by
a more myopic affective system, people will
be more impatient when facing now versus
near-future trade-offs than they will be when
facing future versus further-future trade-
offs—which is the essence of hyperbolic dis-
counting. This formulation also implies that a
decrease in willpower, increase in cognitive
demands, or increase in affective intensity
will lead to a higher value of  without
changing the effective . The quasi-hyper-
bolic form deﬁned here is consistent with a
number of intertemporal preference reversals
(e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, 1997), with de-
clining (average) discount rates (e.g., Ben-
Zion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Thaler,
1981), as well as with evidence (e.g., Freder-
ick et al., 2002) suggesting that the magnitude
of discounting is based on the distinction be-
tween now and the future—and in particular,
that people exhibit nearly constant discount-
ing when facing two future trade-offs.
Beyond providing an alternative account of
hyperbolic time discounting, Equation 2 also
generates testable predictions by applying the
two general predictions of our model:
Intertemporal Choice Prediction #1 (I-1): An increase
in h(W, ) will lead to more myopic behavior.
Intertemporal Choice Prediction #2 (I-2): Any factor
that increases the intensity of the affective motivation
for the immediate payoff will lead to more myopic
behavior.
The increases to myopic behavior listed in
Predictions I-1 and I-2 will affect choice only
when the decision involves tradeoffs between
immediate and future payoffs. Willpower, cog-
nitive load, or affective intensity will not alter
tradeoffs involving two or more future payoffs.
In addition, note that Predictions I-1 and I-2
also hold for the more general model, which
allows the affective system to discount expo-
nentially (but with a lower discount factor than
that displayed by the deliberative system).
There is existing evidence on Predictions I-1
and I-2. For instance, Vohs and Heatherton
(2000) investigated how willpower depletion
affects the amount of ice cream people eat when
asked to taste and rate three ﬂavors. To the
extent that eating ice cream involves immediate
beneﬁts and future costs, eating more ice cream
can be taken to reﬂect increased myopia. In
support of I-1, they found that, among dieters,
willpower depletion led subjects to eat more ice
cream. However, they found no effect among
nondieters. In addition, Vohs and Faber (2007)
found that willpower depletion led to increased
impulse buying, and Vohs et al., (2008) found
5 Mathematically hyperbolic discounting is described
with the discount factor 1/(1kt). The beta-delta approxi-
mates this formulation in discrete time. For  and  between
0 and 1, the decision maker will be present biased when
choosing between immediate and delayed rewards, but will
discount exponentially when choosing between different
delayed rewards. Note that some scholars have argued
against discounting models, in favor of attribute tradeoff
models (Scholten & Read, 2010).
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that willpower depletion increased procrastina-
tion. Finally, more direct evidence of the impact
of willpower depletion on delay discounting is
documented by Vohs et al. (2013). Individuals
who performed depletion tasks prior to making
intertemporal choices were more likely to
choose smaller, immediate rewards over larger,
delayed rewards.
The Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) study earlier
in this article provides support for the cognitive
demands Prediction of I-1—speciﬁcally, cogni-
tive load makes subjects more prone to choose
cake over fruit, reﬂecting increased myopia.
Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013) provide
more direct evidence. They asked Chilean high
school juniors to make a series of short-term
trade-offs and long-term trade-offs for mone-
tary payoffs. Relative to control subjects, sub-
jects who answered these questions while under
cognitive load showed nontrivial reductions in
short-term patience. In contrast, cognitive load
had no effect on long-term patience.
I-2 captures a host of predictions based on
the different factors, discussed above, that
increase affective intensity. Most straightfor-
wardly, our model predicts that nontemporal
proximity of immediate outcomes should play
a large role in elicited discount rates. Thus,
for example, the extent that an immediate
reward can be seen or smelled will affect the
magnitude of discount rates that people’s be-
havior reveals, which is consistent with the
research by Mischel and colleagues described
earlier in this article. Note that Mischel’s
results are puzzling when viewed from the
perspective of hyperbolic discounting. As
time passes, and thus the delay between the
immediate smaller snack and the delayed
larger snack shrinks, children become less
willing to wait (which is why many children
initially decide to wait, but then “bail out”)—
exactly the opposite of what hyperbolic dis-
counting would predict. Willpower depletion,
however, provides a natural explanation. Spe-
ciﬁcally, as time passes and the person’s will-
power is slowly depleted, eventually they no
longer have enough willpower to support fur-
ther delay.
Indeed, our framework provides a natural for-
malization of this behavioral pattern. Speciﬁ-
cally, let  denote the time for which a child has
been waiting, let W() denote the willpower
remaining at time , and make the natural as-
sumption that have dW/d  0—because wait-
ing takes willpower and thus willpower declines
over time. Letting x denote the deliberative op-
timum (waiting) and x’ denote the affective
optimum (getting the snack now), the person
will wait only if U(x) – U(x’)  h(W(), )
[M(x’, a) – M(x, a)]. As time passes ( in-
creases) and willpower depletes (W() de-
clines), this condition becomes less and less
likely to hold.
Our framework can similarly explain why
decision makers are more likely to succumb
to temptation when they are repeatedly con-
fronted with tempting choices. Not only are
temptation and willpower likely to ﬂuctuate
over time, allowing for more opportunities for
temptation to overcome willpower, but also
because resisting temptation depletes will-
power, and doing so repeatedly depletes it
proportionately.
Giordano et al. (2002) provide additional
evidence in support of I-2. They measured the
time discounting of heroin addicts for both
money and heroin, both when the addicts
were satiated (after they had received treat-
ment with an opioid agonist) and when they
were deprived (before receiving treatment).
They observed greater time discounting for
heroin than for money, and greater discount-
ing of both types of reward when the addicts
were opioid-deprived than when they were
satiated. Johnson et al. (2007) similarly found
that smokers discount cigarettes more than
they discount money or health, and Rosati et
al. (2007) found that individuals are more
impatient for food relative to money. These
results are consistent with our framework as
long as heroin, food and cigarettes have
higher affective intensity than money (and
have even higher affective intensity when de-
cision makers are in a state of craving or
hunger).
Finally, I-2 predicts that people who have
particularly strong affective reactions to stim-
uli will exhibit more myopic behavior. In fact,
direct support for this prediction comes from
research by Hariri et al. (2006), who found
that people who exhibited larger affective re-
actions to random monetary gains and losses
in one experimental session (as measured by
neural activation in the ventral striatum) also
showed increased myopia when trading off
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immediate versus future monetary payoffs in
a different experimental session.
Risky Decision Making
A second natural application of our model is
to choices between risky prospects. To apply
our two-system approach to risky decision mak-
ing, we must make assumptions about how the
two systems respond to risks. For the delibera-
tive system, a natural assumption is that risks
are evaluated according to their expected utility
(or perhaps expected value). Indeed, most re-
searchers, as well as knowledgeable lay people,
agree that expected-utility theory is the appro-
priate prescriptive theory to use for evaluating
risks (for a discussion, see Bleichrodt et al.,
2001). It is less obvious what drives the affec-
tive system, but we suggest that insensitivity to
probabilities and loss aversion—two prominent
features in many descriptive theories of risk
preferences (Starmer, 2000)—derive from the
affective system.
Suppose that each option x in the choice set X
is a lottery x  x1, p1; . . . ; xN, pN, where out-
come xi occurs with probability pi. We assume
that the deliberative system’s utility function is
U(x)  piuxi. In some subsequent analyses,
we assume that u(xi)  xi (i.e., the deliberative
system cares about expected value) whenever
choosing between monetary gambles. This does
not affect any of our results; it only makes it
easier to illustrate the effects of incorporating
the affective system into a model of risky
choice.
The affective system, in contrast, has moti-
vational function M(x, a)  wpi vxi, a,
where w(pi) is a nonlinear probability-weighting
function, and v(xi, a) is a value function that
incorporates loss aversion. For simplicity, we
assume the value function is vxi ,a  auxi if
xi is a gain, and vxi, a  a uxi if xi is a loss,
where the variable   1 reﬂects the degree of
loss aversion. For the probability-weighting
function, many of our results don’t require a
speciﬁc assumption, and thus we often use a
generic w(p). However, we believe that the key
feature is that the affective system is less sen-
sitive to probabilities than the deliberative sys-
tem, that is, dw/dp  1 for p  0, 1. In our
analysis, we sometimes use the speciﬁc exam-
ple of w(p)  c  bp for all p  0, 1, w(0) 
0, and w(1)  1, where c  0 and c  1  b.6
Incorporating these functions into Equation
1, the person will choose the option x that
maximizes
V(x) piu(xi) h(W,) * w(pi)v(xi, a).
(3)
The assumptions underlying Equation 3
come from diverse lines of research from a
range of disciplines and resemble some of the
assumptions made in Mukherjee (2010). There
is strong physiological evidence that supports
our contention that the affective system exhibits
insensitivity to variation in probabilities. Stud-
ies that measure fear by means of physiological
responses such as changes in heart rate and skin
conductance—which primarily reﬂect activity
in the affective system—ﬁnd that reactions to an
uncertain impending shock depend on the ex-
pected intensity of the shock but not the likeli-
hood of receiving it (except if it is zero; Bankart
& Elliott, 1974; Deane, 1969; Elliott, 1975;
Monat et al., 1972; Snortum & Wilding, 1971).
Other evidence supports the idea that emotional
responses result largely from mental images of
outcomes (Damasio, 1994). Because such im-
ages are largely invariant with respect to prob-
ability—one’s mental image of winning a lot-
tery, for example, depends a lot on how much
one wins but not that much on one’s chance of
winning—emotional responses tend to be in-
sensitive to probabilities.
There is also evidence that supports our con-
tention that loss aversion derives from the af-
fective system. For instance, Chen et al. (2006)
introduced a currency into a colony of capuchin
monkeys, presented the monkeys with gambles,
and found that the monkeys displayed loss aver-
sion. To the extent that animal behavior is in-
dicative of the output of the human affective
system, this result suggests that loss aversion,
and the behaviors that it generates, derives from
the affective system. Of course, there are many
other differences between human and animal
risk taking that are attributable to factors other
6 Note that our assumption dw/dp  1 for all p  0, 1
will require a discontinuity at p  0 and at p  1, much as
was suggested in the original version of prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
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1 2
than affective strength. For example, Weber et
al. (2004) found that some differences between
human and animal behavior in the domain of
risk disappear when differences in reward learn-
ing are controlled for.
There is also neuroscientiﬁc evidence. Tom
et al. (2007) collected fMRI data while subjects
decided whether to accept or reject gambles that
involved a chance to win or lose various
amounts of money. The gambles differed in the
magnitudes of the gains and losses, and the
researchers found that affective regions, such as
the striatum and medial orbitofrontal cortex,
react to these changes. Moreover, these regions
display a neural loss aversion: The increase in
activity when the gain amount increases is
smaller than the decrease in activity when the
loss amount increases. Similar results have also
been documented by Weber et al. (2007), who
found that the amygdala is differentially active
when decision makers are parting with goods.
In addition, Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, and
Phelps (2013) found that the reappraisal of
choices involving loss aversion generates in-
creased activity in the dorsolateral and ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex and reduced activity in
the amygdala. Regulating loss aversion, accord-
ing to this research, involves the suppression of
emotion by the deliberative system.
The relationship of affect with loss aversion
has also been shown to be responsible for non-
risky reference dependence anomalies, such as
the endowment effect. Particularly, Knutson et
al. (2008) found that activity in limbic system
regions, such as the nucleus accumbens, which
play an important role in loss averse behavior,
also predict individual susceptibility to the en-
dowment effect. Individuals who showed in-
creased affective sensitivity to losses were also
most likely to display discrepancies between
acceptable buy and acceptable sell prices.
Another piece of neuroscientiﬁc evidence for
the role of affect in loss aversion comes from a
study by Shiv et al. (2003), who compared healthy
people; patients with brain lesions in regions re-
lated to emotional processing, such as the
amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex (they were
normal on most cognitive tests, including tests of
intelligence); and patients with lesions in regions
unrelated to emotion. Patients with emotion-
related lesions were more likely to select risky
gambles (involving losses) than other subjects—
that is, they exhibited less loss aversion—and ul-
timately earned more money, suggestive of the
idea that the emotional processing regions that
were damaged play a role in loss aversion. More-
over, whereas normal people and patients with
lesions unrelated to emotion were inﬂuenced by
their outcomes in previous rounds, patients with
emotion-related lesions were not. These results
have also been documented by De Martino, Ku-
maran, Seymour, and Dolan (2010). De Martino
and coauthors estimated loss aversion coefﬁcients
for two individuals with amygdala damage. Using
a series of gambles with gains and losses ranging
from $20 to $50, they found that estimated loss
aversion coefﬁcients for the two patients were
very close to one, indicating an absence of loss
aversion.
Predictions
The general model presented earlier will
yield predictions that reﬂect three rough intu-
itions. First, because insensitivity to probabili-
ties and loss aversion derive from the affective
system, willpower depletion or unrelated cogni-
tive demands, such as cognitive load, will mag-
nify these behavioral tendencies. Second, if a
person faces a choice between lotteries for
which all outcomes involve the same type of
good and thus the same affective intensity, then
an increase in that affective intensity will also
magnify insensitivity to probabilities and loss
aversion. Finally, if a person faces a choice
between lotteries that involve different goods
and thus different affective intensities, then the
effects of affective intensity are good-speciﬁc.
To translate these rough intuitions into speciﬁc
predictions, we apply our model, as speciﬁed in
Equation 3, to speciﬁc risky choices.
Monetary Certainty Equivalent for
Monetary Gambles
Suppose a person faces a simple gamble ($Z,
p; $0,1–p) with Z  0, and we elicit the per-
son’s monetary certainty equivalent—that is,
the certain amount $CE such that the person is
indifferent between the gamble and that certain
amount. Tests for nonlinear probability weight-
ing often focus on these types of choices, and in
particular on how overweighting of small prob-
abilities should lead to CE  pZ, whereas un-
derweighting of large probabilities should lead
to CE  pZ.
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1 3
This type of choice has two simplifying fea-
tures. First, because all outcomes involve a
monetary payoff, the same affective intensity
for money, which we denote by aM, is applied to
all outcomes. Second, because Z  0 and there-
fore CE  0, and because we assume for mon-
etary outcomes that u(x) x, we can ignore loss
aversion, and the value function merely be-
comes v(xi, a)  aMxi. Hence, according to our
model, the monetary certainty equivalent is de-
termined by CE  h(W, )[aMCE]  pZ 
h(W, )[w(p)aMZ], which yields that CE 
w˜(p)Z where
w˜(p)
0 if p 0
p h(W,) aM w(p)
1 h(W,) aM
if p (0, 1)
1 if p 1
Much as in expected utility and prospect the-
ory, the certainty equivalent is derived from
multiplying the magnitude of the outcome by a
weight that is a function of the probability of
that outcome. However, the probability weight-
ing function for each of the three models is
different. Under expected utility with linear util-
ity for money, CE  pZ (i.e., linear weighting
of probabilities), and under prospect theory with
a linear value function in the gain domain,
CE  w˜(p)Z, where w˜(p) is prospect theory’s
probability-weighting function. Figure 1 pres-
ents an example of an effective weighting func-
tion implied by our model when the affective
system’s weighting function w(p) is assumed to
be linear with a positive intercept and a slope
less than 1 (reﬂecting an insensitivity to proba-
bility changes). In particular, it depicts (a) the
weight used by the deliberative system (p), (b)
the weight used by the affective system, w(p),
and (c) the effective weight used for decisions,
w˜(p). Notice that our model is closer in spirit to
Kahneman and Tversky’s original formulation
in being ill deﬁned at the extremes (in fact,
Barseghyan et al., 2013 estimates probability
weighting from data on insurance deductible
choices and seems to ﬁnd support for Kahne-
man and Tversky’s original formulation).
Like prospect theory, if affective motivations
generate an overweighting of small probabili-
ties and underweighting of large probabilities,
as reﬂected in w(p), then our model predicts
CE  pZ for p   and CE  pZ for p  .
However, unlike expected utility and prospect
theory, which assume ﬁxed probability weight-
ing functions, our model generates novel test-
able predictions for factors that should alter
probability weighting and hence the certainty
equivalent:
Risky Choice Prediction #1 (R-1): When generating a
certainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, an
increase in h(W, ) will increase CE when CE  pZ
and decrease CE when CE  pZ.
Risky Choice Prediction #2 (R-2): When generating a
certainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, an
increase in the intensity of affective motivation for
Figure 1. Effective probability weighting function w˜(p) predicted by our model for certainty
equivalents for monetary gambles when the affective system has probability weighting
function w(p)  w0  (w1  w0)  p with w0  0 and w1  1.
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1 4
money will increase CE when CE  pZ and decrease
CE when CE  pZ.
Intuitively, because deliberation argues for
CE  pZ, if CE  pZ then the affective system
is dragging CE upward, and therefore when
willpower depletion, cognitive load, or affective
intensity for money give more sway to affect, it
will drag CE further upward. Analogously, if
CE  pZ, then the affective system is dragging
CE downward, and therefore when willpower
depletion, cognitive load, or affective intensity
give more sway to affect, it will drag CE further
downward. Hence, our model generates sharp
predictions for these simple decisions; unfortu-
nately, we know of no existing evidence on
such effects.
Monetary Certainty Equivalent for Simple
Nonmonetary Gambles
Suppose a person faces a simple gamble (x,
p;0, 1  p), where x is a nonmonetary good
such as a plate of cookies, and again we elicit
the person’s monetary certainty equivalent for
this gamble. Because this choice involves two
distinct goods—for example, money versus
cookies—we must distinguish between affec-
tive intensity for money, aM, and affective in-
tensity for x, which we denote by ax. According
to our model, the monetary certainty equivalent
is determined by CE  h(W, )[aMCE] 
pu(x)  h(W, )[w(p)axu(x)], which yields that
CE  w˜(p)u(x) where
w˜(p)
0 if p 0
p h(W,) aX w(p)
1 h(W,) aM
if p (0, 1)
1 if p 1
Figure 2 depicts the effective weighting
function w˜(p) here using the same affective
system’s weighting function w(p) from Figure
1. While the effective weighting function here
has the same qualitative shape as that in Fig-
ure 1, there is one important difference:
whereas in Figure 1, w˜(p)  p for p close
enough to one, in Figure 2, it is possible to
have w˜(p)  p for all p  1. Intuitively, there
are two forces at work. First, just as for the
certainty equivalent for simple monetary
gambles, the affective system overweighs
small probabilities, which tends to drag the
CE upward, and the affective system under-
weights large probabilities, which tends to
drag the CE downward. Second, and unique
for this case, affective intensity for the non-
monetary good might be larger than affective
intensity for money, which tends to drag the
CE upward. For low probabilities, these two
effects reinforce each other, and thus affect
drags the CE upward. For high probabilities,
in contrast, the two forces oppose each other.
If the former dominates, affect drags the CE
downward (panel A of Figure 2); if the latter
dominates, affect drags the CE upward (panel
B of Figure 2). Because the impact of will-
power depletion and unrelated cognitive de-
mands, such as cognitive load, depend on
whether affect is dragging the CE upward or
downward, our model yields somewhat dif-
ferent predictions for the certainty equivalent
for simple nonmonetary gambles than for
simple monetary gambles (we are not aware
of any existing evidence on these predic-
tions):
Risky Choice Prediction #3 (R-3): When generating a
certainty equivalent for simple nonmonetary gambles, an
increase in h(W, ) will increase CE when p is small, but
when p is large, the effect is ambiguous.
Because the choice is between money versus
a nonmonetary good, the implications of affec-
tive intensity are good-speciﬁc. In particular, an
increase in the affective intensity for x will
increase the affective system’s motivation for x
without changing its motivation for money, and
thus increase the certainty equivalent. Analo-
gously, an increase in the affective intensity for
money will increase the affective system’s mo-
tivation for money without changing its moti-
vation for x, and thus decrease the certainty
equivalent.
Risky Choice Prediction #4 (R-4): When generating a
certainty equivalent for simple monetary gambles, any
factor that increases the intensity of the affective mo-
tivation for the non-monetary good will increase CE,
whereas any factor that increases the intensity of the
affective motivation for money will decrease CE.
The excessive reaction to affectively charged
but unlikely outcomes that is predicted by our
model can be seen in numerous domains of
behavior, from gold rushes to market manias to
the mating behavior of young adults. Less an-
ecdotally, Ditto et al. (2006) offered partici-
pants choices between gambles for the chance
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1 5
to win chocolate chip cookies and various ﬁxed
outside options. Half of the participants were
only told about the cookies, whereas for the
other half the cookies were freshly baked in the
lab and placed in front of participants as they
made their decision. Just as our model (R-4)
predicts that increased affective intensity for
cookies will increase the monetary certainty
equivalent, it also predicts that increased affec-
tive intensity for cookies will make people more
likely to accept the gamble over an outside
option. This is exactly what is found by Ditto et
al. (2006, though their results hold only for the
high risk gambles).
Another study (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)
compared certainty equivalents for simple gam-
bles that involve affect-rich outcomes (such as
vacations and electric shocks) with certainty
equivalents for simple gambles that involve af-
fect-poor outcomes (such as money). In each
case, they found that the certainty equivalent for
the affect-rich outcome was larger than the cer-
tainty equivalent for the affect-poor outcome
when the probability was very low (1%), but
this result was reversed when the probability
was very high (99%). From these results, they
concluded that probability-weighting for affect-
rich outcomes is more S-shaped than probabil-
ity-weighting for affect-poor outcomes. In our
model, affective intensity for the nonmonetary
good does not directly translate into an effect on
the probability-weighting function. Even so,
these results are consistent with our model. In
particular, according to our model, the increase
Figure 2. Effective probability weighting function w˜(p) predicted by our model for certainty
equivalents for nonmonetary gambles when the affective system has probability weighting
function w(p)  w0  (w1–w0)p with w0  0 and w1  1.
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1 6
in probability from 1% to 99% will have a
bigger effect on the affect-poor outcomes than
on affect-rich outcomes as long as the deliber-
ative system, which is the system inﬂuenced by
the probability change, has a stronger reaction
to the affect-poor outcome. For the case of
gains, this means the deliberative system must
prefer the affect-poor outcome (i.e., the utility
of the affect-poor outcome is more positive),
and in the case of losses, it means the deliber-
ative system must prefer the affect-rich outcome
(i.e., the utility of the affect-poor outcome is
more negative). For the gambles studied by
Rottenstreich and Hsee, both seem plausible.
Risk Preferences for Mixed (Gain-Loss)
Gambles
Suppose a person must choose whether to
accept a gamble ($G,1/2; –$L,1/2) with G,L0.
Unlike the previous decision, such gambles in-
volve both gains and losses, and thus loss aver-
sion becomes relevant. According to our model,
the person will accept when 12G  12
 L  hW, aMG   aML  0,
where   w(1/2) here. This generates the
following predictions:
Risky Choice Prediction #5 (R-5): When facing 50–50
gain-loss gambles with L  G  L, an increase in
h(W, ) will make it more likely that the person rejects
the gamble.
Risky Choice Prediction #6 (R-6): When facing 50–50
gain-loss gambles with L  G  L, any factor that
increases the affective intensity for money will make it
more likely that the person rejects the gamble.
If G  L then both systems prefer to reject,
and if G  L then both systems prefer to
accept, and so in either case willpower deple-
tion, cognitive load, and affective intensity are
irrelevant. The interesting case occurs when
L  G  L—when the gamble has a small but
positive expected value—in which case the de-
liberative system prefers to accept while the
affective system prefers to reject. In such cases,
willpower depletion, cognitive load, or affective
intensity all increase the inﬂuence of loss aver-
sion and make it more likely that the person will
reject the gamble. For simplicity, we have re-
stricted the previous example to the settings
where both the gain and the loss outcomes are
equally likely. However, these insights hold for
more general gambles as well (in which the
effect of willpower depletion, cognitive load, or
affective intensity will depend on gain and loss
probabilities, in addition to gain and loss mag-
nitudes).
Although we are not aware of any evidence
of the impact of willpower depletion on risk-
taking behavior, Benjamin et al. (2013) provide
some indirect evidence on the effects of unre-
lated cognitive demands, such as cognitive load.
In addition to asking the time preference ques-
tions described previously, they also asked their
subjects to make a series of risky choices. Rel-
ative to control subjects, subjects who answer
these questions while under cognitive load
showed substantial reductions in risk taking be-
havior. Similar results have also been docu-
mented by Whitney et al. (2008) who found that
the probability of choosing a risky gamble over
a safe gamble reduced under cognitive load. To
the extent that small-stakes risk aversion derives
from loss aversion (Rabin, 2000; Rabin &
Thaler, 2001), these results are consistent with
the prediction that increasing cognitive load
will lead to increased loss aversion (Prediction
R-5).7
The Endowment Effect
Even though it is not an example of risky
decision making, the endowment effect—the
tendency to value an object more highly when
one owns it—is commonly attributed to loss
aversion (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1991),
and thus our model has implications for the
endowment effect. Suppose, as in many ex-
perimental demonstrations of the endowment
effect, that we elicit two reservation values:
(a) The selling price PS is the price such that,
if the person is initially endowed with an
object, she will be indifferent between keep-
ing the object and receiving $PS. (b) The
choice price PC is the price such that, if the
person is initially not endowed with an object,
she will be indifferent between gaining the
object and receiving $PC. The typical ﬁnding in
experiments is that, even though the choices are
7 Rabin and Thaler note that the preference for small-
scale safe outcomes over small-scale risky outcomes ob-
served in many laboratory experiments is inconsistent with
the type of risky behavior observed for larger real-world
stakes. Loss-aversion is a mechanism that can resolve this
inconsistency.
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1 7
the same—leaving the experiment with an object
or with some money—the selling price is signif-
icantly larger than the choice price. To formal-
ize this situation within our model, we assume,
as done previously, that the deliberative system
values money P as P and values the object x as
u(x). The deliberative system is not inﬂuenced
by one’s endowment. The affective system, in
contrast, is sensitive to one’s endowment. Spe-
ciﬁcally, when endowed, the affective system
views the choice as [gain PS, lose u(x)] versus
[no changes]; and when not endowed, the af-
fective system views the same choice as [gain
PC] versus [gain u(x)]. Hence, the selling price
PS and the choice price PC are determined by
PS  h(W, )[aMPS – axu(x)]  u(x)  h(W,
)[0] and PC  h(W, )[aMPC]  u(x)  h(W,
)[axu(x)], which generates PS/PC  1  h
W,  ax ⁄ 1  hW,  ax. Given   1, not
surprisingly our model yields an endowment
effect (PS/PC  1). More important, our model
makes several predictions with regard to the
endowment effect.
Endowment Effect Prediction #7 (R-7): Any increase
in h(W, ) will increase the magnitude of the endow-
ment effect (increase PS/PC).
Endowment Effect Prediction #8 (R-8): Any factor
that increases the intensity of the affective motiva-
tion for the object will increase the magnitude of the
endowment effect (increase PS/PC).
Because the endowment effect is driven by
the affective system, willpower depletion or
unrelated cognitive demands, such as cogni-
tive load, will magnify the endowment effect.
Moreover, because affective intensity for the
object will magnify the impact of the affec-
tive system, it will also magnify the endow-
ment effect. We know of no evidence for R-7.
But there is support for the role of affective
intensity for the object, Prediction R-8. Con-
siderable research suggests that the endow-
ment effect is more pronounced for outcomes
such as changes in health status (see, for
instance, Thaler, 1980). In one meta-analysis,
Horowitz and McConnell (2002) found that,
whereas the mean ratio of willingness to ac-
cept relative to willingness to pay for ordinary
private goods was 2.9, this ratio was 10.1 for
goods involving health and safety. While
health outcomes differ from other outcomes
in many ways, they are frequently associated
with strong emotional reactions, and are thus
more vulnerable to the effect of loss aversion
and related features of the affective system.
Discussion
Taking account of the interplay between affect
and deliberation helps to make sense of several
important behavioral effects in the literature on
decision making under risk, and it also leads to
novel predictions about speciﬁc behaviors. Be-
yond the phenomena and predictions just outlined,
the same framework could potentially shed light
on and generate novel predictions concerning a
variety of risk-related phenomena. For instance,
the model can be used to understand the effects of
temporal proximity on risk-taking. There is a great
deal of evidence that temporal proximity is an
important determinant of fear responses. As the
prospect of an uncertain aversive event ap-
proaches in time, fear tends to increase even when
cognitive assessments of the probability or likely
severity of the event remain constant (Loewen-
stein, 1987; Roth et al., 1996). Similarly, after the
moment of peak risk recedes into the past (e.g.,
after a near-accident), fear lingers for some period,
but dissipates over time. Evidence that temporal
proximity can inﬂuence risk behaviors comes
from studies wherein people initially agree to do
various embarrassing activities in exchange for
payment, but then closer to the time when the
activity has to be performed, change their minds
(Van Boven et al., 2005). Moreover, consistent
with changes in the affective state of fear being the
cause, subjects who were shown a ﬁlm clip de-
signed to induce fear (from Kubrick’s “The Shin-
ing”) right before they made their initial decision
were much less likely to choose to perform, and
hence less likely to change their minds when the
so-called “moment of truth” arrived.
Social Preferences
Humans experience a wide range of social
emotions, from powerful empathic responses,
such as sympathy and sadness, to more negative
emotions, such as anger and envy. To give a
ﬂavor for how our two-system perspective can
be applied to social preferences, in this section
we apply our model to one speciﬁc social mo-
tive—altruism—and its associated affect—
sympathy. The perspective we suggest is that
the deliberative system has a stable concern for
others driven by moral and ethical principles for
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1 8
how one ought to behave. The affective system,
in contrast, is driven toward anything between
pure self-interest and extreme altruism depend-
ing on the degree of sympathy that is triggered.8
Suppose that each option x in the choice set X
is a pair of payoffs x  (xS, xO), where xS is a
payoff for oneself and xO is a payoff for another
person. The deliberative system puts some sta-
ble weight  on the other person’s payoff, and
so its utility function is U(x)  xS  xO. The
affective system, in contrast, puts a variable
weight on the other person’s payoff that de-
pends on the degree of sympathy that the person
currently feels toward the other. Because the
degree of sympathy is naturally interpreted as
the intensity of affect, the affective system’s
motivational function is M(x, a)  xS  axO.
Incorporating these functions into Equation
1, the person will choose the option x that
maximizes
V(x) [xsxo] h(W,)[xs axo]. (4)
One motivation for the assumptions in this
section comes from studies of other-regarding
behavior in animals, which, again, we take as
evidence for what drives the affective system.
Animals, including monkeys and rats, can be
powerfully moved by the plight of others (for an
overview, see Preston & de Waal, 2002). At the
same time, other-regarding behavior is not al-
ways observed in animals. Masserman, Wech-
kin, and Terris (1964), for instance, found that
prosocial behavior in primates (aiding another
animal that was being subjected to electric
shocks) was more likely in animals that had
experienced shock themselves, was enhanced
by familiarity with the shocked individual, and
was nonexistent when it was a different species
of animal. Perhaps stretching the terminology
used in this article we can interpret these ﬁnd-
ings as a decrease in proximity leading to re-
duced concern for others.
Research by Joshua Greene and colleagues
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004) provides neural evi-
dence on our perspective. They compared how
people react to “personal” moral judgments,
which involve doing personal harm to another—
for example, pushing a person in front of a
trolley to stop it from hitting ﬁve other people—
with how they react to “impersonal” moral
judgments—for example, ﬂicking a switch so
that the trolley turns to another track and only
hits one person instead of ﬁve. They proposed
that such judgments are made using a combina-
tion of cognitive processes that argue for utili-
tarian judgments and emotional processes that
deter one from doing direct harm to others.
Consistent with this view, they found that af-
fective regions of the brain, such as areas of the
temporal sulcus and posterior cingulate, are ac-
tivated more for personal moral judgments than
for impersonal moral judgments, whereas delib-
erative areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, are activated more in the opposite set-
ting (and it has long been known that people are
less likely to make the utilitarian judgment for
the personal moral dilemma).9 In the same vein,
more recent research has shown that patients
with brain damage to affective regions, such as
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, are more
likely to make utilitarian, impersonal moral
judgments, even in highly personal settings
(Koenigs et al., 2007).
Predictions
Maximizing Equation 4 is equivalent to max-
imizing V˜(x)  xS  ˜axO, where ˜a 
  hW, a ⁄ 1  hW, . Hence, the per-
son’s choice will reﬂect an effective concern for
others that is a weighted average of the delib-
erative concern  and the affective concern a.
Moreover, the affective system can push behav-
ior toward more or less concern for others rel-
ative to the deliberative optimum. In situations
where there is very little sympathy triggered in
the affective system, the affective system will
push behavior closer to pure self-interest—as
reﬂected by a   implying ˜a  . In
contrast, in situations where there are very high
levels of sympathy triggered in the affective
system, the affective system will push behavior
toward more altruism—as reﬂected by a  
implying ˜a  .
8 Note that in general, sympathy and altruism are not
identical: Altruism may stem from sympathy, if behavior is
controlled by the affective system, or it may stem from
moral principles, if behavior is controlled by the delibera-
tive system.
9 Though note that Greene et al. (2004) suggest that the
relationship between cognition and emotion may not be this
simple; that is, certain limbic areas, such as the anterior
cingulate cortex, may also be involved in detecting conﬂict
between emotion and cognition, and in recruiting prefrontal
cortex control of emotional regions to resolve this conﬂict.
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To generate testable predictions, we apply the
general predictions of our model.
Social Choice Prediction #1 (S-1): An increase in h(W,
) will increase ˜a when affective intensity is high
(a  ) and decrease˜a when affective intensity is
low (a  ).
Social Choice Prediction #2 (S-2): Any factor that
increases the intensity of the affective motivation will
increase ˜a.
S-1 reﬂects that the effects of willpower de-
pletion or unrelated cognitive demands, such as
cognitive load, depend on the degree of sympa-
thy experienced. Speciﬁcally, when a person
experiences little or no sympathy our model
predicts that willpower depletion or cognitive
load should reduce the likelihood of an altruistic
act. In contrast, when a person experiences high
sympathy our model predicts that willpower
depletion or cognitive load should increase the
likelihood of an altruistic act.
Gailliot et al. (2007) provide support for the
effects of willpower depletion when sympathy
is low. Speciﬁcally, in a task involving hypo-
thetical questions about charitable giving and
helping behavior toward strangers—both argu-
ably low-sympathy situations—they found that
subjects with higher willpower depletion were
indeed less altruistic. There is also evidence on
the effects of affective intensity (S-2). Perhaps
the most direct evidence comes from a study by
Batson et al. (1995) on empathy-induced altru-
ism. They manipulated subjects’ empathy to-
ward a target individual by having them read a
short description of that individual’s need while
taking an objective perspective (low empathy)
or while trying to imagine how that individual
feels (high empathy). They then gave subjects
the opportunity to help the target despite the fact
that doing so would violate some moral princi-
ple of justice such as random allocations or
allocation based on need. Consistent with S-2,
they found that subjects in the high-empathy
treatment were much more likely to help the
target individual.
S-2 also helps to explain why people treat
statistical deaths differently than identiﬁable
ones, since foreknowledge of who will die (or
which group deaths will come from) creates a
more vivid—and evocative—image of the con-
sequences (see Schelling, 1968; Bohnet & Frey,
1999; Slovic, 2007, Small & Loewenstein,
2003, for an experimental demonstration).
A recent study by Small et al. (2007) pro-
vides further support for our perspective on the
role of identiﬁability. Small et al. provided sub-
jects with the opportunity to donate to a charity,
and manipulated whether subjects were shown
an identiﬁable victim (a picture and a descrip-
tion of a little girl) or a statistical victim (factual
information about the overall problem). They
also manipulated the extent to which people
were primed to think more deliberatively. They
found that deliberative thought decreased dona-
tions to the identiﬁable victim, but did not affect
donations to the statistical victim. Under the
plausible assumption that the affective system
plays a major role in donations to the identiﬁ-
able victim and but not in donations to the
statistical victim, these results are what our
model (Prediction S-2) predicts.
While we have focused our analysis solely on
the simple social motive of altruism, researchers
have discussed other social motives as well. For
instance, there is a large literature that focuses
on people’s concerns for relative payoffs
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Messick & Sen-
tis, 1985). In principle, our model could be
applied to these concerns as well; however,
because both concerns would seem to have both
a deliberative and an affective component, it is
not entirely obvious what to assume about the
motives of the two systems. Similarly, another
area our approach could be applied to is game
theoretic decision making. Groups of decision
makers are frequently able to avoid rational, but
inefﬁcient, outcomes, such as defection in pris-
oner’s dilemma type games. While there are
many reasons why decision makers cooperate in
this manner, affective impulses, that are espe-
cially pronounced with close others, may play
an important role in explaining this behavior.
Discussion
There is a great deal of evidence that people’s
decisions are inﬂuenced by both affective and
deliberative processes. Whereas standard con-
sequentialist models focus, for the most part, on
deliberative processes, our main contribution in
this article has been to develop a formal model
to incorporate affective processes. In particular,
we have modeled the impact of affective pro-
cesses using a motivation function that is myo-
pic, that displays loss aversion and is insensitive
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to probabilities, and that is inﬂuenced by sym-
pathy and empathy concerns. The impact of this
motivation function on behavior is increasing in
the affective intensity of the stimuli in consid-
eration, increasing in unrelated cognitive de-
mands, such as cognitive load, and decreasing
in the willpower possessed by the decision
maker. We have shown that our model can
explain a range of psychological, behavioral
and neuroscientiﬁc results regarding intertem-
poral, risky and interpersonal decision making,
and generates some new predictions that have
not yet been tested.
Ours is not the ﬁrst dual-process model of
decision making. Metcalfe and Mischel’s
(1999) hot/cool model and Fazio and Towles-
Schwen’s (1999) MODE model, for example,
propose that behavior is the product of two
systems: one emotional and the other cognitive.
Metcalfe and Mischel use their model to under-
stand the effect of willpower, and Fazio and
Towles-Schwen apply their model to attitude
formation and other aspects of social judgment.
Our model differs from these two important and
inﬂuential approaches in its focus on preferen-
tial choice and its ability to make quantitative
predictions in this domain.
These properties make our model similar to
formal dual-process theories of intertemporal
choice in economics (Benhabib & Bisin, 2005;
Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg &
Levine, 2006; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler &
Shefrin, 1981). Indeed some of our assump-
tions—such as those of affective myopia—
resemble those made by these approaches, and
many of the insights presented by these ap-
proaches hold for our model as well. What is
unique about our model is its ability to make
predictions across a number of different do-
mains, including both intertemporal and risky
choice, as well as social choice. These predic-
tions rely on a small set of fundamental princi-
ples—such as the sensitivity of emotion to prox-
imity and vividness, the consequentialist nature
of deliberation, and the role of willpower in
resolving the conﬂict between these two sys-
tems—principles that are ﬁrmly grounded in
psychology and neuroscience. Our model can
thus be seen as generalizing these existing ap-
proaches, and subsequently extending the de-
scriptive and conceptual scope of dual process
theory for preferential choice.
Our model also resembles a prior dual-
process theory in psychology. Particularly
Mukherjee (2010) builds upon an early version
of our model (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue,
2004) to study risk preferences in detail. As in
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2004), Mukher-
jee assumes a deliberative and an affective sys-
tem interact to determine behavior, where each
has its own objective function, and behavior is
determined by a weighted sum of the two ob-
jective functions. Also as in Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue (2004), for the domain of risk
preferences, Mukherjee assumes that the delib-
erative system focuses on expected value
whereas the affective system is inﬂuenced by
loss aversion and a complete insensitivity to
probabilities (Mukherjee further assumes that
the affective system is also inﬂuenced by dimin-
ishing sensitivity). Mukherjee then investigates
the implications of this model for a number of
well-known decision problems that have
emerged in the prospect theory literature: vio-
lations of stochastic dominance, the nature of
risk attitudes, ambiguity aversion, the common
consequence effect, the common ratio effect,
and the isolation effect. However, Mukherjee’s
analysis does not focus on the impact of will-
power, cognitive load, or affective intensity,
which is a primary focus of our article. Moreover,
when we apply our model to risk preferences, we
focus on implications for a completely different
set of risk contexts—speciﬁcally, for four fre-
quently studied experimental paradigms: eliciting
monetary certainty equivalents for monetary gam-
bles, eliciting monetary certainty equivalents for
nonmonetary gambles, decisions whether to ac-
cept or reject mixed (gain-loss) gambles, and the
endowment effect.
There are a number of directions in which to
further expand upon our framework. Perhaps
the most important is to more fully explore the
dynamics of willpower. We have provided an
outline of how willpower can change during the
time course of the decision process, leading to
switches midway through choice; however,
there are even more nuanced willpower dynam-
ics. For instance, some, albeit preliminary, stud-
ies have found support for the idea that, in
addition to being depleted in the short-term by
exertion, willpower, like a muscle, may become
strengthened in the long-term through repeated
use (Muraven et al., 1999). More importantly,
people’s behavior might also reﬂect their at-
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tempts to manage their use of willpower. There
is in fact experimental evidence, in a version of
the Baumeister paradigm, that people do have
some awareness of the dynamic properties of
willpower and take these into account in a stra-
tegic fashion (Muraven, 1998).
A second direction in which to expand our
framework is to study people’s assessments of
their own behaviors. Because such assessments
are an inherently cognitive task, they will nat-
urally tend to exaggerate the role played by
deliberation. In effect, one could say that the
deliberative self egocentrically views itself as in
control and commensurately underestimates the
inﬂuence of affect (see Wegner & Wheatley,
1999). This failure to appreciate the role of
affect in behavior can have a negative impact on
efforts at self-control.
An implication of failing to appreciate the
role of affect is that people will exaggerate the
importance of willpower as a determinant of
self-control. People who are thin often believe
they are thin because of willpower, and that
those who are less fortunate exhibit a lack of
willpower. However, it is far more likely that
those who are thin are blessed (at least in times
of plentiful food) with a high metabolism or a
well-functioning ventromedial hypothalamus
(which regulates hunger and satiation). Indeed,
obese people who go to the extraordinary length
of stapling their stomach to lose weight often
report that they have a sudden experience of
“willpower” despite the obvious fact that sta-
pling one’s stomach affects hunger rather than
willpower (Gawande, 2001). It is easy and nat-
ural for those who lack drives and impulses for
drugs, food, and sex to condemn, and hence to
be excessively judgmental and punitive, toward
those who are subject to them—to assume that
these behaviors result from a generalized char-
acter deﬁcit, a deﬁciency in willpower. Simi-
larly, the rich, who are not confronted with the
constant task of reigning in their desires, are
likely to judge the short-sighted behaviors of the
poor too harshly. There is in fact recent evi-
dence that people who are in elevated affective
states tend to have a much more acute appreci-
ation of the power of drives and the limitations
of self-control than those who are affectively
neutral states (Nordgren et al., 2007).
A third direction in which to expand our
framework is to take it to speciﬁc domains in
order to develop more detailed model speciﬁ-
cations and quantitative predictions. Mathemat-
ical models have two types of goals: (a) devel-
oping precise qualitative predictions, and (b)
developing precise quantitative predictions. Our
analysis in this article has focused exclusively
on the former—for example, deriving precise
qualitative predictions for the directional impact
of cognitive load, willpower depletion, and af-
fective intensity on various behavioral out-
comes. As such, we have imposed relatively
little general structure on the deliberative utility
function U, the affective motivational function
M, and the cost function h for mobilizing will-
power. But if researchers take our framework to
speciﬁc domains, it will be natural to im-
pose— or better yet estimate—a more fully
speciﬁed model, and to use that model to gen-
erate more quantitative predictions. Such a
quantitative analysis would also help in com-
paring our model with the nested baseline ra-
tional model (which would involve only the
deliberative utility function, U).
After decades of domination by a cognitive
perspective, in recent decades affect has come
to the fore as a topic of great interest among
psychologists. In this article, we attempt to in-
tegrate many of the ﬁndings from research con-
ducted by psychologists and decision research-
ers interested in affect by proposing a formal
model of interactions between affect and delib-
eration that can both explain existing ﬁndings
and also generates testable but as yet untested
predictions. If further testing substantiates these
predictions, and hence the model, this could
constitute the ﬁrst step toward a formal theoret-
ical perspective that integrates two major sides
of human judgment and behavior.
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Recognition Without Awareness: Encoding and Retrieval Factors
Fergus I. M. Craik, Nathan S. Rose, and Nigel Gopie
Rotman Research Institute at Baycrest, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
The article reports 4 experiments that explore the notion of recognition without awareness using words
as the material. Previous work by Voss and associates has shown that complex visual patterns were
correctly selected as targets in a 2-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) recognition test although partici-
pants reported that they were guessing. The present experiments sought to extend this earlier work by
having participants study words in different ways and then attempt to recognize the words later in a series
of 4-alternative forced-choice (4-AFC) tests, some of which contained no target word. The data of interest
are cases in which a target was present and participants stated that they were guessing, yet chose the
correct item. This value was greater than p  .25 in all conditions of the 4 experiments, demonstrating
the phenomenon of recognition without awareness. Whereas Voss and colleagues attributed their findings
with kaleidoscope patterns to enhanced processing fluency of perceptual attributes, the main factor
associated with different levels of recognition without awareness in the present studies was a variable
criterion for the subjective state accompanying selection of the “guess” option, depending on the overall
difficulty of the recognition test. We conclude by discussing some implications of the results for the
distinction between implicit and explicit memory.
Keywords: recognition, awareness, criterion shifts, implicit memory, explicit memory
In real-life decision situations we are often faced with alterna-
tives that seem so equivalent that choice is extremely difficult.
Under such circumstances our final selection may feel like an
arbitrary choice, although in fact there may be implicit influences
acting outside conscious control that bias us toward selecting one
alternative over another. The observation that people can make
correct choices while believing that they are selecting randomly
has a long history in experimental psychology. Studies dating from
the 19th century have consistently found that participants can
make subtle perceptual discrimination judgments with above-
chance accuracy despite claims that they are simply guessing
(Adams, 1957; Voss & Paller, 2010). Voss and colleagues have
recently provided evidence for a similar effect in recognition
memory (Voss, Baym & Paller, 2008). Participants studied a series
of kaleidoscope images and then attempted to recognize the stud-
ied items among a set of perceptually similar pairs. The study
phase was performed under either full attention (FA) or divided
attention (DA) conditions, and the recognition test was either a
yes-no test (10 studied targets mixed with 10 similar foils) or a
2-AFC test (10 simultaneously presented target-foil pairs). In the
yes-no test, recognition accuracy was good following encoding
under FA conditions but very poor following DA at encoding, as
one might expect in an explicit memory situation. Surprisingly,
however, participants’ performance on the forced-choice test was
better following DA than FA at encoding. Further experiments
revealed that when participants were asked to rate their forced-
choice responses as being on the basis of some memory for the
studied item or as random guesses, recognition accuracy was
higher for responses judged to be guesses than for those thought to
be based on memory.
These experiments thus provide evidence for substantial levels
of recognition memory when participants believe they are simply
guessing—that is, for recognition without awareness. This result
was obtained only under very specific conditions, however—when
encoding was performed under DA conditions, when the test was
2-AFC, when responding was under a tight time deadline (c. 2 sec
from stimulus onset), and when the choice was between two
perceptually similar visual patterns. There was essentially no ev-
idence for the effect with a yes-no testing procedure or even with
a forced-choice procedure when participants were given unlimited
time to respond or when target stimuli were paired with a percep-
tually dissimilar foil (Voss et al., 2008, Experiments 3 & 4,
respectively). A subsequent study revealed a further limitation; the
effect was not obtained in the forced-choice procedure when
participants were encouraged to respond accurately and guess only
when absolutely necessary, although the original result reappeared
when participants were encouraged to guess (Voss & Paller, 2010).
Voss and colleagues refer to their finding as “implicit recogni-
tion” and suggest that the underlying processes are different both
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from those mediating explicit recollection and from those medi-
ating feelings of familiarity. They comment that “Familiarity-
based recognition is taken as an instance of explicit memory
because familiarity responses entail the awareness of memory
retrieval” (Voss et al., 2008, p. 458). In support of the claim that
implicit recognition has a different mechanism they cite a further
study (Voss & Paller, 2009) in which participants performed the
forced-choice test for kaleidoscope patterns, encoded under either
FA or DA conditions. Participants in this study assessed each
recognition choice as being associated with some explicit recol-
lection of the encoding phase (“remember”  R), with a more
general feeling of familiarity (they simply “knew” it had been
studied  K), or as a pure guess. Event-related potential (ERP)
recordings were also made during the recognition test. The results
confirmed earlier findings of higher levels of accuracy following
DA at encoding, and also of greater than chance accuracy levels
with “guess” responses, especially in the DA condition. Addition-
ally, the pattern of behavioral results in guess decisions was
distinct from the pattern observed with both R and K decisions,
suggesting that the mechanism associated with implicit recognition
is different from that associated with recognition with awareness.
The ERP results supported this claim. Recognition responses ac-
companied by feelings of recollection or familiarity were associ-
ated with positive shifts in the late positive complex (600–900 ms)
and in the P200 potential. In contrast, correct guess responses were
associated with frontal-occipital negative potentials occurring
200–400 ms after stimulus onset. The authors speculate that the
distinct mechanism underlying the phenomenon of recognition
without awareness may reflect a stimulus-specific enhancement of
perceptual fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), with this
subtle change in processing yielding enough information to sup-
port a correct recognition choice, although not enough to give rise
to any conscious feeling of remembering.
A major question arising from this work is whether the phe-
nomenon of recognition without awareness can be demonstrated
with material other than complex perceptual patterns and, if so,
whether it is associated with similar neural mechanisms. Is implicit
recognition found with verbal materials, for example? In one early
experiment, Peynirciog˘lu (1990) had participants study a list of
words, and then gave them a word-fragment completion test in
which some fragments were from the list and others were new.
Participants attempted to complete the fragments and also rated
each fragment with regard to whether it was based on a list
member or based on a new word. Considering only fragments that
were not completed, a higher mean rating was given to list than
lure words. Thus, apparently participants had some sense of fa-
miliarity for the fragments even in the absence of identification.
Subsequent work by Cleary and Greene (2004, 2005) showed that
when studied and unstudied words were presented too quickly to
identify in a perceptual identification test, participants could still
discriminate studied from unstudied items. The authors attributed
the effect to a greater sense of familiarity associated with the
briefly flashed studied words. The finding that recognition without
identification is associated with a specific ERP signal (Voss &
Paller, 2009) was confirmed and extended to verbal material in a
study using the method of Peynirciog˘lu (1990) and reported by
Ryals, Yadon, Nomi, and Cleary (2011). The two major findings
were, first, that for unidentified word fragments the proportion
attributed to the original list was greater for studied than unstudied
unidentified items; that is, recognition without identification
(RWI) was again obtained. Second, the ERP correlate of the RWI
effect was an N300 component of the evoked response, in agree-
ment with Voss and Paller (2009) but using verbal materials and a
yes-no recognition procedure. Ryals and colleagues concluded that
their results confirmed the existence of unconscious recognition
memory and that the RWI effect is indexed by the N300 ERP
signature.
A study by Starns, Hicks, Brown, and Martin (2008) also found
evidence for recognition without identification using verbal mate-
rial. Their basic paradigm was to have participants study a list of
words in which half of the words were printed in large font and
half in small font (Experiment 1), or were rated for either pleas-
antness or imageability (Experiments 2 & 3). Participants were
then given a recognition list composed of 50% studied words and
50% lures; additionally, half of the participants were informed that
only 25% were targets and the other half informed that 75% were
targets. Following this test, participants were re-presented with the
original list and asked to decide the “source”—that is, whether
each word had been in small or large font (or rated for pleasantness
or imageability). The major finding was that participants’ source
judgments were above chance for words they had failed to recog-
nize in the first test. Importantly, however, this effect was found
only in the condition in which participants were informed that only
25% of the test words were targets. The authors concluded that the
phenomenon of accurate source memory for unrecognized items is
a reality, but that it occurs only under conditions in which a
conservative response bias has been induced.
In summary, there is good evidence for the phenomenon of
recognition without awareness, although the evidence associated
with verbal materials is somewhat indirect in the sense that correct
decisions about list membership were made on the basis of word
fragments or the words themselves presented very briefly (Cleary
and colleagues). Similarly, in the experiments by Starns et al.
(2008) the evidence for recognition without identification comes
from above-chance attribution of source rather than of the words
themselves. One interesting question then is whether the phenom-
enon would extend to conditions in which participants correctly
select words presented in full view despite claiming that they are
simply guessing. This is the question addressed in the present
experiments.
We became interested in these findings when considering the
results of an earlier set of experiments reported by Gopie, Craik
and Hasher (2011). In that study, younger and older adult partic-
ipants first named the print color (red, green, blue, yellow) of a
series of words as rapidly as possible; they were informed that the
words themselves were irrelevant. This encoding phase was fol-
lowed by a word fragment completion test, containing fragments
of words from the “encoded” list as well as new word fragments.
The higher completion rate for repeated words than for new words
(priming effect) was greater for older adults (0.25) than for
younger adults (0.10), in line with the notion that older adults fail
to inhibit “irrelevant” information, which they can subsequently
use if that information becomes useful (Hasher, Zacks & May,
1999). Surprisingly, however, this pattern reversed in a second
experiment using the same color-naming initial phase, but with
explicit instructions to “use words from the initial list where
possible” in the fragment-completion test. Now younger adults had
a priming score of 0.24 and older adults’ score dropped to 0.08.
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The same Age  Implicit/Explicit interaction was replicated in a
further experiment.
What is the nature of the encoded verbal information in the
incidental color-naming situation? It is well established that im-
plicit verbal tests such as fragment completion are particularly
sensitive to perceptual information (e.g., Craik, Moscovitch &
McDowd, 1994; Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004), and the
successful priming shown by older adults suggests that they may
have encoded words in the color-naming phase in a perceptual
manner. When younger adults performed the color-naming task
under DA conditions, their subsequent fragment-completion per-
formance resembled that of older adults (implicit completion 
0.22, explicit completion  .03; Gopie et al., 2011, Experiment
3), again suggesting that the DA condition induced a somewhat
superficial encoding of the words. This DA condition obviously
resembles the DA conditions used by Voss and colleagues, and the
finding of successful fragment completion subsequent to this type
of encoding fits well with Voss and colleagues’ characterization of
their recognition without awareness as reflecting enhanced percep-
tual fluency. These initial findings prompted the question of whether
recognition without awareness would be observed if the color-naming
initial phase was followed by an explicit recognition test. Would
participants select a previously viewed word at greater than chance
levels while claiming that they were simply guessing? The follow-
ing experiments investigated this possibility.
A further purpose of the present series of studies was to obtain
more information about the types of representation associated with
implicit recognition, and the factors that affect the size of the
effect. The similarities and differences between effects obtained
with words and with kaleidoscope patterns should suggest com-
monalities and limitations among the various representations un-
derlying implicit recognition effects. The results may also point to
differences in the representations associated with implicit and
explicit memory for the studied items. Do such differences reflect
the involvement of different memory systems, for example (e.g.,
Tulving & Schacter, 1990), or simply differences in the types or
amounts of information the representations contain about the orig-
inal episode (e.g., Chechile, Sloboda & Chamberland, 2012)?
With regard to factors that might influence the size of the effect,
we were influenced by two findings from previous studies and one
conjecture of our own. First, we presented words in an initial
encoding phase under either full or divided attention conditions
(FA or DA). The reasons for this followed the stronger effects
observed by Voss and colleagues under DA conditions, also the
possibility from the studies by Gopie et al. (2011) that DA induces
a more superficial perceptual encoding. We speculated that recog-
nition without awareness for words might also be stronger follow-
ing such conditions. Second, the results of Starns et al. (2008)
provided strong evidence that the effect would be greater under
conditions of conservative responding in the test phase, so our
results were examined with this point in mind. Finally, in line with
the notions of encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) we
hypothesized that the effect would be stronger to the extent that the
encoding and test conditions were different, so this factor was also
incorporated in our design. The rationale for this last point is
described in the next paragraph.
To illustrate the phenomenon of recognition failure of recallable
words, Tulving and Thomson (1973) first presented target words
as response items in a paired-associate list. Next, in an apparently
unrelated phase of the experiment, participants were given cue
words and asked to generate four free associations to each cue
word. The cues were chosen so that the generated associations
often matched response words in the previous paired-associate list.
In the third phase, participants were asked to read through the
words they had generated and circle any they recognized as the
previously learned words. Finally, they were given the original
paired-associate stimulus words as cues to recall the appropriate
responses. The main result was that participants often failed to
recognize generated target words in Phase 3, although the same
words were recalled in response to the original paired-associate
cues in the final phase. The authors’ interpretation of this striking
result was that target words encoded specifically as responses in a
paired-associate list were not perceived subjectively as the same
words when encountered again as their own generated associa-
tions. Essentially, the context change between encoding and test
acted to reduce recognition. Applying this thinking to the phe-
nomenon of recognition without awareness, our conjecture was
that a similar change of context between initial encoding and
the recognition test might result in a failure of explicit recog-
nition, but allow the participant to still select the correct target
word in a forced-choice test by virtue of implicit recognition.
This notion predicts that greater amounts of context change
between encoding and test would be associated with increased
recognition failure but also an increased likelihood of ‘recog-
nition without awareness.’
In order to provide a sensitive test of recognition memory, and
to allow for the possibility of recognition without awareness, we
used the testing procedure devised by Tulving and Thomson. In the
present studies, participants were shown a series of 4-word sets
and instructed to choose the one word they may have encountered
in the first (encoding) phase. They were also told (correctly) that
some of the 4-word sets contained no target, but that they must still
select one word as the most likely to have been in the first phase.
To make sense of this procedure, participants were also instructed
to give a confidence rating for each choice, in which 2  “fairly
certain it was on the list,” 1 “possibly on the list,” and 0 “pure
guess—I was forced to choose one.” In a 4-AFC situation, chance
responding will yield p  .25, so the interest in the present
experiments is in cases in which target items are present, partici-
pants give a rating of 0, yet choose correctly at a level higher than
0.25. In line with the previous literature, we will refer to such
outcomes as ‘recognition without awareness.’ Experiments 1 and 2
utilized the color-naming procedure reported by Gopie et al.
(2011) as the encoding phase, and in the final two experiments we
used the paired-associate learning task reported by Tulving and
Thomson (1973).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. The participants were 48 undergraduates from
the University of Toronto who participated in the experiment for
course credit. Their mean age was 18.9 years, and mean score on
the Shipley vocabulary scale (Zachary, 1986) was 29.1. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the FA or DA condition, n  24
per condition.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
1273RECOGNITION WITHOUT AWARENESS
3 1
Design and procedure. The experiment consisted of two
phases; incidental encoding followed by a 4-AFC recognition test.
These phases were separated by a 10-min retention interval in
which participants played the Tetris computer game. The first
phase was described as a color-judgment experiment, in which
participants were presented with a series of 40 common nouns
whose font color was red, blue, green or yellow. The task was to
judge the color of each word as it appeared in the computer
monitor and to respond as rapidly as possible by pressing one of
four response buttons. Following each response there was a 1,000
ms intertrial interval before the next word appeared. The words
themselves were described as being irrelevant to the task. Half of
the participants performed the task under FA conditions, and half
under DA conditions. The DA task was to listen to a string of
auditory digits presented at a 1.5 s rate, and detect targets defined
as three successive odd digits (e.g., 7–9–5, 1–3–1, etc.). DA
participants signaled detection of an auditory target by pressing the
space bar.
After completing the color-judgment task, all 48 participants
played the computer game Tetris for 10 min. They then all per-
formed an explicit recognition memory task under full attention
conditions. The recognition test contained 50 4-AFC trials; partic-
ipants were instructed to select one of the four words in all
cases—a word that may have been an ignored color word in the
first phase. Of the 50 trials, 40 did contain one target word from
the study phase, and 10 contained no target words. Participants
were informed that on certain trials no target word would be
present, but that they should always choose the word they judged
to be the most likely from Phase 1. Participants were also asked to
rate their choice as a word they were “fairly certain” had been in
Phase 1, as “possibly there” or as a “pure guess.” These ratings
were coded as 2, 1, and 0, respectively.
Results
When a target word was present among the four choices, par-
ticipants rated their choice as a “pure guess” on an average of 19.1
trials out of 40 (48%) in the FA condition and 20.9 trials (52%) in
the DA condition. In these cases the proportions of correct choices
were 0.27 and 0.33 for FA and DA conditions, respectively; that is,
the proportions of correct selections were 0.27 and 0.33, given that
a target word was present and that the selection was made with
zero confidence. The proportions of “pure guess” judgments in this
and the following experiments are given in Table 1 under the
heading “Prop. 0.” The values of correct selections given a con-
fidence rating of zero are referred to as p(c)|0, and these values are
also given in Table 1. The chance value is 0.25, and t tests showed
that the 0.27 value was not significantly different from 0.25,
t(23)  0.80, p  .05, whereas the value of 0.33 was reliably
different from chance, t(23)  4.82, p  .001. Additionally, the
DA value of 0.33 was significantly higher than the FA value of
0.27, t(46)  2.11, p  .05. When a target was present in the set,
the conditional probabilities of choosing it correctly given a con-
fidence rating of 1 (“possibly there”) or 2 (“fairly certain”) were
0.35 and 0.49, respectively, for FA participants, and 0.32 and 0.43,
respectively, for DA participants. Thus performance was above
chance but far from perfect when participants claimed some mem-
ory awareness of their choices.
Discussion
The major finding of interest was that participants in the DA
condition did exhibit some degree of recognition without aware-
ness. In that condition, 18 participants had values of correct
choices rated as a “guess” that exceeded the chance level of 0.25
whereas only four participants had values less than 0.25. The
finding of more recognition without awareness following DA
conditions at encoding echoes the findings of Voss and colleagues,
and is in line with the idea that this encoding condition may have
yielded superficial perceptual encodings of words. Arguably, this
type of encoding may be sufficient to choose target words cor-
rectly in a later forced-choice recognition test, but insufficient to
yield the subjective experience of remembering. In order to obtain
further evidence on this phenomenon we replicated the study in a
second experiment, but with the one difference that participants
were informed in the first color-judging phase that memory for the
words would be tested later. Our assumption was that this change
would result in more deliberate encoding of the words, and there-
fore an increase in hit rate in the recognition test. We also pre-
dicted that this stronger encoding would be associated with a
decline in the proportion of “0” responses (because of the in-
creased hit rate) and a reduction in the propensity to select target
words while apparently guessing (following our assumption that
intentional encoding in the first phase would result in a greater
match between encoding and retrieval).
Experiment 2
Method
The design and procedure were exactly as in Experiment 1,
including the FA and DA conditions, but with the one alteration
that participants were informed before performing the color-
judgment task that there would be a memory test for the colored
words. The participants were again undergraduates who partici-
pated for course credit; 24 were tested in the FA condition (mean
age  19.0 years; Shipley vocabulary  29.5) and 21 were tested
Table 1
Performance Measures in Experiments 1--4
Experiment Hit rate Prop.“0” p(c)|0 Prop. “1  2” p(c)|1  2
Experiment 1
FA 0.34 0.48 0.27 0.52 0.20
DA 0.34 0.52 0.33 0.48 0.13
Experiment 2
FA 0.58 0.26 0.39 0.74 0.56
DA 0.35 0.39 0.30 0.62 0.19
Experiment 3
FA 0.69 0.26 0.40 0.74 0.75
DA 0.57 0.31 0.34 0.69 0.59
Experiment 4
FA 0.85 0.17 0.41 0.83 0.91
DA 0.84 0.15 0.43 0.85 0.88
Note. Overall hit rate is defined as correct selection of a target item
regardless of confidence rating (0  1  2). Prop. “0”  proportion of
choices rated zero; p(c)|0  probability of choosing correctly, given a ‘0’
confidence rating; Prop. “1  2”  proportion of choices rated 1 or 2;
p(c)|1  2  probability of choosing correctly, given a confidence rating
of 1 or 2. These last values are corrected for chance responding (see text).
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in the DA condition (mean age  19.3 years; Shipley vocabu-
lary  30.1).
Results
When a target word was present, participants rated their choice
as a “pure guess” 10.5 times, on average, out of a possible 40 trials
in the FA conditions and 15.2 times, on average, in the DA
condition. Thus the measures of proportion “0” were 0.26 and
0.39, respectively (see Table 1). In these “pure guess” cases, the
mean proportions of correct choices were 0.39 in the FA condition
and 0.30 in the DA condition (see Table 1). Although both of these
p(c)|0 values exceed the chance value of 0.25, only the FA value
was significantly higher than 0.25, t(23)  2.85, p  .01; the DA
value was not significantly greater than chance, t(20)  1.56, p 
.05. In addition, the FA value of 0.39 was not significantly higher
than the DA value of 0.30, t(43)  1.54, p  .05. The proportions
of correct selections made with confidence ratings 1 and 2 when
targets were present were 0.44 and 0.84, respectively for the FA
condition, and 0.31 and 0.57, respectively for the DA condition.
These “aware” values are understandably higher than the corre-
sponding values in Experiment 1.
Three 2 (FA/DA) 2 (Experiments 1 & 2) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were also carried out to compare the values of hit rate,
proportion “0” and p(c)|0 between the experiments. Hit rate was
defined as the probability of selecting the correct target when one
was present, regardless of confidence rating. The ANOVA on hit
rates showed a significant effect of experiment, F(1, 90)  42.12,
p  .001, p2  .32, of FA/DA, F(1, 90)  33.47, p  .001, p2 
0.27, and the interaction between the two factors, F(1, 90) 
32.02, p .001, p2 .26. Table 1 indicates that these effects show
that hit rates in Experiment 2 were generally higher than those in
Experiment 1, and also that hit rates were higher for FA than DA
conditions. However, these effects were modulated by a significant
interaction between the factors; only the FA condition in Experi-
ment 2 showed the benefit of intentional learning conditions. The
ANOVA on proportion “0” scores revealed significant effects of
experiment, F(1, 90)  21.06, p  .001, p2  .19, and of FA/DA,
F(1, 90)  4.78, p  .03, p2  .05, but no interaction, F(1, 90) 
1.11, p  .05. That is, values of proportion “0” were higher for
Experiment 1 than for Experiment 2, and somewhat higher for DA
conditions than for FA conditions (see Table 1). The ANOVA on
p(c)|0 values showed that neither the effect of Experiment, F(1,
90)  1.68, p  .05 nor FA/DA (F  1.0) was significant, but the
interaction was statistically reliable, F(1, 89)  5.58, p  .02,
p2  .06. Table 1 shows that this last effect is attributable to the
value for DA being higher than that for FA in Experiment 1, but
that FA is greater than DA in Experiment 2.
Discussion
Our predictions for Experiment 2 relative to the first experiment
were that the intentional learning instructions in the color-
judgment phase would increase the hit rate, reduce the proportion
of “0” confidence ratings, and also reduce the value of proportion
correct, given a “0” rating [p(c)|0]. The first two predictions were
borne out by the results, although the hit rate increase was found
only for FA conditions. The prediction that p(c)|0 would decrease
was not upheld, however. There was no main effect for experi-
ment, but the significant interaction between Experiment and
FA/DA showed that p(c)|0 increased from 0.27 to 0.39 in the FA
condition but declined slightly (from 0.33 to 0.30) in the DA
condition. The speculation that recognition without awareness
might decrease as a function of a better match between encoding
and test conditions was, therefore, not supported by these results.
Our assumption was that the intentional encoding instructions in
Experiment 2 would be more similar than the incidental conditions
in Experiment 1 to the intentional recognition conditions at test,
and so p(c)|0 should decline from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2,
which generally did not happen.
Another initial prediction was that the probability of recognition
without awareness would be greater in DA than in FA conditions.
This prediction was supported marginally in Experiment 1, but the
probabilities of p(c)|0 reversed in Experiment 2 where the values
were 0.39 for FA and 0.30 for DA. The difference was not
significant, but was nevertheless in the wrong direction. The
proportion of guess responses did drop substantially as the poten-
tial to learn the words in Phase 1 increased. In turn, this result
raises the possibility that the subjective meaning of a guess re-
sponse might change as a function of how well words were
learned. The possibility that such a change in criterion might signal
a shift to more conservative responding in line with the conclu-
sions of Starns et al. (2008) is considered again after describing
two further experiments.
Despite obtaining results from the two color-word experiments
that gave little support to the notions of either context change or
encoding under DA conditions as a basis for recognition without
awareness, we decided to change the encoding paradigm before
abandoning the ideas. Accordingly, we ran two experiments using
a paradigm that was closer to the paradigm used by Tulving and
Thomson (1973). One difference was that in our version the test
words were provided rather than generated by the participants. The
paradigm thus consisted of several paired associate lists in the
encoding phase followed by a test phase consisting of a series of
4-AFC recognition tests. To encourage the use of the “pure guess”
(“0”) response, only half of the test trials contained a target, and
participants were informed of this fact. Experiment 3 was the first
study using this paradigm, and so was basically exploratory in
nature.
Experiment 3
Method
Experiment 3 again contained an encoding phase followed by a
test phase. In this case the first phase consisted of a series of
paired-associate lists, and this phase was followed by a 4-AFC
recognition test for words on the final list. The participants were 48
young adults (undergraduate students) who were allocated ran-
domly to one of two conditions, FA and DA, during the learning
phase. The FA condition had 24 participants (mean age  18.8
years; years of education  12.3) and the DA condition also had
24 participants (mean age  18.6 years; years of education 
12.5). The materials used for the paired-associate lists were com-
mon words (mostly nouns) of 1–3 syllables and ranging in fre-
quency from 10 (coin) to 1,207 (man) according to the Kucˇera and
Francis (1967) norms. During the encoding phase, participants
studied two lists of 24 paired associates (Lists 1 & 2) presented
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visually at a 5 s rate with a 1 s interstimulus interval. Participants
in the DA condition also performed the “successive-odd-digits”
task presented auditorily while learning the lists. In this case the
DA task was made slightly easier by asking participants to detect
the presence of two successive odd digits. At the end of each list
all participants completed a self-paced cued-recall test. List 3 had
48 paired associates presented in the same way, but at the end of
presentation participants were informed that we were interested in
the effects of time delay on memory, and that the recall test would
come later. In the meantime, they played the computer game Tetris
for 5 min.
Participants were then given 48 sets of four words on two sheets
of paper. Half of the sets contained a response word from List 3;
the other half contained no target words. There were two versions
of the 4-AFC recognition test (A & B); 24 participants (12 FA and
12 DA) received Version A, which contained 24 List 3 response
words, and the remaining 24 participants received Version B,
which contained the target words not on A. Participants were asked
to circle one word in each set of four, the word most likely to come
from List 3. They were informed that only half of the 4-word sets
contained a target, but they should always select one, guessing
when necessary. They were also instructed to provide a confidence
rating with each word, with 0, 1, 2 having the same meaning as in
Experiments 1 and 2. Finally, they were given the cued-recall test
for the original List 3.
Results and Discussion
Paired associate recall probabilities were 0.36, 0.61 and 0.43 for
Lists 1, 2, 3, respectively, for the FA group, and 0.12, 0.36, and
0.26, respectively, for the DA group. Thus, as expected, the recall
values for DA participants were consistently lower than the cor-
responding values for FA participants.
As shown in Table 1, hit rates were 0.69 and 0.57 for the FA and
DA groups, respectively. Thus intentional learning of paired-
associate responses presented at a relatively slow rate (6 s per pair)
was associated with higher hit rates than those obtained from the
first two experiments. Proportions of target words recognized
correctly with confidence ratings 1 and 2 were 0.58 and 0.94,
respectively, for the FA group, and 0.55 and 0.79, respectively, for
the DA group. All of these values were reliably higher than 0.25,
all values of t  6.50. Table 1 also shows that the proportion of
words selected with zero confidence on the 24 trials when a target
word was present was 0.26 for FA participants and 0.31 for DA
participants. When a target word was present and the selection was
made with zero confidence, participants were correct with propor-
tions 0.40 for the FA group and 0.34 for the DA group. These
values are shown in Table 1 under the heading p(c)|0. The 0.40
value for FA was greater than the chance value of 0.25, t(22) 
2.73, p  .01; but the 0.34 value for DA was not reliably greater
than chance, t(23)  1.60, p  .12. From the point of view of the
context change hypothesis, it is unclear whether the shift between
paired-associate learning and the 4-AFC test is more or less than
the shift between color-word naming and the test, so the final
experiment was designed to provide a clearer test of this hypoth-
esis. For now it may be noted that the value of p(c)|0 was again
higher for the FA group than for the DA group, again providing no
evidence for the notion that recognition without awareness is
associated with DA at encoding. The third hypothesis, that the
incidence of recognition without awareness is restricted to condi-
tions of conservative responding (Starns et al., 2008), is difficult to
assess from these data; consideration of this possibility is deferred
until the final experiment is described.
The major purpose of Experiment 4 was to provide a strong test
of the context shift account by making conditions for the 4-AFC
test as compatible as possible with the encoding conditions. This
was accomplished by reminding participants of the original paired-
associate pairs at the time of the recognition test. We did this by
preceding each set of four words in the 4-AFC test with a stimulus
word from the original learned list. When a target word was
present in the set it was always preceded by its correct stimulus
word from the original List 3 learning trial. Thus, if the original
pair to be learned was moth-FOOD, the four words provided for
the recognition test (BASE, FOOD, BOOK, FARM) would be
preceded by “moth.” When a target word was not present, the
recognition set was composed of four new words preceded by a
randomly chosen stimulus word from the original paired-associate
list. By reinstating the learning context in this way we expected to
increase the hit rate but greatly reduce the phenomenon of recog-
nition without awareness.
Experiment 4
Method
Experiment 4 was a replication of Experiment 3, with the one
change that each set of four words in the 4-AFC recognition test
was preceded by a stimulus word from the 48 pairs to be learned
in List 3. In the 24 cases that a target word was present, the
stimulus word was its correct pair mate; the remaining 24 4-AFC
cases (which contained no target words) were paired randomly
with the remaining 24 stimulus words. As in Experiment 3, half of
the participants were given the A set of 4-AFC choices and half
were given Set B. Forty-eight participants age 18–28 years par-
ticipated in the study. Half of them were assigned to the FA
condition (mean age  21.8 years, mean years of education 
14.8) and half to the DA condition (mean age  21.3 years, mean
years of education  14.8). The DA group again performed the
auditory monitoring task (“tap the table every time you hear 2
successive odd digits”) while learning the initial three paired-
associate lists.
Results and Discussion
The overall recognition performance in this cued 4-AFC situa-
tion was predictably high—85% correct for FA and 84% correct
for DA participants (hit rates in Table 1). Nevertheless, partici-
pants did rate their confidence level as zero in a number of
instances when a target was present; the proportions were 0.17 for
the FA group and 0.15 for the DA group (proportion “0” in Table
1). For the 21 participants in the FA group who selected items with
zero confidence, the proportion of correct choices was 0.41; this
value was significantly greater than the chance value of 0.25,
t(20)  3.31, p  .01. For the 18 DA participants who selected
items with zero confidence, the proportion was 0.43, and the
associated significance value was t(17)  3.38, p  .01. Clearly
these values of p(c)|0 did not fall close to 0.25 as predicted, and are
broadly comparable to the results of Experiment 3, despite the
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apparent success of the contextual reinstatement manipulation—
overall recognition rates rose from 69% to 85% for FA participants
in Experiments 3 and 4, respectively, and from 57% to 84%,
respectively, for DA participants.
Other results made sense in light of the easier conditions asso-
ciated with the cued 4-AFC procedure. Probabilities of correct
recognition given confidence ratings 1 and 2 were 0.60 and 0.99,
respectively, for FA participants, and 0.61 and 0.99, respectively,
for DA participants. Cued recall probabilities for Lists 1, 2, and 3
were 0.43, 0.62, and 0.54, respectively, for FA participants, and
0.20, 0.44, and 0.44, respectively, for DA participants. Thus the
DA manipulation reduced recall values, as in the previous exper-
iments, but it is interesting to note that the manipulation did not
reduce recognition scores in this instance. Apparently, the combi-
nation of context reinstatement with the forced-choice procedure
was sufficient to compensate for the poorer initial encoding re-
vealed in the cued recall cases.
Three ANOVAs were conducted to compare the results of
Experiments 3 and 4. Each was a 2 (Experiments 3 & 4)  2 (FA
vs. DA) between subjects analysis. For overall hit rates, there was
a significant effect of Experiment, F(1, 92)  44.70, p  .001,
p2  .33, and marginally reliable effects of FA/DA, F(1, 92) 
3.23, p  .08, p2  .03, and the interaction between the factors,
F(1, 92)  2.90, p  .10, p2  .03. Table 1 shows that these
effects signify that hit rates were higher in Experiment 4 than in
Experiment 3, and that there was a trend for these values to be
higher for FA than for DA, especially in Experiment 3. For the
measure proportion “0,” the ANOVA yielded a significant effect
of Experiment, F(1, 92)  14.91, p  .001, p2  .14, but no
effects of either FA/DA (F  1.0) or of the interaction, F(1, 92) 
1.79, ns. Table 1 shows that the proportion of zero responses was
greater in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 4. For the measure
p(c)|0, the effect of Experiment was not significant, F(1, 82) 
2.63, p  .05, and neither the effect of FA/DA (F  1.08) nor the
interaction (F  1.0) approached significance.
But the major result of interest is that the greater amount of
contextual reinstatement from Experiment 3 to Experiment 4 had
no effect on the values of p(c)|0. The contextual reinstatement
manipulation clearly worked, given the substantially higher levels
of overall recognition in the present experiment, but there was no
evidence for a reduction in ‘recognition without awareness.’ The
hypothesis that recognition without awareness in these paradigms
might be akin to the phenomenon of recognition failure in the
Tulving and Thomson (1973) experiments was therefore not sup-
ported by the present results, or at least not in the version that
proposes that the size of the effect should be reduced as
the encoding and retrieval contexts are made more similar. Over
the four experiments, there is thus little or no support for either the
context change hypothesis or the notion that recognition without
awareness is more likely to occur under conditions of DA at
encoding. The remaining hypothesis, that the value of p(c)|0 rises
as recognition decisions are made under more conservative crite-
ria, is considered in the General Discussion that follows.
General Discussion
A consideration of the data from all four experiments (see Table
1) shows clearly that our measure of recognition without aware-
ness [p(c)|0] does not vary systematically with FA/DA at encod-
ing, and there is also little evidence for the notion that p(c)|0 varies
as a function of context shift between encoding and retrieval.
However, another possibility stems from the idea that there may be
criterion shifts in the likelihood of giving a zero confidence re-
sponse. In particular, it seemed possible that the criterion may
depend on the overall ease or difficulty of the final 4-AFC recog-
nition test. Presumably easy tasks will yield many 1 and 2 judg-
ments when targets are present, and relatively few 0 judgments.
But for easy tasks, targets are typically rather obvious and will be
rated 1 or 2. If an item is less obvious, it may be chosen but given
a zero confidence rating when contrasted with easier items. This
thinking predicts a relationship between overall difficulty of the
recognition test and values of p(c)|0—easy tasks should give
relatively few “0” judgments, but a high value of p(c)|0.
Table 1 shows that the overall hit rates rise generally from
Experiment 1 to Experiment 4, indicating that there was a tendency
for the tasks to become easier. The Table also shows a tendency for
the proportion of “0” responses when a target was present to
decline from the first to the last experiment (understandably, as
participants made more confident 1 or 2 responses as task diffi-
culty decreased) and also for the measure p(c)|0 to increase from
Experiments 1 to 4. These trends were assessed by carrying out a
series of Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients among the vari-
ables, using the means of the eight conditions (4 Experiments 
FA/DA). The correlation between hit rate and proportion “0” was
rho (6)  0.94, p  .01 and the correlation between hit rate and
p(c)|0 was rho (6)  0.93, p  .01 (Figure 1a and 1b, respec-
tively). Additionally, the correlation between proportion “0” and
p(c)|0 was rho (6)  0.91, p  .01. There is thus good evidence
across the eight conditions that as the task became easier (mea-
sured by increasing hit rate), the proportion of “0” confidence
responses declined and the values of p(c)|0 correspondingly in-
creased. Also, it is the case that values of p(c)|0 increased system-
atically as the proportion of “0” responses declined.
Further insight into the processes operating in the experiments
may be gained by considering the relations between hit rates and
the proportions of responses given 1 or 2 ratings when a target was
present, and also between hit rates and the proportions of these 1
or 2 responses that were actually correct [p(c)|1  2]. The pro-
portions given either 1 or 2 confidence responses are simply the
complements of the proportions given zero responses, and are
shown in column 4 of Table 1. These values signal the occasions
that participants thought they had chosen the correct item. In order
to compare the values of proportion correct given 1 or 2 [p(c)|1 
2] with the proportions chosen with 1 or 2 confidence ratings, we
corrected values of p(c)|1  2 for chance. Specifically, for each
condition we first calculated the proportion correct given a rating
of 1 or 2; we then subtracted the chance value of 0.25 from that
proportion, and divided the result by 1.0 minus chance (0.75). The
resulting scale of proportions correct given a 1 or 2 rating thus runs
from 0 to 1.0, as does the scale of proportions of 1 or 2 chosen. The
corrected values of p(c)|1  2 are shown in column 5 of Table 1.
These values, and also the proportions of 1 or 2 chosen, are plotted
against overall hit rate in Figure 2.
The figure shows that both functions are well fit by linear
functions, but with different slopes. At lower values of hit rate
(difficult tasks) the proportions correct are around 0.15–0.20,
whereas the proportions of selections made with1 or 2 confidence
ratings are between 0.45 and 0.55. That is, the relatively high
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confidence levels are unwarranted by the proportions actually
correct. This discrepancy reduces, however, as the tasks get easier,
until at higher levels of hit rate (relatively easy tasks) the propor-
tions of choices made with 1 or 2 ratings are slightly lower than the
corresponding proportions correct. That is, participants are some-
what conservative in their allocation of confidence ratings at the
easy end of task difficulty. This observation is in line with previous
reports that stricter criteria are typically applied to strongly en-
coded stimuli and thus easier detection and recognition perfor-
mance (Singer, 2009). On the assumption that trials themselves
vary on a continuum of difficulty for each person in a given
experiment, this pattern implies that for low values of hit rate
participants allocate more ratings of 1 and 2 than they “ought to”
given the difficulty level, so the remaining “0” allocations are
given to the most difficult trials, and correspondingly show a low
probability of being correct. When hit rates are high, however, the
pattern reverses. Now participants allocate fewer ratings of 1 and
2 to choices than they might do given the relatively easy tasks, and
so the remaining “0” allocations are given to trials that are also
relatively easy and so show a higher hit rate. In summary, we
suggest that the strong correlation between overall hit rate and
p(c)|0 is a function of a changing criterion for the allocation of “0”
responses (Singer, 2009). The probability of ‘recognition without
awareness’ increases as the tasks become easier, and participants
adopt a more conservative criterion for claiming that they have
chosen an item from the encoding list.
How general is this criterion account of recognition without
awareness? It is clearly compatible with the results of Starns and
colleagues (2008) who explicitly concluded that source memory
for unrecognized items varied with the bias to respond “old” in
recognition decisions. In their case the phenomenon appeared only
under conditions that promoted conservative responding. The pres-
ent account is probably less applicable to the studies by Cleary and
Greene (2004, 2005) and by Ryals et al. (2011) who showed
recognition of list membership in the absence of identification on
the basis of processing word fragments or speeded processing of
the words themselves. In these cases the recognition of list mem-
bership is probably due to an unconscious recognition memory
process, possibly attributable to a minimal sense of familiarity as
the authors suggest.
With regard to the studies of Voss and colleagues (Voss et al.,
2008; Voss & Paller, 2009, 2010), we agree with those authors that
the term “implicit memory” should be reserved for cases in which
individuals’ performance shows evidence of memory for previous
events, yet they are unaware that their responses are based on
memory. By this definition, choices accompanied by feelings of
either recollection or familiarity (or given with either “remember”
or “know” responses) are classified as cases of explicit memory.
On the contrary, correct choices made but classified as ‘guesses’
are instances of implicit memory—recognition without awareness.
Such instances were documented both by Voss and colleagues and
in the present experiments.
Voss and Paller (2010) consider, but reject, the possibility that
recognition without awareness is simply based on the processing
of relatively weak representations that might otherwise evoke
responses of familiarity or recollection (see also Voss, Lucas &
Paller, 2012). Their arguments are based partly on different ERP
signatures related to implicit memory compared to those associ-
ated with familiarity and recollection (Voss et al., 2012), but also
to the changes in R, K, and guess responses between conditions in
Figure 1. (a) Proportions given “0” ratings, and (b) p(c)|“0” (proportions correct given ratings of “0”), as a
function of overall hit rate for the FA and DA conditions.
Figure 2. Proportions rated 1 or 2, and proportions correct given 1 or 2
ratings, as a function of overall hit rate.
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which guessing was either encouraged or discouraged. In the latter
case, the probability of a guess response being accurate was p 
.43 (less than chance in a 2-AFC paradigm), whereas when guess-
ing was encouraged the accuracy of responses classified as guesses
rose to p  .78 (Voss & Paller, 2010). Interestingly, the propor-
tions correct for R and K responses did not change systematically
between the two encouragement conditions: for R responses the
proportions correct were 0.80 under “confidence encouraged” in-
structions and 0.76 under “guessing encouraged “ instructions; the
corresponding proportions for K responses were 0.60 and 0.62,
respectively. The authors argue that this result is not consistent
with a simple shift in criterion. However, an alternative reading of
the result is that whereas the encouragement to guess led to an
increase in the rate of guessing (from 12% to 26%) and a con-
comitant decrease in the rates for R and K responses, the subjective
criteria for K and R responses (based on proportions correct)
remained relatively unchanged, whereas the encouragement to use
the “guess” response allowed participants to select that response
more often. It is also necessary to add that the subjective criterion
for “guess” must have changed, such that under encouraging
conditions items that might otherwise be classified as K or R are
now classified more cautiously as guesses, with a consequent rise
in the probability that such responses are correct. Our suggestion
is therefore that encouragement to guess differentially changes the
criterion for what constitutes a ‘guess’ response but leaves the
subjective labels unchanged for K and R responses.
Conditions under which recognition without awareness was not
observed in the studies reported by Voss and colleagues include
recognition of kaleidoscope patterns using a yes-no procedure,
using a 2-AFC procedure when the two choices were perceptually
very different, and when participants were given an extended time
to decide. All of these cases likely engender a deliberate conscious
retrieval strategy rather than a reliance on perceptually based
implicit recognition. Voss and Paller (2009) boost their case for a
perceptual basis of their implicit memory demonstrations by show-
ing that the neural correlates of the effect included frontal-occipital
brain potentials at 200–400 ms post-stimulus-onset, potentials that
were distinct from the late positive responses associated with
judgments of recollection or familiarity. Given that these research-
ers used complex and relatively meaningless kaleidoscope patterns
as stimuli it makes sense that recognition choices were made on
the basis of perceptual processing.
In our own case the stimuli were words, the four choices
presented on each test trial were not perceptually similar, and
participants performed the sequence of 4-AFC test trials at their
own pace, rather than under time pressure. In addition, Table 1
makes it clear that there were no systematic changes associated
with encoding under full versus divided attention in our experi-
ments. It thus seems clear that implicit recognition can occur with
a variety of materials and under a variety of experimental condi-
tions. One way of reconciling the present results with those of
Voss and Paller is to suggest that the selection of a correct item is
based on processing the relevant neural representation in all cases,
although of course the nature of that representation will vary
widely. We also suggest that such representations are the basis for
correct selection for both implicit and explicit recognition mem-
ory; the difference between the two types is that explicit memory
is accompanied additionally by some representation of the context
of initial occurrence—either a nonspecific feeling of past occur-
rence in the case of K responses or specific recollection of context
for R responses. Speculatively, this second type of representation
may be associated with changes in the neural activations recorded
as the late positive complex in the ERP signals reported by Voss
and Paller (2009). In turn, various factors will contribute to the
encoding and retrieval of such contextual representations; they
may include such things as attention to contextual attributes during
encoding, the associative relationship of the target item to its initial
context, the degree to which the retrieval context matches the
encoding context, and the extent to which the participant engages
deliberate attempts to recollect the initial situation. These, of
course, are among the factors studied by many researchers inves-
tigating the characteristics of explicit recollection.
The point we wish to stress here is that two distinct sets of
factors may be operating to give rise to the phenomenon of
recognition without awareness; one set contributes to the relative
strengths (or degrees of fluent processing) of representations of
target items and their lures, the second set contributes to the
occurrence and adequacy of representations of the initial encoding
contexts of these target items. According to this view, recognition
without awareness will occur when item representations are
strongly present (or are processed fluently), but contextual repre-
sentations are weak or absent. In the Voss and Paller experiments,
participants deliberately attempted to learn the kaleidoscope pat-
terns so good item representations were established. It seems
likely, however, that the corresponding contextual representations
were poorly differentiated among the various very similar items,
enabling participants to select a target item correctly but in the
absence of any feeling of recollection that it was one they had
studied. The encoding of well-differentiated contextual represen-
tations would be even less likely under divided attention condi-
tions, and the retrieval of such representations would be poor under
conditions that discouraged a deliberate analytic retrieval strategy—
for example, the speeded 2-AFC conditions used in the Voss and
Paller studies.
In the case of the current experiments, participants were pre-
sumably able to form good item representations under the inten-
tional learning conditions of Experiment 2, 3, and 4. Context
information was also available at encoding but this information
may have been difficult to access at retrieval given that the items
were now presented in a very different 4-AFC context. Addition-
ally, we suggest that the probability of correctly selecting a target
item with zero confidence varied with the overall difficulty of the
particular recognition test, and a concurrent shift in the criterion
associated with the subjective feeling of what constitutes a “guess”
response. Voss and Paller (2012) suggest that their effects are
based on fluency of perceptual processing of the encoded repre-
sentations, and this seems very reasonable given that the items
were complex and relatively meaningless visual patterns. In the
present case, the correct selection of the target word when confi-
dence was zero may also be attributable to the greater perceptual
fluency of processing targets relative to lures (Jacoby and White-
house (1989). Alternatively, Chechile, Sloboda, and Chamberland
(2012) have suggested that implicit and explicit recognition differ
simply in the adequacy (e.g., strength, vividness) of the encoded
representation, with weakly represented items being insufficient to
support explicit recognition, but still sufficient to select the correct
item while claiming that the choice was simply a guess. We add to
the Chechile et al. model by suggesting that the criterion for a
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“guess” response is variable as described earlier, but differ from
them by suggesting that explicit recognition also involves the
retrieval of a further representation of the initial context.
Conclusions
The four experiments presented in this article provide ample
evidence for the reality of recognition without awareness; in this
case, with words exposed for several seconds. In many ways the
existence of the phenomenon is unsurprising as related effects
have been reported over the years. One example is the ability of
participants to make accurate psychophysical judgments (e.g.,
relative judgments of weight, length, and shape) while claiming
that they were simply guessing (early studies reviewed by Adams,
1957). A second example is evidence for semantic processing of
words in the absence of conscious identification of these words
(e.g., Marcel, 1983; Stenberg, Lindgren, Johansson, Olsson &
Rosén, 2000). In the present case we have suggested that variation
in the strength of the effect is principally attributable to the general
difficulty of the recognition decision in a particular experiment—
easier decisions were associated with fewer guess responses but
with higher values of recognition without awareness [higher values
of p(c)|0]. The data are thus consistent with the notion that the
subjective criterion for choosing correctly while stating that the
choice was simply a guess is flexible, depending (among other
possible factors) on the context of the overall recognition situation.
It may be asked what “criterion shift” means across different
conditions that always involve the forced-choice procedure; does
the participant not simply choose the subjectively strongest item in
all cases? In answer, we emphasize that our use of the term
“criterion shift” does not refer to whether or not participants make
a choice—they choose on all trials—but rather to the subjective
state accompanying the selection, and to the fact that this state
varies as a function of overall task difficulty. Under easy condi-
tions many trials yield obvious selections labeled 1 or 2. On the
remaining trials participants can still select the correct item, but
these cases feel relatively less obvious and are therefore labeled 0.
Under difficult conditions participants make more “guess” selec-
tions, but in this case the general difficulty results in the selection
of fewer target items; choice is much closer to chance responding.
Finally, unlike Voss and Paller (2009), we see no reason in our
data to suggest that implicit and explicit recognition reflect differ-
ent forms of memory. We argue rather that correct selection of a
target item may be based on relative fluency of processing, or on
the strength or adequacy of its encoded representation, and that
these factors are likely to vary on a continuum. Additionally,
however, the recognition process will evoke some representation
of the item’s previous context of occurrence. This representation
will also vary in the degree to which it fully specifies the past
event; inadequate representations may simply evoke a feeling of
general “pastness” whereas more adequate representations will
reinstate a conscious memory of the original event. In turn, these
different degrees of adequacy will be associated, respectively, with
the subjective impressions of familiarity and recollection. In cases
where such additional contextual representations are not evoked,
the participant may still choose the target item correctly, but now
with no subjective feeling of explicit recognition. These cases may
therefore be described as recognition without awareness.
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The Tip-of-the-Tongue Heuristic: How Tip-of-the-Tongue States Confer
Perceptibility on Inaccessible Words
Anne M. Cleary and Alexander B. Claxton
Colorado State University
This study shows that the presence of a tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state—the sense that a word is in
memory when its retrieval fails—is used as a heuristic for inferring that an inaccessible word has
characteristics that are consistent with greater word perceptibility. When reporting a TOT state, people
judged an unretrieved word as more likely to have previously appeared darker and clearer (Experiment
1a), and larger (Experiment 1b). They also judged an unretrieved word as more likely to be a high
frequency word (Experiment 2). This was not because greater fluency or word perceptibility at encoding
led to later TOT states: Increased fluency or perceptibility of a word at encoding did not increase the
likelihood of a TOT state for it when its retrieval later failed; moreover, the TOT state was not diagnostic
of an unretrieved word’s fluency or perceptibility when it was last seen. Results instead suggest that TOT
states themselves are used as a heuristic for inferring the likely characteristics of unretrieved words.
During the uncertainty of retrieval failure, TOT states are a source of information on which people rely
in reasoning about the likely characteristics of the unretrieved information, choosing characteristics that
are consistent with greater fluency of processing.
Keywords: tip-of-the-tongue states, metacognition, attribution, heuristics, recognition without
identification
The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state is the feeling of being on the
verge of retrieving a word from memory when unable to do so
(Brown, 1991, 2012; Schwartz, 2002). It is generally thought to
result largely from attributions that people make based on other
available information, such as retrieval of some of the unretrieved
word’s attributes (see Schwartz, 2002; Schwartz &Metcalfe, 2011,
for a review). For example, if unable to retrieve a word but able to
retrieve its first letter, one may infer from this that the word is on
the verge of access. The present study is concerned with the
reverse: whether participants infer from the presence of a TOT
state itself an increased likelihood of certain word characteristics.
Such a finding would underscore the need for teasing apart in-
stances of actual access to a word’s attributes and instances of
mere inference of those attributes from the TOT state itself, thus,
having important implications for the study of TOT states.
There is reason to hypothesize that TOT states can serve as a
source of inference. As reviewed by Cleary, Staley, and Klein
(2014), an inadvertent finding from the recognition-without-
identification literature is that people infer from the presence of a
TOT state an increased likelihood that an unretrieved word ap-
peared on an earlier study list. Recognition-without-identification
itself is old-new discrimination among unretrieved targets; it is
shown by higher ratings of study-status likelihood for studied than
for nonstudied unretrieved targets. For example, participants give
higher ratings of likely answer study-status to general knowledge
questions whose unretrieved answers were studied than to those
whose unretrieved answers were not (Cleary, 2006). The inadver-
tent finding to emerge from the recognition-without-identification
literature is that higher study-status likelihood ratings are given
during TOT than non-TOT states, regardless of the actual study-
status of the unretrieved targets (e.g., Cleary & Specker, 2007;
Cleary, 2006; Cleary, Konkel, Nomi, & McCabe, 2010; Cleary &
Reyes, 2009). In short, during TOT states, people are biased to
judge unretrieved targets as studied. This TOT bias is distinguish-
able from recognition-without-identification, occurring in situa-
tions where the recognition-without-identification effect does not
(e.g., Cleary et al., 2010), and even in situations where the
recognition-without-identification effect is reversed (Cleary et al.,
2014).
Because the TOT bias pattern was an incidental finding, Cleary
et al.’s (2014) review of it as a consistent pattern across
recognition-without-identification studies represents the first work
devoted solely to this effect. Though many explanations are pos-
sible for the association between TOT states and study-status
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likelihood ratings for unretrieved targets, Cleary et al. argue that
participants infer from the presence of a TOT state an increased
likelihood that the unretrievable target must have been studied. If
so, this raises the possibility that TOT states are used to make other
inferences (beyond regarding whether the unretrieved target was
studied), using something that we refer to hereafter as the TOT
heuristic.
The present study examined whether people infer from the
presence of a TOT state itself likely attributes of the unretrieved
information. This TOT heuristic hypothesis is important to inves-
tigate because most theoretical explanations of TOT experiences
include a role of conscious access to attributes regarding the
unretrieved word, yet the possibility that participants might some-
times infer those attributes from the TOT state itself (as opposed to
actually accessing them) has not been considered. Use of such a
TOT heuristic would mean that future research on to what people
have access during TOT states will need to account for what is
really being accessed versus what is merely being inferred from
the presence of a TOT state.
We investigated the specific hypothesis that participants infer
from the presence of a TOT state characteristics about the unre-
trieved target word that are thought to be more fluent. Our rea-
soning was as follows. Although a TOT state might seem to reflect
a state of disfluency (because of the inaccessibility of the sought-
after word), participants may assume that an unretrieved word for
which a TOT state is present is in a heightened state of accessi-
bility relative to an unretrieved word for which a TOT state is not
present. In fact, this is the very definition of a TOT experience—
feeling as if the word is on the verge of access (e.g., Schwartz,
2001). If participants assume that a TOT state indicates a height-
ened state of accessibility for an unretrieved word relative to a
non-TOT state, this could explain why participants infer a greater
likelihood of a target’s having been studied recently (as recent
presentation might be expected to lead to heightened accessibility).
If the TOT state feels like (or is interpreted as) a heightened state
of accessibility for the currently unretrievable target word relative
to when a TOT for it does not occur, then participants may assume
from the TOT state that the target has qualities or characteristics
that are associated with greater accessibility. From this, we hy-
pothesized that participants will attribute from the presence of a
TOT state an increased likelihood of fluent attributes of the unre-
trieved word.
What attributes make a word seem more fluent or accessible?
One factor is the clarity of its font (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, &
Girard, 1990). For this reason, in Experiment 1a, we examined the
hypothesis that participants would judge an unretrieved target as
more likely to have earlier appeared in a darker, clearer font if in
a TOT state than if not. We were especially interested in such
judgments for nonstudied items, where there was no particular font
associated with the target. Another factor may be font size, with
larger font sizes seeming more fluent (Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber,
& Rhodes, 2014; Rhodes & Castel, 2008). In Experiment 1b, we
examined the hypothesis that participants would judge an unre-
trieved target as more likely to have earlier appeared in a larger
font if in a TOT state than if not. In Experiment 2, we examined
judgments of word frequency, a known indicator of fluency or acces-
sibility (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). Although TOTs are
thought to be more likely for low than high frequency words (e.g.,
Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991), if participants assume
that a TOT state indicates a heightened state of accessibility for an
unretrieved word relative to when an unretrieved word elicits no TOT,
participants may then infer from a TOT state a greater likelihood that
the unretrieved word is of higher frequency relative to when a TOT
does not occur.
Experiments 1a and 1b
Method
Participants. Colorado State University students participated
in exchange for credit toward a course. Forty participated in
Experiment 1a, and 56 in Experiment 1b.
Materials. Stimuli were a pool of 80 general knowledge ques-
tions and their answers selected from Nelson and Narens’ (1980)
norms and used in prior research (Cleary et al., 2014). For each
participant, 40 of the 80 answers were presented on a study list. In
Experiment 1a, 20 of the study answers were presented in a dark
black font (the high font clarity condition) and 20 were presented
in a light gray font (the low font clarity condition), against a white
background. The font color was set using the E-prime software’s
black and silver font color settings, respectively. Although there
were only three conditions (studied in dark font, studied in light
font, and nonstudied), we kept the ratio of studied to nonstudied
items equal, as in prior research (e.g., Cleary & Specker, 2007;
Cleary, 2006; Cleary et al., 2010; Cleary & Reyes, 2009). There-
fore, to simplify our counterbalancing, four versions of the exper-
iment were created to rotate the answer through the conditions of
studied versus nonstudied and dark versus light font across partic-
ipants.
In Experiment 1b, the same method was applied to font size
instead of clarity. All fonts were presented in black on a white
background, and 20 of the 40 study words were presented in 48
point (large) font while 20 were presented in 18 point (small) font
(following from Rhodes & Castel, 2008).
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that used by Cleary
(2006). Participants were instructed that they would view a list of
words on the computer (they were told nothing specific about the
font) and that afterward, they would be asked a series of questions.
Instructions regarding the test were withheld until after the study
list. The study list of 40 words (20 dark, 20 light in Experiment 1a;
20 48-point, 20 18-point in Experiment 1b) appeared individually
in a random order for 1 s each with a 1 s interstimulus interval (a
duration chosen to reduce effective encoding strategies so that not
all studied items would be retrievable at test).
Following the study list, participants were given a description of
the test and the prompts that would appear with each question. As
the question remained on the screen, all dialog box prompts
pertaining to it were given sequentially before proceeding to the
next test question. Participants first attempted to answer the ques-
tion using the dialog box. Then, another dialog box prompted them
to indicate if they were experiencing a TOT state for the answer,
which was defined as in Cleary (2006). Participants were then
prompted to give a rating, regardless of whether the question had
been answered or the answer had been studied. In Experiment 1a,
this rating indicated the likelihood that the answer had appeared in
darker, clearer font versus a lighter, less clear font on the earlier-
presented list (0  definitely lighter, less clear; 10  definitely
darker, more clear). In Experiment 1b, it indicated the likelihood
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that the answer had appeared in a larger versus a smaller font (0 
definitely smaller; 10  definitely larger). The next dialog box
prompted a second attempt at identifying the answer; here, partic-
ipants were encouraged to guess. The final dialog box prompted
for partial information about the target, asking “Please type in any
partial information you can think of about the word. (Examples:
First letter, how it sounds, syllables, etc.).”
Results and Discussion
It is important to first consider how often participants could
correctly answer the general knowledge questions. As in prior
research (Cleary & Specker, 2007; Cleary, 2006; Cleary & Reyes,
2009), in Experiment 1a, participants correctly answered a lower
proportion of questions whose answers were not studied (M .39,
SD  .15) than questions whose answers were studied, whether
they were studied in dark font (M  .49, SD  .21), t(39)  4.28,
SE .02, Cohen’s d .69, p .001, or light font (M .48, SD
.17), t(39)  4.06, SE  .02, Cohen’s d  .65, p  .001. Studying
the answers in dark instead of light font did not make them more
retrievable when given their questions at test, t(39)  0.47, SE 
.03, p  .64. The same held for Experiment 1b. Participants
correctly answered a lower proportion of questions whose answers
were not studied (M  .39, SD  .13) than questions whose
answers were, whether they were studied in large font (M  .51,
SD  .17), t(55)  6.78, SE  .02, Cohen’s d  .91, p  .001, or
small font (M  .50, SD  .17), t(55)  5.86, SE  .02, Cohen’s
d  .79, p  .001. Studying the answers in large instead of small
font did not make them more retrievable at test, t(55) 0.21, SE
.03, p  .83.
The rates at which participants provided partial information
about the target answer (e.g., first letter, sound) were near zero.
The means were: Experiment 1a, studied, dark font (M  .02,
SD .03), studied, light font (M .02, SD .03), and nonstudied
(M  .04, SD  .04); in Experiment 1b, studied, large font (M 
.016, SD  .027), studied, small font (M  .015, SD  .025), and
nonstudied (M  .024, SD  .023). Because partial identification
rates were at floor, they will not be discussed further.
The data of interest for Experiment 1a were the font clarity
ratings given during retrieval failure (when neither the answer nor
any partial information about it could be retrieved). Our hypothesis
was that font clarity ratings would be higher during TOT than
non-TOT states. As in prior work (Cleary & Specker, 2007;
Cleary, 2006; Cleary & Reyes, 2009) not all participants reported
a TOT state in all conditions; this caused eight to be lost from this
analysis in Experiment 1a (seven in Experiment 1b). As shown in
Figure 1, font clarity ratings were higher during reported TOT than
non-TOT states. (The mean number of TOT states was 4.56 and
4.03 in the studied and nonstudied TOT conditions, respectively.)
This main effect of TOT state was the only significant effect to
emerge from a 2  2 TOT-state (TOT vs. non-TOT)  Study-
status (target word studied vs. target word nonstudied) repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the font
clarity ratings given during retrieval failure, F(1, 31)  18.74,
MSE  4.32, p2  .38, p  .001 (other Fs  1.0). In short,
participants thought it more likely that an unretrieved word was
clearer upon last reading it when in a TOT state for it than when
not.
The same was found for judgments of font size in Experiment
1b. As shown in Figure 2, font size ratings given during retrieval
failure were higher during TOT than non-TOT states. (The mean
number of TOT states was 4.69 and 6.65 in the studied and
nonstudied TOT conditions, respectively.) This main effect of
TOT state was the only significant effect to emerge from a 2  2
TOT-state (TOT vs. non-TOT)  Study-status (target word stud-
ied vs. target word nonstudied) repeated measures ANOVA per-
formed on the font size ratings given during retrieval failure,
F(1, 48)  11.12, MSE  3.32, p2  .19, p  .002 (other Fs 
1.0). In short, participants thought it more likely that an unre-
trieved word was larger upon last reading it when in a TOT state
for it than when not.
One possibility is that if a study word is processed more fluently
in the first place, participants are more likely to retrieve partial
visual information about it later during retrieval failure. If partial
visual information is itself used to make an attribution of being in
a TOT state, this could lead to a greater likelihood of a TOT
experience in the fluent font condition, explaining the association
between TOT states and font clarity or size estimates during
retrieval failure.
Three aspects of our data rule out this explanation. First, more
perceptible answer fonts did not increase TOT states for those
answers later. The probability of a TOT state was not higher for
unretrieved target words that were studied in dark font (M  .24,
SD .18) than light font (M .23, SD .20), t(31) 0.36, SE
.03, p  .72. The probability of a TOT state was also not signif-
icantly higher for unretrieved targets that had been presented in
large font (M  .27, SD  .20) than small font (M  .24, SD 
.23), t(48)  0.78, SE  .03, p  .44.
Second, when unable to retrieve a studied answer, participants
were also unable to retrieve its font clarity level or relative size.
Font clarity ratings given to unanswered questions whose answers
were studied were not higher when the answers were studied in
dark font (M  3.14, SD  1.82) than light font (M  3.45, SD 
1.74), t(31)  1.33, SE  .24, p  .20. Similarly, font size ratings
Figure 1. Mean judgments of the font clarity of unretrieved target words
during their retrieval failure (including failure to retrieve partial target
information) as a function of reported tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states.
Higher ratings indicate a judged greater likelihood that the unretrieved
target was previously presented in a darker, clearer font. Each error bar
represents the standard error of the mean.
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were not significantly higher when the answers were studied in
large font (M 3.62, SD 1.53) than small font (M 3.40, SD
1.64) font, t(48)  1.39, SE  .16, p  .17.
Finally, among test trials for which the unretrieved answer had
not even been studied, participants still gave higher font clarity
ratings when reporting a TOT state than when not, t(31)  4.04,
SE  .42, Cohen’s d  .73, p  .001 (see the right-hand side of
Figure 1), and higher font size ratings when reporting a TOT state
than when not, t(48)  2.88, SE  .31, Cohen’s d  .42, p  .006
(see the right-hand side of Figure 2).
Some might wonder if participants somehow recognize when an
unretrieved word was not on the study list, then give low ratings on
such trials as a way of indicating that those items are “less clear”
in memory. The ability to recognize whether an unretrieved word
was studied or not is the aforementioned recognition-without-
identification effect (e.g., Cleary & Specker, 2007; Cleary, 2006;
Cleary & Reyes, 2009; Cleary et al., 2014). Given that recognition-
without-identification is a well-established finding, it is plausible
that participants might use their sense of whether an unretrieved
target was studied to give font clarity or size judgments. However,
the old-new discrimination that characterizes the recognition-
without-identification effect did not occur in the present study;
neither the font clarity nor font size ratings showed the target
old-new discriminability that characterizes the recognition-
without-identification effect (Figures 1 and 2). In short, partici-
pants were not basing their font clarity or size judgments for
unretrieved targets on recognition of the study-status of those
targets.
Unlike for unretrieved answers, for retrieved answers partici-
pants used a heuristic whereby if they recognized that the answer
was not studied (perhaps upon its retrieval it had no corresponding
visual episodic representation), they tended to infer that it was
probably less clear (or smaller). Font clarity ratings for retrieved
nonstudied targets were significantly lower (M 5.17, SD 2.23)
than for retrieved studied targets, whether studied in darker font
(M  7.02, SD  1.74), t(31)  4.72, SE  .39, Cohen’s d  .85,
p  .001, or lighter font (M  6.65, SD  2.03), t(31)  3.72,
SE  .40, Cohen’s d  .67, p  .001. Font size ratings were
significantly lower for retrieved nonstudied targets (M  4.43,
SD  1.69) than for retrieved targets studied in the larger font
(M 6.60, SD 1.78), t(48) 7.76, SE .28, Cohen’s d 1.12,
p  .001; however, ratings did not differ between retrieved targets
studied in the smaller font (M  4.43, SD  1.88) and nonstudied
retrieved targets, t(48)  0.003, SE  .29, p  .997. Among
studied targets that were retrieved, participants’ font clarity ratings
did not differ significantly for targets studied in darker versus
lighter fonts, t(31)  1.52, SE  .24, p  .14. However, partici-
pants did give higher font size ratings to retrieved targets that were
studied in larger font than to those studied in smaller font, t(48) 
7.09, SE  .31, Cohen’s d  1.02, p  .001.
The means also suggest that target retrieval success versus
failure was a piece of information used in deciding on the rating
(i.e., an inference that because the target word does not come to
mind, it must be less clear in memory). As evidenced above, the
mean font clarity and font size ratings for retrieved targets were
higher than the midpoint of the scale, whereas the means for
unretrieved targets tended to fall on the lower end of the scale. This
pattern is typical in research comparing study-status judgments
given during retrieval success versus failure (e.g., Cleary, 2006);
here, it is occurring with clarity and size judgments.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined whether the TOT heuristic demon-
strated in Experiments 1a and 1b would extend to word frequency
judgments for unretrieved targets. Word frequency is an indicator
of a word’s fluency; more frequently occurring words are easier to
access than less frequently occurring words (e.g., Hertwig, Herzog,
Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981).
Though low frequency words may be more likely to elicit TOTs
than high frequency words (e.g., Burke et al., 1991), if participants
are inclined to infer from a TOT state a heightened state of
accessibility for the unretrieved target relative to when no TOT
state is present, they may infer from the presence of a TOT state
a greater likelihood of the unretrieved target being of higher
frequency.
Method
Participants. Forty Colorado State University students partic-
ipated in exchange for credit toward a course; one was lost for not
doing the task.
Materials. Stimuli were the same as in Experiments 1a and 1b
with the exception that all study words were presented in 18 point
black font. Target words were counterbalanced across participants
for study-status assignment.
The target answers were submitted to the English Lexicon
Project Web Site (Balota et al., 2007) to determine their word
frequency indices. The majority (71/80) of the target answers’
HAL frequency indices were available. Of these, the HAL fre-
quency (M  730.63, SD  541.82) range was 7–1966; the log
HAL frequency (M  6.22, SD  1.06) range was 1.95–7.58,
Thus, our overall pool of target answers was generally low in word
frequency, which is not surprising, given that they are from a pool
intended to elicit TOT experiences.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1a
and 1b except that the ratings pertaining to each unretrieved target
Figure 2. Mean judgments of the font size of unretrieved target words
during their retrieval failure (including failure to retrieve partial target
information) as a function of reported TOT states. Higher ratings indicate
a judged greater likelihood that the unretrieved target word was previously
presented in a larger font. Each error bar represents the standard error of the
mean.
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at test were judgments of the likelihood of a higher versus lower
frequency target word (0  definitely less frequent, 10  defi-
nitely more frequent).
Results and Discussion
Although our pool of targets was generally low in word fre-
quency, frequency still had an impact on target retrievability as
well as on participants’ judgments of relative frequency for re-
trieved targets. We performed a median split to divide the target
words into relative frequency categories of high (M  6.98, SD 
0.39) and low (M  5.44, SD  0.97) HAL log frequency (the
median item was placed into the category to which it was closest—
the high category). The probability of fully retrieving the answer
was higher for high frequency (M  .44, SD  .14) than for low
frequency (M  .33, SD  .15) targets, t(38)  8.21, SE  .01,
Cohen’s d  1.33, p  .001. Participants also discerned relative
word frequency among retrieved targets; they gave higher fre-
quency ratings to high (M  6.25, SD  2.41) than to low (M 
5.97, SD  2.29) frequency retrieved targets, t(38)  2.76, SE 
.10, Cohen’s d  .45, p  .01.
This was not the case for unretrieved targets: Participants did
not give higher frequency ratings to unretrieved targets from the
high frequency category (M 3.71, SD 1.71) than to those from
the low frequency category (M  3.71, SD  1.63), t(38)  0.02,
SE  .12, p  .99. In short, participants were unable to detect
relative word frequency for targets that they failed to identify.
Their frequency ratings also did not demonstrate the target old-
new discriminability that characterizes the recognition-without-
identification effect, as they did not give higher frequency ratings
to studied (M  3.52, SD  1.57) than to nonstudied (M  3.70,
SD  1.65) targets, t(38)  1.58, SE  .12, p  .12.
Turning to our primary question: Evidence of a TOT heuristic
was found. As shown in Figure 3, participants judged an unre-
trieved target as more likely to be of higher frequency when in a
TOT state than when not (note that four participants did not report
a TOT state in every condition, and thus were lost from this
analysis). A 2  2 TOT-state (TOT vs. non-TOT)  Study-status
(target word studied vs. target word nonstudied) repeated measures
ANOVA performed on the word frequency ratings given during
retrieval failure revealed a main effect of TOT state, F(1, 34) 
39.19,MSE 3.20, p2 .54,.001 (other Fs 1.0). (The mean
number of TOT states reported was 5.09 for the TOT studied
condition and 6.66 for TOT nonstudied condition.) This TOT
heuristic is interesting given that the probability of reporting a
TOT state for the unretrieved target words did not differ between
the high (M  .26, SD  .18) and low frequency (M  .26, SD 
.15) categories, t(34)  0.24, SE  .02, p  .82. Overall, these
findings suggest that participants assumed that the presence of a
TOT state indicated a greater likelihood that the unretrieved target
word was a higher frequency word, even though this was not so.
This is consistent with the idea that participants view a TOT state
as indicating a heightened state of accessibility for the unretrieved
target relative to when a TOT state for it does not occur.
General Discussion
People often erroneously use currently available information as
a heuristic for making unrelated judgments (e.g., Rhodes & Castel,
2008; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Xuan,
Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007). We investigated a new heuristic that
we call the TOT heuristic, whereby people use the presence of a
current TOT state to make inferences regarding the characteristics
of the unretrieved information. The experiments reported here
suggest that people infer from the presence of a TOT state char-
acteristics of the unretrieved information that are consistent with
higher fluency or accessibility. When in a TOT state, people
judged an unretrieved target as more likely to have previously
appeared in a darker, clearer font (Experiment 1a) or a larger font
(Experiment 1b); they also judged the unretrieved target as more
likely to be of higher word frequency (Experiment 2). The full set
of results reported here suggest that the association between re-
ported TOT states and these judgments was not the result of more
fluent or accessible memory representations underlying TOT states
than non-TOT states. Instead, participants appear to attribute the
TOT state itself to an increased likelihood that the unretrieved
word had more fluent or accessible traits. In short, TOT states
themselves seem to confer a sense of perceptibility or fluency on
inaccessible words, rather than vice versa.
During retrieval failure, why should a TOT state lead to the
sense of a more fluently accessible word in memory relative to a
non-TOT state? It is important to consider that the very definition
of a TOT state is that the person feels on the verge of accessing a
currently unretrievable word (e.g., Schwartz, 2001); this implies a
sense of heightened accessibility for unretrieved words that elicit
TOT states relative to unretrieved words that do not. From this
perspective, it makes sense that people might assume from the
presence of a TOT state that the unretrieved word has qualities that
are consistent with heightened accessibility relative to when an
unretrieved word does not elicit a TOT state.
Though our paradigm used a study/test-list methodology, the
TOT heuristic reported here likely extends to real-world situations.
Judgments of word frequency, for example, do not require a study
list. In fact, the study list had little impact in the present study.
Thus, the TOT heuristic would likely extend to a situation in which
no study list preceded the general knowledge questions (partici-
Figure 3. Mean judgments of relative word frequency of unretrieved
target words during their retrieval failure (including failure to retrieve
partial target information) as a function of reported TOT states. Higher
ratings indicate a judged greater likelihood that the unretrieved target word
was a higher frequency word. Each error bar represents the standard error
of the mean.
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pants would likely still show higher judgments of frequency during
TOT than non-TOT states). Regarding perceptual clarity judg-
ments, consider a situation in which a witness to a crime is pressed
to remember the word printed on the side of a van that was
involved. The person cannot remember the word, but is asked to
indicate anything else memorable about it: Was the word light or
dark? Was it large or small? The TOT heuristic might lead the
person to make incorrect inferences about the appearance, size,
quality, or other characteristics of the unretrieved information.
The fact that people use TOT states to make inferences about the
characteristics of unretrieved information has important implica-
tions for the study of (and theoretical understanding of) TOT
states. Widely held TOT theories generally assume that TOT states
result largely from attributions that people make based on other
available information, such as retrieval of some of the unretrieved
word’s attributes (see Schwartz, 2002; Schwartz &Metcalfe, 2011,
for a review). It has not been previously considered in the literature
that the presence of a TOT state itself might be used to infer
characteristics or qualities regarding the unretrieved information.
Our demonstration of a robust TOT heuristic in making inferences
about the characteristics of unretrieved target words underscores
the need for teasing apart instances of actual access to a word’s
attributes and instances of mere inference of those attributes from
the TOT state itself.
For example, in research claiming that participants have access
to partial target information during TOT states, it will be important
to demonstrate that the partial access is driving the TOT state and
not vice versa (that the TOT state is actually driving the report of
partial access via the TOT heuristic). It is possible that there are
cases in which TOT states themselves are used to infer certain high
frequency or high fluency word attributes that may indeed occur
with a high probability in the world and make it seem as if partial
target word access is occurring when it is not—it is merely an
inference being made. For example, if participants are likely to
infer high frequency letters or phonemes from the presence of a
TOT, this may lead to a higher probability of being correct some
of the time than if the guessing was truly random; this could inflate
the apparent degree to which participants actually have direct
partial access to target attributes during a TOT state.
As a specific example, many more English words start with the
letter “t” than start with the letter “j” (Project Gutenberg data).
Thus, it is possible that when asked to guess the first letter of an
inaccessible word when in a TOT state, participants may be more
likely to choose high frequency first letters like “t” (because of the
fluency or accessibility) than lower frequency first letters like “j.”
Because many more words actually do start with “t” than with “j,”
participants have a higher probability of being right when guessing
“t” than when guessing “j.” Thus, the mere fact that participants
may select the correct first letter more often during TOT states
than during non-TOT states is not sufficient evidence of partial
access—it may be that participants are using the TOT state to
make the inference regarding the first letter, choosing letters that
are more fluent or accessible, and thus, more probable. In short, the
present findings highlight the importance of disentangling any type
of direct partial target access during reported TOT states from the
use of a TOT heuristic to infer those attributes.
Future research should examine whether participants use the
TOT heuristic to infer other qualities and characteristics of the
unretrieved target, such as the number of words in an unretrieved
name (e.g., Hanley & Chapman, 2008), a word’s length, or the
likelihood that the word starts with a more versus a less frequent
first letter or sound. Given the proposed role of partial attribute
access in other metacognitive states, such as feelings-of-knowing
(e.g., Nomi & Cleary, 2012), future studies should also examine
whether similar heuristics are used with such other states. In short,
future research should not only further examine the TOT heuristic,
but also what other types of metacognitive states might also be
used to make similar inferences.
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Searching for Explanations: How the Internet Inflates Estimates of
Internal Knowledge
Matthew Fisher, Mariel K. Goddu, and Frank C. Keil
Yale University
As the Internet has become a nearly ubiquitous resource for acquiring knowledge about the world,
questions have arisen about its potential effects on cognition. Here we show that searching the Internet
for explanatory knowledge creates an illusion whereby people mistake access to information for their
own personal understanding of the information. Evidence from 9 experiments shows that searching for
information online leads to an increase in self-assessed knowledge as people mistakenly think they have
more knowledge “in the head,” even seeing their own brains as more active as depicted by functional
MRI (fMRI) images.
Keywords: transactive memory, explanation, knowledge
Just as a walking stick or a baseball glove can supplement the
functioning of the body, cognitive tools, computational instru-
ments, and external information sources can supplement the func-
tioning of the mind. The mind can often increase efficiency and
power by utilizing outside sources; for tasks like memory, it can
rely on cognitive prostheses, such as a diary or a photo album.
These external archives can become necessary components of an
interdependent memory system (Harris, 1978).
The mind can also become dependent on other minds. When
others serve as externalized repositories of information, transactive
memory systems can emerge (Wegner, 1987). In these systems,
information is distributed across a group such that individuals are
responsible for knowing a specified area of expertise. For instance,
one person could be responsible for knowing where to find food
while another knows how to prepare it. Members of the systems
must also track where the rest of the knowledge is stored. Thus,
these systems consist of two key elements: internal memory
(“What do I know?”) and external memory (“Who knows what?”)
(Hollingshead, 1998; 2001). By reducing redundancy, transactive
memory systems work to encode, store, and retrieve information
more effectively than could be done by any individual.
Transactive memory systems explain how intimate couples
(Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985) and familiar groups (Kozlow-
ski & Ilgen, 2006; Peltokorpi, 2008) divide cognitive labor and
perform efficiently. These systems can form even with complete
strangers, as stereotypes can serve as “defaults” or proxies for
another person’s expertise (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991).
Better performing memory systems can emerge through commu-
nication strategies that allocate domains of knowledge to individ-
uals in the network. Increased group coordination leads to better
problem solving than in comparable groups of strangers (Holling-
shead, 1998; Littlepage, Robison, & Reddington, 1997). This
communication can take place through explicit negotiation (e.g.,
“you remember the first 3 digits, I will remember the last 4”), but
often occurs implicitly. As a relationship develops, members of the
system with higher relative self-disclosed expertise will become
responsible for knowledge in that domain. Similarly, an individual
with access to unique information will become responsible for that
information (Wegner, 1987). When groups have not developed
these dependencies, decision-making in real-world interactions can
be worse than individuals’ decisions (Hill, 1982).
Transactive memory may have origins in children’s early
emerging abilities to navigate the social world and access knowl-
edge in others’ minds. External sources of knowledge, especially
parents, teachers, and other social partners, play an integral role in
children’s conceptual development (Gelman, 2009). Information
learned from others also exerts a powerful influence over chil-
dren’s notions of what to accept as true—for example, the exis-
tence of germs or Santa Claus (Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher, &
Pons, 2006). From an early age, children show an emerging but
initially limited ability to navigate the terrain of distributed knowl-
edge (Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008). With age
they become aware of the breadth, depth, and epistemic limitations
inherent to particular kinds of expertise (Danovitch & Keil, 2004).
These types of early emerging sensitivities to the content and
limitations of other minds may underlie adult transactive memory.
A growing body of theoretical and empirical work suggests that
transactive memory systems can be technological as well as social.
Though these systems are typically thought to be composed of
human minds, our reliance on technology, like the Internet, may
form a system bearing many similarities to knowledge dependen-
cies in the social world. The Internet is the largest repository of
human knowledge and makes vast amounts of interconnected
information easily available to human minds. People quickly be-
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come accustomed to outsourcing cognitive tasks to the Internet.
They remember where to find information and rely on the Internet
to store the actual information (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011).
This evidence suggests that the Internet can become a part of
transactive memory; people rely on information they know they
can find online and thus track external memory (who knows the
answer), but do not retain internal memory (the actual answer).
The Internet has been described as a “supernormal stimulus” in
that its breadth and immediacy far surpass any naturally occurring
transactive partner to which our minds might have adapted (Ward,
2013a). Even if the Internet lacks the agency of human transactive
memory partners, it shares many of their features and may thus be
easily treated as their cognitive equivalent. Compared with a
human transactive memory partner, the Internet is more accessible,
has more expertise, and can provide access to more information
than an entire human transactive memory network. These features
leave Internet users with very little responsibility for internal
knowledge and may even reduce the extent to which users rely on
social others in traditional, interpersonal transactive memory sys-
tems.
In a sense, a transactive memory partnership with the Internet is
totally one-sided: the Internet stores all the knowledge, and the
human is never queried for knowledge. Furthermore, there is no
need to negotiate responsibility because the Internet is the expert in
all domains. However, to access knowledge in the transactive
memory system, the Internet user must navigate the Internet’s
information in much the same way that one transactive memory
partner might know about and query the knowledge contained in
another’s mind. This interactive aspect of accessing knowledge on
the Internet distinguishes it from the way our minds access other
information sources. With its unique, supernormal characteristics
that allow us to access it much the same way we access human
minds, the Internet might be more similar to an ideal memory
partner than a mere external storage device. In short, the cognitive
systems may well be in place for users to treat the Internet as
functionally equivalent to an all-knowing expert in a transactive
memory system.
The particular features of the Internet may make it difficult for
users to clearly differentiate internally and externally stored infor-
mation. In most cases of information search, the boundary between
information stored “in the head” and information out in the world
is quite clear. When we do not know something ourselves, we must
take the time and effort to query another source for the answer. If
we go to the library to find a fact or call a friend to recall a
memory, it is quite clear that the information we seek is not
accessible within our own minds. When we go to the Internet in
search of an answer, it seems quite clear that we are we con-
sciously seeking outside knowledge. In contrast to other external
sources, however, the Internet often provides much more imme-
diate and reliable access to a broad array of expert information.
Might the Internet’s unique accessibility, speed, and expertise
cause us to lose track of our reliance upon it, distorting how we
view our own abilities?
One consequence of an inability to monitor one’s reliance on the
Internet may be that users become miscalibrated regarding their
personal knowledge. Self-assessments can be highly inaccurate,
often occurring as inflated self-ratings of competence, with most
people seeing themselves as above average (Alicke, Klotz, Breit-
enbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Dunning, 2005; Pronin,
2009). For example, people overestimate their own ability to offer
a quality explanation even in familiar domains (Alter, Oppen-
heimer, & Zemla, 2010; Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013;
Fisher & Keil, 2014; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). Similar illusions of
competence may emerge as individuals become immersed in trans-
active memory networks. They may overestimate the amount of
information contained in their network, producing a “feeling of
knowing,” even when the content is inaccessible (Hart, 1965;
Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). In other words, they may conflate the
knowledge for which their partner is responsible with the knowl-
edge that they themselves possess (Wegner, 1987). And in the case
of the Internet, an especially immediate and ubiquitous memory
partner, there may be especially large knowledge overestimations.
As people underestimate how much they are relying on the Inter-
net, success at finding information on the Internet may be con-
flated with personally mastered information, leading Internet users
to erroneously include knowledge stored outside their own heads
as their own. That is, when participants access outside knowledge
sources, they may become systematically miscalibrated regarding
the extent to which they rely on their transactive memory partner.
It is not that they misattribute the source of their knowledge, they
could know full well where it came from, but rather they may
inflate the sense of how much of the sum total of knowledge is
stored internally.
We present evidence from nine experiments that searching the
Internet leads people to conflate information that can be found
online with knowledge “in the head.” One’s self-assessed ability to
answer questions increased after searching for explanations online
in a previous, unrelated task (Experiment 1a and b), an effect that
held even after controlling for time, content, and features of the
search process (Experiments 1c). The effect derives from a true
misattribution of the sources of knowledge, not a change in un-
derstanding of what counts as internal knowledge (Experiment 2a
and b) and is not driven by a “halo effect” or general overconfi-
dence (Experiment 3). We provide evidence that this effect occurs
specifically because information online can so easily be accessed
through search (Experiment 4a–c).
Experiment 1a
Experiment 1a used a between-subjects design to test whether
searching the Internet for explanations leads to higher subsequent
ratings for the ability to answer entirely different questions in
unrelated domains. In one condition, participants used the Internet
to find the answers to common explanatory knowledge questions;
then, in the second phase, they evaluated their ability to explain the
answers to unrelated sets of questions in various domains of
knowledge. In the other condition, participants were asked not to
use the Internet in the initial induction portion of the study and
then, in the second phase, assessed their ability to explain the same
unrelated questions seen by the participants who had used the
Internet.
Method
Participants. Two hundred two participants (119 men, 83
women, MAge  32.59, SD  12.01) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Rand,
2012). Based on pilot testing, it was determined that a sample size
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of 75–100 participants per condition would be required to detect an
effect. Once the requested amount of participants completed the
experiment, data collection ended. Five participants were elimi-
nated for failing to follow the instructions to look up answers
online; failure to follow instructions was assessed via participants’
answers to the following question at the end of the survey: “For
how many of the trivia questions at the beginning of this survey
did you use the Internet to find the answer? Please answer hon-
estly, this will aid us in our research.” Participants in the no
Internet condition who chose any number greater than zero were
eliminated, and participants in the Internet condition who chose
any number fewer than four were eliminated. Participants did not
complete multiple experiments; each experiment contains a unique
naïve sample. Informed consent was obtained from all participants
in all experiments.
Procedure and design. Experiment 1a consisted of two con-
ditions, each with two components: induction and self-assessment.
During the induction phase, participants were either instructed to
use the Internet to find explanations to common questions (Internet
condition) or were instructed not to use the Internet to find the
answers to those same questions (no Internet condition). During
the second, entirely separate self-assessment phase, participants in
both conditions were asked to evaluate how well they could
explain the answers to groups of questions in a variety of domains.
These questions were entirely unrelated to the questions in the
induction phase.
In the induction phase, participants in the Internet condition saw
a random subset of four out of six questions about explanatory
knowledge such as, “How does a zipper work?” and were asked to
search the Internet to “confirm the details of the explanation” (see
Appendix A for the full set of questions and Appendix B for the
exact instructions). The question contained the phrase “confirm the
details” because the explanations were common enough that most
people could offer some account without looking up the compre-
hensive answer. The idea was that participants should have some
sense of the answers they were searching for, such that they might
more readily and consistently inflate their internal knowledge with
the knowledge they were accessing. For this reason, all induction
questions were selected from a group of Google autocompleted
queries beginning with “Why” and “How”; the questions were
selected through piloting with both Internet and no Internet con-
dition instructions to avoid possible ceiling and floor effects. After
finding a good explanation for each of the induction questions in
this first phase of the experiment, participants in the Internet
condition reported the URL of the “most helpful website” and
rated their ability to explain the answer to the question on a 1 (very
poorly) to 7 (very well) Likert scale. Participants in the no Internet
condition viewed the same random subset of questions and were
asked to rate their ability to explain the answers to the questions
“without using any outside sources.” The purpose of asking par-
ticipants to rate how well they could explain the answers to the
induction questions in this first phase was to track likely differ-
ences between confidence in no Internet users and Internet users,
who might feel more sure of the answers after looking them up.
During the second phase, the self-assessment phase, all partic-
ipants rated their ability to answer questions about knowledge in
six domains unrelated to the questions posed in the induction
phase: weather, science, American history, food, health treatments,
and the human body. For each set, participants considered four
questions, for example, “Why are there more Atlantic hurricanes in
August and September?”, “How do tornadoes form?”, “Why are
cloudy nights warmer?” (see Appendix C for complete list of
questions for each domain set). Participants were asked, “How
well could you answer detailed questions about [topic] similar to
these?” on a 1 (very poorly) to 7 (very well) Likert scale.
Results
Participants who had looked up explanations on the Internet in
the induction phase rated themselves as being able to give signif-
icantly better explanations to the questions in the unrelated do-
mains during the self-assessment phase (M  3.61, SD  1.27,
95% confidence interval [CI]  [3.40, 3.91]) than those who had
not used the Internet (M  3.07, SD  1.06, 95% CI  [2.88,
3.27]), t(195)  3.24, p  .001, Cohen’s d  0.50 (Figure 1). The
effect was observable across all six domains for which participants
were asked to assess their knowledge.
However, participants in the Internet condition spent longer in
the induction phase (M 214.40 s, SD 129.93) than participants
in the no Internet condition (M  26.26 s, SD  26.26), t(195) 
14.65, p  .001. Extended reflection on the initial questions may
have increased explanatory confidence, accounting for the differ-
ence between conditions. Furthermore, participants in the Internet
condition rated themselves as having a better ability to explain the
items in the induction phase (M  5.00, SD  1.42) than those in
the no Internet condition (M  3.34, SD  1.19), t(195)  8.90,
p  .001.
In addition, the results of this experiment failed to address the
possibility that Internet use was not inflating Internet condition
participants’ confidence in their knowledge, but rather that the No
Internet participants’ self-assessed knowledge ratings were de-
flated from baseline by lack of Internet use. Experiment 1b was
designed to test whether the Internet participants’ self-assessed
knowledge ratings were in fact rising from a baseline.
Experiment 1b
Experiment 1b used a nearly identical design to Experiment 1a;
the key difference was that this experiment added a self-
assessment phase prior to the induction phase for both the Internet
and the no Internet conditions. This additional knowledge self-
assessment phase was identical to the second phase of Experiment
1a: It asked participants to evaluate their knowledge about differ-
ent domains with representative questions through the question,
“How well could you answer detailed questions about [topic]
similar to these?” Participants provided ratings on a 1 (very poorly)
to 7 (very well) Likert scale. Because this preinduction self-
assessment phase was also identical to the third phase of this new
Experiment 1b, its addition was intended to allow for direct com-
parison between pre- and postinduction self-assessed knowledge
ratings, testing whether the observed effect (the difference in
postinduction self-assessed knowledge ratings between the Inter-
net and no Internet conditions) occurred because Internet use
inflated users’ confidence from baseline or because a lack of
Internet use deflated confidence from baseline in the no Internet
condition. Because Internet use is quite widespread in the United
States, with more than 71.1% of households reporting accessing
the Internet in 2011, we wanted to determine the directionality of
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the effect (File, 2013). This was perhaps especially important
given that our participants were Amazon Mechanical Turk workers
who are presumably heavier Internet users than average.
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-two participants (76 men, 76
women, MAge  32.14, SD  10.24) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Ten
participants were eliminated for not following instructions in the
induction phase to look up answers online, as judged by their
responses to the “Internet check” question at the end (“For how
many of the trivia questions at the beginning of this survey did you
alter the search provided in the link to find the answer? Please
answer honestly, this will aid us in our research”).
Procedure and design. Experiment 1b used the same design
as Experiment 1a but also included an additional, preinduction
self-assessment. During the preinduction self-assessment phase,
participants in both the Internet and the no Internet conditions were
asked to evaluate how well they could explain the answers to
questions about specific subject matter (these questions were iden-
tical to the self-assessment questions in Experiment 1a and may be
viewed in full in Appendix C). Next, during the induction phase,
and exactly as in Experiment 1a, participants either used the
Internet to find explanations to common questions or were shown
the same questions with instructions not to use the Internet to find
the answers. Finally, in the postinduction self-assessment phase,
participants responded to the same set of questions from the
preinduction self-assessment phase.
Results
There was no difference in the preinduction self-assessment
baseline ratings between the Internet (M  3.21, SD  1.16, 95%
CI  [3.08, 3.34]) and the no Internet condition (M  3.21, SD 
1.33, 95% CI  [3.04, 3.37]), t(140)  0.04, p  .99. Repli-
cating the results from Experiment 1a, participants who looked for
explanations on the Internet during the induction phase rated
themselves as being able to be give significantly better explana-
tions in the unrelated domains during the postinduction self-
assessment phase (M  3.63, SD  1.52, 95% CI  [3.44, 3.81])
than participants who had not used the Internet (M  3.15, SD 
1.21, 95% CI  [2.96, 3.29]), t(140)  2.1, p  .05, Cohen’s
d  0.35 (Figure 1). The effect was observable across all six
domains for which participants were asked to assess their knowl-
edge, consistent with the account that the baseline of self-assessed
knowledge is systematically inflated because of Internet use.
Just as in Experiment 1a, however, participants in the Internet
condition spent longer in the induction phase (M  196.24 sec-
onds, SD  166.31) than participants in the no Internet condition
(M  28.75 seconds, SD  21.67), t(140)  7.17, p  .001. And
just as in Experiment 1a, participants in the Internet condition rated
themselves as having a better ability to explain the items in the
induction phase (M  4.18, SD  1.58) than those in the no
Internet condition (M  3.56, SD  1.34), t(140)  2.50, p  .05.
Experiment 1c addressed these confounds by equating both time
spent in the induction task and amount of learning (i.e., self-
assessed ability to explain induction questions) during the induc-
tion task across conditions.
Experiment 1c
The results of Experiment 1a and b provided initial evidence for
an effect whereby searching the Internet for explanations results in
an increase from baseline in self-assessed knowledge for unrelated
domains. However, in those experiments, both time spent in the
induction phase and information learned during the induction
phase may have accounted for the difference between the Internet
and no Internet conditions. Experiment 1c sought to rule out these
alternative explanations.
Experiment 1c was designed to match both the amount of time
spent and the content (i.e., the explanations viewed in the induction
phase) across the Internet and no Internet conditions. The design of
Experiment 1c also addressed a third possibility: that features of
autonomous searching behaviors (including source scrutiny, a
sense of self-directed learning, etc.) could explain the difference in
self-assessed knowledge ratings between the conditions.
Method
Participants. Two hundred four participants (120 men, 84
women, MAge  32.85, SD  10.29) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Nine
participants were eliminated for failing to look up the answers to
the questions in the Internet condition, as assessed by the Internet
check question at the end of the survey.
Procedure and design. The design for Experiment 1c was
identical to that of Experiment 1a, with three changes. First,
participants in the Internet condition were provided with specific
instructions for how to find each explanation to the induction
questions, thereby constraining their searching to prespecified
sources. For example, participants in the Internet condition were
asked, “Why are there dimples on a golf ball?” and instructed,
“Please search for the scientificamerican.com page with this in-
formation.” We specifically selected these web sources because
they contained primarily textual content and included little or no
graphics.
Participants in the no Internet condition were provided with the
exact text from the same websites for which Internet participants
were instructed to search. (In contrast, in Experiments 1a and b, the
no Internet participants received no information at all about the
questions in the induction phase.) Because the websites from
which the explanations were drawn were specially selected for
their heavy textual content, this ensured that participants across
conditions viewed the same explanatory content, controlling for
the amount of new information participants accessed during the
induction phase across conditions.
Last, because the results of a separate pilot study showed that
participants took an average of 12.6 s to find the webpage listed in
the instructions, Experiment 1c also introduced a 12.6-s delay
before explanations were displayed for participants in the no
Internet condition, thereby controlling for time spent in the induc-
tion phase.
Participants in the Internet condition were excluded either if
they failed to provide the URL of the intended page or if they
provided any URL different from the intended page for any ques-
tion in the induction phase.
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Results
Participants in the Internet condition spent the same number of
time on each explanation (M  68.00 s) as participants in the no
Internet condition (M  73.36s), t(193)  1.01, p  .31.
Once again, participants in the Internet condition provided
higher self-assessments of knowledge postinduction (M  3.78,
SD  1.19, 95% CI  [3.54, 4.03]) than participants in the no
Internet condition (M  3.07, SD  1.12, 95% CI  [2.85, 3.28]),
t(193)  4.30, p  .001, Cohen’s d  0.63 (Figure 1).
Though the explanatory content viewed in the induction phase
was exactly matched across conditions, when asked how well they
could explain the questions in the induction phase, participants in
the Internet condition gave higher ratings (M  5.07 SD  0.99)
than participants in the no Internet condition (M  4.33, SD 
1.33), t(193)  4.33, p  .001. A linear regression model,
controlling for self-rated ability to explain the questions in the
induction phase, B  .039,   .41, p  .001, showed experi-
mental condition to still be a significant predictor of knowledge
self-assessments, B  .042,   .17, p  .01. Even though
participants in the Internet condition rated their ability to explain
the induction questions higher than those in the no Internet con-
dition, this difference did not explain the difference in knowledge
ratings in the self-assessment phase.
Notably, in addition to equating for time spent and exact content
accessed during the induction phase, the results of Experiment 1c
suggest that features of autonomous searching such as evaluating,
comparing, or choosing between multiple sources of information
cannot explain the effect because participants in the Internet con-
dition were told exactly where to go to retrieve their explanatory
information.
Discussion
Across three studies, Experiment 1 demonstrated that searching
for explanations online increases self-assessed knowledge in un-
related domains. The effect is observed even when time spent in
the induction phase is the same for participants in both Internet and
no Internet conditions, when the content viewed across conditions
is identical, and when Internet condition participants’ autonomous
search behavior is restricted through the assignment of a particular
web source.
Experiment 2a
Participants in the Internet and no Internet conditions in Exper-
iments 1a–c could have interpreted the dependent measure differ-
ently. That is, the phrasing of the dependent measure (“How well
could you explain the answers to questions similar to these about
[topic]?”) may have left the meaning of “you” open to interpreta-
tion. If participants in the Internet condition were considering both
the knowledge in their heads and online information when assess-
ing their ability to answer questions in various domains, then it
would be entirely unsurprising that they deemed themselves more
knowledgeable. Experiments 2a and b were designed to resolve
this ambiguity inherent to the phrasing of the dependent measure
in Experiments 1a–c, thus allowing for more accurate interpreta-
tions of findings from those experiments.
Method
Participants. Two hundred three participants (99 men, 104
women, MAge  33.24, SD  11.35) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Eleven
participants were eliminated for either not looking up the answers
to the questions in the Internet condition or using the Internet to
look up answers to the questions in the no Internet condition as
determined by answers to the end-of-survey Internet check
question.
Procedure and design. In Experiment 2a, a new dependent
measure replaced those used in the self-assessment phase of
Experiment 1. Instead of asking participants to rate how well
they could answer questions about topics using a Likert scale
ranging from 1 (very poorly) to 7 (very well), participants were
shown a scale consisting of seven functional MRI (fMRI)
images of varying levels of activation, as illustrated by colored
regions of increasing size (Figure 2). Participants were told,
“Scientists have shown that increased activity in certain brain
regions corresponds with higher quality explanations.” This
dependent variable was designed to unambiguously emphasize
one’s brain as the location of personally held knowledge. Par-
ticipants were then asked to select the image that would corre-
spond with their brain activity when they answered the self-
assessed knowledge questions in each of the six domains. To
further ensure that participants accurately interpreted this new
dependent measure as pertaining to their own, independently
held knowledge, at the end of the experiment participants
explained all of the factors they considered when making judg-
ments about their brain activity via free response. The proce-
dure was otherwise identical to Experiment 1a.
Results
Replicating the effect found in Experiment 1, participants in the
Internet condition chose the images with more brain activity (M 
4.66, SD  .99, 95% CI  [4.40, 4.83]) than those in the no
Internet condition (M  4.12, SD  1.13, 95% CI  [3.94, 4.39]),
t(190)  3.52, p  .001, Cohen’s d  0.43 (Figure 1).
Two independent raters coded free responses about the factors
participants considered when making judgments about their brain
activity and found that Internet participants were not considering
knowledge online when making their ratings in the self-assessment
phase. When asked what they did consider, 41% spontaneously
mentioned their current knowledge, 37% the complexity of their
explanation, 30% the complexity of the question, 13% the amount
of thinking required, 17% other explanations, and only 2% cited
access to other sources. Interrater reliability was high (  .83,
p  .001) with disagreements resolved through discussion. Re-
moving participants who considered accessing outside sources as a
relevant factor had no effect on the significance of the results.
Experiment 2b
The findings of Experiment 2a suggested that participants in
both conditions had interpreted the dependent measure in the
self-assessment phase as intended—that is, as pertaining solely to
the knowledge they held in their heads, rather than to their own
knowledge plus knowledge accessible from outside sources. Ex-
periment 2b addressed the possibility of a misinterpretation of the
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dependent measures even more directly with instructions clarify-
ing that the ratings in the self-assessment phase should reflect the
participant’s current knowledge “without any outside sources.”
Method
Participants. One hundred ninety-nine participants (127 men,
72 women, MAge  31.42, SD  10.92) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Twelve
participants were eliminated for either not looking up the answers
to the questions in the Internet condition or using the Internet to
look up answers to the questions in the no Internet condition as
determined by the end-of-survey Internet check question.
Procedure and design. The procedure and design of Exper-
iment 2b were identical to those of Experiment 1a with one
difference: Each question from the self-assessment phase of the
experiment asked participants explicitly how well they could an-
swer questions about this topic “without any outside sources.” In
previous experiments, this phrase had appeared only in the instruc-
tions for the induction phase of the no Internet condition, not in
the self-assessment phase questions. The addition of this phrase
was intended to explicitly restrict participants’ judgments about
the boundaries of knowledge to include only their own internal
knowledge.
Results
Participants in the Internet condition rated their ability to answer
questions without using outside sources higher (M  3.41, SD 
1.47, 95% CI  [3.10, 3.72]) than participants in the no Internet
condition (M 2.94, SD 1.16, 95% CI [2.72, 3.16]), t(193)
4.30, p  .001, Cohen’s d  0.36 (Figure 1).
Discussion
The findings from Experiments 2a and b provide direct evidence
that participants interpreted the self-assessed knowledge questions
similarly across the Internet and no Internet conditions. In other
words, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that participants in the
Internet condition of these experiments and Experiment 1 did not
consider knowledge available online when rating their knowledge
in new domains during the self-assessment phase of the experi-
ment.
Experiment 3
A possible explanation for the observed effect is that using the
Internet to access explanations simply increases confidence in
one’s knowledge or abilities more generally. Experiment 3 was
designed to explore the possibility of such a “halo effect” by
replacing the topics in the self-assessment phase with explanatory
knowledge topics that are similar yet cannot be accessed using the
Internet. Detailed autobiographical knowledge is one of the few
forms of knowledge that cannot be found online yet closely mir-
rors the kind of explanatory questions used in the previous exper-
iments. If a difference between the self-assessed knowledge ratings
for the Internet and no Internet conditions still exists for these
questions, it would suggest that general overconfidence from In-
Figure 2. Measure of self-reported brain activity in Experiment 2a. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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Figure 1. Differences in self-assessed knowledge between the Internet and no Internet conditions for Exper-
iments 1–3. Error bars indicate mean  95% confidence interval (CI).
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ternet use could account for the results of Experiment 1–2. How-
ever, no difference between the conditions would be evidence for
a boundary condition of the phenomenon, indicating the previous
results are not explained by a “halo effect.”
Method
Participants. Three hundred two participants (194 men, 108
women, MAge  31.32, SD  9.86) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Twenty-
two participants were eliminated for either not looking up the
answers to the questions in the Internet condition or using the
Internet to look up answers to the questions in the no Internet
condition as determined by responses to the end-of-survey Internet
check question.
Procedure and design. In Experiment 3, we changed the type
of topics presented during the self-assessment phase of the exper-
iment. Instead of asking about explanatory questions that can be
answered using the Internet, we asked participants about autobio-
graphical explanatory knowledge for which the Internet would be
of no help. The six knowledge topics were personal history,
personal future, relationships, local culture, personal habits, and
emotions. For example, questions about relationships were, “Why
are you so close with your best friend?”; “How are you similar to
your mother?”; and, “How could you become friendlier with your
next door neighbor?” (see Appendix D for the full list of autobi-
ographical questions).
In pilot testing, participants viewed these autobiographical
knowledge self-assessment questions as significantly easier than
the explanatory self-assessment topics from Experiments 1–2 (pre-
sumably because they were much more familiar topics); so, we
included a second set of questions which were rated to be equally
as difficult as the explanatory knowledge questions from Experi-
ments 1–2. The difficult autobiographical questions were grouped
into the same categories as the easier autobiographical questions
and were chosen from the results of pilot tests in which self-
assessed knowledge ratings were similar to the self-assessment
questions used in Experiments 1–2 (see Appendix E for the full list
of the difficult autobiographical questions).
Experiment 3 thus used a 2 (Internet vs. no Internet) 2 (Easier
vs. Difficult) between-subjects design. Just as in previous experi-
ments, after the induction phase participants viewed six unrelated
knowledge topics (with three representative sample questions
each) and were then asked, “How well could you explain the
answer to questions about [topic] similar to these?” They provided
their responses on a 1 (very poorly) to 7 (very well) Likert scale.
Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that self-
assessed knowledge ratings for autobiographical questions were
the same after accessing the Internet (M  4.24, SD  1.33)
compared with not accessing the Internet (M  4.04, SD  1.38),
F(1, 276)  1.37, p  .30 (Figure 1). As expected, participants
gave higher ratings for the easier autobiographical questions (M 
4.91, SD  0.96) compared with the difficult autobiographical
questions (M  3.35, SD  1.25), F(1, 276)  134.21, p  .001.
There was no interaction, indicating that at both levels of diffi-
culty, using the Internet did not boost self-assessed knowledge for
questions that could not be found online.
Discussion
Experiment 3 suggests that accessing the Internet does not lead
to a general overconfidence, but rather to a more specific illusion
of knowledge that occurs only in domains where the Internet
would be of use. If induction time and induction content (Exper-
iment 1), imprecise interpretations of personally held knowledge
(Experiment 2), and general overconfidence effects (Experiment 3)
cannot explain the observed inflation of self-assessed knowledge,
what else might? Experiment 4 explores whether the process of
querying through Internet search might be the underlying mecha-
nism explaining the effect.
Experiment 4a
The findings from Experiments 1–3 raise important questions
about the locus of this effect. Experiment 4a provides evidence that
actively posing queries through Internet search engines is the
specific mechanism by which Internet usage causes an increase in
self-assessed knowledge. Experiment 4a was designed to investi-
gate (a) whether the effect persists when the act of searching is
removed from accessing explanations on the Internet and (b)
whether the effect persists even when less popular search engines
are used for searching. If there is no effect when the act of
searching is removed from accessing explanations yet remains
even when Internet users couple with unfamiliar “partners,” to-
gether these results would be strong evidence that active searching
is the element of Internet access that drives the observed effect in
which participants inflate their self-assessed knowledge after In-
ternet use.
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-seven participants (77 men,
80 women; MAge  31.94, SD  11.34) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Nine
participants were eliminated for failing to follow instructions by
using a search engine they were not instructed to use; this was
assessed using an end-of-survey Internet check question that ex-
plicitly asked participants whether they had used a search engine
other than the one they had been assigned (“For how many of the
trivia questions at the beginning of this survey did you alter the
search provided in the link to find the answer? Please answer
honestly, this will aid us in our research”).
Procedure and design. Experiment 4a contained two condi-
tions, each a variation on the design of Experiment 1c. The first
condition, the no search condition, was designed to test whether
there is an increase in knowledge self-assessments when the search
component is entirely removed from the induction task for partic-
ipants in the Internet condition. In this condition, participants saw
an experimental setup that was identical to that of the Internet
condition of Experiment 1c; however, instead of searching for the
answers to induction questions online themselves, participants in
this condition were provided with a link that took them directly to
the website with the explanation.
Second, the other search engines condition was designed to test
whether the effect might only occur using a search engine with
which one has successfully queried for knowledge in the past. If an
association between a particular search engine and successfully
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accessing knowledge drives the increase in self-assessed knowl-
edge in the Internet conditions of the previous experiments, then
using less popular search engines should yield a weaker effect (or
perhaps none at all). However, if actively querying an information-
rich source via search engine drives the effect, then participants
should increase their knowledge self-assessments after using any
search engine. The other search engine condition was identical to
the Internet condition of Experiment 1c, except that participants
were instructed to look up the answers to the induction questions
using one of the following 5 search engines (varying in popular-
ity): duckduckgo.com, blekko.com, ixquick.com, search.yahoo
.com, ask.com.
Results
Participants who used links to access information instead of
searching provided lower self-knowledge ratings (M 3.20, SD
0.99, 95% CI  [3.09, 3.31]) than participants who used other
search engines (M  3.63, SD  1.27, 95% CI  [3.49, 3.77]),
t(146)  2.28, p  .03, Cohen’s d  0.37. A one-way ANOVA
showed no difference in self-assessed knowledge across the dif-
ferent website that participants accessed, F(4, 77)  .63, p  .64.
Experiment 4b
The findings of Experiment 4a suggest that active search is
necessary in order for Internet usage to result in inflated estimates
of self-assessed knowledge. To further explore the account that
searching is the specific mechanism by which the effect occurs,
Experiment 4b investigated whether the effect still holds when
searching the Internet yields unhelpful information. Does self-
assessed knowledge increase even if the search engine does not
provide a satisfactory answer?
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-one participants (106 men,
45 women, MAge  29.79, SD  7.94) from the United States
completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Six
participants were eliminated for not following instructions by
removing the Google search filters; this was assessed using an
end-of-survey Internet check question that explicitly asked partic-
ipants whether they had removed the Google search filters (“For
how many of the trivia questions at the beginning of this survey
did you alter the search provided in the link to find the answer?
Please answer honestly, this will aid us in our research”).
Procedure and design. The design of Experiment 4b’s two
conditions was identical to that used in the Internet condition
induction in Experiment 1c except for one difference: in place of
the original explanatory induction questions, each of the two
conditions of Experiment 4b used a new set of induction questions.
These two new sets of induction questions were matched in struc-
ture and content to each other; the only difference between them
was that one set contained questions that a top Google search result
could answer comprehensively (the answer condition), while the
other set consisted of questions with answers that could not be
found using Google (no answer condition). For example, partici-
pants in the Answer condition would be asked “Why is ancient
Egyptian history more peaceful than Mesopotamian history?”,
which returns an article that clearly answers the question, and
participants in the no answer condition would be asked “Why is
ancient Kushite history more peaceful than Greek history?”, which
is parallel in content and structure yet does not have an answer
easily found online (see Appendix F for the full set of questions).
Just as in the induction phase of Experiment 1c, participants saw
a random subset of 4 induction questions and were instructed to
“search the Internet to confirm the details” of their explanations to
these questions. After the induction phase, they completed the
same general knowledge self-assessment questions used in previ-
ous experiments.
Results
Knowledge ratings did not differ between participants in the
answer condition (M  4.00, SD  1.19, 95% CI  [3.74, 4.26])
and those in the no answer condition (M  4.11, SD  1.22, 95%
CI  [3.81, 4.41]), t(143)  0.55, p  .58. To draw meaningful
comparisons between these results and those of previous experi-
ments, we combined the results of relevant earlier experiments.
Experiments 1a–c and 2b provided four successful demonstrations
of the effect (though Experiment 2a also successfully replicated
the effect, the change in the dependent measure to fMRI pictures
shifted ratings higher compared with the other experiments). Using
the data from the no Internet condition of these four previous
studies for comparison with the results of Experiment 4b, we can
determine whether search activity, even if unsuccessful, leads to
increased ratings of knowledge.
Pooling across the no Internet conditions from the previous
studies, we found that participants in the answer condition of
Experiment 4b increased their knowledge ratings compared with
the aggregate no Internet baseline formed by combining Experiments
1a–c and Experiment 2b (M  3.05, SD  1.13, 95% CI  [2.94,
3.16]), t(476)6.81, p .00l. The results of this comparison hold
if the answer condition ratings are compared individually to the no
Internet condition from Study 1a, t(153)  4.43, p  .001, Study
1b, t(188)  5.66, p  .001, Study 1c, t(184)  5.46, p  .001,
and Study 2b, t(185)  6.15, p  .001. Surprisingly, even despite
unsuccessful search efforts, participants in the no answer condition
also increased their self-assessed knowledge compared with the ag-
gregated no Internet ratings, t(461)  6.94, p  .001. This result
also holds when the no answer condition is compared with each
of the previous no Internet conditions individually, Study 1a,
t(138)  4.69, p  .001, Study 1b, t(173)  5.91, p  .001,
Study 1c, t(169)  5.70, p  .001, and Study 2b, t(170)  6.32,
p  .001. This is strong support for searching as the mechanism that
gives rise to illusions of knowledge from Internet use.
Experiment 4c
The findings from Experiment 4b provide initial evidence that
search activity, even when unsuccessful because of hard-to-find rel-
evant results, drives the observed effect. Experiment 4c further ex-
plores the extent to which the retrieval of search results causes Internet
users to inflate their self-assessed knowledge in that it uses an even
stronger test. Experiment 4c asks whether the illusion persists even
when searching returns only irrelevant results or no results at all. If
search success is causing participants to inflate their self-assessed
knowledge, then participants who access irrelevant results or zero
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results will have lower ratings of self-assessed knowledge than par-
ticipants in the analogous Experiments 1a–c and 2b who successfully
access relevant search results. However, if search activity alone,
regardless of search success, is driving the inflation of self-assessed
knowledge, then participants who search unsuccessfully will rate
themselves higher than participants in the no Internet conditions from
previous experiments.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-eight participants (men 
86, women  52; MAge  31.26, SD  10.39) from the United
States completed the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Seven participants were eliminated for removing the filters placed
on the search; this was assessed using an end-of-survey Internet
check question that explicitly asked participants whether they had
removed the search filters they had been assigned.
Procedure and design. Experiment 4c consisted of two con-
ditions that were each variations on the design of the Internet
condition of Experiment 1a. These conditions were together de-
signed to investigate whether impeding the effectiveness of par-
ticipants’ search activity by filtering search results affected partic-
ipants’ subsequent self-assessed knowledge ratings.
In the filtered results condition, participants were instructed to
search for the explanations to the induction questions using a
filtered Google search that provided only the most recently posted
results (i.e., within the past week). These recent results from the
filtered Google search did not provide direct answers to the induc-
tion questions. In the no results condition, participants were in-
structed to search for the answers to the induction questions using
a Google filter that blocked all results, with the Google results
page displaying a message to participants that their search “did not
match any documents.”
Results
Participants in the filtered results did not differ in their self-
assessed knowledge (M  3.57, SD  1.27, 95% CI  [3.27,
3.87]) compared with those in the no results condition (M  3.75,
SD  1.17, 95% CI  [3.46, 4.04]), t(129)  .82, p  .42.
Again pooling together ratings from participants in the no Internet
conditions of Experiment 1a–c and 2b to form a baseline for
comparison, we found that participants in the filtered results con-
dition rated their knowledge higher (M  3.57, SD  1.27) than
participants who had not searched online for answers to the induc-
tion questions (M  3.05, SD  1.13, 95% CI  [2.94, 3.16]),
t(465)  3.49, p  .001. The results holds if the filtered results
ratings are compared individually to the no Internet condition from
Study 1a, t(142)2.06, p .05, Study 1b, t(177)2.84, p
.01, Study 1c, t(173)  2.74, p  .01, and Study 2b,
t(174)  3.43, p  .001.
Strikingly, the ratings from the no results condition, in which
participants’ searching activities returned zero search results at all,
were also higher (M  3.75, SD  1.17) than the aggregate no
Internet condition (M  3.05, SD  1.13, 95% CI  [2.94, 3.16]),
t(458)  4.50, p  .001. When compared individually, the no
results ratings were also higher than the no Internet condition from
Study 1a, t(135)2.93, p .01, Study 1b, t(170)3.86, p
.001, Study 1c, t(166)  3.71, p  .001, and Study 2b,
t(167)  4.37, p  .001.
Discussion
The illusion of knowledge from Internet use appears to be
driven by the act of searching. The effect does not depend on
previous success on a specific search engine, but rather generalizes
to less popular search engines as well (Experiment 4a). It persists
when the queries posed to the search engine are not answered
(Experiment 4b) and remains even in cases where the search query
fails to provide relevant answers or even any results at all (Exper-
iment 4c). Even when stripped of such potentially integral features,
Internet searching still results in increases in self-assessed knowl-
edge. This suggests that the illusion is driven by the act of
searching itself.
General Discussion
Searching for answers online leads to an illusion such that
externally accessible information is conflated with knowledge “in
the head” (Experiment 1a and b). This holds true even when
controlling for time, content, and search autonomy during the task
(Experiment 1c). Furthermore, participants who used the Internet
to access explanations expected to have increased brain activity,
corresponding to higher quality explanations, while answering
unrelated questions (Experiment 2a). This effect is not driven by a
misinterpretation of the dependent measure (Experiment 2b) or
general overconfidence (Experiment 3) and is driven by querying
Internet search engines (Experiment 4a-c).1
In many ways, our minds treat the Internet as a transactive
memory partner, broadening the scope of knowledge to which we
have access. The results of these experiments suggest that search-
ing the Internet may cause a systematic failure to recognize the
extent to which we rely on outsourced knowledge. Searching for
explanations on the Internet inflates self-assessed knowledge in
unrelated domains. Our results provide further evidence for the
growing body of research suggesting that the Internet may function
as a transactive memory partner (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011).
People tend to inaccurately recall the original source of their
internal memories (Johnson, 1997; Johnson, Hashtroudi, &
Lindsay, 1993). In this regard, our findings might be initially
unsurprising: When searching online, people misattribute the
source of the specific answers they find because they think the
answer was stored in their own mind instead of on the Internet.
However, in the current set of studies, we first asked people one
set of questions in the induction phase and then asked them an
entirely separate set of questions in different domains of knowl-
edge. This design rules out the explanation that participants
merely failed to monitor the fact that the Internet was the source
of their knowledge. Rather, our results suggest that what par-
ticipants failed to accurately monitor was the proportion of
internal and external memory comprising the sum total of
accessible knowledge, mistaking outsourced knowledge for in-
ternal knowledge. People neglect the extent to which they
would rely on their partner in the transactive memory system to
access explanatory knowledge.
This illusion of knowledge might well be found for sources
other than the Internet: for example, an expert librarian may
experience a similar illusion when accessing a reference Rolodex.
1 See Table 1 for summary of experimental findings.
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An individual in a highly integrated social environment (Hutchins,
1995) may conflate knowledge “in the head” with knowledge
stored in other human sources, such as fellow members of a
cockpit crew. While such effects may be possible, the rise of the
Internet has surely broadened the scope of this effect. Before the
Internet, there was no similarly massive, external knowledge da-
tabase. People relied on less immediate and accessible inanimate
stores of external knowledge, such as books—or, they relied on
other minds in transactive memory systems. In contrast with other
sources and cognitive tools for informational access, the Internet is
nearly always accessible, can be searched efficiently, and provides
immediate feedback. For these reasons, the Internet might become
even more easily integrated with the human mind than other
external sources of knowledge and perhaps even more so than
human transactive memory partners, promoting much stronger
illusions of knowledge.
Recent evidence suggests similar illusions occur when users
search for fact-based information online (Ward, 2013b). After
using Google to retrieve answers to questions, people seem to
believe they came up with these answers on their own; they show
an increase in “cognitive self-esteem,” a measure of confidence in
one’s own ability to think about and remember information, and
predict higher performance on a subsequent trivia quiz to be taken
without access to the Internet. These fact-based effects are depen-
dent on the reliability and the familiarity of the search engine,
suggesting the processes by which the Internet affects cognition
function differently across types of knowledge. These differences
across informational contexts highlight the need for further re-
search on the effects of different forms of online information
search.
Confusion of accessible knowledge with one’s personal knowl-
edge may not be a gradual result of cultural immersion. Instead, it
may be an early emerging tendency that remains even as children
learn to access to the division of cognitive labor in the world
around them. Tasks like learning the meanings of new words may
be facilitated by a tendency for children to believe that they “knew
it all along” (Kominsky & Keil, 2014; Mills & Keil, 2004; Taylor,
Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994). Such misattributions may endow
children with an adaptive confidence that their understandings are
well grounded. The Internet may exaggerate this bias even in
adults, leading to failures in recognizing the limits of internal
explanatory knowledge.
The participants in our studies completed the experiments online
and presumably use Internet search engines frequently. Why might
we still observe an effect if the participants are already closely
connected with the Internet as a transactive memory partner? It
may be that chronic (overall frequency of use) and recent (exper-
imental induction) search both influence knowledge self-
assessments. In the area of social priming, similar effects have
been found. Chronic and recent influences combine additively, so
experimental exposures can be an effective way of mimicking
chronic states (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Higgins &
Bargh, 1987). In political psychology, for example, where self-
interest is assumed to drive political and economic choices, when
participants are primed with self-interest its influence is even
stronger (Young, Thomsen, Borgida, Sullivan, & Aldrich, 1991).
In the case of the Internet, frequent use may boost ratings of
self-assessed knowledge, but in-the-moment online search inde-
pendently increases ratings as well.
Table 1
Summary of Experimental Results
Experiment Method
Results
(self-assessed knowledge ratings) Conclusions
1a Internet condition uses Internet to look up explanations
to common questions; no Internet condition does
not.
Internet  no Internet Internet condition gives higher self-
knowledge ratings than no
Internet condition
1b Same as Experiment 1a, but all participants make self-
assessed knowledge ratings both before and after
induction phase.
Preinduction, no difference
between Internet and no
Internet
Searching the Internet increases
self-assessed knowledge from
baseline
1c Internet condition searches constrained to specific
sources; no Internet condition sees identical
explanations
Controlling for induction phase
ratings, Internet  no Internet
Time, content, and autonomous
search activity do not explain the
effect
2a Same as 1a, but DV for self-assessed knowledge
questions  fMRI “brain activity”
Internet  no Internet Participants are not misinterpreting
the dependent measure
2b Same as 1a, but DV for self-assessed knowledge
questions  “on your own, with no outside sources”
Internet  no Internet Participants are not misinterpreting
the dependent measure
3 Same as 1a, but questions for self-assessed knowledge
phase are autobiographical explanatory questions
No difference between Internet
and No Internet conditions
Effect not explained by general
overconfidence
4a Link condition clicked on a link to explanation instead
of searching; Other search engines condition used 5
alternative engines for searching
Other search engines  Link Effect driven by active search
independent of search engine
4b Answer condition searched for induction questions
easily found on Internet; no Answer condition
searched for matched-content questions not
answered in any search result
Both answer and no answer
conditions  no Internet
baseline
Effect holds even without direct
answers to search query
4c Recent results condition searched for induction
explanations in Google search returning irrelevant
recent results only; zero results condition returned
zero search results.
Both recent results and no results
conditions  no Internet
baseline
Effect holds even without any
results for search query
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There are clearly benefits to the freely accessible information on
the Internet; however, there may be costs inherent to the strategy
of accessing that information. The boundary between personal and
interpersonal knowledge is becoming increasingly blurred (Clark
& Chalmers, 1998). As technology makes information ever more
easily available and accessible through searching, the ability to
assess one’s internal “unplugged” knowledge will only become
more difficult. Erroneously situating external knowledge within
their own heads, people may unwittingly exaggerate how much
intellectual work they can do in situations where they are truly on
their own.
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Appendix A
Questions Used in the Induction Phase
Why are there leap years?
Why are there more women than men?
Why are there phases of the moon?
Why are there time zones?
How does a zipper work?
Why are there dimples on a golf ball?
Why are there jokers in a deck of cards?
How is glass made?
Appendix B
Induction Phase Instructions From Experiment 1a
Internet condition:
We are interested in how well people can explain the answers to
common questions. Please search the Internet to confirm the de-
tails of the explanation, and then evaluate. Please copy and paste
the URL of the most helpful website in the space provided.
No Internet condition:
In this task, you will be asked a series of questions. We are
interested in how well people can explain the answers to common
questions. Please evaluate your understanding, using no outside
sources.
Appendix C
Topics and Questions Used as the Dependent Measure in Experiments 1–2, 4–5a-b
Weather
Consider the following questions about weather:
1. Why are there more Atlantic hurricanes in August and
September?
2. How do tornadoes form?
3. Why are cloudy nights warmer?
Science
Consider the following questions about science:
1. How do scientists determine the dates of fossils?
2. How do scientists know that the universe is expanding?
3. Why can’t x-rays penetrate lead?
American History
Consider the following questions about American history:
1. Why did the Civil War begin?
2. How were the first labor unions formed?
3. Why did Nixon resign?
Food
Consider the following questions about food:
1. What is gluten?
2. Why does Swiss cheese have holes?
3. How is vinegar made?
(Appendices continue)
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Anatomy and Physiology
Consider the following questions about anatomy and physiology:
1. Why do people laugh?
2. How does the heart pump blood?
3. Why do men go bald?
Health Issues
Consider the following questions about health issues:
1. Why are so many people allergic to peanuts?
2. Why can’t HIV be transmitted through saliva?
3. Why can’t you drink on antibiotics?
Appendix D
Topics and Easier Questions Used as the Dependent Measure in Experiment 3
Personal History
Consider the following questions about your personal history:
1. How did you choose your current career?
2. Why did you choose to live where you currently live?
3. How did you decide what to study during high school?
Relationships
Consider the following questions about relationships:
1. Why are you close with your best friend?
2. How are you similar to your mother?
3. How could you become friendlier with your next door
neighbor?
Local Culture
Consider the following questions about the local culture where
you live:
1. How does the way people dress in your town reflect their
socioeconomic status?
2. How is your town different from other parts of the
country?
3. How do the restaurants near where you live reflect your
state’s culture?
Personal Habits
Consider the following questions about personal habits:
1. How do you choose what music to listen to?
2. How do you decide what to wear on important days?
3. How do you decide what to do on the weekend?
Future
Consider the following questions about the future:
1. How will you feel when you become elderly?
2. How will you try to succeed next week?
3. How will your life satisfaction be one year from now?
Emotions
Consider the following questions about emotions:
1. Why do you become annoyed by some things that don’t
seem to bother others?
2. Why do you become frustrated?
3. What causes you to feel most alive?
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix E
Topics and Difficult Questions Used as the Dependent Measure in Experiment 3
Personal History
1. What is the relationship between the classes you chose
during freshman year of high school and your current
career?
2. How did the number of windows in your current living
space influence your feelings of social connectedness
after you moved in?
3. How did your learning style in your high school fresh-
man year math class affect your later interest in minia-
ture golf?
Relationships
1. How does your best friend influence your protein in-
take?
2. What are the origins of the difference in the degree to
which you and your mother enjoy the genre of ‘Mys-
tery’?
3. How could you discover enough about your next door
neighbor’s sense of humor enough to reliably predict
when he or she will laugh?
Local Culture
1. How does the menu organization at individually owned
restaurants in your town compare with the menu orga-
nization at chain restaurants in your town?
2. How is your town’s or county’s governing body differ-
ent from where your relatives live?
3. In your area, how are people’s hairstyles correlated with
their religious beliefs?
Personal Habits
1. How do songs in the key of D affect your mood the next
day?
2. How do car advertisements affect the clothes you wear
on formal occasions?
3. How does the way you make weekend plans reflect the
way your father made weekend plans as a child?
Future
1. In what ways will being elderly be similar to the time
times of physical discomfort you have already experi-
enced?
2. How will the number of phone calls you make at your
job affect the ways in which you try to succeed next
week?
3. One year from now, how will your attention to detail
affect your life satisfaction?
Emotions
1. How does being annoyed affect how likely you are to
attend a sporting event next year?
2. How are your current feelings of frustration related to
your first memory?
3. How do lunar patterns affect your emotional
well-being?
Appendix F
Questions Used in the Induction Phase of Experiment 4b
Questions with answers online:
Why is ancient Egyptian history more peaceful than Mesopota-
mian history?
How does the location of Cameroon affect the health of its
inhabitants? How do mountains affect the weather? How did the
Erie Canal affect New York City?
Questions without answers online:
Why is ancient Kushite history more peaceful than Greek his-
tory?
How does the location of Pierre, South Dakota, affect the health
of its inhabitants?
How do wheat fields affect the weather?
How did the Erie Canal affect Tioga County?
Received October 10, 2014
Revision received January 12, 2015
Accepted February 20, 2015 
687SEARCHING FOR EXPLANATIONS
6 0 
BRIEF REPORT
Stress Increases Cue-Triggered “Wanting” for Sweet Reward in Humans
Eva Pool, Tobias Brosch, Sylvain Delplanque,
and David Sander
University of Geneva
Stress can increase reward pursuits: This has traditionally been seen as an attempt to relieve negative
affect through the hedonic properties of a reward. However, reward pursuit is not always proportional to
the pleasure experienced, because reward processing involves distinct components, including the moti-
vation to obtain a reward (i.e., wanting) and the hedonic pleasure during the reward consumption (i.e.,
liking). Research conducted on rodents demonstrates that stress might directly amplify the cue-triggered
wanting, suggesting that under stress wanting can be independent from liking. Here, we aimed to test
whether a similar mechanism exists in humans. We used analog of a Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer test
(PIT) with an olfactory reward to measure the cue triggered wanting for a reward but also the sensory
hedonic liking felt during the consumption of the same reward. The analog of a PIT procedure, in which
participants learned to associate a neutral image and an instrumental action with a chocolate odor, was
combined with either a stress-inducing or stress-free behavioral procedure. Results showed that compared
with participants in the stress-free condition, those in the stress condition mobilized more effort in
instrumental action when the reward-associated cue was displayed, even though they did not report the
reward as being more pleasurable. These findings suggest that, in humans, stress selectively increases
cue-triggered wanting, independently of the hedonic properties of the reward. Such a mechanism
supports the novel explanation proposed by animal research as to why stress often produces cue-triggered
bursts of binge eating, relapses in drug addiction, or gambling.
Keywords: stress, incentive salience, wanting, liking, human Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xan0000052.supp
Have you ever eaten more high-calorie foods during a stressful
period? As documented by a consistent corpus of literature (e.g.,
O’Connor & Conner, 2011), stress cannot only increase the con-
sumption of high-calorie foods, but it can also increase the use of
other kinds of rewards, such as drugs (Sinha, 2001) or sexual
stimuli (Chumbley et al., 2014). Although these effects of stress
have been proven to have a large impact on public health problems
(e.g., addiction relapses or binge eating; Lo Sauro, Ravaldi,
Cabras, Faravelli, & Ricca, 2008), the underlying psychological
mechanisms remain poorly understood.
It has been proposed that rewards are used to reduce the nega-
tive effects of stress, which are compensated by the hedonic
pleasure triggered by their consumption (Koob & Le Moal, 2001).
According to this proposal, stress increases the pursuit of rewards,
as consumption is made even more pleasurable by relieving the
negative effects of stress.
The incentive salience theory proposes an alternative mecha-
nism in which the key principle is independent of the hedonic
properties of the reward (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). According
to this theory, the pursuit of a reward is not always directly
proportional to the pleasure experienced, because reward process-
ing involves distinct components, including the motivation to
obtain a reward (i.e., wanting) and the hedonic pleasure during the
reward consumption (i.e., liking), which are usually correlated but
can be dissociated under particular circumstances. Experiments
conducted on rodents showed that direct manipulation of mesolim-
bic dopamine increases effort mobilization after the presentation of
a reward-associated cue (i.e., wanting), without simultaneously
increasing hedonic pleasure (i.e., liking) during reward consump-
tion (Peciña, Cagniard, Berridge, Aldridge, & Zhuang, 2003;
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Wyvell & Berridge, 2000). This supports the idea that wanting and
liking rely on two distinct neuronal networks that can be activated
independently of each other (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).
Manipulating the glucocorticoid system in a population of rodents,
Peciña, Schulkin, and Berridge (2006) provided evidence suggesting
that the stress-induced increase of reward pursuits might be driven by
a selective increase of wanting. The glucocorticoid system is known
to be involved in the mediation of physiological and behavioral
responses to stress (Herman et al., 2003). To investigate its effects on
wanting, Peciña and coworkers (2006) used a three-phase paradigm
called the Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer test (PIT; Lovibond,
1983). First, during instrumental conditioning, a behavioral response
(e.g., pressing a lever) was associated with the food reward. Second,
during Pavlovian conditioning, neutral stimuli (i.e., sounds) were
associated with the absence or presence of a food reward (negatively
or positively conditioned stimulus: conditional stimulus CS or
CS). During the transfer test, the Pavlovian stimuli (CS, CS)
were presented and their influence on instrumental action was mea-
sured: The increase in action energization after CS presentation was
taken to reflect cue-induced wanting. After Pavlovian and instrumen-
tal conditioning, but before the transfer test, Peciña and colleagues
(2006) manipulated the glucocorticoid system by microinjecting
cortisol-releasing factor in the nucleus accumbens. Rodents in which
the glucocorticoid system was stimulated showed a larger cue-
induced wanting compared with rodents who received a placebo
treatment. The transfer test was administered under extinction, thus
rodents never experienced any aversive state reduction triggered by
the hedonic properties of the reward. The investigators thereby dem-
onstrated that, similar to dopamine manipulation, manipulation of
stress-related systems increased wanting, independently of the reliev-
ing liking dimension of the reward. Although these findings provide a
novel explanation for the stress-induced increase of reward pursuits, to the
best of our knowledge, they have never been demonstrated in humans.
This study aimed to investigate whether stress influences want-
ing in humans by using methods and concept operationalizations
comparable with relevant animal research. We used an analog of a
PIT adapted to a human population (Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2008): During instrumental conditioning, an instrumental
action (i.e., pressing a handgrip) was associated with chocolate
odor (unconditioned stimulus, US). During an analog of a Pavlov-
ian conditioning task geometric figures were associated with the
presence (CS) or absence (CS and baseline) of chocolate odor
(see Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2014), and during the
transfer test, the effort mobilized on the handgrip was measured
during the presentation of the Pavlovian stimuli (CS, CS, and
baseline). After the instrumental and the analogous Pavlovian
conditioning but before the transfer test, participants underwent
either a stress-inducing task or a control stress-free task (Schwabe,
Haddad, & Schachinger, 2008). Participants in the stress and
stress-free conditions then performed the transfer test and evalu-
ated how much they liked smelling the chocolate odor.
Based on the animal literature, our prediction was that the
cue-induced wanting would be larger in the stress condition than in
the stress-free condition, reflected by a larger increase in the effort
mobilized during the presentation of CS compared with other
CSs. We expected this increase of cue-induced wanting for choc-
olate odor even in the absence of an increase of hedonic pleasure
during chocolate odor presentation.
Method
Participants
Forty-one participants who liked chocolate were recruited at the
University of Geneva. They were asked not to eat, practice sport,
or drink coffee 4 hr before the experimental session and received
30 Swiss francs for their participation. Five participants were later
excluded: 2 for technical problems and 3 for being under psycho-
tropic treatment. The 36 (19 men) remaining participants (24.15
3.05 years old) had no reported olfactory trouble.
Materials
Stimuli. The Pavlovian stimuli consisted of three geometric
complex figures typically used in human conditioning paradigms
(Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004;
Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007) that in a pilot study (n
26) were rated as similarly neutral on a pleasantness scale (see
Pool et al., 2014). They were displayed in the center of the
computer screen with a visual angle of 8°. The Pavlovian identities
of three images used as CS, CS, and baseline were counter-
balanced across participants. The US consisted of a chocolate odor
(20% dissolved in propylene glycol; Firmenich, SA, Geneva, Swit-
zerland), which was released for 1.5 s by using a computer-
controlled olfactometer with an airflow fixed at 1.5 L/min deliv-
ering the olfactory stimulation rapidly, without thermal and tactile
confounds via a nasal cannula (see Ischer et al., 2014).
Instrumental apparatus. The mobilized effort was measured
through an isometric handgrip (TDS121C) connected to the
MP150 Biopac Systems (Santa Barbara, CA) with a 1,000 Hz
sampling rate. The dynamic value of the signal was read by
MATLAB (version 8.0) and used to provide participants with
visual online feedback (Psychtoolbox 3.0; for the visual interface
implemented in MATLAB) that reflected the force exerted on the
handgrip. This visual feedback was illustrated through the “mer-
cury” of a thermometer-like image displayed on the left side of the
screen (30° visual angle) that moved up and down according to
the mobilized effort (see Figure 1a and 1c). The mercury of the
thermometer-like display reached the top if the handgrip was
squeezed with at least 50% or 70% (criterion varied every 1 s) of
the participants’ maximal force.
Procedure
First, participants completed the instrumental and the analogous
Pavlovian conditioning. After the instrumental and the analogous
Pavlovian conditioning but before the transfer test, 18 participants
then performed the stress-inducing task, whereas the other group
performed a stress-free task. Subsequently, they took a 10-min
break, and then performed the PIT test (adapted from Talmi et al.,
2008; see Table 1). Finally, they evaluated the perceived pleasant-
ness of the odors.
Instrumental conditioning. Participants learned to squeeze a
handgrip to trigger the release of chocolate odor. There were 24
trials each comprised of a 12-s “task-on” period followed imme-
diately by a “task-off” period of 4–12 s (8 s average).
During the task-on periods, a geometric image and a thermom-
eter were displayed in the center and on the left side of the screen,
129STRESS INCREASES WANTING
6 2
respectively. The fluid movement of the thermometer-like dis-
play’s mercury provided online visual feedback of the effort par-
ticipants exerted on the handgrip (see Figure 1a). Participants were
asked to keep their gaze on the central geometric image and to
squeeze the handgrip, thereby bringing the mercury of the
thermometer- like display up to the maximum and then down
again, without paying attention to the speed of compressing the
grips. They were told that during the 12-s presentation of the
thermometer-like display, there were three “special 1-s windows”
and that if they happened to squeeze the handgrip during one of
these time windows, they would trigger the release of chocolate
odor. Finally, they were told that they were free to choose when to
squeeze on the grip and were encouraged to use their intuition. In
reality, only two special 1-s windows were randomly selected in
each task-on period to be rewarded with chocolate odor, and if
participants happened to squeeze the handgrip with at least 50% or
70% of their maximal force during these time windows, a sniffing
signal (a black asterisk; 2° visual angle) was displayed at the center
of the geometric image and the chocolate odor was delivered.
During the task-off periods, a fixation cross (2° visual angle) was
Figure 1. The analog of a human Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) paradigm adapted from Talmi et al.
(2008). During instrumental conditioning, (a) participants learned to squeeze a handgrip to trigger the release of
a rewarding chocolate odor. During the analogous Pavlovian conditioning, (b) participants were exposed to
repeated pairings of the positive conditioned stimulus (CS) with the rewarding chocolate odor and the negative
conditioned stimulus (CS) with the odorless air. When the CS or CS was displayed, a target appeared in
the center of the image and participants had to press a key that triggered odor release. The baseline was displayed
without any target, and no odor was released. The PIT test (c) was administered under extinction, the CS, the
CS, and the baseline were displayed in random order (here a CS trial is illustrated), and participants could
squeeze the handgrip if they wished to do so. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Table 1
Illustration of the Analog of a Human Pavlovian Instrumental Transfer Test Combined With Stress Induction
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Instrumental conditioning Analogous Pavlovian conditioning Stress induction Transfer test in extinction
24 trials R ¡ O1 18 trials CS ¡ O1 SECPT or WWT 6 trials CS ¡ R?
18 trials CS ¡ Ø 6 trials CS ¡ R?
6 trials baseline ¡ R?
Note. The instrumental action (R) consists of pressing a handgrip dynamometer. The conditioned stimuli (CS) consist of geometric images. The CS is
associated with a chocolate odor (O1), whereas the CS is associated with the absence of a chocolate odor (Ø). Participants in the stress group performed
the socially evaluated cold pressor test (SECPT; Schwabe et al., 2008), thereby inducing stress. Participants in the stress-free group performed a warm water
test (WWT; Schwabe et al., 2008). The analog of the human Pavlovian instrumental transfer procedure has been adapted from Talmi et al. (2008) for our
research question.
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displayed at the center of the screen and participants were asked to
keep their gaze on the fixation cross and to relax their hand to
recalibrate the baseline force.
Analogous Pavlovian conditioning. The procedure that we
previously elaborated (Pool et al., 2014) was applied here. Briefly,
three initially neutral images were attributed the Pavlovian roles of
“baseline,” “CS,” and “CS.” There were 36 trials composed of
a 12-s task-on period during which the CS or the CS was
displayed on a computer screen, followed by a 12-s task-off period
during which a baseline image was displayed.
During the task-on periods, a target appeared every 4 s at the
center of the CS image three times per period. Participants had to
press the “A” key as fast as possible after they perceived the target
that was presented for a maximum of 1 s. Each time the CS
image was displayed and the participant pressed the key, a choc-
olate odor was released; when the CS image was displayed,
odorless air was released. Participants were informed that the kind
of odor released depended only on the CS image and not on the
key-pressing task. They were told that the key-pressing task was a
measure of their sustained attention independent of the odor-image
contingencies (see also Talmi et al., 2008). To further emphasize
this aspect, participants were also informed that the odor would be
released after a 1-s interval after target onset if they had not
responded until then. However, the odor was released faster when
participants pressed on the keyboard than when participants did
not press on the keyboard. Because of this instrumental component
the conditioning task can be considered a hybrid of Pavlovian and
discriminative instrumental learning, rather than a pure Pavlov-
ian learning. During the task-off periods, the baseline image
was displayed without any target, and no odor was released (see
Figure 1b).
After the analogous Pavlovian conditioning, participants evalu-
ated the pleasantness of the images used as CS, CS, and
baseline on a visual analog scale (from extremely unpleasant to
extremely pleasant) presented at the center of the computer screen
with a visual angle of 23°. The order of the images was random-
ized across participants.
Stress manipulation. After the pleasantness ratings of the
images used as CS, CS, and baseline, participants belonging to
the stress group (n  18; 8 men) performed a socially evaluated
cold pressor test (as described by Schwabe et al., 2008). They were
asked to immerse their nondominant hand in cold water (0–2 °C)
for as long as possible (they could remove the hand at their
discretion, but the test was ended by the experimenter after 3 min).
They were told that they were being videotaped to analyze their
facial expression, and the experimenter observed them the entire
time. The stress-free group (n  18; 10 men) was instructed to put
their hand in warm water (35–37 °C) for 3 min without being
observed (warm water test). Immediately after the cold pressor
task, using pencil and paper participants evaluated on a scale how
pleasant, stressful, and painful the task was for them, from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (extremely). Ten minutes before and 30 min after the
task, samples of saliva were collected through Salivette (Sarstedt
AG & co, Nümbrecht, Germany), as a manipulation check.
PIT test. After the stress induction task participants took a
10-min break and then they received the same instructions as in
instrumental conditioning. First they completed 12 trials identical
to those in instrumental conditioning (two special 1-s windows
were rewarded) followed by 12 trials administered under partial
extinction (one special 1-s window was rewarded). Immediately
afterward, they performed 18 transfer test trials administered under
extinction (no time window was rewarded). In the transfer test, one
of the Pavlovian stimuli (CS, CS, or baseline) replaced the
instrumental geometric image during the entire trial (see Figure
1c). The presentation order on the transfer tests was randomized
across the three stimuli (CS, CS, and baseline). There were
two cycles of testing. In each cycle, each cue was presented three
times consecutively, so that each Pavlovian stimuli was presented
six times for a total of 18 transfer trials.
Odor evaluation. Immediately after the PIT, participants
evaluated the pleasantness (from extremely unpleasant to ex-
tremely pleasant), the familiarity (from not familiar at all to ex-
tremely familiar), the edibility (from not edible to extremely edi-
ble), and the intensity (from not perceived to extremely strong) of
the chocolate odor and the odorless air on visual analog scales
displayed on a computer screen.
Results
Instrumental Conditioning
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) applied to
the number of squeezes surpassing 50% of each participant’s
maximal force (Talmi et al., 2008) over 24 trials revealed a
marginal effect of trial, F(23, 805) 1.50, p .06, 2 .04, 95%
confidence intervals (CIs)  .00, .05 suggesting that participants
learned that squeezing the handgrip triggered the release of the
rewarding chocolate odor. Figure 2A shows that participants read-
ily learned to squeeze after five trials; a linear contrast showed that
the squeeze frequency increased linearly during these first five
trials, t(35)  2.99, p  .01, d  .32, 95% CIs  .09, .53. This
increase was not significant in Trials 6–15 or in Trials 15–24
(ps  .6).
To control that participants assigned to stress and stress-free
groups did not statistically differ in their Pavlovian learning, we
applied a 5 (trials: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5)  2 (group: stress or stress-free)
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA to the number of squeezes
surpassing the criterion of 50% of the participants’ maximal force.
The analysis revealed a main effect of trial F(4, 136)  5.23, p 
.01, 2 .13, 95% CIs .01, .54, without a significant interaction
between image and group (p  .69); therefore, suggesting that the
increase of squeeze frequency over time was similar in participants
that would have later been assigned to the stress and the stress-free
group. This analysis also revealed a descriptive difference in the
average squeeze frequency between the two groups, participants
that would have later been assigned to the stress-free group
squeezed on average 1.88 more than the participants that would
have later been assigned to the stress group. This difference was
not significant (p  .13), but it was large. Therefore, we decided
to control for these pre-existing differences in all the statistical
tests assessing the effect of stress by comparing the squeeze
frequency between the two groups after the stress induction task.
Analogous of Pavlovian Conditioning
Successful Pavlovian contingency learning was revealed by
both the reaction times (RTs) of the key-pressing task and the
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likability of the CSs (see Figure 2B). For the key-pressing task, we
analyzed RTs on the first target of the on-task period. All re-
sponses that were more than 3 SDs from the mean (2% of the
trials) or absent (5.5% of the trials) were removed. A paired t test
showed that participants were faster when the CS was displayed
than when the CS was displayed, t(35) 3.60, p .01, d .37,
95% CIs  .15, .39.
A repeated-measures ANOVA applied to the likability rat-
ings of the three Pavlovian images (CS, CS, or baseline)
revealed a significant effect, F(2, 70)  10.89, p  .01, 2 
.23, 95% CIs  .14, .55; participants liked the CS image more
than the CS, t(35)  3.47, p  .01, d  .73, 95% CIs  .27,
1.17, which did not statistically differ from the baseline in
likability ratings (p  .35).
To control that participants assigned to the stress and stress-free
groups did not statistically differ in their Pavlovian learning, we
applied a 2 (image: CS or CS) 2 (group: stress or stress-free)
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA to the RTs. The analysis re-
vealed a main effect of image, F(1, 34)  12.66, p  .01, 2 
.27, 95% CIs  .05, .48, without interaction between image and
group (p  .67); therefore, suggesting that the difference between
CS and CS was similar in participants that would later be
assigned to the stress and the stress-free group. A 3 (image: CS,
CS, baseline)  2 (group: stress or stress-free) mixed repeated-
measures ANOVA was applied to the likability ratings. The anal-
ysis revealed a main effect of image, F(2, 68)  10.83, p  .01,
2  .24, 95% CIs  .12, .57, without a significant interaction
between the effect of image and group (p  .44), thereby suggest-
ing that the effect of image on the likability rating was similar in
participants that would later be assigned to the stress and the
stress-free groups.
Stress Manipulation
On average, participants who performed the socially evaluated
cold pressor test (stress group) kept their hand in the cold water for
80.61 s (SEM  14.75) and they reported a higher level of stress
(M  5.22, SEM  0.67) and pain (M  6.33, SEM  0.67),
Figure 2. (A) Instrumental conditioning. The number of times participants (n  36) squeeze the handgrip is
displayed as a function of trials over time. (B) The analogous Pavlovian conditioning. The bars (left axis)
illustrate the pleasantness rating of the images used as Pavlovian stimuli after conditioning, and the line plot
(right axis) illustrates the latency to detect the cue during the presentation of the positive conditioned stimulus
(CS) or the negative conditioned stimulus (CS). Error bars (1 SEM) are adapted for within-subject design
(Cousineau, 2005). (C) Salivary cortisol (nanomoles per liter) 10 min before and 30 min after the stress-inducing
and the control task. Error bars represent SEM. (D) The PIT in the stress-free and the stress groups (n  18 in
each group). The increase of the number of squeezes compared with the baseline is displayed as a function of
the CS and the CS. Error bars represent SEM.
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ts(34)  5.95, 9.42, ps  .01, ds  2.04; 3.23, 95% CIs  1.16,
2.77; 2.13, 4.11 compared with the participants who performed the
warm water test (stress-free group; Ms 0.77, 0.33, SEMs 0.33,
0.16, respectively). Participants in the stress group also reported a
lower level of pleasure (M  2.11, SEM  0.46) than participants
in the stress-free group (M  6.99, SEM  0.58; t(34)  6.421,
p .001 d 2.202, 95% CIs 1.23, 2.88). Moreover, the prepost
variation of cortisol induced by the task was marginally larger in
the stress group compared with the stress-free group, t(34) 2.20,
p  .051 d  .75, 95% CIs  .05, 1.40 (see Figure 2C).
PIT test
A 3 (image: CS, CS, and baseline)  6 (extinction trial) 
2 (group: stress or stress-free) mixed repeated-measures ANOVA
was applied to the number of squeezes surpassing 50% of the
participants’ maximal force. Because there was a large difference
in the average squeeze frequency during the instrumental condi-
tioning between participants attributed to the stress and the stress-
free groups, the average squeeze frequency during the instrumental
conditioning was modeled as a covariate in all the between groups
tests. The analysis revealed a main effect of image, F(2, 68) 
6.61, p  .01, 2  .16, 95% CIs  .04, .47, indicating that the
squeeze frequency increased during the CS compared with the
CS, t(35)  2.79, p  .01, d  .41, 95% CIs  .11, .72, which
did not statistically differ from the baseline (p  .83). Moreover,
the analysis revealed a main effect of trial number, F(5, 170) 
2.71, p  .02, 2  .07, 95% CIs  .01, .44, showing that the
squeeze frequency globally decreased over time. Most important
for our hypothesis, the analysis showed a two-way interaction
between image and group, F(2, 66)  5.911, p  .01, 2  .15,
95% CIs  .04, .46, revealing that the increase in number of
squeezes toward the CS (compared with the CS) was larger in
the stress group compared with the stress-free group, t(34) 2.32,
p  .02, d  .77, 95% CIs  .09, 1.44 (see Figure 3A and B and
Figure 4A). Furthermore, this analysis did not reveal a main effect
of group (p  .1), suggesting that the stress and the stress-free
groups did not statistically differ in the overall squeeze frequency.
To further investigate whether the effect of stress was specific to
the CS, we computed the relative score for the CS and the CS,
by subtracting the squeeze frequency during the presentation of the
baseline image from the squeeze frequency during the presentation of
the CS (i.e., [CS baseline] and [CS baseline]). We then
conducted two planned contrasts. These contrasts revealed that the
relative increase in number of squeezes toward the CS was signif-
icantly larger in the stress group compared with the stress-free group,
t(34) 2.39, p .03, d 1.04, 95% CIs .11, 1.47, but the relative
number of squeezes toward the CS did not significantly differ
between the two groups (p  .4; see Figure 2D).
Odor Evaluation
Paired t tests revealed that the chocolate odor was evaluated as
being more edible, t(34)  9.38, p  .01, d  1.27, 95% CIs 
.63, 1.43; more intense, t(34)  10.88, p  .001, d  2.06, 95%
CIs  1.42, 2.61; more familiar, t(34)  5.28, p  .01, d  .70,
95% CIs .38, .99; and more pleasant, t(34) 6.19, p .01, d
1.60, 95% CIs  .63, 1.43, than the odorless air. The perceived
pleasantness of the chocolate odor was not significantly different
in the stress and the stress-free group, t(34)  .19, p  .85 (see
Figure 4B). Moreover, the two groups did not significantly differ
on the perception of the other dimensions of odor (all ps .4), nor
in the differential perceived pleasantness of the chocolate odor
compared with the odorless air (p  .7)
Figure 3. PIT in the stress-free (A) and the stress (B) group. The number of times participants (n  18 in each
group) squeezed the handgrip is displayed as a function of the conditioned stimuli (CSs) perceived by the
participants during the block administered under extinction. Each CS was presented three times in a row during
one block and the presentation order of the CSs in each block was randomized.
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Discussion
This study aimed to investigate whether, as predicted by the
incentive salience theory, stress increases wanting in humans. We
used paradigms and concept operationalizations that were as sim-
ilar and comparable as possible to those used in previous research
conducted on rodents. We adapted an analog of a human PIT,
which originally used a monetary reward (Talmi et al., 2008), by
instead using an olfactory reward (i.e., chocolate odor) to assess
the effort mobilized to obtain it (i.e., wanting) and the hedonic
pleasure during its consumption (i.e., liking); we administered this
paradigm in stress and stress-free conditions. Our findings dem-
onstrate, in humans, that the cue-triggered wanting observed in the
analog of a PIT was amplified in the stress condition compared
with the stress-free condition. Moreover, results showed that
global effects in the analog of a PIT with an olfactory reward are
similar to those in the analog of a PIT with a monetary reward: The
effort mobilized in instrumental action is influenced by the pre-
sentation of Pavlovian stimuli. The effort invested in instrumental
action was larger during the presentation of the stimulus that was
previously associated with chocolate odor, as compared with the
presentation of the stimuli that were not.
Note that the analogous Pavlovian conditioning we used
involved an instrumental component (i.e., pressing a key to
discover whether the image was associated with a chocolate
odor or not). Colwill and Rescorla (1988) demonstrated that
transfer effect is significantly bigger for discriminative stimuli
(i.e., stimuli predicting a privileged time interval during which
an instrumental action leads to a reward) compared with Pav-
lovian stimuli. Nonetheless, in contrast to the discriminative
instrumental learning, in our Pavlovian procedure the instru-
mental action had limited predictive value: the chocolate odor
was delivered based on the CS image, even when the instru-
mental action was not performed.
Comparable with that in rodents (Peciña et al., 2006), this
wanting amplification in humans is critically dependent on the
interaction between the state of the individual (i.e., stress) and the
presence of a reward-associated cue in the environment (see Figure
S1 in Supplemental Materials for a visual comparison). Stress did
not globally increase effort mobilization, therefore, ruling out
possible motor confounds as well as the possibility that the in-
crease of effort induced by stress relied on a general state of
arousal. Descriptively, the stress-free group squeezed globally
more than the stress group during the PIT; however, this descrip-
tive difference was not statistically significant and it was already
present during the instrumental conditioning was administered
before the stress manipulation. Therefore, differences in the global
squeeze frequency were probably because of a simple sampling
effect rather than an effect of stress (see supplementary analysis
for more details). Consistent with the animal literature (e.g.,
Peciña et al., 2006), the stress amplification seemed to be
specific to the perception of the reward-associated cue: during
the presentation of the reward-associated cue, the stress group
mobilized more effort than the stress-free group, but during the
presentation of the stimulus that was not associated with the
reward the stress-free and the stress group did not seem to
behave differently. Moreover, the stress induction procedure
was administered after the Pavlovian and instrumental condi-
tioning, thereby excluding possible confounds related to learn-
ing processes (see, e.g., Allman, DeLeon, Cataldo, Holland, &
Johnson, 2010, for a similar procedure).
Our results also showed that, although participants mobilized
more effort to smell the chocolate odor when under stress, they did
not report the odor as being more pleasurable. This finding sup-
ports the incentive salience theory, which postulates that wanting
and liking represent two different components of reward process-
ing that can be activated independently of each other under par-
ticular circumstances (Berridge & Robinson, 1998, 2003). It also
supports the idea that the increase of reward pursuits induced by
stress might not be driven by a top-down attempt to relieve the
negative effects of stress through reward consumption (Koob & Le
Moal, 2001), but may instead be driven by a direct bottom-up
effect of stress on cue-triggered wanting (Peciña et al., 2006).
Although the present finding provides evidence showing that stress
increases cue-triggered wanting and not self-reported liking, the
Figure 4. (A) Wanting for chocolate odor (increase in the number of squeezes during presentation of the
CS compared with the CS). (B) Liking of chocolate odor (rating on a scale from 0 to 100). Error bars
represent SEM.
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mechanism underlying this phenomenon remains to be explored.
Recent evidence from animal (Cabib & Puglisi-Allegra, 2012) and
human (e.g., Lewis, Porcelli, & Delgado, 2014) literature suggests
that stress increases the dopaminergic activity in the ventral stria-
tum. According to the incentive salience theory, the dopaminergic
activity in this region is selectively involved in wanting (and not in
liking; Berridge & Robinson, 2003); therefore, one could speculate
that stress directly and selectively activate the mesolimbic brain
network involved in wanting.
In contrast to previous rodent experiments, in our study, we
did not manipulate brain activity; instead, we used a more
ecological procedure to induce stress behaviorally. This sug-
gests that the selective activation of a reward component can
occur not only when the brain is directly manipulated (Haver-
mans, 2011, 2012), but can also occur in more ecological
settings such as behavioral manipulation. Note, however, that in
our study, differences in the increase of cortisol between the
two groups was smaller compared with those in other experi-
ments that used the same procedure of stress induction
(Schwabe et al., 2008). This might be because we included
female participants, thereby increasing the noise of the cortisol
measure, variation being because of menstrual cycle effects on
cortisol responses (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993;
see also Figure S2 in Supplemental Materials).
The stress effect on “wanting” was significant but rather mod-
erate. The moderate size of the effect is not surprising given that
findings on rodents have similar effect sizes (Peciña et al., 2006)
and that in an experimental setting we could only induce a mild
stress. Therefore, future studies are necessary to further investigate
the effect of more intense everyday life stressors on human want-
ing and liking.
In conclusion, the present study supports the conceptualization
of a hedonic-independent mechanism underlying the increase of
reward pursuits induced by stress (Peciña et al., 2006) by showing
that, compared with a stress-free situation, in a stressful situation
participants are willing to work more to obtain a reward, even
though they do not report liking it more. This selective increase of
cue-triggered wanting from stress might be crucial for modeling
the effects of stress on binge eating, relapses in addiction, and
gambling.
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Memory as a Hologram: An Analysis of Learning and Recall
Donald R. J. Franklin and D. J. K. Mewhort
Queen’s University
We present a holographic theory of human memory. According to the theory, a subject’s vocabulary
resides in a dynamic distributed representation—a hologram. Studying or recalling a word alters both the
existing representation of that word in the hologram and all words associated with it. Recall is always
prompted by a recall cue (either a start instruction or the word just recalled). Order of report is a joint
function of the item and associative information residing in the hologram at the time the report is made.
We apply the model to archival data involving simple free recall, learning in multitrial free recall, simple
serial recall, and learning in multitrial serial recall. The model captures accuracy and order of report in
both free and serial recall. It also captures learning and subjective organisation in multitrial free recall.
We offer the model as an alternative to the short- and long-term account of memory postulated in the
modal model.
Keywords: hologram, memory, learning, recall
If you were asked whether you know the meaning of the word
“apple,” you are likely to be able to affirm your knowledge in less
than a second. Likewise, if you were asked whether you know a
fact that you do not know (e.g., Margaret Trudeau’s maiden name),
you are likely to confirm that you do not know within a compa-
rable time (see Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981). In both exam-
ples, you have to search what you do know. If search involved an
item-by-item process, quick confirmation of both what you know
and what you do not know is hard to explain—if search were
serial, instead of reading the remainder of this sentence, you would
still be lost in thought, seeking Margaret Trudeau’s maiden name.
Given that you are not lost in an exhaustive item-by-item search,
you must have used a parallel search, likely with a content-
addressing mechanism.
In this article, we present an account of memory as a holo-
gram—a method of data storage that supports a content-
addressable search. To present the model, we will focus on learn-
ing and ordered recall. How we order recall is a fundamental
problem because behaviour is extended in time. Because verbal
report is necessarily a serial process, subjects must order their
responses, even though multiple potential responses are available
in memory.
Analysis of how subjects order behaviour has been a longstand-
ing topic of controversy (e.g., Lashley, 1951). Order of recall must
depend on the words stored in memory, on associations among
them, and on information about the words and the context in which
they were stored. Particularly controversial has been the balance of
two contributing sources of information: item-to-item associations
and item-to-context associations. The latter refers to information
about the words, such as their position in a spatial or temporal
stream (e.g., Dennis, 2009).
Ebbinghaus’s (1885/1913) account was based on information
taken from the list; to order report, it depended on associative links
among items, particularly item-to-item links. Young (1962) used a
transfer paradigm to argue against the associative-link idea; a
rebuttal by Johnson (1975) showed that Young’s analysis was
fatally flawed. Fifteen years later, Lewandowsky and Murdock
(1989) revived interest in the associative-link idea. In their ac-
count, memory was a holographic store. At the start of each trial,
memory was empty, and as subjects studied a list of words, the
hologram stored the studied items and the pairwise associations
among adjacent items. During recall, subjects used the associative
chain to drive report. Mewhort and Popham (1991) used the same
associative-chain ideas to simulate report of tachistoscopically
presented letter strings under conditions of masking and letter
spacing; that is, they exploited pairwise associations to handle
left-to-right scanning (see Mewhort & Campbell, 1981).
In the last two decades, however, a wealth of data has surfaced
that challenge the item-to-item chaining mechanism. Instead, cur-
rent theorists focus on mechanisms based on context, specifically
on item-to-context associations. As we will document later, our
account does not use context-to-item associations (either temporal
or spatial) to account for simple list-learning paradigms, but we
acknowledge that subjects use such information in more complex
situations. Indeed, one of the desirable characteristics of our ho-
lographic model is the ability to combine sources of information,
in particular, item-to-item information and item-to-context infor-
mation.
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Bryden’s (1967) account is likely the earliest of modern context-
based theory. Based on tasks in which space and time were put in
conflict (e.g., dichotic-listening or split-span tasks), he proposed
that order of report reflected ranking of items in space or by time,
and he provided a neurophysiological model to explain the rank-
ing. Unfortunately, although the model could account for either
spatial or temporal organisation, it was unable to explain the
switch from a temporal to spatial dimension (see also Mewhort,
1973, 1974).
Although more recent models generally ignore examples involv-
ing spatial–temporal conflict, they agree that order of report is
based on item-to-context information. Unfortunately, the nature of
the context is controversial. Alternative suggestions include time,
temporal position within a list, list position, and position from the
ends of the list (see Botvinick & Plaut, 2006; Brown, Neath, &
Chater, 2007; Brown, Preece, & Hulme, 2000; Burgess & Hitch,
1999; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002, 2012; Grossberg & Pearson,
2008; Henson, Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996; Lewandowsky &
Farrell, 2008).
Curiously, because item-to-item associations cannot do the full
job, most accounts based on item-to-context information deny that
item-to-item associations are useful at all (e.g., Dennis, 2009). Our
view is that some item-to-item associations surely exist, and if so,
they are likely to be put to use. It is equally curious that current
accounts conspicuously ignore subjects’ prior knowledge (i.e.,
their semantic memory or lexicon).
In this article, we propose a holographic account of memory.
The account acknowledges subjects’ prior knowledge of words by
storing vectors that represent words in a holographic lexicon. The
lexicon consists of a single vector that is a composite of all words
and relations among words. The model postulates that feedback
during study and report alters the strength of all items (words and
their associates) in semantic memory. Further, recall of a word is
based on all information in semantic memory as the word is
considered for report. Hence, we agree with theorists who argue
that item-to-item associations are insufficient to account for recall
order (e.g., Dennis, 2009). Instead of item-to-context associations,
order of report in the holographic account is based on the mech-
anisms of storage and retrieval.
The Theory
The lexicon (also known as semantic memory) is at the heart of
the theory. It contains a representation of all words and associa-
tions among words in the model’s vocabulary. The lexicon is based
on the mathematics of light holography and exploits Gabor’s
(1968, 1969) demonstration that memory systems based on vector
convolution mimic a hologram (see also Longuet-Higgins, 1968;
Murdock, 1982; Poggio, 1973).
Because it is a long-term memory (LTM), the lexicon would
be treated conventionally as a stable store. Discussing the
Atkinson-Shiffrin model, for example, Shiffrin (1999, p. 20)
noted that “the primary structural distinction in the memory
system is between the active memories (all the short-term and
sensory stores) and the passive memory (long-term store).” By
contrast, we treat the lexicon as a dynamic store: Changing the
strength of any word or association increases the strength of
similar objects and decreases the strength of dissimilar ones.
Our treatment of the lexicon as a dynamic store reflects the
properties of the holographic memory system in which we have
implemented it.
During the study of a list of words, presentation of an item not
only strengthens its representation in the lexicon but also reduces
the strength of the preceding studied items. The reduction is an
interference effect (overwriting); the interference is a primary
contributor to recency effects. In addition, through rehearsal, sub-
jects create interitem associations and add them to the lexicon.
Adding items to the lexicon changes the strength of the corre-
sponding representations already present in the lexicon.
The reduction in the strength of preceding studied items is
often described in structural terms implying a two-store mix
that allows the subject to sample from one store or the other.
The sampling idea is motivated by shape of the accuracy profile
across the list—the serial-position curve—in particular, the
relative size of the primacy and recency components of the
accuracy profile. The structural view assumes that subjects
report words from the recency end of the list from short-term
memory (STM) and then pick up items from the primacy end of
the list from a second less labile store (e.g., Craik, 1970; Waugh
& Norman, 1965). In effect, the structural view assumes that the
reduction in the strength of initially presented items is a step
function as the subject switches from one store to the other—a
view that has been criticised on both logical and empirical
grounds (Gruneburg, 1970; Melton, 1963). Instead of a struc-
tural account, we describe the reduction in terms of feedback to
the lexicon (overwriting); feedback provides a continuous re-
duction in the strength of previously studied items. Here, we
echo the view urged by Ebbinghaus: “The earlier images are
more and more overlaid, so to speak, and covered by the later
ones. Therefore, in the case of the earlier images, the possibility
of recurrence offers itself more rarely and with greater diffi-
culty” (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913, Chapter 7, Section 26).
The ability to form item-to-item associations is limited by the
effort involved. Rundus and Atkinson’s (1970) data illustrate
how the limitation works. They asked subjects to rehearse out
loud and found the number of rehearsals of each word fell off
exponentially with position in the list. Figure 1 shows their data
(in closed circles). In addition, we fit the data to a geometric
function (the discrete form of an exponential). The fitted geo-
metric function is shown in open circles. As is clear in the
figure, the geometric function fits their data extremely well.
During recall, subjects use all information, both item and
associative, to select successive responses. Item and associative
information are obtained from all lexical entries and, when
combined, yield an overall measure of strength for each entry.
The entry whose strength is both closest to a criterion and
within defined boundaries is selected for report. Recall halts
when no item is within the bounds and all restart options have
been exhausted. Feedback from report affects all lexical entries.
Because the state of the lexicon controls recall, the theory
anticipates trial-to-trial interactions. Task differences affect the
way retrieval is implemented. In serial recall, for example,
associative information is given priority initially when selecting
an item for recall. When recall halts for the first time, however,
selection is based on a different criterion— one based on item
information.
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Feedback During Study and Retrieval
Alters the Lexicon
When a subject studies or reports a word, its strength in the
lexicon is changed. Changing one item, or association, also
changes the strength of the other material in the lexicon. The way
that particular items and associations are treated depends on the
procedure involved in the task. For a simple free-recall trial, for
example, changes are introduced by virtue of studying and report-
ing the list of items presented on the trial. For a learning task, by
contrast, additional changes are introduced by virtue of the repe-
tition of the materials. Likewise, if an additional constraint is
imposed, as in a serial-recall task, the emphasis given to item and
associative information is changed accordingly. We will discuss
the implementation of each paradigm separately.
Learning depends on both item and associative feedback to the
lexicon. When subjects see a list of words for the first time,
feedback is based on those items recalled. If the subject sees the
same material again, feedback is based additionally on the current
strength of the material in memory. As a result, feedback is
moderated by information retained from one trial to another.
Implementing the Theory
Representation assumptions. For the simulations that fol-
low, each word is represented by a vector of 2,048 values; each
value is derived independently by sampling from a Gaussian
distribution with a mean of 0 and variance of 1/2,048. The dimen-
sionality of 2,048 provides the system with appropriate resolution
for the vectors.
Vectors created in this fashion are often described as orthonor-
mal in expectation. That is, the dot-product of each vector with
itself is approximately 1.0, and the dot-product of two different
arbitrarily chosen vectors is approximately 0.0. As a result, the
dot-product—instead of the normalized dot-product (the vector
cosine)—can be used to measure the similarity of any two vectors.
An association between each pair of words is constructed by
computing the outer-product of the pair. The outer-product is
compressed to a vector of the same dimensionality as the dimen-
sionality of the word vectors using circular convolution (), that is,
z  x  y.
Figure 2 illustrates the arithmetic of circular convolution: The
top panel shows two vectors, x and y; x is shown as a standard
column vector; y is transposed, (yT) to a row vector.
The left side of the middle panel shows the outer-product matrix
produced by multiplying the two vectors, that is, x  yT. As
shown, the outer-product matrix is constructed by computing three
rows (one corresponding to each of the rows in x). The elements
in each row are computed by multiplying the row element in x by
each of the columns in y.
The right side of the middle panel shows a Latin square. The
values in the square index values from the outer-product matrix
that must be summed to form the convolved vector z. The bottom
panel sums the relevant values to form each entry of the convolved
vector z. Circular convolution is commutative, that is, (x  y) 
(y  x). Plate (2003) and Kelly, Blostein, and Mewhort (2013)
discuss methods by which it can be made noncommutative.
Circular correlation (#) is an approximate inverse of circular
convolution. Figure 3 illustrates the arithmetic: The top panel
shows two vectors xT and z. Vector z is the convolution of x and
y from Figure 2. The middle panel of Figure 3 shows their outer
product. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows a facsimile vector
(y=) constructed by forming the correlation (x # z). Although y= is
Figure 1. Number of overt rehearsals as a function of presentation
position. Data (closed circles) from Rundus and Atkinson (1970) fit to a
geometric function (open circles).
Figure 2. The calculations for circular convolution. The top panel shows
two vectors, x and yT, to be convolved. The middle panel shows their
outer-product matrix and a Latin square indexing the values summed to
collapse the matrix. The bottom panel sums the components of the out-
product matrix and shows the resulting vector z.
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not identical to y, it resembles y as indicated by its cosine with y
(0.93).1
Our representation assumptions are fundamentally the same as
used by Lewandowsky and Murdock (1989; see also Franklin,
2013; Franklin & Mewhort, 2002). Like Lewandowsky and
Murdock, we use a hologram for memory. In their simulations, the
hologram is empty at the start of each trial—they treat the holo-
gram as a store for studied items (see also Murdock, 1982). Unlike
Lewandowsky and Murdock, we treat the hologram as a permanent
store that holds the whole of the subject’s lexicon—the subject’s
vocabulary and interword associations. It is not empty at the start
of each study trial.2
Johns and Jones (2010) have questioned the use of random
vectors as exemplars in models of memory on the grounds that
random vectors typically create a population of exemplars that is
too Gaussian in shape. The too-Gaussian problem cannot be solved
easily because the use of structured vectors raises other complica-
tions. Kelly et al. (2013) have suggested that structure in the Latin
square (used in convolution and correlation) can be confounded
with structure in the vectors themselves. Of course, the confound-
ing does not occur with random vectors because, by definition,
random vectors lack structure. Kelly et al.’s work motivated us to
stick with tradition and to use random vectors rather than struc-
tured vectors (such as those produced by the Bound Encoding of
the Aggregate Language Environment (BEAGLE) model or by
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), see Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort,
2006; Jones & Mewhort, 2007; Landauer & Dumais, 1997, respec-
tively). Although we use random vectors to represent words, we do
not attach semantics to particular exemplars. The features in the
random vectors might represent descriptions of the words or brain
states that represent the words. For the purposes of our demon-
strations, the referent for the features can be left vague. The
interactive nature of the vector-holographic architecture illustrated
in the model is its critical contribution.
Some properties of a holographic store. A hologram, like
human memory, is a distributed representation that is robust to loss
of medium. To illustrate the property, we constructed a hologram
by superimposing 2,000 item vectors of dimensionality 2,048 and
the 1,999,000 (C[2000, 2]) word-to-word associations, each
weighted by a constant (0.01). We added five lexical items se-
lected at random to the hologram at strength 0.8. As a baseline, we
measured the strength for each of the five items in the hologram.
Armed with the baseline measurement, we replaced 64, 128, 256,
512, or 1,024 elements of the hologram at random with a value of
0.0. Strength is measured using the dot-product of each of the five
items with the lexicon. At each step, we assessed the strength of
the critical five items in the hologram.
We repeated the procedure (i.e., we built a fresh hologram,
selected five items at random, and lesioned the hologram) 100
times to obtain 500 data points for each percentage of memory
destroyed. The data, shown in Figure 4, are means of the 500 data
points. As shown in Figure 4, as more of the hologram is de-
stroyed, the strength of the representation of the critical five items
is reduced, but even when 50% of the values in the hologram have
been set to zero, the strength of the critical five items remains high.
Second, holographic memories are dynamic. Adding or
strengthening a word stored in memory changes the strength of all
words; the change (either an increase or a decrease) depends on the
similarity of each item to the item added. To illustrate the dynamic
property, we constructed a hologram of 100 items, each of dimen-
sionality 200. All items, weighted by 0.01, were added to the
hologram.
Figure 5 shows the strength (measured with the dot-product) of
the 100 items. The top panel (left side) shows the strength of the
items immediately after all items had been added to the hologram.
As is shown, the strengths hover around the nominal strength of
0.01. The top panel (right side) shows the corresponding strengths
after the first item was added again with a weight of 0.35. Again,
the strengths hover around the nominal 0.01, but there is consid-
erably greater variability. The lower panels show a corresponding
increase in variance as the final two items are added to the
hologram.
The changes in strength shown in Figure 5 are systematic.
Figure 6 replots the change in item strength for all memory items
using similarity of all items in the hologram to the just-added item
on the abscissa.
As shown in Figure 6, the change in strength of any item
depends upon its similarity to the item just readded and on the
1 We have described circular convolution and correlation in terms of the
outer-product matrix and the calculations used to compress it. In practice,
because it is faster, we compute convolution vectors using an algorithm
based on the Fourier transform (the routine CO6EKF from the Numerical
Algorithms Group, www.nag.com).
2 Whether or not memory should be empty on each trial has become a
contentious issue (e.g., Murdock & Kahana, 1993 vs. Shiffrin, Ratcliff,
Murnane, & Nobel, 1993). Our use of a holographic lexicon assumes that
memory always contains knowledge.
Figure 3. The calculations for circular correlation. The top panel shows
two vectors, xT and z (from Figure 2), to be correlated. The middle panel
shows their outer-product matrix, and a Latin square indexing the values
summed to collapse the matrix. The bottom panel sums the components of
the out-product matrix and shows the resulting vector y=.
118 FRANKLIN AND MEWHORT
7 3
weight at which the item was readded; the slope of the change
function equals the weight of the item readded. Figures 5 and 6
illustrate the interactive nature of the holographic store. Changing
the strength of an item in memory affects the strength of all other
items. The changes resemble the excitatory part of a spreading-
activation model (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975), without the hy-
draulics necessary to make such a model work. But, as shown, the
changes in the hologram are inhibitory as well.
In the sections to follow, we will apply the model to archival
data from free-recall, learning, and serial-recall paradigms to dem-
onstrate that the model can capture the fundamental characteristics
of performance in the paradigms. Given that the model is able to
capture data from the several paradigms, we offer it as a new
approach to the problem of ordering recall.
Free-Recall Paradigms
In a typical free-recall trial, subjects are given a list of words for
study and are subsequently asked to recall as many words as
possible in any order. When a subject studies a word, its repre-
sentation is strengthened in the lexicon. The extent of the change
depends on the position of the word in the study list. On each trial,
the model adds a start item that signals that the next item is the first
item to be studied and an end-of-list item (i.e., a recall cue). The
list’s length is represented by the symbol LL; hence, for the
simulation, the study list includes the list proper (i.e., items 1 to
LL) along with items 0 and (LL  1).
Following Rundus and Atkinson (1970), the efficiency with
which adjacent items can be associated falls off as more items are
studied; the strength of association for successive pairs of studied
items follows a decreasing geometric function of list position. To
Figure 4. Retrieval strength as a function of the percentage of memory
lesioned.
Figure 5. Retrieved strength of 100 items as some are strengthened in a lexicon.
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implement the decrease in efficiency, we set the strength of the
association between adjacent pairs of items using a geometric
function starting from a context item that precedes the list. The
values of associative strength, i, are computed as follows:
i0
i1
where 0 is the maximum strength of association,  is a scaling
parameter, and i runs from 1 to (LL  1).
Studying an item not only reinforces its existing strength in the
lexicon but also interferes with items studied earlier in the list. One
can anticipate each item’s strength by using a decreasing geomet-
ric series back from the last item presented. The strength, i, of the
word in the ith serial position in the study list is
i0
P
where 0 is the maximum value of any studied item,  is a scaling
parameter that represents the proportion of strength retained,  is
the minimum item weight (fixed at 0.35), and P is a counter that
increases from 0 to (LL) as i decreases from (LL  1) to 1.
Initial report is prompted by the end-of-list item (LL  1), and
the word reported serves as the cue for the next report. When a
word is recalled (either correctly or in error), a proportion
of the reported item and a proportion of the association between
the reported item and its report cue, is fed back to the lexicon.
The feedback is calculated
Item : 1 - r ● L,
Associative : 1 - p * r ● L
where r is the recalled word, L is the lexicon, p is the report cue,
and  is a scaling parameter set to 0.063 (a value derived from
pilot studies).
The choice of the end-of-list item to prompt the initial report
deserves comment. Helstrup (1984) has shown that subjects in a
free-recall paradigm try initially to treat the task as a serial-recall
task. As a result, they start report with the first presented item, and
performance on the initial items is high. Over the first few practice
trials, they soon learn that, for a long list, their serial strategy
leaves the final items from the list unreported. Accordingly, they
change strategies and begin to recall from the end of the list. With
further experience in the task, they make fine adjustments to their
start-position strategy. We will illustrate the adjustments using
Murdock’s (1962) data when we apply the model to the free-recall
paradigm.
Of course, with short lists, subjects may have little incentive to
change strategies because the final items remain available. There-
fore, the subjects stick with a serial strategy. For such cases, the
model would use Item 0 as the initial report cue. Ward, Tan, and
Grenfell-Essam (2010) and Corballis (1967) have described such
cases.
To decide which item to report, the model computes the strength
of all items in the lexicon, and the strength of the association of the
probe with the lexicon. The decision is based on the sum of item
and associative information in the lexicon. Hence, the first step in
Figure 6. Change in retrieval strength as a function of similarity of the item added to each newly strengthened
item.
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retrieval requires calculating the strength with which each vocab-
ulary item is associated with the probe. To compute the associative
strength values, we first obtain a composite of the items in the
lexicon in which each item is represented roughly proportional to
the strength of its association with the probe. To obtain the
composite, f, we compute
f r # L
where f, the composite, contains information (a) about all vocab-
ulary items that have been associated with the probe, and (b) about
items that are similar to the vocabulary items that have been
associated with the probe. We assess the similarity of the compos-
ite to each item in the lexicon (i.e., to each vocabulary item, vi). To
assess the similarity of the ith item to f, we compute S(vi), a scalar,
Svi f ● vi
where i  0 to 2,000.
A vocabulary item’s momentary strength is defined as the sum
of its current strength plus the strength contributed by the asso-
ciative information. Each word’s current strength is obtained by
computing vi • L. The momentary strength for the ith vocabulary
item is S(vi)  vi • L, where, as before, i  0 to 2,000.
The word with a momentary strength closest to criterion is
selected for recall, provided the momentary strength falls within
limits. In the current simulations, the criterion was set at 1.0 (the power of
the item vectors), with limits set at 0.5. Note that the selection
rule specifies report of the item closest to 1.0, not the item with the
highest momentary strength. Recall halts when no candidate has an
appropriate momentary strength.
The selection rule picks the word with strength closest to crite-
rion. The rationale for the rule is that a neural pathway includes
neurons with variance in activation. If we think of a vector as
representing a neural pathway, the representation and storage
mechanisms of the holographic system we describe shares the
properties of variance in representation. We think of the criterion
as the mean of the distribution of variances so that the rule
specifies the item closest to the mean of the pathway.
To show the model in action, we applied it to standard experi-
ments. Our applications are not comprehensive—it is likely im-
possible to be comprehensive in a single article. Our intent is to
show that the model can accommodate classic phenomena, espe-
cially those thought to support alternative conceptions and accom-
modate phenomena designed to illuminate particular interpreta-
tions of current interest.
Before introducing the demonstrations, however, we offer a
cautionary note. Any manipulation is analytic only within the
theoretical framework in which it has been advanced. Most ma-
nipulations will constrain performance, but if the theoretical
framework is flawed, the constraints will not reflect the issues that
they were intended to illuminate, and the manipulations will not
have the theoretical force they were designed to have. Hence, our
strategy in testing the model is to show that it responds to the
constraints in the same way that subjects do, but we reserve our
interpretation of the results to issues defined within our model.
For the demonstrations to follow, the lexicon was constructed by
summing the word vectors and the pairwise associations among
the words. We used a vocabulary of 2,000 words and their
1,999,000 associations (C[2000, 2]  1,999,000). Each entry to
the lexicon was weighted by a scalar, 0.001. Because subjects have
differing vocabularies, we constructed a fresh lexicon for each
subject.
Single-Trial Free Recall
A sample free-recall trial. In a free-recall trial, subjects study
a list of words and are subsequently asked to recall as many words
as possible. Figure 7 tracks a sample trial to illustrate how the
recall mechanism works. The ordinate is the momentary strength
for each of 85 words taken from a lexicon of 2,000. We restricted
the figure to 85 words to avoid excessive clutter. The studied
words are shown as the leftmost 12 items in each panel. Each panel
(numbered 1 to 6) shows the strength of each of the 85 words on
a report-by-report basis. As is shown, Word 12 was the first item
to be reported. The next report was Word 7, followed by Word 20
(an intrusion). Reporting continues until none of 2,000 words’
momentary activation is close enough to criterion (1  0.5).
Two features of the example deserve emphasis. First, reporting
does not stop because a response is an intrusion rather than a
studied item. It is possible (but extremely unlikely) for the model
to produce a series of intrusions without reporting a studied item.
Second, the model has a natural stopping rule: reporting stops
when none of the 2,000 words in the lexicon have a momentary
strength close enough to the criterion of (1  0.5).
Murdock (1962). In his classic book, Models of human mem-
ory, Norman (1970) reprinted the serial-position curve from
Murdock (1962) as an example of stable data worthy of theoretical
attention. Fortunately, a complete record of Murdock’s data can be
downloaded from the Computational Memory Lab at University of
Pennsylvania (http://memory.psych.upenn.edu/DataArchive). We
start our analysis by fitting the model to Murdock’s data.
Murdock (1962) asked subjects to study lists of 10, 15, 20, 30,
or 40 different words drawn from the Toronto Noun Pool. Each
word was presented orally at a rate of 1s or 2 s per word. After the
list had been presented, the subjects were invited to report the
words in any order. As we noted earlier, subjects adjust their report
strategy as they practice the task. An analysis of Murdock’s data
illustrates the adjustments. Figure 8 shows mean output position
(position in the report) as a function of presentation position in
10-trial blocks. Initially (top left panel) subjects start report with
the last list item and work backward before switching to report of
the initial list items. The asymptotic items come later in the report
stream. By Trial 35 (bottom left panel), subjects report the fourth-
from-last item first and work forward. The change is shown clearly
in the hook that appears in the figure at the last four presentation
positions. By Trial 70 (bottom right panel), the hook has deepened.
Early authorities suggested that the change in report docu-
mented by the hook does not occur with lists presented visually
(e.g., Beaman & Morton, 2000; Kahana, 1996), but they either
confounded modality with amount of practice or administered too
little practice to allow the hook to develop. In a large experiment,
Roberts (1972) compared both visual and auditory presentation
(across both list length and rate of presentation), and his data
exhibit the hook in both modalities. The change in report order is
not a modality effect; as we have suggested, it is a strategic shift
that reflects subjects’ reflection on performance for end-of-list
items (although there may be other reasons as well).
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Figure 9 corroborates the change in report order using a differ-
ent measure, the conditional response probability (CRP) curve, a
measure of the probability of recalling item a immediately fol-
lowed by item b, conditioned on the recall of b (see Kahana,
1996). The CRP is plotted on the ordinate, with the distance
between presented items on the abscissa. As subjects’ change
strategy across trials, the tendency to report in forward order
increases.
The change in report order across trials illustrates a problem
with averaging data across trials. Models that do not include a
mechanism sensitive to the strategic shift in report should not be
applied across a shift in strategy. Because the holographic model
does not include a shift mechanism, we simulated performance in
Murdock’s (1962) experiment where the empirical order of report
was stable. The decision to use trials with a stable order of report
is a conservative one pending empirical results to point the way to
the kind of strategic mechanism needed by the model.
We applied the model to the first 10 trials of Murdock’s (1962)
20-item list presented at a rate of one word per second. On each
trial of the simulation, the model studied 20 words. Recall was
prompted using the end-of-list marker (word LL  1). Recall
continued until none of the 2,000 vocabulary items had a momen-
tary strength close enough to criterion. To honour the idea that, in
a free-recall task, subjects try to use all information at their
disposal, when report halted for the first time, the model attempted
to restart by using the beginning-of-the-list marker (Word 0) as a
probe.
We fit the model to the serial-position curve (smoothed so that the
fit was less perturbed by noise) using a downhill simplex optimization
algorithm (see Press, Teukolsky, Vetterling, & Flannery, 1992, pp.
402–406). Once we had obtained the fitted parameters, we ran the
model 20 times independently (using the fitted parameters) and re-
corded the range of values produced. The procedure of fitting first and
then running 20 times was designed to reveal the variance inherent in
the model’s behaviour as a result of its use of Gaussian vectors to
represent words.
Figure 10 presents the results of the simulation. The filled
symbols connected with a solid line shows Murdock’s (1962) data.
The vertical bars show the range of values produced by the model
over the 20 independent runs. Each run included 15 simulated
subjects, each with their own lexicon. As is clear in the figure, the
model captures the shape of the serial-position curve.
The serial-position curve shows the number of items recalled
correctly as a function of presentation position. It is an aggregate
function: Because each trial allows only one word at each stimulus
position, no subject would produce the serial-position curve like
that in Figure 10 on any single trial. Hence, the serial-position
curve is an artifact produced by averaging over trials. Neverthe-
less, the serial-position curve has been an important analysis from
the beginning of experimental work in psychology. Nipher (1878),
who published the first known scientific experiment in memory,
calculated serial-position curves, as did Ebbinghaus (1885/1913).
Subsequently, the majority of published list-learning experiments
include the serial-position curve as part of the analysis. The his-
torical importance of the serial-position curve, and its popularity as
an analytical tool, make it an excellent choice as a measure to
assess the model’s fitting ability.
The shape of the serial-position curve suggests that subjects
prefer to report the most recent items first. That preference is often
interpreted in terms of a multiple-store theory (e.g., Craik, 1970;
Figure 7. Momentary activation for 80 of 2,000 words across successive reports. The first 12 words were
studied; the remaining items were unstudied but were included in the lexicon.
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Waugh & Norman, 1965). We shall say more about the viability of
such theory later. At this point, it is worth noting that our account
is based on a single-store—the subject’s lexicon.
Because it is an aggregate function, the serial-position curve
gives us limited information regarding how recall may have varied
across individual trials. To get a more complete account of recall,
we need to supplement the basic serial-position curve by examin-
ing order of report and other basic data such as the number of items
reported per trial.
The next analysis examines the number of words reported
correctly per trial. We tallied the number words reported correctly
per trial for each of Murdock’s (1962) subjects, and calculated a
frequency distribution pooled across subjects. For comparison, we
computed the corresponding frequency distribution pooled across
the 20 runs of the model described in Figure 10.
Figure 11 presents the results of the frequency analysis of words
correct per trial for both the simulated data and the human data.
Closed circles represent the frequency distribution drawn from the
Murdock (1962). Open circles represent the frequency distribution of
the simulated data. As is evident in Figure 11, the 15 simulated
subjects (pooled across 20 runs) are a close match to human subjects
on this measure. Both the model and Murdock’s subjects reported
approximately the same distribution of words correctly per trial.
It is important to note that the curve in Figure 11 was not a fitted
curve. Rather, we used the data produced from the 20 runs using
parameters from the simulated serial-position curve. The distribu-
tion of words correct per trial comes for free without refitting.
The free-recall paradigm allows subjects to order their responses
without constraint, but, of course, subjects do not report in random
order. Presumably, the way that they constrain their report reflects
the mechanisms used to order recall. Because of its potential as a
window on the nature of the mechanisms, several measures have
been advanced to describe order of report.
Figure 12 shows one measure: the position in the output stream
as a function of presentation position (the same measure we used
in Figure 8). The solid line presents Murdock’s (1962) data, and
the vertical bars show the range of data from the model from the
20 runs shown in Figures 10 and 11. As is shown in Figure 12, the
model’s function tracks the pattern of the data. Note that items
recalled most often, as shown on the serial-position curve, are
recalled earliest in the output stream. Items recalled less often tend
to be recalled later. The strong negative correlation between the
serial-position curve and the output-position curve was also re-
ported by Deese and Kaufman (1957).
Figure 13 shows the CRP function drawn from Murdock’s
(1962) data in the left-hand panel. The right-hand panel displays
the values drawn from the simulated data. As is clear in the figure,
the probability of a forward response is much greater than the
probability of a backward response for both the subjects and the
model. Like the serial-position curve, the CRP function is a com-
posite. The CRP function is complicated by the fact that it is not
only a composite but also a conditional composite. For that reason,
statistical analysis on the CRP function is often problematic.
The final measure of order of report eschews conditional
analysis in favour of a correlation between input position (the
serial-position in which the word was presented) and the output
position (the position in which it was reported). The measure
has been used in earlier work (Deese & Kaufman, 1957;
Mewhort, 1974). Here, we used Kendall’s tau for the correla-
tion. Hence, if the report were strictly first to last, the correla-
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Figure 8. Mean output position as function of presentation position for blocks of 10 trials in ascending order.
The data are drawn from Murdock (1962).
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tion would be 1. If it were strictly last to first, the correlation
would be 1. Most trials yielded an intermediate value indi-
cating a mixture of orders. If a particular trial involves fewer
than two correct responses, tau was set to 0.0.
Figure 14 presents the distribution of correlations for Murdock’s
(1962) subjects and for the model (across the 20 runs). As is clear
in Figure 14, the model captures the distribution well.
Figures 10 through 14 describe the basic characteristics of report
in a typical free-recall task. Some of the measures should be
interpreted with caution because they are composite scores or are
based on conditional analyses. Taken together, however, they
provide a clear picture of performance in the task.
It is important to note that we obtained parameters for the model
by fitting the serial-position curve shown in Figure 10. The data
shown in the remaining figures are based on data from the 20 runs
(shown in Figure 10); the 20 runs are, of course, based on the
parameters of the original fit. We conclude that the model captures
the basic facts of report in free recall—it provides a picture of the
topology of report. Table 1 presents the free parameters used in the
simulation.
A comment about the parameters is in order. Franklin and
Mewhort (2013) documented that the parameters are insensitive to
changes in list length provided the word pool, rate of presentation,
and subject pool are constant. In addition to the free parameters
listed in Table 1, we fixed the bounds around the criterion at 0.5.
Increasing the bounds is one way to make the model more flexible;
it raises the level of performance while making it easier to fit the
model to data.
Both our account and formal implementations of dual-store
accounts (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin,
1981) are consistent with the main features of the serial-position
data, but the holographic model captures a more complete picture
of performance. Neither account is forced by the data. As is often
the case, there are at least two theories consistent with the data. We
await an empirical test to distinguish the theories.
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from the same data set used in Figure 8. Forward ordering of report increases with practice in the task.
Figure 10. Accuracy of report as a function of presentation position. The
solid line shows Murdock’s (1962) data; the vertical bars show the range
of simulated values over 20 independent runs of the model.
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In the next section, we will apply the model to an extension of
the simple free-recall case. The extension was motivated by the-
oretical concerns of interest at the time. The same concerns do not
necessarily motivate our interest in the extension, but for historical
reasons if none other, it is of interest to see if the model can
accommodate the extended situation.
Extensions to Single-Trial Free Recall
Craik (1970) asked subjects to study a series of 15-word lists for
immediate report. Recall of each list showed a typical serial-
position curve with a small primacy effect and a pronounced
recency effect (see Figure 15). After finishing the series of free-
recall tests, the subjects were invited to recall all words that they
could remember from any of the tests. The serial-position curve
Figure 11. Cumulative proportion of words correct per trial. The closed
circles present data from Murdock (1962). The open circles present data
from the independent 20 runs of the model derived by fitting the serial
position curve in Figure 10.
Figure 12. Mean output position as a function of presentation position.
The solid line shows Murdock’s (1962) data; the vertical bars show the
range of 20 independent runs of the model derived by fitting the serial
position curve in Figure 10.
Figure 13. Conditional response probability relative to the position of the
current response. The left-hand panel shows Murdock’s (1962) data. The
right-hand panel represents data drawn from the model averaged across the 20
independent runs derived by fitting the serial position curve in Figure 10.
Figure 14. The distribution of tau (order-of-report) scores. The closed
circles show the function drawn from Murdock’s (1962) data. The open
circles represent data drawn from the model derived by fitting the serial
position curve in Figure 10.
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from the final recall-all test showed a modest primacy effect and a
negative recency effect: Report from the final position of the
15-word lists—the positions that had been reported well in imme-
diate recall—were depressed to a low level, hence the designation
negative-recency effect (see Figure 15, closed symbols). Watkins
and Watkins (1974) showed, however, that negative recency be-
comes a null recency effect if subjects do not know the list length
on successive trials. Craik interpreted the results in terms of a
two-store structural model, as did Watkins and Watkins.
We ran the model following Craik’s (1970) paradigm. We fit the
aggregate free-recall data (based on Craik’s initial 10 free-recall
trials) to obtain parameters for the 15-item lists. Using the param-
eters obtained from the fit, we administered 10 simple free-recall
trials, followed by a test asking for recall of the words from any of
the lists. Although list length was constant, the model did not
“know” that fact; we did not try to build in a strategic mechanism
to exploit knowledge of list length. Hence, following Watkins and
Watkins (1974), our simulation of Craik‘s data should show a null
recency rather than Craik’s negative recency effect.
Figure 15 shows Craik’s data (left panel) along with the results
of the simulation (right panel). As shown in Figure 15 (open
symbols), the simulated serial-position curve for the initial simple
free-recall trials (averaged over the 10 trials) took the standard
form: a small primacy effect and a pronounced recency effect. The
simulated serial-position curve for the final recall-all test (open
symbols) showed a modest primacy effect and a null recency
effect. In short, the simulation captures the key features of Craik’s
data and is consistent with Watkins and Watkins (1974) results.
Craik’s (1970) results are usually interpreted in structural terms.
The idea is that reports contributing to the primacy portion of the
Table 1
Free Parameters
Simulation
Free parametersa
0 0   
Murdock (1962) 0.140683 0.177325 0.963693 0.804632 — —
Craik (1970) 0.167997 0.208553 0.887460 0.867606 — —
Klein et al. (2005) immediate free-recall 0.275530 0.061587 0.980672 0.883129 — —
Klein et al. (2005) free-recall learning 0.170011 0.162542 0.925955 0.920406 0.03 0.03
Klein et al. (2005) serial-recall learning 0.234218 0.077323 0.970268 0.964993 0.620028 0.000643
Subjective organization 0.190543 0.180603 0.810512 0.805652 0.065028 0.046643
a Parameters 0, 0, , and  are used in single-trial free recall and on the first trial of free-recall learning and serial learning. Subsequent learning trials
use only parameters  and .
Figure 15. Accuracy as a function of presentation position in Craik’s (1970) negative-recency paradigm. The
left panel shows Craik’s (1970) original data. The right panel shows the model’s simulation of Craik’s (1970)
paradigm.
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trial-by-trial serial-position curve are taken from one memory
(often called LTM or secondary memory), whereas reports con-
tributing to the recency portion of the curve are taken from a
second memory (often called STM or primary memory). From the
structural perspective, the negative recency effect occurs because
items stored in STM are held only for a brief time, so that when the
recall-all test occurs, the words are no longer available.
Glanzer and Cunitz (1966) advanced a similar interpretation for
an experiment that used an end-of-list distraction technique to
knock words out of STM. They predicted (and found) that the
recency component of the serial-position curve would be elimi-
nated. Unfortunately, although their empirical results are consis-
tent with the structural interpretation, they do not force that inter-
pretation. Indeed, Bjork and Whitten (1974; see also Koppenaal &
Glanzer, 1990) provided an extensive analysis of the two-memory
structural idea and showed that it fails. Neath (1993) manipulated
the timing of distraction (both during study and immediately prior
to report) and the nature of distraction (i.e., homogeneous or
changing). Because of the way distraction affected rehearsal, he
also argued against a two-store account. In Bjork and Whitten‘s
words, “The customary two-process theoretical account of imme-
diate free recall is certainly incomplete, if not wrong” (p. 189).
The present simulation reproduces Craik’s (1970) contrast be-
tween the serial-position curve for immediate recall and the serial-
position curve for the report-all condition, but our model does not
include the structural distinctions advanced by Craik or by Glanzer
and Cunitz (1966). Because the model can reproduce Craik’s data
without reference to two memory systems, our simulations support
the arguments against the two-store idea.
The holographic account explains the negative-recency effect in
terms of overwriting the lexicon across successive free-recall tri-
als. Note that although the final free-recall trial was not overwrit-
ten by a succeeding free-recall trial, it was overwritten by instruc-
tions to report from any list. The instructions had the effect of
damping the lexicon by the equivalent of a list of about 1.1 items.
From the perspective of our model, the idea of interference (over-
writing) is correct, but the idea that it is selective to one of two
memory systems is not.
Both Craik (1970) and Glanzer and Cunitz (1966) exploited a
distraction technique to clean the contents of primary memory. In
Craik’s case, distraction was provided by successive free-recall
trials. In Glanzer and Cuntiz’s case, distraction was provided by
requiring subjects to count backward before report. Unfortunately,
as Neath (1993) demonstrated, distraction is a more complicated
operation than they acknowledged. To test the idea of a labile
STM—the same issue addressed by Craik and by Glanzer and
Cunitz—Hebb (1961) asked subjects to complete a series of im-
mediate serial-recall memory-span tasks. Every third list in the
series was repeated, and Hebb found considerable savings from
one repeated list to the next. As Hebb noted, the pattern of savings
across a complete report of two series denies the idea of a simple
labile STM. Clearly, the interference administered by Craik and by
Glanzer and Cunitz is more complicated than the simple idea of
knocking items out of a STM store. Curiously, neither Craik nor
Glanzer and Cunitz cited Hebb’s work.
In earlier work, Franklin and Mewhort (2013) applied the cur-
rent model to other extensions of the free-recall task. For example,
the model successfully captures both part-list cuing (Slamecka,
1968; Sloman, Bower, & Rohrer, 1991) and the list-strength effect
(Tulving & Hastie, 1972). The list-strength effect refers to a report
advantage conferred on repeated items in a list coupled with a
disadvantage conferred on nonrepeated items. The part-list cuing
effect refers to a report disadvantage when, after subjects have
studied a list, they are told that they do not have to report a subset
of the items. In both cases, the model suggests that the phenomena
reflect changes in rehearsal leading to changes in order of report
induced by the repetition manipulation (list-strength) and the pre-
sentation of for-free items (part-list), respectively.
Single-Trial Serial Recall
In a simple serial-recall task, subjects are asked to study a list of
words and to report them in order, from first to last. Hence, unlike
the unconstrained case of free recall, serial recall constrains the
subject’s order of report. To respond to the extra constraint, the
model changes several details concerning how report is assembled.
First, because subjects are required to report from first to last,
the model uses the begin-study cue (Item 0) as the initial response
cue. As in free recall, any response produced is used as a cue for
the next response; hence, the early reports are ordered primarily by
the chain of associative links. When recall halts, to honour the idea
that the subject uses all information available as in free recall, we
allow recall to restart. In free recall, report is restarted by using
Item 0 as a prompt. Because the two paradigms involve very
different constraints, serial recall requires a different restart mech-
anism.
In serial recall, the words studied most recently are strongly
represented in the lexicon. But the task requires report in order.
The two facts—that recently studied words are strongly repre-
sented in the lexicon and that report must be in first-to-last order—
are in conflict. To resolve the conflict, the model uses order
information derived from each word’s strength of representation in
the lexicon. To do so, the model changes the criterion for report.
Instead of reporting the word whose momentary strength is closest
to 1.0 (and, thereby, risking a report that is out of order), the model
picks the word whose item strength is within the response bound-
ary and is closest to the boundary. That is, the model abandons
associative information in favour of item information. Subse-
quently, if no response is available, report halts.
Because order is constrained in serial recall, most recent studies
of serial recall have focussed on context information that subjects
presumably use to order materials and on the pattern of errors
made during recall. Note that the model does not use context
information to guide serial report; instead, it guides recall using
the same information that is used in free recall (but it changes
the way the information is used). We want to acknowledge,
however, that some tasks (such as a list-discrimination task;
Jacoby, 1991) require context information. To respond to the
requirements of such tasks, the model would have to encode
context information. We will discuss the use of environmental
context information later.
We start our demonstration of serial recall by considering the
immediate serial-recall experiment by Klein, Addis, and Kahana
(2005). Their subjects studied lists of 19 words for immediate
serial recall. We fit the model to obtain parameters appropriate to
their task; the results shown in Figure 16.
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The left panel of Figure 16 shows Klein et al.’s (2005) data from
their Figure 2(A); the right panel summarizes the simulated data.
As shown in Figure 16, the simulation matches the data well.
Figure 17 shows the CRP function taken from Klein et al.’s
(2005) data along with the corresponding function taken from the
simulation shown in Figure 17. As before, the open circles show
the CRP function from the simulation shown in Figure 16. The
principle result in both the data and the simulation is a strong
preference to report in forward direction. It is important to note
that the simulation of the serial-position curve was obtained by
fitting the data to obtain appropriate parameters. The CRP function
from the simulation falls out without refitting, that is, the CRP
function falls out for free as a natural consequence of the memory
system.
We used our simulation of Klein et al.’s (2005) experiment to
assess the model’s ability to capture two characteristics of imme-
diate serial recall documented much later by Farrell, Hurlstone,
and Lewandowsky (2013). Figure 18 shows the simulated recall
probability as a function of the lag between successive responses,
when conditioned on the first-order error. There are two points of
interest. First, the pattern matched the empirical pattern of the
majority of the 13 serial-recall experiments summarised by Farrell
et al. (see their Figure 4). Second, the lag function in Figure 18
shows a higher probability for the item preceding the item just
recalled. The usual CRP function shows a higher probability for
the item following the item just recalled (as shown in Figure 17).
Farrell et al. cite the reversal of the CRP following the first-order
error as evidence against simple chaining models (see also Henson,
Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996). Although the holographic model
uses item-to-item associations—as do simple chaining models—it
is also able to predict the reversal of the CRP function.
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate a unique, almost contradictory, aspect
of serial recall. Both fall out of the model without refitting. They
reflect the commutativity of circular convolution and the dynamic
nature of the holographic lexicon. We know of no other model that
can capture both effects.
Farrell et al. (2013) have documented a second characteristic of
serial recall. They examined sequential dependencies during serial
report across 13 studies. Figure 19 shows the proportion of items
recalled as a function of their distance from the correct position
(Lag 0). The data for the figure were drawn from the same
simulation that reproduced the serial-position curve in Figure 16;
the match to empirical data comes for free. Items recalled most
often are recalled earliest in the output stream. Items recalled less
often tend to be recalled later. As is clear in the figure, the most
likely response from the model is the word presented in that
position. When simulated subjects err, they are more likely to
Figure 16. Accuracy as a function of serial position in serial recall. The
closed symbols present the first trial averaged across subjects from Klein
et al. (2005). The open symbols present the simulation averaged over 20
independent runs of the paradigm.
Figure 17. Conditional response probability as a function of distance
from the last item recalled. The filled symbols present data from Klein et
al. (2005). The open symbols show the simulation based on 20 independent
runs of the paradigm.
Figure 18. Recall probability as a function of distance from the first-
order error. The data are based on the 20 independent runs from the
simulation of the Klein et al. (2005) paradigm.
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report from an adjacent position. The pattern illustrated in Figure
19 matched the patterns shown by Farrell et al. for 13 serial-recall
studies. Items recalled most often are recalled earliest in the output
stream. Items recalled less often tend to be recalled later. The
strong negative correlation between the serial-position curve and
the output-position curve was also reported by Deese and Kaufman
(1957).
Figures 16 through 19 describe the basic characteristics of report
in a typical serial-recall task. As before, composite measures and
conditional analyses should be interpreted with caution. That said,
taken together, the data provide a clear picture of performance in
the task. It is important to note that we obtained parameters for the
model by fitting the serial-position curve shown in Figure 16. The
data shown in the remaining figures are based on data from the
simulation shown in Figure 16. We conclude that the model
captures the basic facts of report in serial recall.
Following Lashley’s (1951) cri de coeur, serial recall is often
treated as a labouratory model for the larger issue of serial organi-
sation of sequential behaviour. Recent accounts have stressed the
role of environmental context. As the holographic model shows,
however, such context is not needed to account for simple verbal
experiments. It is definitely needed for exotic tasks such as split-
span tasks that put temporal and spatial context in conflict (e.g.,
Broadbent, 1954, Experiment 2). We will discuss the holographic
model’s ability to incorporate environmental context later.
Learning Paradigms
Multitrial free recall. The cases illustrated so far involve
simple study-recall examples. In a learning experiment, subjects
study the materials repeatedly. Klein et al. (2005) compared learn-
ing in free recall under two presentation conditions. In the first, a
list of words was presented in the same order on each trial. In the
second, the words were presented in different orders on successive
trials.
Presenting words in the same order on successive trials makes
interitem associations available, and as Klein et al. (2005) show,
subjects are able to capitalize on them. In particular, the primacy
part of the serial-position curve rose more quickly with learning
using same-order presentations relative to scrambled presentations.
The shift is consistent with the model: Because the same-order
condition preserves interitem associations and because associative
information is strongest for items in the primacy portion of the
serial-position curve, the model predicts faster learning in the
primacy part of the serial-position curve.
To implement learning, feedback to the lexicon on successive
learning trials was modified to acknowledge both associative and
item feedback. In addition, the amount of feedback was based on
the strength of the information in memory. The rationale for basing
feedback on the current strength in memory is based on work by
Rundus (1974). He argued that when attempting to learn a list,
subjects pay more attention to (and rehearse more often) those
items whose strength is weaker in memory than those that are
stronger in memory. Hence, feedback was determined on succes-
sive learning trials using the expressions:
Item : 0.51 - a ● L,
Associative : (0.51 - ([a  b] ● L) ,
where a is an arbitrary item studied on the previous trial and
presented again on the current trial, a  b is an arbitrary association
studied on the previous trial, L is the lexicon,  and are item and
associative feedback parameters, respectively. The constant 0.51
was set just above the upper bound, at which items become
available for recall.
The learning variant of the model has a switch that turns on the
use of learning feedback. Feedback is used only if item and
associative information are above their respective criteria. The
criterion for item information is set to 0.30. For associations the
criterion is the value
0 ([LL1]) 0.01
Figure 20 presents data from five free-recall learning trials. The
left panel presents data drawn from Klein et al. (2005) from a
condition in which the study lists were presented in the same order
on each trial. The right panel presents the simulated output of the
model. As is apparent in Figure 20, left panel the amount of
learning between trials is greatest for those items in the asymptotic
portion of the serial-position curves. In addition, note that the
amount of learning decreased across trials. The simulated data in
the right panel anticipates both of these trends. Note that both
trends are captured, even though the learning parameters remained
constant across list position and across trials in our simulation. As
both Klein et al.’s data and our simulation of the data show, when
words are presented in the same order on successive trials, interi-
tem associations are available, and both subjects and the model are
able to capitalize on them.
Multitrial serial recall. In multitrial serial-recall paradigms,
subjects are usually given the same list of items in the same order.
In addition to the same-order condition described in Figure 20,
Klein et al. (2005) also examined the standard serial-recall para-
digm. Figure 21 presents their data from five serial-recall learning
trials. When items are presented in the same order on each trial,
Figure 19. Proportion of items recalled as a function of their distance
from the correct position (Lag 0). The data are based on the 20 independent
runs from the simulation of the Klein et al. (2005) paradigm.
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serial-recall learning and free-recall learning have much in com-
mon: The amount of learning between trials is greatest for those
items in the asymptotic portion of the serial-position curves and
the amount of learning decreases across trials.
Figure 21 shows the original data of Klein et al. (2005). Figure
22 presents a simulation of learning for a 19-item list. Because we
did not attempt to fit the Klein et al. learning data, we present the
data on a separate figure. Even without fitting, the model captured
all trends seen in the original data. Note that the pattern of learning
is similar in both free and serial learning. For example, both show
greatest learning at the asymptotic portion of the serial-position
curve, and in both cases, the amount of learning decreases across
trials.
Associative learning is typically described as a gradual increase
in excitatory and inhibitory connections among stimulus units—a
delta rule. The basic idea is that associative strength accumulates
across repetitions (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; but see
Jamieson, Crump, & Hannah, 2012). Jones and Mewhort (2007)
present a learning algorithm that assembles information from
different sentences to settle on a meaning rather than on a gradual
increment in the strength of an association. Because each word
starts as a random vector in their model, the settling operation is,
in effect, a noise-reduction algorithm. The present model combines
the two ideas. On the one hand, studied items and associations
settle at a near optimal value (0.5) across trials, but to the extent
that background items in the hologram represent noise, optimizing
the strength of studied words and associations reduces noise.
Subjective organisation. Bousfield (1953) asked subjects to
study words from various categories and found that the subjects
tended to cluster items from like categories when they recalled the
items. Such clustering is widely accepted as evidence that
subjects organized the material semantically. To generalise the
idea, Tulving (1962) used unrelated words and showed that sub-
jects cluster the words into idiosyncratic categories. He referred to the
phenomenon as subjective organisation to highlight the fact that
subjects cluster material in an idiosyncratic fashion.
In their study of learning in free recall using words presented in
the same order, Klein et al. (2005) preserved interitem associa-
tions. To minimise the temptation to exploit such interitem asso-
ciations, one should present the words in different orders (as they
did in a second condition). The ideal method would be to ensure
(a) that each word appeared in each serial position equally often,
and (b) that each word followed each other word equally often.
Fortunately, the technique for ordering words in such a way was
pioneered by Tulving (1962) in his work on subjective organisa-
Figure 20. Accuracy as a function of presentation position and practice in
free recall. The lists are presented in the same order. The left panel presents
data from Klein et al. (2005); the right panel presents the simulation of the
data averaged over the 20 independent runs of the paradigm.
Figure 21. Accuracy as a function of serial position and practice. The
data were drawn from Klein et al. (2005, Figure 2). Subjects received five
serial-learning trials of a 19-word list.
Figure 22. Accuracy as a function of serial position and practice. The
data are a simulation averaged over the 20 independent runs of the model.
The parameters derived by fitting the first trial of Klein et al.’s (2005)
serial-learning experiment and the learning parameters from the free-recall
simulation shown in Figure 20.
130 FRANKLIN AND MEWHORT
8 5
tion.3 He required subjects to learn a list of 16 words using a
16-trial study-test procedure. On each study trial, the list was
presented in a unique order, and after each study trial, the subjects
were required to report many words as possible. Across a series of
16 study-test trials, each word was presented equally often in each
serial position, and each word followed each other word equally
often. The subjects learned the list with the mean number of words
reported correctly increasing exponentially across the 16 trials
from approximately five to approximately 15.
In addition to measuring accuracy of report, Tulving (1962)
measured the first-order structure imposed during report and found
that as subjects learned the material, they imposed an increasing
amount of structure in their report. Indeed, the correlation between
accuracy of report and amount of structure was astonishingly high
(r  .96). In light of the correlation, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that, for Tulving’s subjects, learning was organisation.
To study learning in free recall, we administered 16 study-test trials
to the model. Each study trial presented the words to be learned in a
different order organized across the simulated subjects using a bal-
anced Latin square constructed, as recommended by Alimena (1962).
Each simulated subject was given a unique vocabulary. After each
study trial, the simulated subjects were required to recall as many
words as possible. In addition to keeping track of accuracy across
trials, we also scored Tulving’s (1962) subjective organisation (SO)
measure. Consistent with his empirical results, the model learned
across trials: Accuracy rose from a mean of 3.8 words to a mean of
15.7. SO scores also increased, and as in Tulving’s study, the corre-
lation between accuracy and SO was high (  .91).
The accuracy and SO curves for our simulated data are shown in
Figure 23. It is clear that the model captures both learning and the
development of organisation during free-recall experiments. The
model has no organisational rules. The increase in SO across trials
is a product of natural processing and storage mechanisms.
We were surprised by the success of the free-recall model in
capturing SO. We had expected that subjective organisation would
depend on semantic information. With recent developments in
building vectors that represent word meaning (e.g., LSA, Landauer
& Dumais, 1997; BEAGLE, Jones & Mewhort, 2007), and subject
to the constraints documented by Kelly et al. (2013), it is possible
to include semantic information. That said, the model captures
organisation without exploiting semantics. Its success reflects as-
sociative feedback linking pairs of recalled items combined with
the variance of moment-to-moment changes in the strength of
items and associations in the lexicon.
If we were to use vectors that include semantic information, the
model should exploit the new information and the feedback pa-
rameters should change. In this connection, we note that Tulving’s
(1962) demonstration experiment used words that were unrelated
semantically but that were stratified into subsets by a wide range
of word-frequency values. For the simulation shown in Figure 23,
we did not attempt to reproduce the word-frequency manipulation.
Discussion
In this article, we have advanced a new theory for ordering
recall in free- and serial-recall tasks. The heart of the theory is a
holographic lexicon that exhibits two important properties: (a) the
hologram is robust to loss of medium (illustrated in Figure 4), a
property desirable in a biological system; and (b) the hologram is
a dynamic store so that altering the strength an item or an associ-
ation stored in the hologram also alters the strength of all items and
associations as a function of their similarity to the item altered
(illustrated in Figure 6).
According to the theory, the hologram holds a representation
(vector) for each word and for word-to-word association among
the words. The hologram can store additional information—such
as an association between a word and a context cue—but we have
focussed on only two sources of information: words and word-to-
word associations. Studying a word, or an association, reinforces
the corresponding representation in the hologram. In addition,
feedback is created during report, and because the hologram is a
dynamic store, both study and report alter the strength of all items
in the hologram. The nature and amount of feedback created
during study and report depend on the experimenter’s instructions
(translated into the subject’s intentions). In particular, feedback is
different when subjects are asked to learn a list across trials.
Learning can occur without instructions, but is stronger when
subjects are instructed to learn the list.
According to the theory, subjects try to use all of the all
information available in the hologram when selecting words to
report. In the demonstrations reported here, we have explored the
use of item (word) and associative (word-to-word) information; we
acknowledge, however, that word-to-context associations may also
be used in the special circumstances explored by Brown et al.
(2000) or by Bryden (1967). In addition to the information stored
in the hologram proper, the theory proposes control mechanisms
designed to help extract all useful information from the hologram.
3 Tulving used a 16  16 completely balanced Latin Square to order the
materials. He noted that a balanced N N square can be constructed easily
if (N  1) is a prime number. Clearly, Tulving was aware that remote
carry-over effects are not controlled using a simple balanced square;
Alimena (1962) has provided an algorithm for eliminating remote carry-
over effects in Latin Squares provided that (N  1) is a prime number.
Figure 23. Accuracy (left scale) and subjective organisation (right scale)
as a function of practice. The open triangles present accuracy from aver-
aged across 20 runs of Tulving’s (1962) paradigm. The open circles present
the corresponding subjective organisation scores.
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One characteristic of the model deserves emphasis. It will not
work well using a small lexicon (e.g., 50 to 250 words). The
present simulations are based on a lexicon of 2,000 words and
1,999,000 word-to-word associations. A toy implementation will
not work. If the dimensionality of the item vectors is too small, the
number of items that can be stored is restricted, and the interac-
tions within the hologram are too small to drive the kind of results
shown here. We have replicated the simulations presented here
using a both a larger and a smaller vocabulary (with a correspond-
ing modification in the dimensionality of the item vectors), but the
important point is that the model’s parameters will adapt to the
dimensionality of the item vectors and to the number of items.
The single-store account stands in contrast to dual-store models
(e.g., the modal model). Several differences deserve emphasis. The
dual-store account assumes that STM is labile and subject to
interference, whereas long-term memory is stable but subject to
error. The holographic account assumes dynamic storage that is
both permanent and subject to momentary changes in strength. As
noted earlier, the dual-store idea has been subject to severe criti-
cism (e.g., Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Neath, 1993). The fundamental
change implied by a holographic model is the focus on process rather
than on static storage. The holographic model assumes that subjects
know their vocabulary and that activation of particular items depends
on the processing currently undertaken. There is no need to transfer
material from a short-term store to the knowledge base. The focus on
process makes terms such as “top down” versus “bottom up” obsolete.
In terms of conventional theory, the holographic account is, perhaps,
closest to Cowan’s (1988, 1993) idea that STM is an activated subset
of long-term memory. He postulated an attentional mechanism acti-
vates a subset of memory. The holographic idea does not require a
separate attentional mechanism and escapes questions concerning the
capacity of various buffer memories.
From the perspective of the holographic model, STM is an
unnecessary construct. The holographic model’s success in cap-
turing Craik’s (1970) data calls the idea of a STM into question
once more. The fact that the concept is unnecessary and has been
misapplied in the analysis of particular experiments—misapplica-
tion highlighted by Bjork and Whitten (1974) and by Neath
(1993)—does not, by itself, mean that there is no short-term store;
it means the basic evidence supporting the concept has been
blunted. In light of the success of the single-store model presented
here, the onus is on those who promote the two-store idea to present new
empirical evidence to support the idea. Perhaps first, however, proponents
of the dual-storage idea need to come up with a working model that can
match the range of phenomena illustrated here.
The single-store holographic account offers an alternative that is
both more parsimonious (one vs. two storage mechanisms) and in
keeping with biological evidence. Kandel (2007, 2009) has argued
that the same neural tissue supports both short-term (chemical) and
long-term (structural) changes in memory. To the extent that a
dual-storage mechanism implies distinct anatomical loci, Kandel’s
evidence denies its feasibility.
The psychological literature too frequently includes concepts that
are consistent with data but that are not forced by the data. We need
experiments that force a conclusion; without such data, theorists risk
reifying mechanisms that lack adequate empirical support. The dan-
ger, of course, is that people start to believe in the reified concept.
Some may even seek its presence in the brain.4 Too often, search for
brain correlates is driven by theory known to be problematic.
The holographic model captures both item and order of report as a
by-product of storage and report operations; it does not require sep-
arate order information. The question of what information subjects
use to order report has been confused in the literature with the
mechanism by which the information is used. For example, several
accounts associate a series of temporal cues with items to be reported,
and by rerunning the temporal series, order recall by recovering the
associated items (Brown et al., 2000; Howard & Kahana, 2002). In
our view, such a theoretical move focuses too much on environmental
information at the expense of internal information associated with the
way words and their associates are stored.
The principles of our account allow several sources of environ-
mental information to be used in combination with simple item and
associative information: Report is based on momentary activation,
a value derived by combining item and associative information. An
easy extension to the mechanism would be to add temporal and/or
spatial environmental information (in the form of an association
between each word and a corresponding context vector). Such an
extension would allow the ordering mechanism to combine inter-
nal and environmental context to handle the temporal–spatial
conflicts addressed by Bryden (1967), the uneven timing cases
explored by Brown et al. (2000), and list discrimination studies of
the sort pioneered by Jacoby (1991). At issue, is a fundamental
computing-science question of data versus process. We have ex-
plored the use of two kinds of information using a mechanism
flexible enough to combine them. The mechanism is also flexible
enough to admit other sources of information. Although we have
focussed on the flexibility provided by the hologram, the thrust of
our account is that control of report rests on the integration of
different sources of information.
Finally, a major limitation of the model deserves mention. The
model uses vectors of random numbers to represent words. The
vectors have not included structure that we know affects performance.
For example, we know from Baddeley’s (1986) work that phonolog-
ical characteristics of words are important in memory, especially in
experiments using short lists. Because the model does not represent
phonological structure, it is unable to handle such data. Future work
should address such holes in the model by extending its representation
assumptions to include the missing structure.
4 The problem is illustrated nicely in the history of physics. At one point,
people believed that light required a medium to support its wave properties;
the literature invented the aether as the appropriate medium. The concept
was so reified that authorities did not question it until the famous
Michelson–Morley experiment (see Michelson & Morley, 1886).
Résumé
Nous présentons une théorie holographique de la mémoire hu-
maine. Selon cette théorie, le vocabulaire d’un sujet réside dans
une représentation distribuée dynamique, soit un hologramme. Le
fait d’étudier ou de se rappeler d’un mot altère autant la représen-
tation actuelle de ce mot dans l’hologramme que tous les mots qui
y sont associés. Le rappel est toujours déclenché par une consigne
de rappel (soit une directive de départ ou le mot venant d’être
évoqué). La séquence d’évocation est une fonction commune entre
l’item et l’information associative résidant dans l’hologramme au
moment de l’évocation. Nous appliquons le modèle aux données
d’archive impliquant une variété de processus tels que le simple
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rappel libre, l’apprentissage en mode de rappel libre multi-essais,
le simple rappel sériel et l’apprentissage en mode de rappel sériel
multi-essais. Le modèle capture l’exactitude et la séquence
d’évocation tant dans un contexte de rappel sériel que de celui d’un
rappel libre. Il capture aussi les processus d’organisation subjec-
tive et d’apprentissage dans un contexte de rappel libre multi-
essais. Nous proposons ce modèle comme alternative a` la théorie
de la mémoire a` court et a` long terme présentée par le modèle
modal.
Mots-clés : hologramme, mémoire, apprentissage, rappel.
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This article extends psychological methods and concepts into a domain that is as profoundly consequen-
tial as it is poorly understood: intelligence analysis. We report findings from a geopolitical forecasting
tournament that assessed the accuracy of more than 150,000 forecasts of 743 participants on 199 events
occurring over 2 years. Participants were above average in intelligence and political knowledge relative
to the general population. Individual differences in performance emerged, and forecasting skills were
surprisingly consistent over time. Key predictors were (a) dispositional variables of cognitive ability,
political knowledge, and open-mindedness; (b) situational variables of training in probabilistic reasoning
and participation in collaborative teams that shared information and discussed rationales (Mellers, Ungar,
et al., 2014); and (c) behavioral variables of deliberation time and frequency of belief updating. We
developed a profile of the best forecasters; they were better at inductive reasoning, pattern detection,
cognitive flexibility, and open-mindedness. They had greater understanding of geopolitics, training in
probabilistic reasoning, and opportunities to succeed in cognitively enriched team environments. Last but
not least, they viewed forecasting as a skill that required deliberate practice, sustained effort, and constant
monitoring of current affairs.
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Predicting the future is an integral part of human cognition. We
reach for an umbrella when we expect rain. We cross the street
when the light turns green and expect cars to stop. We help others
and expect reciprocity—they will help us in future situations.
Without some ability to generate predictions, we could neither plan
for the future nor interpret the past.
Psychologists have studied the accuracy of intuitive predictions
in many settings, including eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1996),
affective forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), and probability
judgment (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). This literature
paints a disappointing picture. Eyewitness testimonies are often
faulty (Wells, 2014; Wells & Olson, 2003), affective forecasts
stray far from affective experiences (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998),
and probability estimates are highly susceptible to overconfidence,
base rate neglect, and hindsight bias (Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin,
1999; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Kahneman et al.,
1982).
To make matters worse, intuitive predictions are often inferior to
simple statistical models in domains ranging from graduate school
admissions to parole violations (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989;
Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). In political forecasting, Tetlock
(2005) asked professionals to estimate the probabilities of events
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up to 5 years into the future—from the standpoint of 1988. Would
there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would
Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war
in the Persian Gulf? Experts were frequently hard-pressed to beat
simple actuarial models or even chance baselines (see also Green
and Armstrong, 2007).
A Forecasting Competition
It was against this backdrop that the National Academy of
Sciences issued a report on the quality of intelligence analysis
(Fischhoff & Chauvin, 2011). A key theme was the need to
systematically track the accuracy of probabilistic forecasts that
analysts routinely (albeit covertly) make. In response, the Intelli-
gence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), the research
and development branch of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, launched a large-scale forecasting tournament de-
signed to monitor the accuracy of probabilistic forecasts about
events that occurred around the world. Five university-based re-
search groups competed to develop methods to elicit and aggregate
forecasts to arrive at the most accurate predictions. Our research
group consistently outperformed the other groups 2 years in a row.
Within the tournament, accuracy of probability judgments was
assessed by the Brier scoring rule (Brier, 1950), a widely used
measure in fields ranging from meteorology (Murphy & Winkler,
1984) to medical imaging (Itoh et al., 2002; Steyerberg, 2009). The
Brier scoring rule is “strictly proper” in the sense that it incentiv-
izes forecasters to report their true beliefs—and avoid making
false-positive versus false-negative judgments. These scores are
sums of squared deviations between probability forecasts and
reality (in which reality is coded as “1” for the event and “0”
otherwise). They range from 0 (best) to 2 (worst). Suppose a
forecaster reported that one outcome of a two-option question was
75% likely, and that outcome occurred. The forecaster’s Brier
score would be (1 – 0.75)2  (0 – 0.25)2  0.125. This measure
of accuracy is central to the question of whether forecasters can
perform well over extended periods and what factors predict their
success.
Consistency in Forecasting Skills
In this article, we study variation in the degree to which people
possess, and are capable of developing, geopolitical forecasting
skill. Skill acquisition and expertise has been examined in numer-
ous domains. We were unsure whether it was even possible to
develop skill in this domain. Geopolitical forecasting problems can
be complex, requiring a balance of clashing causal forces. It is no
wonder that some attribute forecasting success to skill, whereas
others attribute it to luck. Skeptics argue that accurate forecasts are
fortuitous match-ups between reality and observers’ preconcep-
tions in a radically unpredictable world. From this perspective, we
would find little or no consistency in individual accuracy across
questions (Almond & Genco, 1977; Taleb, 2007).
Our prediction task involves several factors usually associated
with poor performance, including a dynamic prediction environ-
ment, a long delay before feedback on most questions, the lack of
empirically tested decision aids, and a reliance on subjective
judgment (Shanteau, 1992). Indeed, Reyna, Chick, Corbin, and
Hsia (2014) showed that intelligence analysts were more suscep-
tible to risky-choice framing effects than either college students or
postcollegiate adults, perhaps because they had developed bad
habits in an “unfriendly” environment. Although experts may, on
average, be poor at exercising good judgment in complex domains
like geopolitical forecasting, others suspect that there are system-
atic individual differences—and that some forecasters will consis-
tently outperform others (Bueno de Mesquita, 2009; Tetlock,
2005).
As we shall soon show, striking individual differences in forecast-
ing accuracy emerged, and these differences created the opportunity
to test hypotheses about which assortment of dispositional variables
(e.g., cognitive abilities and political understanding), situational vari-
ables (e.g., cognitive-debiasing exercises), and/or behavioral variables
(e.g., willingness to revisit and update one’s beliefs) could predict
judgmental accuracy. Insofar as all three classes of variables matter,
how are they interrelated? And what are the characteristics of the best
forecasters?
Dispositional Variables
Accurate predictions of global events require an array of skills.
One needs diverse pockets of content knowledge, a judicious
capacity to choose among causal models for integrating and ap-
plying content knowledge, and a rapid-fire Bayesian capacity to
change one’s mind quickly in response to news about shifting base
rates and case-specific cues. A natural starting hypothesis is intel-
ligence, a well replicated predictor of success, including job per-
formance (Ree & Earles, 1992; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004), socio-
economic status (Strenze, 2007), academic achievement (Furnham
& Monsen, 2009), and decision competence (Del Missier, Män-
tylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).
Intelligence
Theories of intelligence vary in complexity, starting with the
single-factor model widely known as g (Spearman, 1927), the
two-factor fluid/crystallized intelligence framework (Cattell, 1963;
Cattell & Horn, 1978), the seven basic abilities (Thurstone &
Thurstone, 1941), and, finally, the 120-factor cube derived from
combinations of content, operation, and product (Guilford & Hoe-
pfner, 1971). Carroll (1993) reanalyzed over 400 data sets that
measured cognitive abilities and found overwhelming evidence for
a general intelligence factor (interpreted as g, fluid intelligence,
with domain-specific forms of crystallized intelligence defining
additional factors).
Three aspects of intelligence seem most relevant to geopolitical
forecasting. One is the ability to engage in inductive reasoning, or
make associations between a current problem—say, the likelihood
of an African leader falling from power—and potential historical
analogies. Individuals must look for regularities, form hypotheses,
and test them. The second is cognitive control (also known as
cognitive reflection). Someone with greater cognitive control has
the ability to override seemingly obvious but incorrect responses
and engage in more prolonged and deeper thought. The third skill
is numerical reasoning. Numeracy would be especially important
for economic questions such as, “Will the price per barrel for
November, 2011 Brent Crude oil futures exceed $115 by a given
date?” A more numerate forecaster would be likelier to recognize
that the answer hinged, in part, on how close the current price was
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to the target price and how often price fluctuations of the necessary
magnitude occurred within the specified time frame. Our first
hypothesis is therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with greater skill at inductive rea-
soning, cognitive control, and numerical reasoning will be
more accurate forecasters.
Researchers disagree on the relationship between intelligence
and expertise. Some claim that experts, such as chess grandmas-
ters, possess exceptional cognitive abilities that place them high up
in the tail of the distribution (Plomin, Shakeshaft, McMillan, &
Trzaskowski, 2014). Others claim that, beyond a certain moder-
ately high threshold, intelligence is not necessary; what really
matters is deep deliberative practice that promotes expertise by
enabling the neural networking and consolidation of performance-
enhancing knowledge structures (Ericsson, 2014).
The forecasting tournament let us explore the relationship be-
tween intelligence and skill development. If the correlation be-
tween intelligence and accuracy was positive and remained con-
stant throughout the tournament, one could argue that superior
intelligence is necessary for expertise. But if the correlation be-
tween intelligence and accuracy were stronger at the beginning and
weaker toward the end of the tournament (after deliberative prac-
tice), one could argue that deliberative practice is a cognitive
leveler, at least within the ability range of the above-average
IARPA forecasters.
Thinking Style
Cognitive styles capture how people typically think—as op-
posed to what they think about (e.g., causal theories) and how well
they can think (ability). There are as many frameworks for cog-
nitive styles as taxonomies of cognitive abilities (Riding &
Cheema, 1991; Vannoy, 1965; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp,
1971).
A relevant cognitive style is the tendency to evaluate arguments
and evidence without undue bias from one’s own prior beliefs—
and with recognition of the fallibility of one’s judgment (Nicker-
son, 1987). High scorers on this dimension are actively open-
minded thinkers. They avoid the “myside bias”—the tendency to
bolster one’s own views and dismiss contradictory evidence
(Baron, 2000). Actively open-minded thinkers have also been
found to be more accurate at estimating uncertain quantities (Ha-
ran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013), a task that is arguably similar to
estimating the likelihood of future events.
Actively open-minded thinkers also have greater tolerance for
ambiguity and weaker need for closure (the tendency to want to
reach conclusions quickly, often before all the evidence has been
gathered, coupled with an aversion to ambiguity; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Previous research
has found that experts with a greater need for closure reject
counterfactual scenarios that prove their theories wrong while
embracing counterfactual scenarios that prove their theories right
(Tetlock, 1998), a form of motivated reasoning that is likely to
hinder attempts to accurately model uncertainty in the real world.
In a related vein, the concept of hedgehogs versus foxes, devel-
oped by Tetlock (2005), draws on need for closure and taps into a
preference for parsimony in political explanations (the hedgehog
knows one big thing) versus a preference for eclectic blends of
causal precepts (the fox knows many, not-so-big things). Tetlock
found that the foxes were less prone to overconfidence in their
political predictions. Although we measured actively open-minded
thinking, need for closure, and hedgehog versus fox separately,
these constructs reflect distinct but related features of cognitive
flexibility. Given the strong family resemblance among openness
to self-correction, cognitive flexibility, foxiness, and tolerance for
ambiguity, we bundle them into our next hypothesis. Forecasters
with more open-minded and flexible cognitive styles should be
more nuanced in applying pet theories to real-world events—or,
more simply,
Hypothesis 2: More open-minded forecasters will be more
accurate forecasters.
Political Knowledge
Political knowledge refers to content information necessary for
answering factual questions about states of the world. Even the
most intelligent and open-minded forecasters need political knowl-
edge to execute multidimensional comparisons of current events
with pertinent precedents. Consider the question, “Will the United
Nations General Assembly recognize a Palestinian state by Sep-
tember, 30, 2011?” Forecasters with no institutional knowledge
would be at a disadvantage. They might read headlines that a
majority of the General Assembly favored recognition and infer
that recognition was imminent. But someone who knew more
about the United Nations might know that permanent members of
the Security Council have many ways to delay a vote, such as
“tabling the resolution” for a later point in time. This brings us to
our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: More politically knowledgeable forecasters will
be more accurate forecasters.
Situational Variables
Forecasting accuracy also depends on the environment; fore-
casters need opportunities for deliberative practice to cultivate
skills (Arkes, 2001; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993;
Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Some environments lack these oppor-
tunities. Cue-impoverished environments stack the odds against
forecasters who wish to cultivate their skills. Environments with
delayed feedback, misleading feedback, or nonexistent feedback
also restrict learning (Einhorn, 1982).
Mellers, Ungar, et al. (2014) reported two experimentally ma-
nipulated situational variables that boosted forecasting accuracy.
One was training in probabilistic reasoning. Forecasters were
taught to consider comparison classes and take the “outside” view.
They were told to look for historical trends and update their beliefs
by identifying and extrapolating persistent trends and accounting
for the passage of time. They were told to average multiple
estimates and use previously validated statistical models when
available. When not available, forecasters were told to look for
predictive variables from formal models that exploit past regular-
ities. Finally, forecasters were warned against judgmental errors,
such as wishful thinking, belief persistence, confirmation bias, and
hindsight bias. This training module was informed by a large
literature that investigates methods of debiasing (see Lichtenstein
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and Fischhoff, 1980; Soll, Milkman, and Payne, in press; and
Wilson and Brekke, 1994, for reviews).
The second situational factor was random assignment to teams.
Drawing on research in group problem-solving (Laughlin, 2011;
Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006; MacCoun, 2012; Steiner,
1972), Mellers, Ungar, et al. (2014) designed teams with the goal
of ensuring the “process gains” of putting individuals into groups
(e.g., benefits of diversity of knowledge, information sharing,
motivating engagement, and accountability to rigorous norms)
exceeded the “process losses” from teaming (e.g., conformity
pressures, overweighting common information, poor coordination,
factionalism). The manipulation was successful. Teamwork pro-
duced enlightened cognitive altruism: Forecasters in teams shared
news articles, argued about the evidence, and exchanged rationales
using self-critical epistemic norms. Forecasters who worked alone
were less accurate. Here, we explore whether the dispositional
variables discussed earlier add to the predictive accuracy of fore-
casting over and beyond the two situational variables already
known to promote accuracy. Our fourth hypothesis is
Hypothesis 4: Dispositional variables, such as intelligence,
open-mindedness, and political knowledge will add to the
prediction of forecasting accuracy, beyond situational vari-
ables of training and teamwork.
Behavioral Variables
Dweck (2006) argues that those with growth mind-sets who
view learning and achievement as cultivatable skills are likelier to
perform well than those who view learning as innately determined.
More accurate forecasters are presumably those with growth mind-
sets. In the tournament, behavioral indicators of motivation in-
cluded the numbers of questions tried and the frequency of belief
updating. Engaged forecasters should also spend more time re-
searching, discussing, and deliberating before making a forecast.
Our fifth hypothesis is
Hypothesis 5: Behavioral variables that reflect engagement,
including the number of questions tried, frequency of updat-
ing, and time spent viewing a question before forecasting will
add to the prediction of forecasting accuracy, beyond dispo-
sitional and situational variables.
Overview
After testing these hypotheses, we build a structural equation
model to summarize the interrelationships among variables. Then
we develop a profile of the best forecasters. Finally, we take a
practical stance and ask, when information is limited, which vari-
ables are best? Imagine a forecaster who “applies for the job” and
takes a set of relevant tests (i.e., dispositional variables). We might
also know the forecaster’s working conditions (i.e., situational
variables). We could then “hire” the forecaster and monitor work
habits while “on the job” (i.e., behavioral variables). Which type of
variables best identifies those who make the most accurate fore-
casts?
Method
The forecasting tournament was conducted over 2 years, with
each year lasting about 9 months. The first period ran from
September 2011 to April 2012, and the second one ran from June
2012 to April 2013. We recruited forecasters from professional
societies, research centers, alumni associations, and science blogs,
as well as word of mouth. Entry into the tournament required a
bachelor’s degree or higher and completion of a battery of psy-
chological and political knowledge tests that took approximately 2
hr. Participants were largely U.S. citizens (76%) and males (83%),
with an average age of 36. Almost two thirds (64%) had some
postgraduate training.
Design
In Year 1, participants were randomly assigned to a 3  3
factorial design of Training (probabilistic-reasoning training, sce-
nario training, and no training)  Group Influence (independent
forecasters, crowd-belief forecasters, and team forecasters).1
Training consisted of instructional modules. Probabilistic-
reasoning training, consisted of tips about what information to look
for and how to avoid judgmental biases. Scenario training taught
forecasters to generate new futures, actively entertain more possi-
bilities, use decision trees, and avoid overconfidence.
Group influence had three levels. We staked out a continuum
with independent forecasters who worked alone at one end, and
interdependent forecasters who worked in teams of approximately
15 people and interacted on a website at the other end. We also
included a compromise level (crowd belief forecasters) in which
forecasters worked alone, but had knowledge of others’ beliefs.
The benefit of this approach is that forecasters had access to a
potentially potent signal—the numerical distribution of the
crowd’s opinions, but they could avoid the potential costs of social
interaction, such as mindless “herding” or free-riding.
Those in team conditions also received training in how to create
a well-functioning group. Members were encouraged to maintain
high standards of proof and seek out high-quality information.
They were given strategies for explaining their forecasts to others,
offering constructive critiques, and building an effective team.
Members could offer rationales for their thinking and critiques of
others’ thinking. They could share information, including their
forecasts. But there was no systematic display of team members’
predictions. Instructions, training, tests, and forecasting questions
are available in the online supplemental materials.
At the end of Year 1, we learned that probabilistic-reasoning
training was the most effective instructional module, and team-
work was the most effective form of group interaction. We decided
to replicate only the most effective experimental methods from
Year 1 using a reduced 2  2 factorial design of Training
(probabilistic-reasoning training and no training) by Group Influ-
ence (team vs. independent forecasters).
We added another intervention—the tracking of top performers.
We skimmed off the top 2% of forecasters and put them in five
elite teams. This small group of forecasters had a distinctly dif-
ferent experience from others (see Mellers, Stone, et al., 2014) and
therefore was not included in the analyses. However, results did
not change when these forecasters were included.
1 Results from the prediction market are discussed elsewhere because
individual accuracy measures (in the form of Brier scores) cannot be
computed (Atanasov et al., 2014).
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The smaller experimental design of Year 2 required reassign-
ment of forecasters from Year 1 conditions that were not continued
in Year 2 (i.e., crowd belief forecasters and scenario training).
Assignment of forecasters proceeded as follows: (a) if a Year 1
condition remained in Year 2, forecasters stayed in that condition;
(b) crowd-belief forecasters were randomly assigned to indepen-
dent or team conditions; (c) scenario trainees were randomly
assigned to no training or probabilistic-reasoning training. Our
analyses in this article focus only on the effectiveness of two
situational variables: probabilistic-reasoning training and team-
work.
Questions
Questions were released throughout the tournament in small
batches, and forecasters received 199 questions over 2 years.
Questions covered political-economic issues around the world and
were selected by the IARPA, not by the research team. Questions
covered topics ranging from whether North Korea would test a
nuclear device between January 9, 2012, and April 1, 2012, to
whether Moody’s would downgrade the sovereign debt rating of
Greece between October 3, 2011, and November 30, 2011. Ques-
tions were open for an average of 109 days (range  2 to 418
days).
Participants were free to answer any questions they wished
within a season. There were no constraints on how many, except
that payment for the season required that participants provide
forecasts for at least 25 questions. One question asked, “Will there
be a significant outbreak of H5N1 in China in 2012?” The word
“significant” was defined as at least 20 infected individuals and
five casualties. The question was launched on February 21, 2012,
and was scheduled to close on December 30, 2012. If the outcome
occurred prior to December 30, the question closed when the
outcome occurred. Forecasters could enter their initial forecast or
update their prior forecast until the resolution of the outcome.
One hundred fifty questions were binary. One binary question,
released on November 8, 2011, asked, “Will Bashar al-Assad
remain President of Syria through January, 31 2012?” Answers
were “yes” or “no.” Some questions had three to five outcomes. A
three-option question, released on October 4, 2011, asked, “Who
will win the January 2012 Taiwan Presidential election?” Answers
were “Ma Ying-jeou,” “Tsai Ing-wen,” or “neither.” Some ques-
tions had ordered outcomes. One with four ordered outcomes
asked, “When will Nouri al-Maliki resign, lose confidence vote, or
vacate the office of Prime Minister of Iraq?” Answers were “be-
tween July 16, 2012 and Sept 30, 2012,” “between Oct 1, 2012 and
Dec, 31 2012,” between “Jan 1, 2013 and Mar 31, 2013,” or “the
event will not occur before April 1, 2013.” Finally, another set was
conditional questions, typically having two antecedents and two
outcomes. One question asked,
Before March 1, 2014, will North Korea conduct another successful
nuclear detonation (a) if the United Nations committee established
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 adds any further names
to its list of designated persons or entities beforehand or (b) if the
United Nations committee established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1718 does not add any further names to its list of designated
persons or entities beforehand?
Answers to both possibilities were “yes” or “no.”
All forecasters were given a brief Brier score tutorial and
learned that their overarching goal was to minimize Brier scores.
Feedback given to forecasters during the tournament included
Brier scores, averaged over days within a question and across
questions. Forecasters were incentivized to answer questions if
they believed they knew more than the average forecaster in their
condition. If they did not answer a question, they received the
average Brier score that others in their condition received on that
question. Whenever a question closed, we recalculated individual
Brier scores, thereby providing forecasters with constant feedback.
Brier scores used in our analyses did not include the average
scores of others if a forecaster did not answer a question. Instead,
we simply computed the Brier score for each forecast made by a
participant and averaged over Brier scores if that participant made
multiple forecasts on a given question. Inclusion of averages from
others would simply have reduced differences among individuals.
Measures
Prior to each forecasting season, we administered a battery of
psychological tests. Intelligence was measured by four scales.
Inductive pattern recognition was assessed by a short form of the
Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (Ravens APM; Bors &
Stokes, 1998), which circumvents cultural or linguistic knowledge
by testing spatial problem-solving skills. Cognitive control was
measured by the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Fred-
erick, 2005) and the four-item extension of the CRT (Baron, Scott,
Fincher, & Metz, 2014), with questions such as, “All flowers have
petals. Roses have petals. If these two statements are true can we
conclude that roses are flowers?” Mathematical reasoning was
measured by a three-item Numeracy scale. The first item came
from Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001), and the second two were
from Peters et al. (2006).
We had three measures of open-mindedness. The first was a
seven-item actively open-minded thinking test (Haran et al., 2013)
that used a 7-point rating scale (1  completely disagree and 7 
completely agree). Actively open-minded thinking predicts both
persistence in information searches and accuracy in estimating
uncertain quantities (Haran et al., 2013). The second was an
11-item Need-For-Closure scale (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996;
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Responses were made on the same
7-point rating scale. The third was a single question: “In a famous
essay, Isaiah Berlin classified thinkers as hedgehogs and foxes:
The hedgehog knows one big thing and tries to explain as much as
possible using that theory or framework. The fox knows many
small things and is content to improvise explanations on a case-
by-case basis. When it comes to making predictions, would you
describe yourself as more of a hedgehog or more of a fox?”
Responses were made on a 5-point rating scale (1  very much
more fox-like; 5  very much more hedgehog-like).
Political knowledge was assessed by two true–false tests of
current affairs, one given each year. The first was a 35-item test
with items such as “Azerbaijan and Armenia have formally settled
their border dispute.” The second was a 50-item test with items
such as “India’s liberalization reforms now allow for 100% For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) stake in ventures” or “The GINI
coefficient measures the rate of economic expansion.”
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Participants
Year 1 began with 1,593 survey participants who were randomly
assigned to nine conditions, with an average of 177 per condition.
Attrition was 7%. Year 2 started with 943 respondents. Attrition in
Year 2 fell to 3%, perhaps because most participants were return-
ees and familiar with the task. We wanted forecasters who made
many predictions and for whom we could get stable estimates of
forecasting ability. To that end, we used only 743 forecasters who
participated in both years of the tournament and had made at least
30 predictions.
Payments
Forecasters who met the minimum participation requirements
received $150 at the end of Year 1 and $250 at the end of Year
2, regardless of their accuracy. Those who returned from Year
1 received a $100 retention bonus. Forecasters also received
status rewards for their performance via leader boards that
displayed Brier scores for the top 20 forecasters (10%) in each
condition and full Brier score rankings of teams. Team Brier
scores were the median of scores for individuals within a team.
Results
Individual Differences and Consistency Over Time
Our primary goal was to investigate the consistency and pre-
dictability of individual forecasting accuracy, defined as a Brier
score averaged over days and questions. Participants attempted an
average of 121 forecasting questions. Figure 1 shows the distribu-
tion of overall Brier scores, revealing a wide range of forecasting
abilities.
A common approach in studies of accuracy is to compare
intuitive predictions with simple benchmarks, such as the score
one would receive by assigning a uniform distribution over out-
comes for all questions. The raw Brier score would be 0.53, on a
scale ranging from 0 (best) to 2 (worst). The average raw Brier
score of our participants was 0.30, much better than random
guessing, t(741)  61.79, p  .001. Overall, forecasters were
significantly better than chance.
An alternative measure of forecast accuracy is the proportion of
days on which forecasters’ estimates were on the correct side of
50%. This measure is calculated by counting the days on which
forecasters were active and correct (i.e., they placed estimates of
51% or above for events that occurred and 49% or below for
events that did not occur). For multinomial questions, forecasts
were considered correct if the realized option was associated with
the highest probability. We counted all days after the first forecast
was placed, and we carried forward estimates until a participant
updated his or her forecast or the question closed. A perfect score
would be 100%, and a chance score for binary questions would be
50%. For all questions in the sample, a chance score was 47%. The
mean proportion of days with correct estimates was 75%, signif-
icantly better than random guessing for binary questions, t(740) 
79.70, p  .001.
Figure 2 shows the distribution. The correlation between mean
Brier score and proportion of correct days was very high, r  .89,
t(741)  54.25, p  .0001. The proportion of correct days is just
another way to illustrate accuracy. All subsequent analyses focus
on Brier scores, unless otherwise specified.
Next we turn to the question of consistency, but first we make
a simple adjustment to the accuracy metric. Forecasters selected
their own questions, and this feature of the experimental design
allowed people to get a better Brier score if they could select
events that were easier to predict. To handle this problem, we
standardized Brier scores within questions. Standardization mini-
mizes differences in difficulty across questions and allowed us to
focus on relative, rather than absolute, performance. If accuracy
were largely attributable to luck, there would be little internal
consistency in Brier scores over questions. However, Cronbach’s
alpha (a gauge of the internal consistency of Brier scores on
questions) was 0.88, suggesting high internal consistency. Figure 3
illustrates how the best and worst forecasters differed in skill
across time. We constructed two groups based on average stan-
dardized Brier scores after the first 25 questions had closed and
forecasters had attempted an average of 15 questions. The black
and gray lines represent the 100 best and worst forecasters, re-
spectively. Figure 3 tracks their progress over time; average Brier
scores are presented for each group on 26th to the 199th question,
plotted against the order that questions closed.2 Using relatively
little initial knowledge about forecaster skill, we could identify
differences in performance that continued for a period of 2 years.
These groups differed by an average of 0.54—more than half a
standard deviation—across the tournament. If we could identify
good forecasters early, there was a reasonable chance they would
be good later.
There are several ways to look for individual consistency across
questions. We sorted questions on the basis of response format
(binary, multinomial, conditional, ordered), region (Eurzone, Latin
America, China, etc.), and duration of question (short, medium,
and long). We computed accuracy scores for each individual on
each variable within each set (e.g., binary, multinomial, condi-
tional, and ordered) and then constructed correlation matrices. For
all three question types, correlations were positive; an individual
who scored high on binary questions tended to score higher on
2 For each forecaster, we averaged predictions over days, regardless of
the day on which the prediction was made.
Figure 1. Distribution of Brier scores over forecasters plotted against
category bins of size .049. The category labeled .15 refers to Brier scores
between .10 and .149.
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multinomial questions. Then we conducted factor analyses. For
each question type, a large proportion of the variance was captured
by a single factor, consistent with the hypothesis that one under-
lying dimension was necessary to capture correlations among
response formats, regions, and question duration.
Dispositional Variables
Are individual dispositional variables of intelligence, open-
mindedness, and political knowledge associated with forecasting
accuracy? Table 1 shows means and variances of predictor vari-
ables. The mean score on the short version of the Ravens APM was
8.56 out of 12, which was considerably higher than 7.07, the mean
score of a random sample of first-year students at the University of
Toronto (Bors & Stokes, 1998). Our forecasters scored 2.10 on the
CRT, virtually equivalent to 2.18, the average score of MIT
students (Frederick, 2005). The extended CRT and the numeracy
items had no comparable norms.
Table 1 also presents reliability estimates, when applicable.
Values were .71 for the Ravens APM, .55 for the three-item CRT,
.70 for the extended CRT, .11 for Numeracy, .65 for actively
open-minded thinking, .55 for Need for Closure, .53 for the Year
1 political knowledge test, and .64 for the Year 2 test. The most
troubling reliability estimate was that of Numeracy. Most people
found it very easy; the percentages correct on the three items were
93%, 92%, and 86%.
Table 2 shows all possible pairwise correlations. Three of the
four measures of intelligence—the Ravens APM, the CRT, and the
extended CRT—were significantly correlated with standardized
Brier score accuracy: Correlations were .23, .15, and .14,
respectively, t(741)6.38, p .001, t(741)4.17, p .001,
and t(599)3.56, p .001.3 Lower Brier scores indicate higher
accuracy, so negative correlations mean that greater accuracy is
associated with higher intelligence scores. We combined these
variables into a single factor using the first dimension of a prin-
cipal axis factor analysis. The correlation between standardized
Brier scores and factor scores was .22, t(741)  5.51, p 
.001. Greater intelligence predicted better performance, consistent
with our first hypothesis.
Next we turn to open-mindedness and examined whether three
measures—actively open-minded thinking, need for closure, and
hedgehog–fox orientation—predicted forecasting accuracy. The
average score on actively open-mindedness was 5.91, relatively
high on a 1 to 7 response scale. The average need for closure score
was 3.34, close to the middle of the scale, and the average
fox–hedgehog response was 3.82, which indicated that, on aver-
age, forecasters viewed themselves as slightly more hedgehog-
like. More actively open-minded participants had less need for
closure, r.20, t(742)5.56, p .001, and more hedgehog-
like participants had more need for closure, r  .24,
t(742)  6.73, p  .001. Only one of the measures, actively
open-minded thinking, was significantly related to standardized
3 The correlation between reaction time on the Ravens APM test and
forecasting accuracy was also significant; those who spent more time on
the Ravens APM test also tended to be better forecasters, r  0.12,
t(741)  3.29, p  .001.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max Alpha
Standardized Brier score 0 0.29 0.57 1.32 0.88
Ravens 8.56 2.43 0 12 0.71
Cog Reflection Test 2.1 0.97 0 3 0.55
Extended Cog Reflection Test 3.37 1.03 0 4 0.70
Numeracy 2.71 0.53 0 3 0.11
Actively open-minded think 5.91 0.6 4 7 0.65
Need for closure 3.34 0.58 1.45 5.09 0.55
Fox vs. Hedgehog 3.82 0.54 1.9 6
Political knowledge Year 1 28.79 3.07 18 35 0.53
Political knowledge Year 2 36.5 4.64 19 48 0.64
Number predictions per Q 1.58 0.77 1 6.33
Number of questions 21 51 13 199
Deliberation time (s) 3.6 0.71 2 4
Note. Min  minimum; Max  maximum; SD  signaled donation;
Cog  cognition.
a Cronbach’s alpha for Brier scores is calculated at the question level. All
other alphas are calculated at the participant level. Alphas are not reported
for scales with three or fewer items and for behavioral variables.
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Figure 2. Distribution of days on which estimates were on the correct
side of 50% plotted against bins of size .049. The category labeled 0.55
refers to forecasters who were correct for 55% to 59.9% of the days on
which they had active forecasts.
Figure 3. Average scores for 100 best forecasters (black) and 100 worst
forecasters (gray) defined after the close of the first 25 questions. The
x-axis represents the order in which questions closed throughout the rest of
the tournament. Differences defined early in the tournament remained for
2 years, as seen by the space between the two lines.
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Brier score accuracy, r  .10, t(742)  2.51, p  .01. Thus,
we had partial support for the second hypothesis that flexible and
open-minded cognitive styles predicted forecasting accuracy.
The third hypothesis stated that political knowledge would
predict Brier score accuracy. Percent correct scores on these true–
false questions were 82% and 76%, respectively. Test scores were
highly correlated with forecasting accuracy, r  .59,
t(742)  19.91, p  .001. We have no comparable norms, but
the obvious difficulty of the tests makes these scores seem high.
The correlation between political knowledge scores in Years 1 and
2 and relative forecasting accuracy was .18 and .20, respec-
tively, t(741)  4.85, p  .001, and t(648)  5.06, p  .001.
Again, we constructed a single measure of content knowledge
using the first factor of a principal axis factor analysis. The
correlation between relative accuracy and these factor scores
was .22, t(599)  5.52, p  .001. Political knowledge was
predictive of forecasting accuracy, consistent with our third hy-
pothesis.
Earlier, we mentioned the debate about the role of intelligence
versus deliberative practice in the development of expertise. One
hypothesis was that the correlation between intelligence and per-
formance would be strongest early on and gradually disappear as
forecasters engage in more deliberate practice. In past studies, the
Ravens APM is a common measure of cognitive ability (e.g.,
Ruthsatz, Detterman, Griscom, & Cirullo, 2008). We correlated
Ravens APM scores with accuracy early and late in the tourna-
ment. “Early” and “late” are vague terms, so we used multiple
definitions, including the first 50 and last 50 questions, the first 40
and last 40 questions, and the first 30 and last 30 questions (out of
199).
Correlations between the Ravens APM scores and accuracy
based on the first and last 50 questions representing early and late
stages were .22 and .10, respectively. The relationship be-
tween intelligence and performance was stronger earlier than it
was later, t(624)  2.57, p  .01. Similar results occurred with
cutoffs of 30 and 40 questions. This analysis is based on only 2
years of deliberative practice, not 10,000 hr (i.e., the length of
deliberative practice necessary to achieve expertise, according to
Ericsson et al., 1993). Nonetheless, the difficulty of the questions
and the breadth of topics suggest that one would do poorly in our
tournament without some degree of sustained effort and engage-
ment.
Situational Variables
Mellers, Ungar, et al. (2014) showed that forecasters who were
trained in probabilistic reasoning and worked together in teams
were more accurate than others. However, effect sizes in the form
of correlations were not presented. Table 2 shows that relative
accuracy and training in probabilistic reasoning had a correlation
of .17, t(741)  4.56, p  .001. In addition, relative accuracy
of team participation had a correlation of .30, t(741)  8.55,
p .001. These findings illustrate how the prediction environment
influences forecaster accuracy, independent of all else.
To test the fourth hypothesis—dispositional variables predict
forecasting skill beyond situational variables—we conducted a
multiple regression predicting standardized Brier scores from
intelligence factor scores, actively open-minded thinking, po-
litical knowledge factor scores, probability training, and team-
work. The latter two variables were dummy coded. The multiple
correlation was .43, F(5, 587)  26.13, p  .001. Standardized
regression coefficients for two of the three dispositional vari-
ables—intelligence and political knowledge—were statistically
significant, 0.18 and 0.15, t(587)  4.65, p  .001, and
t(587)  3.89, p  .001. Intelligence and political knowledge
added to the prediction of accuracy beyond the situational
variables.
Behavioral Variables
Effort and engagement manifest themselves in several ways,
including the number of predictions made per question (belief
updating), the time spent before making a forecast (deliberation
time), and the number of forecasting questions attempted. The
Table 2
Correlations Among Dispositional, Situational, and Behavioral Variables
Std BS Ravens CRT ExCRT Numeracy AOMT Nfclo Foxhed PKY1 PKY2 Train Teams Npredq Nquest
Std BS 1.00
Ravens 0.23 1.00
CRT 0.15 0.38 1.00
ExCRT 0.14 0.34 0.39 1.00
Numeracy 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.14 1.00
AOMT 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.09 1.00
Nfclo 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 1.00
Foxhed 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.24 1.00
PKY1 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.03 1.00
PKY2 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.59 1.00
Train 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 1.00
Teams 0.30 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.00
Npredq 0.49 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.11 1.00
Nquest 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.23 1.00
Del time 0.30 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.28 0.15 0.25
Note. Bold values are significant at the .001 level. Std BS  Standardized Brier score; CRT  cognitive reflection test; ExCRT  extended cognitive
reflection test; AOMT  actively open-minded thinking; Nfclo  need for closure; Foxhed  fox versus hedgehog; PKY1  political knowledge year 1;
PKY2  political knowledge year 2; train  training; Npredq  number of predictions per question; Nonquest  number of questions answered.
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average number of predictions made per forecasting question was
1.58, or slightly more than 1.5 forecasts per person per question.
Deliberation time, which was only measured in Year 2, was
transformed by a logarithmic function (to reduce tail effects) and
averaged over questions. The average length of deliberation time
was 3.60 min, and the average number of questions tried through-
out the 2-year period was 121 out of 199 (61% of all questions).
Correlations between standardized Brier score accuracy and
effort were statistically significant for belief updating, .49,
t(740)  15.29, p  .001, and deliberation time, .30,
t(694)  8,28, p  .001, but not for number of forecasting
questions attempted. Thus, two of three behavioral variables
predicted accuracy, in partial support of the fourth hypothesis.
The fifth hypothesis stated that behavioral variables would
contribute to the predictability of skill over and beyond dispo-
sitional and situational variables. To test this hypothesis, we
conducted a multiple regression predicting standardized Brier
scores from belief updating, deliberation time, and number of
questions attempted, as well as intelligence factor scores, ac-
tively open-minded thinking, political knowledge factor scores,
training, and teamwork. The multiple correlation was .64, F(8,
581)  52.24, p  .001. Behavioral variables with significant
standardized regression coefficients were belief updating, 0.45,
t(581)  12.89, p  .001, and deliberation time, 0.13,
t(581)  3.69, p  .001. Results were thus consistent with the
fifth hypothesis that behavioral variables provide valuable in-
dependent information, in addition to dispositional and situa-
tional variables.
Structural Equation Model
To further explore interconnections among these variables, we
used a structural equation model that enabled us to synthesize our
results in a single analysis, incorporate latent variables, and per-
form simultaneous regressions to test our hypotheses. The initial
model only included variables that were significant predictors of
standardized Brier score accuracy on their own. These variables
included two latent constructs (political knowledge and intelli-
gence), open-mindedness, probabilistic training, teamwork, belief
updating, and deliberation time.
We then conducted mediation analyses to see whether behav-
ioral variables mediated the relationship between dispositional
variables and accuracy, and situational variables and accuracy.4
Results are shown in Table 3. For simplicity, we removed path-
ways whose inclusion neither improved nor changed the model fit
significantly, and ultimately we arrived at the model in Figure 4.
Yellow ovals are latent dispositional variables, yellow rectangles
are observed dispositional variables, pink rectangles are experi-
mentally manipulated situational variables, and green rectangles
are observed behavioral variables.
Dispositional variables of political knowledge and intelligence
had direct and indirect effects on Brier score accuracy. Better
forecasters had greater knowledge and ability, and part of that
relationship was accounted for by greater belief updating. Actively
open-minded thinking, our best cognitive-style predictor, had only
direct effects on accuracy. Situational variables of teamwork and
training had direct effects on accuracy, but teamwork also had
indirect effects. Those in teams did better than those who worked
alone, especially when they updated their beliefs often and delib-
erated longer.
The structural equation modeling required the fit of five simul-
taneous regressions shown in Table 4. In one regression, the latent
variable of fluid intelligence was predicted from the Ravens APM,
the CRT, the extended CRT, and Numeracy. The coefficient for
the Ravens APM was set to 1.0, and others were estimated relative
to it. In the next regression, the latent variable of political knowl-
edge was predicted from tests in Years 1 and 2. In the third
regression, belief updating was predicted by the two latent vari-
ables and teamwork, and in the fourth, deliberation time was
predicted from teamwork. The last regression was the prediction of
forecaster accuracy from fluid intelligence, political knowledge,
intelligence, actively open-minded thinking, teams, probability
training, belief updating, and deliberation time. Coefficients for
these regressions with observed variables, along with standard
errors, Z statistics, p values, and bootstrapped confidence intervals
(when appropriate) are provided in Table 4.
This model provided a reasonable account of relative forecaster
accuracy. The Tucker-Lewis Reliability Index was 0.92, and the
comparative fit index was 0.95. The root mean squared error of
approximation was 0.04. In addition to fitting a model to individ-
uals’ average relative accuracy scores, we fit models to their first
and last forecasts. Using only first forecasts, the effect of belief
updating disappeared, as expected, but the remaining associations
remained strong. Using only last forecasts, the effect of belief
updating increased, as we would expect, and all other associations
did not change.
One way to test the model’s stability is to calculate confidence
intervals on coefficients using bootstrapping methods. These in-
tervals are presented in Table 4, and all of these exclude zero,
supporting the validity of the relationships. Another way to test the
model’s stability is to conduct cross validations which examine the
extent to which the model would have fit with different subsets of
questions or of participants. For the cross-validation of questions,
we randomly assigned each question to one of 10 folds (or subsets
of questions) with equal numbers of questions in each fold. In each
validation, we used 90% of the questions, computed average
standardized Brier scores for each participant, and refit the struc-
tural model. We repeated this process for each fold and examined
the distributions of resulting coefficients over all 10 validations.
Coefficients for all of the parameters were consistent with the full
model.5 We conducted a similar cross-validation analysis using
subsets of participants, and again, coefficients for all of the pa-
rameters were consistent with the full model in each of the 10
validation sets.
Which Types of Variables Best Predict
Relative Accuracy?
Table 5 shows multiple correlations and tests of nested compar-
isons. Using only dispositional information (intelligence, political
4 We conducted mediation analyses to determine which of our predictors
of accuracy might be mediated by effort. We used those results to deter-
mine which pathways to include in the structural equation model. Results
of the mediation analyses are summarized in Table 3 and Figure 3.
5 Consistency refers to all coefficients in the validation models main-
taining significance (p  .05), and similar magnitude to the full model,
across all 10 cross-validation folds.
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knowledge, and actively open-minded thinking), the multiple cor-
relation for accuracy was .31, close to the famous .3 barrier in
personality research, which is sometimes supposed to be the upper
bound of the validities on many personality scales. Using only
situational variables that describe the conditions under which
forecasters worked, the multiple correlation was .34, similar in
magnitude to that obtained from the dispositional variables, repli-
cating the more general conclusion of Funder and Ozer (1983) that
many individual difference effects and situational manipulations
appear to have similar effect-size upper bounds.
Adding behavioral information on forecaster belief updating and
deliberation time, predictability improved and the multiple corre-
lation rose to .54. Not surprisingly, it is harder to identify the best
forecasters from abstract dispositional constructs than it is from
specific features of their behavior in the prediction environment.
Nonetheless, as we saw in the structural model, and confirm here,
the best model uses dispositional, situational, and behavioral vari-
ables. The combination produced a multiple correlation of .64.
Each model provided a better fit as more variables were included.
F tests for the nested model deviance showed that larger models
provided a significantly better fit than their simpler counterparts.
The person, the situation, and related behavior all contribute to
identifying superior geopolitical forecasting performance.6
Discussion
We examine the geopolitical forecasting skills of participants in
a 2-year tournament. Drawing on diverse literatures, we tested
three categories of hypotheses about the psychological drivers of
judgmental accuracy: (a) dispositional variables measured prior to
the tournament, such as cognitive abilities and styles; (b) situa-
tional variables that were experimentally manipulated prior to the
competition, such as training in probabilistic reasoning and col-
laborative engagement in teams organized around self-critical,
epistemic norms; and (c) behavioral variables measured during the
competition, such as the willingness to revisit and update older
beliefs.
The best forecasters scored higher on both intelligence and
political knowledge than the already well-above-average group of
forecasters. The best forecasters had more open-minded cognitive
styles. They benefited from better working environments with
probability training and collaborative teams. And while making
predictions, they spent more time deliberating and updating their
forecasts.
These predictors of accuracy proved robust over several subsets
of questions. With few exceptions, variables that captured the best
forecasters overall predicted accuracy across different temporal
periods within a question (early, middle, and late), across questions
that differed in length (short, medium, and long durations), and
across questions that differed in mutability (close calls vs. clear-cut
outcomes).
We offer a structural equation model to capture the interrela-
tionships among variables. Measures that reflected behavior within
tournaments served as mediators. Belief updating partly mediated
the relationship between intelligence and accuracy, between polit-
ical knowledge and accuracy, and teamwork and accuracy. Delib-
eration time mediated the relationship between teamwork and
accuracy. This association has different causal interpretations.
Those with more political knowledge and greater intelligence
might have enjoyed the task more—and that enjoyment may have
motivated engagement. Alternatively, once forecasters became
more engaged, they may have become more politically knowledge-
able. Furthermore, those who worked in teams may also have been
6 These correlations were fit directly to the data. Cross-validated corre-
lations would obviously be smaller.
Table 3
Indirect and Total Contributions in Mediation Analyses
Independent Mediator Dependent Indirect p value Total p value
IQ Bel updating Std Br score 0.18 0.001 0.54 0.001
Pol know Bel updating Std Br score 0.16 0.001 0.36 0.001
AOMT Bel updating Std Br score 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.001
Train Bel updating Std Br score 0.07 0.03 0.32 0.001
Team Bel updating Std Br score 0.08 0.01 0.53 0.001
Team Deliberation time Std Br score 0.07 0.001 0.29 0.001
Note. Independent refers to the independent variable, and Dependent is the dependent variable. Indirect is the
product of the correlation between the independent variable and the mediator and that between the mediator and
the dependent variable. Total is the indirect plus the direct effects, where the direct effect is the correlation
between the independent and dependent variable. IQ intelligence; Pol know political knowledge; AOMT
actively open-minded thinking; Train  probablistic reasoning training; Teams  on a collaborative team.
Figure 4. Structural equation model with standardized coefficients. See
the online article for the color version of this figure.
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motivated to do well for the sake of the group, which could also
produce greater updating and ultimately greater accuracy.
Actively open-minded thinking predicted accuracy but less con-
sistently than other variables. This cognitive style is associated
fewer cognitive errors, including the myside bias, biased argument
evaluation, superstitious thinking, and outcome bias (Stanovich &
West, 1997, 1998, 2007). Laboratory evidence shows that actively
open-minded thinking predicts accuracy of estimates of uncertain
Table 4
Regressions in Structural Equation Model
Regressions Estimate Std error z p Bootstrap CI
1. Intelligence (FS)
CRT 1.01 0.12 8.73 0.00
Ex-CRT 0.89 0.10 8.63 0.00
Numeracy 0.35 0.08 4.17 0.00
2. Pol knowledge (FS)
Pol know Year 2 1.22 0.22 5.49 0.00
3. Belief updating
Teams 0.12 0.04 2.91 0.00 0.04 0.21
Pol know 0.30 0.08 3.97 0.00 0.15 0.44
Intelligence 0.34 0.09 3.86 0.00 0.17 0.51
4. Deliberation time
Teams 0.27 0.04 7.18 0.00 0.20 0.34
5. Std Brier score
Belief updating 0.35 0.03 10.72 0.00 0.42 0.29
Deliberation time 0.17 0.04 4.82 0.00 0.24 0.10
Pol know 0.16 0.06 2.80 0.01 0.28 0.05
Intelligence 0.24 0.07 3.54 0.00 0.38 0.11
Teams 0.19 0.03 5.65 0.00 0.26 0.12
P train 0.13 0.03 4.15 0.00 0.20 0.07
AOMT 0.07 0.03 2.13 0.03 0.13 0.01
Note. FS refers to factor score. The regression coefficients for Ravens and the political knowledge test Year
1 were set to 1.0 in the first and second regression, respectively. CRT  cognitive reflection test; ExCRT 
extended cognitive reflection test; Pol know  political knowledge; P train  probablistic reasoning training;
AOMT  actively open-minded thinking.
Table 5
Predicting Overall Forecasting Accuracy From Different Types of Variables
Multiple R F Sig
Variable type
Dispositional (2 latent, 1 observed variable) 0.31 21.12 p  .001
Situational (2 variables) 0.34 49.44 p  .001
Behavioral (2 variables) 0.54 142.52 p  .001
Dis  Sit (2 latent, 3 observed variables) 0.45 30.17 p  .001
Dis  Beh (2 latent, 3 variables) 0.58 60.06 p  .001
Sit  Beh (4 variables) 0.58 89.43 p  .001
Dis  Sit  Beh (7 variables) 0.64 52.99 p  .001
Delta SS Delta DF F Sig
Nested comparisons
Dis vs. Dis  Sit 64.76 2 40.38 p  .001
Sit vs. Dis  Sit 56.16 7 10.01 p  .001
Dis vs. Dis  Beh 154.51 3 79.41 p  .001
Beh vs. Dis  Beh 22.75 7 5.01 p  .001
Sit vs. Beh  Sit 148.88 3 77.79 p  .001
Beh vs. Sit  Beh 25.72 2 25.72 p  .001
Dis  Sit vs. Dis  Sit  Beh 115.51 3 63.51 p  .001
Dis  Beh vs. Dis  Sit  Beh 25.77 2 21.25 p  .001
Sit  Beh vs. Dis  Sit  Beh 22.80 7 5.37 p  .001
Note. Dispositional variables refer to principle factor scores for general intelligence (Ravens, CRT, exCRT,
numeracy) and political knowledge (Year 1 and Year 2 tests), as well as actively open-minded thinking.
Situational variables refer to teams and training. Behavioral variables are the average number of forecasts made
per question and average time spent deliberating about a question. The F test for nested comparisons tests the
probability that the difference in sum of squares between the smaller and larger models is 0 by comparing the
mean square error of the smaller model to the residual sum of squares for the larger one.
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quantities (Haran et al., 2013), but no prior studies have demon-
strated an association between actively open-minded thinking and
forecasting performance on real-world problems. We believe this
cognitive style translates into more accurate political forecasts
through its association with better norms of thinking.
Kahneman and Klein (2009) argued that for any type of skill to
develop, two conditions must be present: (a) an environment with
sufficient deterministic stability to permit learning, and (b) oppor-
tunities for practice. Skill development occurs to the extent that
people care enough to engage in deliberative rehearsal (Ericsson,
2006). Our forecasters received constant feedback in the form of
Brier scores and leaderboard rankings. They had many chances to
learn; there were 199 questions over a period of 2 years, and, on
average, forecasters made predictions for 121 of them. These
conditions enabled a process of learning-by-doing and help to
explain why some forecasters achieved far-better-than-chance ac-
curacy.
In the real world, intelligence analysts use data from diverse
sources. They frequently make nonnumerical forecasts that are
vague and hard to score for accuracy, so feedback is often
absent. Intelligence analysts shift their response thresholds de-
pending on the cost of the errors. That is, they are likelier to say
“signal” when the costs of a miss are high, and they are likelier
to say “noise” when the costs of a false alarm are high. Al-
though our forecasters knew that the Brier-score costs of errors
were symmetric, the real world is much more complicated.
Analysts also operate under bureaucratic-political pressure—
and are tempted to respond to previous mistakes by shifting their
response thresholds. They are likelier to say “signal” when re-
cently accused of underconnecting the dots (i.e., 9/11) and to say
“noise” when recently accused of overconnecting the dots (i.e.,
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). Tetlock and Mellers (2011)
describe this process as accountability ping-pong. One escape from
this cycle is to make a public organizational commitment to using
tournaments to monitor long-term accuracy, not just avoidance of
the most recent mistake (McGraw, Todorov, & Kunreuther, 2011).
Our study is the first to keep score and track categories of
variables that predict performance in the politically sensitive do-
main of intelligence analysis. The study demonstrates the value of
tournaments in identifying top forecasters. If the National Acad-
emy of Science Report on improving intelligence analysis is cor-
rect about the power of measuring accuracy and providing feed-
back to boost performance, tournaments should become a regular
feature of research on improving accuracy in organizational sys-
tems and evaluating the track records of intelligence analysts.
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OBSERVATION
What Can 1 Billion Trials Tell Us About Visual Search?
Stephen R. Mitroff, Adam T. Biggs, Stephen H. Adamo,
Emma Wu Dowd, Jonathan Winkle, and Kait Clark
Duke University
Mobile technology (e.g., smartphones and tablets) has provided psychologists with a wonderful oppor-
tunity: through careful design and implementation, mobile applications can be used to crowd source data
collection. By garnering massive amounts of data from a wide variety of individuals, it is possible to
explore psychological questions that have, to date, been out of reach. Here we discuss 2 examples of how
data from the mobile game Airport Scanner (Kedlin Co., http://www.airportscannergame.com) can be
used to address questions about the nature of visual search that pose intractable problems for laboratory-
based research. Airport Scanner is a successful mobile game with millions of unique users and billions
of individual trials, which allows for examining nuanced visual search questions. The goals of the current
Observation Report were to highlight the growing opportunity that mobile technology affords psycho-
logical research and to provide an example roadmap of how to successfully collect usable data.
Keywords: visual search, big data, mobile applications, airport scanner, multiple-target search
Psychological researchers have never lacked for good questions.
However, sometimes method and technology lag behind—thereby
withholding the necessary tools for addressing certain questions.
As such, each new technological and/or methodological advance
provides the field with a possible means to move forward. Cog-
nitive psychology, for example, has grown hand-in-hand with each
new available technology (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory de-
vices, the tachistoscope, personal computers, eye-tracking devices,
brain-imaging techniques).
At present, we are in the early stages of another breakthrough
capable of pushing psychological forward. Namely, researchers
have begun to “crowd source” experiments to obtain large amounts
of data from many people in short order. Building off ingenious
ideas, such as Luis von Ahn’s “ESP Game” (a “game” that was the
basis for how Google matches words to images; von Ahn &
Dabbish, 2004), researchers have turned to outlets such as Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling,
2011) to rapidly distribute an experiment to many different par-
ticipants.
Another outlet for rapid distribution of experiments is through
the use of mobile applications—“apps” created for mobile devices,
such as Apple and Android products. Psychologists have a history
of using games and game-like interfaces to make experiments
more palatable to participants (e.g., Anguera et al., 2013; Boot et
al., 2010; Mané & Donchin, 1989; Miranda & Palmer, 2014), and
mobile devices offer an exciting new means to crowd source an
experiment in a game-like form.
Some mobile apps have been specifically designed to assess
and/or train cognitive abilities, and they can address open ques-
tions with data voluntarily contributed by users. Other mobile apps
just happen to tap into cognitive abilities in a manner that can be
analyzed by researchers, even though that might not have been the
apps’ intended purpose. For example, some games challenge play-
ers to look for differences between images presented side-by-
side—a game version of change detection tasks (e.g., Simons &
Rensink, 2005). Similarly, other games tap into abilities related to
the cognitive processes of working memory (memory match
games), go/no-go (“whack-a-mole” games), and visual search
(search-and-find games).
Using Mobile Technology for Research
There are clear advantages to crowd sourcing data collection
through mobile technology. The most obvious benefit is the po-
tential for gathering “big data”—massive datasets that provide the
ability to examine nuanced questions with sufficient statistical
power. Likewise, this can provide a means to collect relatively
cheap data in an automated and continuous manner. Lastly, this
process can mimic real-world aspects that are difficult to address
in a laboratory environment (e.g., realistic distributions of vari-
ables).
There are also clear disadvantages to consider. First, researchers
either need to have the necessary skills to create a fun game or
need to partner with a developer. Gathering data through a mobile
This article was published Online First December 8, 2014.
Stephen R. Mitroff, Adam T. Biggs, Stephen H. Adamo, Emma Wu
Dowd, Jonathan Winkle, and Kait Clark, Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University.
We thank Ben Sharpe, Thomas Liljetoft, and Kedlin Company for access
to the Airport Scanner data and for approving the use of Airport Scanner
images.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stephen
R. Mitroff, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, B203 LSRC, Box 90999,
Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. E-mail: mitroff@duke.edu
Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance
© 2014 American Psychological Association
2015, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1–5
0096-1523/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000012
1
game is only worthwhile if people will play the game, and people
are more likely to play if the game is fun (e.g., Miranda & Palmer,
2014). Second, large amounts of data may not necessarily result in
high-quality data; it is critical to carefully select what research
questions are to be addressed and how they are addressed through
the game interface. Finally, by collecting data through crowd
sourcing, there is an inherent lack of control over who is playing
and under what conditions (e.g., there is no way to know what
percentage of the data is collected while participants are on the
toilet).
Assuming the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and that
the disadvantages can be addressed, the largest benefit of data
collection through mobile technology is the potential for analyzing
big data. With millions (or billions) of trials, it is possible to
examine experimental variables that are too difficult to assess in a
laboratory environment. While using mobile technology for re-
search purposes may seem like a simple methodological advance,
it has the potential to greatly inform psychology theory. Here we
discuss our recent efforts focusing on the specific cognitive task of
visual search.
Examples of Using Mobile Technology for Research
Visual search is the act of looking for target items among
distractor items. Decades of research have sought to understand
this ubiquitous cognitive process and to determine how humans,
nonhuman animals, and computers successfully identify targets
(see Eckstein, 2011; Horowitz, 2014; Nakayama & Martini, 2011,
for recent reviews). Visual search has a history of using big data
analyses—in 1998, Jeremy Wolfe collated data from 2,500 exper-
imental sessions to ask “What can 1 million trials tell us about
visual search” (Wolfe, 1998). This endeavor confirmed some open
hypotheses and challenged others, while also demonstrating the
value of big data for visual search analyses.
The downside of Wolfe’s approach was that it took 10 years to
collect—as is to be expected in typical laboratory experiments.
Mobile apps offer the potential to collect data far more expedi-
tiously. In the current report, we discuss results from our recent
partnership with Kedlin Co., the creators of Airport Scanner (https://
www.airportscannergame.com). In Airport Scanner, players are
tasked with searching for illegal items in simulated x-ray bag
images in an airport security environment. Players view one bag at
a time and use finger-taps to identify illegal items on a touchscreen
(see Figure 1 for gameplay examples). Players are provided with a
logbook of illegal and legal items, and the logbook expands (going
from a handful of possible targets to hundreds) as players progress
through the game.
As of November 2014, there were over two billion trials from
over seven million mobile devices available for research purposes.
Data are collected in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the standard Apple User Agreement and those provided by Kedlin
Co. Each player consents to the terms and conditions when install-
ing the application, and the Duke University Institutional Review
Board provided approval for secondary data analyses (see Biggs,
Adamo, & Mitroff, 2014; Mitroff & Biggs, 2014, for more details).
Here we provide a brief overview of two examples of how we have
used the Airport Scanner data for research purposes.
Use of Airport Scanner Data
Example 1: Ultra-rare Targets
In a recently published article (Mitroff & Biggs, 2014), we
explored how visual search performance is affected when specific
targets rarely appeared. While maintaining an overall target prev-
alence rate of 50% (half of the bags in Airport Scanner had at least
one target present), the frequency with which any given target
Figure 1. Sample images from Airport Scanner: the left image contains one target (hand grenade), the middle
contains two identical targets (two exemplars of the dynamite stick target type), and the right image contains two
different target types (derringer, gasoline can). Airport Scanner images appear with permission from Kedlin Co.
Copyright 2014 by the Kedlin Company. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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could appear varied greatly (e.g., a hammer appeared as a target in
3% of the trials while a switchblade appeared as a target in only
0.08% of the trials). Critically, nearly 30 of the targets were
“ultra-rare”—they appeared in less than 0.15% of all trials. To
examine the effects of such extreme target rarity on visual search
performance in a laboratory would be difficult for even one target
item. For example, to assess accuracy for targets that only ap-
peared in 0.1% of trials, 1,000 trials would be needed for a single
occurrence. To obtain sufficient statistical power (e.g., at least 20
occurrences), too many total trials would be needed to realistically
test such a question in a laboratory. However, with the large
Airport Scanner dataset, we were able to look at hundreds of cases
for each of the nearly 30 “ultra-rare” targets. Comparing the
relationship between search accuracy and target frequency across
78 unique target types of various frequency rates revealed an
extremely strong logarithmic relationship (adjusted R2  .92)
such that the “ultra-rare” items were much more likely to be
missed than the more frequently occurring targets (Mitroff &
Biggs, 2014). This example highlights the more obvious benefits
and drawbacks of using big data to address research questions. The
primary benefit is clear—a question that could have taken decades
to answer in a laboratory setting can be answered using big data in
a fraction of the time. The Airport Scanner app also bypasses most
of the potential downsides mentioned above given that it is a
popular game with an interface that is conducive to research.
However, there is an inherent lack of control over the nature of
data collected via mobile technology, and there is no obvious
means to counter this lack of control. Analogous to a “speed/
accuracy trade-off” (a well-studied juxtaposition between perform-
ing quickly vs. performing accurately; e.g., Pachella, 1974), big
data might engender a “volume/control trade-off”—a juxtaposition
between the amount of available data and the methodological
control over the data.
Example 2: Multiple-Target Search Theories
Many real-world visual searches can have more than one target
present within the same search array (e.g., more than one abnor-
mality in a radiological x-ray; more than one prohibited item in a
bag going through airport security). Unfortunately, multiple-target
searches are highly susceptible to errors such that additional tar-
gets are less likely to be detected if one target has already been
found (see Berbaum, 2012, for a review). This effect was origi-
nally termed the “satisfaction of search” phenomenon, but we have
recently renamed it the “subsequent search misses” (SSM) phe-
nomenon (Adamo, Cain, & Mitroff, 2013). SSM errors are a
stubborn source of errors, and several efforts (e.g., Berbaum, 2012;
Cain, Adamo, & Mitroff, 2013) have attempted to identify their
underlying cause(s).
Three primary theories of SSM have been proposed. First, the
original explanation—and the source of the “satisfaction of
search” name—suggests that searchers become “satisfied” with the
meaning of the search on locating a first target and terminate their
search prematurely (Smith, 1967; Tuddenham, 1962). Second, a
resource depletion account (e.g., Berbaum et al., 1991; Cain &
Mitroff, 2013) suggests that cognitive resources (e.g., attention,
working memory) are consumed by a found target and leave fewer
resources available to detect additional targets during subsequent
search. Finally, a perceptual set account suggests that searchers
become biased to look for additional targets similar to the first
found target (Berbaum et al., 1990; Berbaum et al., 1991; Berbaum
et al., 2010); for example, if you just found a tumor, you might
enter “tumor mode” and be less likely to subsequently detect a
fracture that appeared in the same x-ray image.
There have been empirical tests of the satisfaction and resource
depletion theories (see Berbaum, 2012), but no substantial tests
have been offered for the perceptual set account. Previous inves-
tigations have employed a small number of possible target types;
for example, Fleck, Samei, and Mitroff (2010) asked observers to
search for targets that were T-shaped items among L-shaped
distractor items. There were two different forms of the target
Ts—those that were relatively light and those that were relatively
dark. If a perceptual set operates via a priming-like influence, such
a design might be suboptimal, because repeated exposure to each
target could result in elevated priming across all trials for all targets (i.e.,
you only need to see so many lightly colored T-shaped targets
before you become generally biased for lightly colored T-shaped
targets across the entire experiment).
A large and unpredictable set of targets could generate more
short-lived priming during a visual search task, which is more in
line with real-world scenarios in which a perceptual set could
meaningfully impact performance. However, such an experimental
design—many and varied targets spread over an immense number
of trials—is not practical to administer in a laboratory environ-
ment, and it is not easily assessed in real-world scenarios such as
an airport security checkpoint. Here we used the Airport Scanner
gameplay data to address this idea.
More details about the nature of the data and the gameplay are
available elsewhere (e.g., Mitroff & Biggs, 2014); however, we
highlight in Table 1 how we filtered the gameplay variables to
address our specific research question at hand. Each trial (bag)
could contain 0–3 illegal target items with approximately 43% of
all trials containing one target, 6% with two targets, and less than
1% with three targets. We analyzed SSM errors by comparing
search accuracy for a specific target item on single-target trials to
search accuracy for the same target on dual-target trials when
another target had been detected first (e.g., Biggs & Mitroff, 2014).
Players identified a target by tapping directly onto the target
location, and we excluded all cases in which one tap captured two
targets. Analyses were limited to target types with at least 20
instances within our dataset (i.e., the shotgun target type was
filtered from our SSM analyses for only contributing seven in-
stances).
We first determined whether SSM errors occurred in the Airport
Scanner gameplay as we have observed in the laboratory (e.g.,
Cain et al., 2013; Fleck et al., 2010). This analysis was performed
across 78 target items without considering the identity of the first
found target; for example, when calculating the SSM error rate for
the pistol as a second target, all data were included whether or not
the first found target was another pistol, a grenade, a knife, and so
forth. A significant overall SSM error rate was found (M 
14.00%, SE  1.11%), t(77)  12.62, p  .001.
Next, we assessed SSM errors when the two targets in the same
bag were identical (e.g., two exemplars of the dynamite stick target
type; e.g., the second panel of Figure 1) as opposed to when the
two targets in the same bag were not identical (e.g., one pistol and
one hand grenade; e.g., the third panel of Figure 1). Thirty-three
target types met the 20-occurrence minimum for inclusion into
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analyses. We observed significant SSM errors when the first and
second targets were identical (M  6.53%, SE  1.62%), t(32) 
4.04, p  .001, and when the first and second targets were not
identical (M  19.21%, SE  1.36%), t(32)  14.13, p  .001.
Importantly, there was a significant difference in SSM error rates
for identical targets versus nonidentical targets (Mdifference 
12.69%, SE  1.69%), t(32)  7.52, p  .001, such that SSM
errors were substantially reduced when the targets were identical
than when the two targets were not identical.
In this particular example, the power of big data allowed us
to answer a nuanced question that required a substantial number
of trials to appropriately assess. Specifically, this analysis fo-
cused on trials that contained two targets and that met several
exclusionary criteria (see Table 1), which resulted in analyzing
only about 125,000 trials out of a dataset of more than
1,000,000,000 trials (0.01%). It was necessary to examine ac-
curacy for specific target types within a framework containing
a wide variety of target types to prevent participants from
becoming overexposed to any one target. This was best accom-
plished through the use of mobile technology, which allowed
for the accumulation of the necessary data while providing
players an enjoyable experience. Importantly, we expanded
current understanding about the mechanisms underlying SSM
errors by revealing that the errors are, in fact, partially due to a
perceptual set mechanism.
Conclusion
Using a game interface to assess cognitive abilities is not new to
psychological research (e.g., Boot et al., 2010; Mané, & Donchin,
1989), but mobile technology offers a phenomenal opportunity to
examine cognitive processes on a large scale. Here we discussed
two specific examples of how we analyzed data from the Airport
Scanner game to address psychological questions, and much more
is possible.
However, using mobile apps for research purposes is easier said
than done. Researchers can build games for data collection pur-
poses and have complete control over the design and implemen-
tation. However, there is no guarantee that any game will be
successful enough to garner data—simply producing a game does
not ensure anyone will play it. Alternatively, researchers can
partner with developers to create apps or can partner with devel-
Table 1
Game Elements and Nature of Trial Filtering for the Multiple-Target Visual Search Example
Game element/variable
Filtering for SSM errors exampleGame variable Description Cases
Airport 6 levels; increase in difficulty Trainee, Honolulu, Las Vegas,
Chicago, Aspen, London
Exclude Trainee
Rank 5 levels; player’s experience
level
Trainee, Operator, Pro, Expert, Elite Only Elite players (here  62,606 devices)
Day Sessions within Airport level 5 Days per Airport; additional
Challenge levels for some Airports
Exclude Challenge
Mission type Game play mode Career, Challenge Only Career mode
Replay Repeat a Day after completing it Replays allowed or disallowed Replays allowed
Day status How the Day session ended Completed, timed out, security breach No exclusions
Bag type Shape and size of search array  15 unique Bag types Briefcase, carry-on, duffle, and purse included
Passenger type Difficulty of Bag Easy:  0–8 legal items present Exclude Impossible
Medium:  9–13 legal items present
Hard:  14–20 legal items present
Impossible: Requires upgrades
In-game upgrades Add-ons to help with gameplay  10 unique upgrades Exclude all that affect search performance
Special passengers/items Nontypical gameplay events Air Marshals, Flight Crew, First
Class Passengers, Delay
Passengers, Rare Targets (special
items)
Air Marshal and rare-target Bags excluded
Illegal item count No. of target items present 0 targets:  50% of all trials Excluded 0-illegal and 3-illlegal item Bags
1 target:  43% of all trials
2 targets:  6% of all trials
3 targets:  1% of all trials
Legal item count No. of distractor items present 0–20 No exclusions
Specific illegal items Various target items (see Figure
1)
 200 1-target accuracy: N  78
2-target accuracy: N  33
Specific legal items Various distractor items (see
Figure 1)
 200 No exclusions
How data filtering affected trial counts
Total trials available as of 11/18/14 2,236,844,667
Total trials for example analysis date range of 04/15/13 to 08/26/13 1,098,098,764
Total trials for 1-target trial accuracy analyses after all filters applied 1,795,907
Total trials for 2-target trial accuracy analyses after all filters applied 126,579
Note. SSM  subsequent search misses.
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opers of already existing apps, which can be a great opportunity for
both groups; developers can benefit from researchers’ insight and
added press, and researchers can benefit from developers’ skill and
access to established games. Our partnership with Kedlin Co.
exemplifies this beneficial relationship and has been successful
enough to lead to federal funding opportunities for further research
implementations of Airport Scanner.
With the proliferation of mobile technology, it is time to aim
high. In 1998, 1 million trials on a specific cognitive task was a
mind-blowing amount of data (Wolfe, 1998). Today, we collect
over a million trials a day through Airport Scanner. Inflation has
hit visual search, and as researchers, we should (responsibly and
carefully) look for ways to take advantage of this opportunity.
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Sending Your Grandparents to University Increases Cognitive Reserve:
The Tasmanian Healthy Brain Project
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Objective: Increasing an individual’s level of cognitive reserve (CR) has been suggested as a nonphar-
macological approach to reducing the risk for Alzheimer’s disease. We examined changes in CR in older
adults participating over 4 years in the Tasmanian Healthy Brain Project. Method: A sample of 459
healthy older adults between 50 and 79 years of age underwent a comprehensive annual assessment of
current CR, neuropsychological function, and psychosocial factors over a 4-year period. The intervention
group of 359 older adults (M  59.61 years, SD  6.67) having completed a minimum of 12 months
part-time university study were compared against a control reference group of 100 adults (M  62.49
years, SD  6.24) who did not engage in further education. Results: Growth mixture modeling
demonstrated that 44.3% of the control sample showed no change in CR, whereas 92.5% of the further
education participants displayed a significant linear increase in CR over the 4 years of the study. These
results indicate that older adults engaging in high-level mental stimulation display an increase in CR over
a 4-year period. Conclusion: Increasing mental activity in older adulthood may be a viable strategy to
improve cognitive function and offset cognitive decline associated with normal aging.
Keywords: aging, education, cognitive reserve, age-related cognitive decline
One nonpharmacological approach to reducing the risk of rapid
age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease is to in-
crease cognitive reserve (CR). CR is a theoretical construct de-
scribing the capacity of an individual to utilize preexisting brain
networks efficiently (neural reserve) as well as to enlist alternate
brain networks (neural compensation) when under the duress of
brain pathology (Stern, 2002; Tucker & Stern, 2011). Life expe-
riences and innate intelligence are proposed to impart CR on
individuals (Stern, 2002). Research evidence has supported the
role of occupational attainment (Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2006),
intelligence (Whalley et al., 2000), education (e.g., Anstey &
Christensen, 2000), and involvement in cognitively stimulating
activities (Scarmeas & Stern, 2003) in modifying an individual’s
risk for dementia. It is inferred that the modification of an indi-
vidual’s risk for dementia is a result of modifications to the level
of CR that the person displays.
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CR is a theoretical construct, and therefore it is imperative to
recognize that what is measured (latent variable, observed score on
a task or test, or physical property) is not the same thing as the
construct (Zumbo, 2007). At best, attempts to operationalize and
measure CR (Harrison et al., 2015) represent proxy measures with
differing levels of construct validity. Various studies have used
single-proxy measures to infer the impact of CR on cognitive
performance and rate of age-related cognitive decline. For exam-
ple, individuals with lower occupational status have shown lower
performance on measures of global cognitive function in later life
(Dartigues et al., 1992; Frisoni, Rozzini, Bianchetti, & Trabucchi,
1993; Jorm et al., 1998). Similarly, a socially engaged lifestyle in
later life is associated with superior cognitive performance and a
reduced rate of age-related cognitive decline (Barnes, Mendes de
Leon, Wilson, Bienias, & Evans, 2004; Ertel, Glymour, & Berk-
man, 2008; Lövdén, Ghisletta, & Lindenberger, 2005).
A key contributor to CR is thought to be education. Education
is seen as increasing CR through fostering the development of new
cognitive strategies (Manly, Byrd, Touradji, Sanchez, & Stern,
2004). Educational attainment not only is associated with a de-
creased risk of dementia (Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2006) but also
modifies the association between a direct measure of brain pathol-
ogy and performance on measures of cognitive function (Bennett
et al., 2003; Dufouil, Alpérovitch, & Tzourio, 2003). Despite
mixed results, higher levels of education in early adulthood have
been associated with superior performance on measures of cogni-
tive function (Anstey & Christensen, 2000; Lenehan, Summers,
Saunders, Summers, & Vickers, 2015). Therefore, regardless of
whether education influences the rate of normal age-related cog-
nitive decline, enhancing an individual’s level of cognitive func-
tion has the potential of preserving normal cognitive function for
a longer period of time in the presence of neuropathological
changes in the brain.
A recent advancement in the area of CR research has been the
development of a multidimensional proxy measure of CR (Ward,
Summers, Saunders, & Vickers, 2015). Previous research has
typically utilized a single proxy measure, such as years of educa-
tion or occupational attainment, to infer an individual’s level of
CR. However, this approach may not be accurate given that
education, occupational attainment, and leisure activities differen-
tially contribute to CR (Foubert-Samier et al., 2012). Acknowl-
edging the multivariate nature of CR, we developed two factor–
analysis-defined latent proxy measures of CR (Ward et al., 2015).
Prior CR combines proxy measures traditionally associated with
CR, including education, preexisting intellectual capacity, and five
subscores from the Life Experience Questionnaire (Valenzuela &
Sachdev, 2007). However, because CR theoretically develops in
response to new life experiences throughout the life span, we
developed a second proxy measure of CR designed to assess
dynamic change in CR (Ward et al., 2015). This measure of current
CR incorporates cognitive tests suitable for repeated assessment
including current intellectual capacity and academic ability (Ward
et al., 2015). Whereas prior CR enables CR set earlier in life to be
determined, current CR enables possible increases in CR following
an intervention to be quantified. University study typically in-
volves complex mental and social stimulation that is increasingly
being accessed by older populations.
The Tasmanian Healthy Brain Project (THBP) is the first pro-
spective study in the world to examine the potential of university
level of education in later life to reduce age-related cognitive
decline (Summers et al., 2013). The THBP has recruited a sample
of older adults, age 50–79 years at commencement in the study,
from the island state of Tasmania, Australia. The THBP adopts a
mixed-group longitudinal design, comparing older adults who
engaged in later-life tertiary study with a control group who do not
undertake further education. The THBP undertakes annual assess-
ment of each participant, examining cognitive reserve, neuropsy-
chological/cognitive function, psychosocial function, and genetic
factors. This article examines whether engaging healthy older
adults in university-level education results in a measureable
change in CR when accounting for preexisting CR levels for each
individual.
Method
Participants
Data from participants in the THBP as of December 31, 2014,
were utilized for this study. The initial sample comprised 566
adults age 50 –79 years enrolled in the THBP (Summers et al.,
2013). Of these, 19 were excluded from the analysis due to
English being a second, rather than primary, language. A fur-
ther 41 were excluded due to having withdrawn from the project
prior to any follow-up testing. Of the remaining 498 partici-
pants, a further 39 were missing data necessary to calculate
prior CR score. Because prior CR was used as a covariate in the
analysis, participants with missing data on this variable were
excluded. The final sample used in the analysis consisted of 459
healthy older adults.
Participants were not randomly allocated to conditions but
volunteered to participate in either the intervention or control
condition. Those in the intervention group (N  359) undertook
a minimum of 12 months part-time or full-time university
study, with a minimum study load of two units at the under-
graduate or postgraduate level. The remaining 100 participants
in the control group did not engage in any tertiary-level study.
Participants who presented with a medical, neurological, or
psychiatric disorder that could potentially influence neuropsy-
chological test performance were precluded from entry into the
THBP. The project was approved by the Human Research
Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network, and further details of
the study protocol have been published elsewhere (Summers et
al., 2013).
Measures
Participants in the THBP completed a comprehensive testing
battery. For the full project protocol, refer to Summers et al.
(2013). The Dementia Rating Scale–2 (DRS-2; Jurica, Leitten, &
Mattis, 2001), the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS;
Snaith, 2003), and the Medical Health Status questionnaire (Sum-
mers et al., 2013) were completed to ensure participants were free
from dementia and of sound psychological and physical health.
The Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI; International Wellbeing
Group, 2006) and the 18-item version of the Lubben Social Net-
work Scale (LSNS-18; Lubben & Gironda, 2003) are self-report
questionnaires and were completed to assess quality of life and
perceived social support within the sample.
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Prior CR. The tests included in the calculation of prior CR
were as specified in Ward et al. (2015): the Wechsler Test of
Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) to estimate baseline
intellectual capacity; five subscores (Young Adulthood Specific
and Nonspecific; and the Midlife Specific, Nonspecific, and
Continuing Education Bonus) from the Life Experience Ques-
tionnaire (LEQ; Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2007) to quantify pre-
vious lifetime experience in education, occupation, and leisure
activities; and the Medical Health Status Questionnaire (Sum-
mers et al., 2013) to obtain each individual’s total years of prior
education.
Current CR. The tests used for the calculation of current CR
as specified in Ward et al. (2015) were: the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, Third Edition, Short Form 1 (WAIS-III-SF1;
Donnell, Pliskin, Holdnack, Axelrod, & Randolph, 2007) to esti-
mate current intellectual capacity and the spelling and math com-
putation subtests of the Wide Range Achievement Test, Fourth
Edition, Progress Monitoring Version (WRAT-4-PMV; Roid &
Ledbetter, 2006) to assess current academic ability. The WRAT-
4-PMV has four alternate versions of each test, which were utilized
to avoid learning effects (e.g., Form 1 at baseline, Form 2 at Year
1 follow-up).
Procedure
The elements of the test battery used in the current analysis were
as follows: WTAR, DRS-2, Medical Health Status, LEQ, WAIS-
III-SF1, WRAT-4-PMV, HADS, PWI, and LSNS-18. The LEQ
and WTAR IQ estimate were collected only once, at baseline.
Retesting occurred at 1-year intervals (1 month). When avail-
able, alternate versions of tests were used to minimize familiarity
effects (e.g., Forms 1–4 of the WRAT). The full THBP took
approximately 4 hr to complete, and participants were encouraged
to take short breaks as needed to avoid fatigue (Summers et al.,
2013).
Analysis
Calculating prior CR and current CR. Current CR and
prior CR were calculated for each participant using factor
analysis defined regression coefficients as developed and de-
scribed by Ward and colleagues (2015). This equation was used
to calculate prior CR: .370 (WTAR full-scale IQ)  .408 (prior
education in years)  .567 (LEQ Young Adulthood Specific) 
.565 (Young Adulthood Nonspecific)  .630 (LEQ Midlife
Nonspecific)  .875 (LEQ Midlife Continuing Education Bo-
nus)  1.004 (LEQ Midlife Specific). This equation was used
to calculate current CR: .454 (WAIS-III-SF1)  .369 (WRAT-
4-PMV Spelling Level Equivalent Score [LES])  .463
(WRAT-4-PMV Math Computation LES). Because the
regression-based formula for prior CR and current CR are based
on z-transformed raw scores, current CR scores for Years 1, 2,
and 3 (retesting) were z-transformed against the mean and
standard deviation of the entire sample at baseline (Year 0).
Therefore, positive CR scores represent an increase in CR
relative to baseline CR scores.
Modeling approach. Growth mixture modeling (GMM)
was conducted using Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 –
2012) maximum likelihood with robust standard errors estima-
tion. GMM identifies unobserved, homogenous subgroups of
individuals from larger heterogeneous populations on the basis
of similar response patterns (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 –2012).
This is important, given research has shown that various sub-
populations exist within a broader population and are differen-
tially impacted by an intervention (Jackson & Sher, 2005). This
is particularly relevant in the field of CR research, given that a
potential increase in CR could depend on each individual’s
untapped CR capacity. Taking this into account, the conven-
tional latent curve growth approach to analysis could oversim-
plify and potentially underestimate change (Jung & Wickrama,
2008). As such, GMM was conducted on the control and inter-
vention groups separately to examine whether each group was
characterized by classes of individuals with distinct patterns of
change in current CR. We chose to analyze each group sepa-
rately (relative comparison) to enable an examination of differ-
ences between individuals high or low in CR in the rate of CR
change over the 4-year period.
The procedure outlined by Jung and Wickrama (2008) for
conducting GMM was followed. Because the number of unob-
served groups is unknown to the investigator, the suggested pro-
cedure is to identify the best fitting single-class latent growth curve
model (e.g., linear or quadratic) and then progressively test models
with more classes until the model fit is no longer improved by the
addition of extra classes (Jung & Wickrama, 2008). In all models
time was paramatized with scores that represented years since
study entry (0, 1, 2, 3 for the linear term and 0, 1, 4, 9 for the
quadratic term). Initially, Mplus default parameters were used.
The intercepts of the outcome variable at the four time points
were fixed at zero. The intercepts, residual variances, and
covariances of the growth factors were estimated and not held
equal across classes. The model allowed for the effect of the
covariates on the growth parameters for each class to be estimated.
Incremental model changes such as fixing growth factor variance
to zero were also investigated to find the best fitting model. In each
group, initial status of the model represented mean current CR at
baseline, the linear growth rate represented the annual rate of
change in current CR, and the quadratic growth rate indicated the
change in the rate of change (accelerating or decelerating change).
Because the models included a covariate (conditional models), the
intercepts describe the growth factors (i.e., initial starting point,
linear term, and quadratic term) after taking into account the effect
of covariates, so these are reported throughout.
Model evaluation. In the initial latent growth curve analysis
(single class), model fit was assessed by considering a range of fit
indices: the likelihood-ratio chi-square, the root-mean-square error
of approximation (RMSEA), the standardized root-mean-square
residual (SRMR), and the comparative fit index (CFI). As a
general rule, a smaller chi-square indicates a better fit. An RMSEA
value less than .05 and an SRMR less than .05 indicate a good-
fitting model (Geiser, 2013) The CFI should be larger than .95. For
GMM, the optimal number of classes was determined by consid-
ering both the Bayes information criteria (BIC) and the sample-
adjusted BIC. As a general rule, the model with the smallest
information criterion is preferred (Geiser, 2013). The interpretabil-
ity of classes was also considered with reference to theory and
prior research (Schaie, 1989).
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Results
Descriptive Data
Data from a sample of 459 participants was included in this
study. Participants at commencement in the study were 50–79
years of age, of average intelligence, free from dementia, and not
clinically depressed or anxious (see Table 1). The control group
was significantly older, t(496)  4.32, p  .001, and had lower
current CR at baseline, t(494)  3.05, p  .01, compared to the
intervention group. However, because there were no significant
correlations between age and current CR at any time point in either
the control group or the intervention group, the decision was made
not to include age as a covariate in further analysis. There were no
significant differences between the control and intervention groups
across baseline measures of prior CR, global cognition, estimated
premorbid IQ, level of anxiety, or level of depression. The mean
scores of current CR of the control group were lower at baseline
compared to the experimental group, but both groups appeared to
increase current CR score over time.
In the control group, the best fitting single class model was a
linear model with prior CR included as a time-invariant covariate,
2(7, N  100)  23.00, p   .01, RMSEA  .15, confidence
interval (CI) [.09, .22], SRMR  .04, CFI  .95. In the interven-
tion group, the best fitting model was a quadratic model with prior
CR included as a covariate, 2(7, N  359)  26.45, p   .001,
RMSEA .09, CI [.05, .13], SRMR .04, CFI .98. Zero variance
in the linear and quadratic growth factors was specified to avoid an
inadmissible model due to negative residual variances. These
models were used to progressively test models with more classes
in each of the control and intervention groups.
GMM control group. The lowest Adjusted Bayes Informa-
tion Criterion (ABIC) corresponded to a two-class model. The
entropy was calculated at .60, which indicated that the model
had a reasonable classification of individuals into classes. Class
1 (maintainers) comprised 44.3% of the control group. In Class
1, the linear slope was not significant, indicating that linear
change in current CR did not significantly differ from zero (see
Figure 1 and Table 2). The remainder of the control group were
in Class 2 (improvers; 55.7%). This class had a significant
linear slope, suggesting progressive increase in CR over the
4-year period (see Figure 1 and Table 2). The effect of prior CR
was consistent in both classes (see Table 2). Higher prior CR
was associated with a higher current CR score at baseline. Prior
CR did not have a significant association with the rate of linear
change in current CR over time. The classes were examined to
determine whether other demographic variables could account
for class membership. However, there were no differences
between decliners and improvers in sex, age, level of depres-
sion, level of anxiety, personal wellbeing, or social connected-
ness.
Intervention group. The lowest ABIC corresponded to a
two-class model in the intervention group also, and the entropy
value of .78 indicated good separation of individuals into
classes. Class 1 (maintainers) constituted a minority of the
intervention group (7.5%). In this class the significant negative
linear growth term indicates that current CR score decreased
over the 4-year period, and the significant quadratic term sug-
gests that CR change accelerated over time (see Figure 2 and
Table 3). The majority of the intervention group were in Class
2 (improvers; 92.5%). The significant linear growth term indi-
cates that the current CR for this class increased over the 4-year
period (see Figure 2 and Table 3). The negative quadratic term
indicated the rate of increase decelerated over time, though this
parameter was not significant (see Table 3). Within Class 1
(maintainers), higher prior CR was associated with lower cur-
rent CR at baseline. However, within Class 2 (improvers),
higher prior CR was associated with higher current CR at
baseline. In both classes, prior CR had no association with the
rate of linear or quadratic change in current CR over time (see
Table 3).
The classes were examined to see whether other demographic
variables could describe class membership. However, there were
no differences between maintainers and improvers in sex, age,
Table 1
Sample Demographic and Cognitive Reserve (CR) as a Function of Group
Variable
Control (baseline
N  100)
Intervention (baseline
N  359) p
Obtained effect
size (d) PowerN (%) M (SD) N (%) M (SD)
Independent
samples t test 2
Female 64 (61) 273 (69.5) .10
Baseline age (years) 62.62 (6.34) 59.48 (6.69) .001 .482 .828
DRS-2 AEMSS 11.81 (2.27) 11.96 (2.07) .52 .069 .004
WTAR (est. FSIQ) 112.23 (5.10) 112.65 (5.47) .079 .005
HADS–Anxiety 5.51 (2.91) 5.24 (3.15) .35 .090 .006
HADS–Depression 2.86 (2.28) 2.38 (2.26) .05 .212 .076
Prior CR 0.36 (2.27) 0.13 (2.28) .06 .215 .081
Current CR
Year 0 (baseline) 0.26 (1.01) 0.07 (0.98) .002 .332 .354
Year 1 0.05 (1.12) 0.32 (1.05) .04 .341 .384
Year 2 0.11 (0.97) 0.34 (1.00) .11 .234 .108
Year 3 0.22 (1.11) 0.68 (0.98) .01 .439 .716
Note. DRS-2 AEMSS  Dementia Rating Scale age and education corrected Mayo scaled score; WTAR (est. FSIQ)  Wechsler Test of Adult Reading
Scale estimated full-scale IQ; HADS  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.
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level of depression, level of anxiety, personal wellbeing, or social
connectedness.
Discussion
The hypothesis that individuals who receive an education inter-
vention will display an increase in CR compared to a control group
was supported by the results of the study. In both the control group
and the intervention group, there appear to be two distinct sub-
groups of individuals. In the intervention group, approximately
92.5% of the sample displayed a significant increase in CR over
time, whereas the remaining 7.5% generally maintained CR across
the 4-year period. Among those in the intervention group, the
maintainers displayed higher levels of CR at baseline relative to
the improvers. In contrast, among the control group participants,
44.3% displayed no change in CR over time, with the remaining
55.7% displaying a significant increase in CR over the 4 years. The
increase in CR seen in this subgroup of control participants was
evident in those individuals who displayed below-average CR at
baseline. Despite increasing over time, the level of CR of the
control improvers remained below the 50th percentile of the base-
line CR of the entire cohort.
Table 3
Estimates (and Standard Errors) of Class-Specific Intercept
Parameters and the Effect of Prior CR on Class-Specific
Growth Terms for the Intervention Group
Variable
Model estimate (SE)
Effect
size d
Class 1: Maintainers
(n  15)
Class 2: Improvers
(n  344)
Initial status 1.227 (.229) .038 (.053) 5.17
Linear growth rate .664 (.203) .226 (.051) 3.79
Quadratic growth rate .189 (.072) .022 (.018) 2.55
Prior CR covariate
Initial status .208 (.062) .182 (.022) 3.89
Linear term .133 (.082) .024 (.021) 1.13
Quadratic term .037 (.028) .005 (.008) 0.87
Note. CR  cognitive reserve; d  11(time)/SDpooled (Feingold, 2009).
 p  .05.  p  .01.
Figure 1. Control Group 2 class model estimated means adjusted for the
effect of prior cognitive reserve (CR). The dotted horizontal line indicates
the 50th percentile of current CR of the entire cohort at baseline.
Figure 2. Intervention Group 2 class model estimated means adjusted for
the effect of prior cognitive reserve (CR). The dotted horizontal line
indicates the 50th percentile of current CR of the entire cohort at baseline.
Table 2
Estimates (and Standard Errors) of Class-Specific Intercept
Parameters and the Effect of Prior CR on Class-Specific
Growth Terms for the Control Group
Variable
Model estimate (SE)
Effect
size d
Class 1: Maintainers
(n  43)
Class 2: Improvers
(n  57)
Initial status .598 (.242) .674 (.114) 4.34
Linear growth rate .040 (.044) .185 (.052) 1.67
Prior CR covariate
Initial status .180 (.078) .253 (.058) 0.62
Linear term .022 (.019) .004 (.018) 0.55
Note. CR  cognitive reserve; d  11(time)/SDpooled (Feingold, 2009).
 p  .05.  p  .01.
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These results indicate that the overwhelming majority of healthy
older adults who engaged in some degree of university-level
education for at least 12 months displayed a measureable increase
in CR over a 4-year period. The small number of participants who
displayed no change in CR over time while attending university
already had higher than average CR at baseline (1.2 SDs above
the cohort at baseline). This tentatively suggests that individuals
with already high levels of current CR may lack the capacity for
further increases in current CR. This finding should be interpreted
with caution, however, due to the small sample size for this group
(n  15).
The findings of the present research are consistent with other
investigations reporting benefits from cognitive training programs
(Ball et al., 2002) and physical activity (Kramer et al., 1999) on
cognitive function, presumably through the positive effect these
activities have on building CR. The proportion of the control group
who showed improvement in current CR despite not receiving the
intervention is comparable to that shown in other studies. For
example, up to 37% of the no-contact control group in the study by
Ball and colleagues (2002) showed increases on a range of cog-
nitive measures despite not receiving a cognitive training program.
That 55.7% of the control group in the present study displayed an
increase in CR may reflect unreported involvement in mentally
complex and stimulating activities outside of the THBP. It would
have been informative to have an ongoing measure of noneduca-
tional life experiences and activities, beyond baseline, in order to
explain control group growth.
For three of the groups, prior CR tended to be associated with
higher current CR at baseline. This finding suggests that prior life
experience, such as education, promotes higher levels of CR in
later life. However, in the intervention-maintainers group, prior
CR was associated with lower current CR at baseline. Due to the
small sample size of this group (n  15), such associations must
be treated with caution. There was no association between prior
CR and the rate of linear or quadratic change over time. Thus, prior
CR predicts initial levels of current CR for the majority of partic-
ipants but is not predictive of the rate or degree of change in CR
that occurs following exposure to university-level education.
Though the benefit of early-life education on late-life cognitive
function is well reported (Anstey & Christensen, 2000; Lenehan et
al., 2015), this research is the first to investigate the potential
benefit of a period of formal education in later life to enhance CR.
It also utilizes a multivariate estimation of both preexisting and
current CR in order to provide an accurate evaluation of the
potential benefit associated with the education intervention (Ward
et al., 2015). However, it is important to note that the modeling
approaches utilized rely on extrapolation from an incomplete da-
taset. The THBP is an ongoing study, and it will be interesting to
see whether these findings are robust once the full sample proceeds
through all of the time points in future years. There are a number
of limitations that should be noted in interpreting the results of the
present study. Noticeably, the control group reaches just the min-
imum sample size of 100, which is typically preferred for latent
growth modeling (Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010). The total
number of person-by-time observations influences statistical
power (Curran et al., 2010). Additionally, due to the progressive
recruitment of participants into the THBP over a 4-year period, the
models estimated are based on extrapolation from an incomplete
data set, in which some individuals have only one or two obser-
vations over time. This may result in increased within-group
variability, as indicated by a larger standard error of the mean,
which is more evident in the control group and therefore less
power to detect significant intercept and slopes. Future research
will need to reexamine the findings of the present analysis once the
complete THBP participant pool finishes assessment over all time
points.
It is also important to note that although unavoidable due to the
design of the present study, the recruitment of voluntary partici-
pants into the THBP may result in a self-selection bias of older
adults with an interest in pursuing further education and a history
of higher level secondary school education required for entry into
University-level study. Therefore the participants in the THBP are
likely to have a higher level of prior education and a greater
interest in education than WOULD the wider community. How-
ever, it is important to note that the THBP is designed to determine
whether increased mental activity in later life is beneficial to
cognitive function in an aging population. As such, the THBP has
utilized higher education as the tool for stimulating mental activity.
A finding of increased cognitive capacity would be evidence of an
effect of increased mental activity that could be achieved through
the pursuit of mentally stimulating activities distinct from
university-level education.
To summarize, the findings of the present study indicate that
engaging healthy older adults in university-level education FOR a
minimum of 12 months results in a measureable and significant
increase in cognitive reserve. Future research is planned to deter-
mine whether this increase in cognitive reserve is sufficient to
offset age-related cognitive decline and, further, whether this in-
crease in CR mitigates the risk for degenerative conditions such as
dementia or delays the onset of clinical symptoms of dementia in
those at risk of dementia.
References
Anstey, K., & Christensen, H. (2000). Education, activity, health, blood
pressure and apolipoprotein E as predictors of cognitive change in old
age: A review. Gerontology, 46, 163–177. http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/
000022153
Ball, K., Berch, D. B., Helmers, K. F., Jobe, J. B., Leveck, M. D.,
Marsiske, M., . . . Willis, S. L. (2002). Effects of cognitive training
interventions with older adults: A randomized controlled trial. JAMA:
Journal of the American Medical Association, 288, 2271–2281. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.288.18.2271
Barnes, L. L., Mendes de Leon, C. F., Wilson, R. S., Bienias, J. L., &
Evans, D. A. (2004). Social resources and cognitive decline in a popu-
lation of older African Americans and whites. Neurology, 63, 2322–
2326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL.0000147473.04043.B3
Bennett, D. A., Wilson, R. S., Schneider, J. A., Evans, D. A., Mendes de
Leon, C. F., Arnold, S. E., . . . Bienias, J. L. (2003). Education modifies
the relation of AD pathology to level of cognitive function in older
persons. Neurology, 60, 1909–1915. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL
.0000069923.64550.9F
Curran, P. J., Obeidat, K., & Losardo, D. (2010). Twelve frequently asked
questions about growth curve modeling. Journal of Cognition and De-
velopment, 11, 121–136. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248371003699969
Dartigues, J.-F., Gagnon, M., Letenneur, L., Barberger-Gateau, P., Com-
menges, D., Evaldre, M., & Salamon, R. (1992). Principal lifetime
occupation and cognitive impairment in a French elderly cohort
(Paquid). American Journal of Epidemiology, 135, 981–988.
Donnell, A. J., Pliskin, N., Holdnack, J., Axelrod, B., & Randolph, C.
(2007). Rapidly-administered short forms of the Wechsler Adult Intel-
530 LENEHAN ET AL.
ligence Scale-3rd ed. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 22, 917–
924. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.acn.2007.06.007
Dufouil, C., Alpérovitch, A., & Tzourio, C. (2003). Influence of education
on the relationship between white matter lesions and cognition. Neurol-
ogy, 60, 831– 836. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL.0000049456
.33231.96
Ertel, K. A., Glymour, M. M., & Berkman, L. F. (2008). Effects of social
integration on preserving memory function in a nationally representative
US elderly population. American Journal of Public Health, 98, 1215–
1220. http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.113654
Feingold, A. (2009). Effect sizes for growth-modeling analysis for con-
trolled clinical trials in the same metric as for classical analysis. Psy-
chological Methods, 14, 43–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014699
Foubert-Samier, A., Catheline, G., Amieva, H., Dilharreguy, B., Helmer,
C., Allard, M., & Dartigues, J.-F. (2012). Education, occupation, leisure
activities, and brain reserve: A population-based study. Neurobiology of
Aging, 33, 423.e15–423.e25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neurobiolaging
.2010.09.023
Frisoni, G. B., Rozzini, R., Bianchetti, A., & Trabucchi, M. (1993).
Principal lifetime occupation and MMSE score in elderly persons. Jour-
nal of Gerontology, 48(6), S310–S314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geronj/
48.6.S310
Geiser, C. (2013). Data analysis with MPlus. New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
Harrison, S. L., Sajjad, A., Bramer, W. M., Ikram, M. A., Tiemeier, H., &
Stephan, B. C. M. (2015). Exploring strategies to operationalize cogni-
tive reserve: A systematic review of reviews. Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Neuropsychology, 37, 253–264. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13803395.2014.1002759
International Wellbeing Group. (2006). Personal wellbeing index (4th ed.).
Melbourne: Australian Centre on Quality of Life, Deakin University.
Jackson, K. M., & Sher, K. J. (2005). Similarities and differences of
longitudinal phenotypes across alternate indices of alcohol involvement:
A methodologic comparison of trajectory approaches. Psychology of
Addictive Behaviors, 19, 339–351. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0893-164X
.19.4.339
Jorm, A. F., Rodgers, B., Henderson, A. S., Korten, A. E., Jacomb, P. A.,
Christensen, H., & Mackinnon, A. (1998). Occupation type as a predic-
tor of cognitive decline and dementia in old age. Age and Ageing, 27,
477–483. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ageing/27.4.477
Jung, T., & Wickrama, K. A. S. (2008). An introduction to latent class
growth analysis and growth mixture modeling. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 2, 302–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2007.00054.x
Jurica, P. J., Leitten, C. L., & Mattis, S. (2001). Dementia Rating Scale-2
(DRS-2): Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment
Resources.
Kramer, A. F., Hahn, S., Cohen, N. J., Banich, M. T., McAuley, E.,
Harrison, C. R., . . . Colcombe, A. (1999, July 29). Ageing, fitness and
neurocognitive function. Nature, 400, 418–419. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1038/22682
Lenehan, M. E., Summers, M. J., Saunders, N. L., Summers, J. J., &
Vickers, J. C. (2015). Relationship between education and age-related
cognitive decline: A review of recent research. Psychogeriatrics, 15,
154–162. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psyg.12083
Lövdén, M., Ghisletta, P., & Lindenberger, U. (2005). Social participation
attenuates decline in perceptual speed in old and very old age. Psychol-
ogy and Aging, 20, 423–434. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.20.3
.423
Lubben, J., & Gironda, M. (2003). Centrality of social ties to the health and
well being of older adults. In B. Berkman & L. Harooytan (Eds.), Social
work and health care in an aging world (pp. 319–350). New York, NY:
Springer.
Manly, J. J., Byrd, D., Touradji, P., Sanchez, D., & Stern, Y. (2004).
Literacy and cognitive change among ethnically diverse elders. Interna-
tional Journal of Psychology, 39, 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
00207590344000286
Muthén, B. O., & Muthén, L. K. (1998–2012). Mplus user’s guide (7th
ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.
Roid, G. H., & Ledbetter, M. F. (2006). WRAT4 progress monitoring
version: Professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Re-
sources.
Scarmeas, N., & Stern, Y. (2003). Cognitive reserve and lifestyle. Journal
of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 25, 625–633. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1076/jcen.25.5.625.14576
Schaie, K. W. (1989). The hazards of cognitive aging. Gerontologist, 29,
484–493. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geront/29.4.484
Snaith, R. P. (2003). The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Health
and Quality of Life Outcomes, 1: 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1477-
7525-1-29
Stern, Y. (2002). What is cognitive reserve? Theory and research
application of the reserve concept. Journal of the International
Neuropsychological Society, 8, 448 – 460. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S1355617702813248
Summers, M. J., Saunders, N. L., Valenzuela, M. J., Summers, J. J.,
Ritchie, K., Robinson, A., & Vickers, J. C. (2013). The Tasmanian
Healthy Brain Project (THBP): A prospective longitudinal examination
of the effect of university-level education in older adults in preventing
age-related cognitive decline and reducing the risk of dementia. Inter-
national Psychogeriatrics, 25, 1145–1155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S1041610213000380
Tucker, A. M., & Stern, Y. (2011). Cognitive reserve in aging. Current
Alzheimer Research, 8, 354 –360. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/156720
511795745320
Valenzuela, M. J., & Sachdev, P. (2006). Brain reserve and dementia: A
systematic review. Psychological Medicine, 36, 441–454. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1017/S0033291705006264
Valenzuela, M. J., & Sachdev, P. (2007). Assessment of complex mental
activity across the lifespan: Development of the Lifetime of Experiences
Questionnaire (LEQ). Psychological Medicine, 37, 1015–1025. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1017/S003329170600938X
Ward, D. D., Summers, M. J., Saunders, N. L., & Vickers, J. C. (2015).
Modeling cognitive reserve in healthy middle-aged and older adults: The
Tasmanian Healthy Brain Project. International Psychogeriatrics, 27,
579–589. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1041610214002075
Wechsler, D. (2001). Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR). San Anto-
nio, TX: Harcourt Assessment.
Whalley, L. J., Starr, J. M., Athawes, R., Hunter, D., Pattie, A., & Deary,
I. J. (2000). Childhood mental ability and dementia. Neurology, 55,
1455–1459. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/WNL.55.10.1455
Zumbo, B. D. (2007). Validity: Foundational issues and statistical meth-
odology. In C. R. Rao & S. Sinharay (Eds.), Handbook of statistics: Vol.
26. Psychometrics (pp. 45–79). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier
Science B. V.
Received April 28, 2015
Revision received September 16, 2015
Accepted September 27, 2015 
531INCREASING COGNITIVE RESERVE IN OLDER ADULTS
1 1 5
A Complementary Processes Account of the Development of Childhood
Amnesia and a Personal Past
Patricia J. Bauer
Emory University
Personal-episodic or autobiographical memories are an important source of evidence for continuity of
self over time. Numerous studies conducted with adults have revealed a relative paucity of personal-
episodic or autobiographical memories of events from the first 3 to 4 years of life, with a seemingly
gradual increase in the number of memories until approximately age 7 years, after which an adult
distribution has been assumed. Historically, this so-called infantile amnesia or childhood amnesia has
been attributed either to late development of personal-episodic or autobiographical memory (implying its
absence in the early years of life) or to an emotional, cognitive, or linguistic event that renders early
autobiographical memories inaccessible to later recollection. However, neither type of explanation alone
can fully account for the shape of the distribution of autobiographical memories early in life. In contrast,
the complementary processes account developed in this article acknowledges early, gradual development
of the ability to form, retain, and later retrieve memories of personally relevant past events, as well as
an accelerated rate of forgetting in childhood relative to adulthood. The adult distribution of memories
is achieved as (a) the quality of memory traces increases, through addition of more, better elaborated, and
more tightly integrated personal-episodic or autobiographical features; and (b) the vulnerability of
mnemonic traces decreases, as a result of more efficient and effective neural, cognitive, and specifically
mnemonic processes, thus slowing the rate of forgetting. The perspective brings order to an array of
findings from the adult and developmental literatures.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, childhood amnesia, development, episodic memory, forgetting
For better or for worse, we all have a personal past. We have an
historical self who has experienced a lifetime of events. Some of
the events are mundane and have a short tenure in memory. For
example, though we encode where we parked the car when we
arrived at work in the morning, after retrieving the information at
the end of the day, we commit no further effort to retaining it.
Others of our experiences are defining moments in our lives, such
as graduation from college, the birth of a child, or the death of a
parent. Memories of these types of events not only are long lasting,
they also are critically important to our sense of self—our sense of
continuity over time rests on memories of events and experiences
that took place in the past. In essence, we believe that we are the
same person yesterday and today because we have memories of
ourselves from the past. However, there is a striking discontinuity
in our personal past. That is, most adults have few if any memories
from the first 3 to 4 years of life. There is what appears to be a
gradually increasing number of memories from the years of age 3
to 7, after which an adult-like distribution of personal memories is
assumed. In this review, I advance a novel account of this discon-
tinuity in terms of complementary processes that contribute to
increases in the quality of personal memories and to decreases in
their vulnerability to forgetting; thus, producing the characteristic
distribution that is the hallmark of childhood amnesia.
Since the “amnesia” for events from the first years of life was
first identified in the literature at the end of the 19th century (Henri
& Henri, 1896, 1898; Miles, 1895), and named at the beginning of
the 20th century (Freud, 1905/1953), there have been a number of
empirical studies that establish its robust nature. As well, a number
of theories as to the source of the amnesia have been proposed. As
elaborated below, though the theories differ in specifics, they fall
into one or the other of two categories. Some accounts emphasize
late development of the ability to remember the past. They suggest
that adults suffer from amnesia for early life events because in the
period that eventually becomes obscured by the amnesia, children
lack the capacity to create personal memories. It is only after the
development of some criterial attribute that children begin to form
and retain personal memories. By other accounts, early memories
are formed but as a result of an emotional, cognitive, or linguistic
change, they later become inaccessible to recall and functionally
disappear. Thus, these accounts recognize a developmentally early
capacity to form and retain personal memories and hypothesize
causes for their later loss to recollection.
As will become apparent, a corollary implication of existing
theoretical accounts of childhood amnesia is of discontinuous
processes in personal memory. In the case of theories that empha-
size late emergence of a new ability to remember, there is thought
This article is based on a Master Lecture delivered to the American
Psychological Association, Orlando, Florida, 2012. Support for preparation
of the manuscript was provided by Emory College of Arts and Science. The
author also thanks Shala Blue, Marina Larkina, Nicole Varga, and other
members of the Memory at Emory laboratory group for their comments on
an earlier version of this article; as well as Robyn Fivush and three
anonymous reviewers for constructive critiques.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Patricia J.
Bauer, Department of Psychology, 36 Eagle Row, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322. E-mail: patricia.bauer@emory.edu
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to be a period of time before onset of the new ability during which
individuals are unable to form, retrain, and later retrieve personal
memories. In the case of theories that emphasize the later func-
tional disappearance of early memories, there is thought to be a
change in emotional, cognitive, or linguistic processes that renders
early events inaccessible to later recollection. The discontinuity
inherent in these accounts stems from the fact that they emphasize
one or the other side—but not both sides—of the mnemonic coin.
That is, theories that posit late development of the capacity to
create personal memories do not take into account the possibility
that memories of early life events were formed but then were lost
to recollection. Absent a focus on processes that contribute to the
later inaccessibility of memory traces, in these accounts, the cause
of later amnesia is failure to form memories in the first place.
Conversely, theories that posit events that cause the later func-
tional disappearance of early memories do not take into account
the possibility that the memories that subsequently disappeared
may have been especially vulnerable to forgetting because of poor
quality of the traces themselves. Absent recognition of differences
in the qualities of memories that are formed early versus later in
life, the cause of later inaccessibility is an event that renders early
memories lost to later recollection.
The purpose of the present theoretical review is to advance a
novel account of the phenomenon of the amnesia of childhood that
draws from each of these traditional categories of explanation, yet
is not a straightforward integration of them. Unlike the traditional
categories of explanation—that emphasize one or the other, but not
both sides of the mnemonic coin—the account I develop is explic-
itly complementary. On one side of the mnemonic coin are devel-
opmental changes in a number of factors and processes that facil-
itate encoding, consolidation, and later retrieval of memory traces,
eventually resulting in a corpus of personal memories. On the other
side of the mnemonic coin are a number of factors and processes
that undermine the integrity of memory traces, eventually render-
ing some inaccessible to later recollection. More important, it is
only by considering both the processes that function to increase the
quality of memory traces and the processes that function to un-
dermine them that we can explain the phenomenon of childhood
amnesia—neither set of processes alone is sufficient to account for
the full pattern of data summarized in this review.
The complementary processes account also departs from tradi-
tional explanations of childhood amnesia in its emphasis on es-
sential continuities in memory over the course of development.
That is, the complementary processes account recognizes the roots
of personal memory even in infancy, and a continuous course of
development throughout childhood. Over time, the developmental
changes permit formation of representations of personally relevant
past events that feature more, better elaborated, and more tightly
integrated, personal-episodic or autobiographical elements, rela-
tive to those formed earlier in life. In other words, the capacity to
form personal memories does not emerge later in development, but
gradually improves over the course of childhood. The account also
recognizes normative forgetting processes that operate throughout
the period eventually obscured by childhood amnesia (and be-
yond). Because early in development, memory processes are car-
ried out by a relatively immature neural substrate, memory repre-
sentations formed early in life are especially vulnerable to
forgetting. In other words, early memory representations do not
become inaccessible as a result of an event or qualitative change,
but are lost as a result of normative forgetting processes that
weaken memory traces over time. The interaction effect is child-
hood amnesia—the result of lower quality raw materials operated
upon by relatively inefficient and ineffective mnemonic processes.
The complementary processes account brings order to an array of
findings from the adult and developmental literatures. It is
grounded in contemporary understanding of neural, cognitive, and
specifically mnemonic developmental processes that help to ex-
plain the later inaccessibility of memories of early life events and
experiences.
Personal-Episodic or Autobiographical Memories:
Definition and Importance
Personal memories are not alone in the vast corpus of represen-
tations of past events available to healthy adults and children alike.
Rather, they are but one of many types or forms of memories. In
the parlance of an influential taxonomy of types of memory
(Tulving, 1972, 1983), they are episodic memories: memories of
specific past events that happened at a particular place and time.
Retrieval of memories of these events often is accompanied by a
sense of mentally placing oneself in the past as if reliving the
experience. This autonoetic awareness (e.g., Baddeley, Eysenck,
& Anderson, 2009; Tulving, 2002, 2005) of the experience as
having taken place in the past is accompanied by vivid recollection
of what happened, when, and where. Episodic memory frequently
is operationalized in terms of an individual’s recall or recognition
of items from a studied list, recall of a passage of text, memory for
faces, and so forth.
Episodic memory typically is contrasted with semantic memory
(Tulving, 1972, 1983), the latter of which comprises our store of
world knowledge. Unlike episodic memories, semantic memories
are not located in a particular place or time. For example, we may
know that the capital of Georgia is Atlanta, yet unless there was
something especially noteworthy or significant about the episode
during which we learned this fact, we do not have memory for
when or where it was acquired. Even more phenomenologically
distant from episodic memory is so-called nondeclarative or im-
plicit memory (e.g., Squire, 1987; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen,
1993). These representations are based on past experiences that,
like semantic memories, are not located in specific place and time.
However, unlike semantic (as well as episodic) memories, they can
influence behavior without conscious recollection. Instead, non-
declarative memories are of motor patterns for how to ride a
bicycle, for example, or conditioned or reflexive responses to
stimuli. They influence our behavior, to be sure, but they do so
without being brought to consciousness (see for, e.g., Bauer, 2013
and Squire et al., 1993, for further development of distinctions
among types or forms of memory in the developmental and adult
literatures, respectively).
The distinctions among different types or forms of memory are
critically important to the effort to explain childhood amnesia
because the amnesia does not obscure all types of memories. Even
infants and very young children learn and remember a great many
things. Infants recognize their caregivers over time and across
contexts, they learn to walk and talk, and by the preschool years,
children have accrued a great deal of semantic or factual knowl-
edge about the world. These mnemonic accomplishments persist
beyond infancy and childhood—they are not obscured by child-
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hood amnesia. Rather, childhood amnesia is the relative paucity of
episodic memories for events and experiences from the first years
of life. However, it is more than amnesia for items on a list or
passages of text, for example. It is the relative paucity of episodic
memories of events and experiences that are about one’s self, and
about which one has emotions, thoughts, reactions, and reflections.
Because of their reference and relevance to the self, these memo-
ries are considered not only episodic, but self defining and auto-
biographical (see Bauer, 2013, 2014; Fivush & Zaman, 2014).
Thus, the period that is obscured by the “peculiar amnesia of
childhood” (Freud, 1920/1935) is one from which we are lacking
autobiographical memories.
The absence—or at best, sparse representation—of autobio-
graphical memories from the first years of life leaves a salient void
in one respect in particular, namely, continuity of self. As noted
briefly above, it is on the basis of memories for past events that we
recognize ourselves as continuous in time (e.g., Habermas &
Köber, 2014). In general, the ability to remember one’s self in the
past is a precondition for a sense of personal continuity (e.g.,
Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013), and personal memories ground
a stable and enduring representation of the self over time (e.g.,
Bauer, Tasdemir-Ozdes, & Larkina, 2014; Bluck & Alea, 2008;
Conway, 2005; McAdams, 1995; Wilson & Ross, 2003). The fact
that most adults suffer a paucity of autobiographical memories
from the first years of life means that although they had a physical
existence before their earliest memory, they experience a discon-
tinuity of psychological self. The importance of autobiographical
memories helps to explain why they have been the focus of
significant research attention, as well as why their absence from
the first years of life has been of sustained interest for more than
a century.
At this point it is important to recognize that there is not
universal agreement on the definition of autobiographical memory.
There is consensus that to be “admitted” into the category of
autobiographical memories, episodic memories must be of specific
past events and experiences that are about one’s self, and about
which one has emotions, thoughts, reactions, and reflections. How-
ever, some perspectives would consider these criteria to be neces-
sary, though not sufficient. Additional criteria suggested in the
literature are that autobiographical memories are (a) of discrete,
one-time-only or unique events, as opposed to recurring events; (b)
expressed verbally; and (c) long lasting (e.g., Nelson, 1993; see
Bauer, 2007, 2014, for reviews). By other definitions, even this
larger set of criteria would be considered insufficient to differen-
tiate autobiographical from episodic memory. In the literature on
self identity, for example, autobiographical memory is defined as
a capacity that permits construction of a sequence of memories of
temporally linked events, such as expressed in a life story or
autobiography (e.g., Fivush, Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011;
Fivush & Zaman, 2014; Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams,
2001; see also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Thomsen, 2009).
From this perspective, retrieval of an autobiographical memory
involves autobiographical consciousness, defined as a form of
consciousness of a present self who is different from—yet tempo-
rally linked to—the past self who experienced the event (Fivush,
2012; see also Fivush & Zaman, 2014). It is only in adolescence
that individuals begin to create narratives of past events that bear
these features, leading to the suggestion that autobiographical
memory is a capacity that emerges only in adolescence.
The perspective adopted in this review is that autobiographical
memory is adequately defined as a system that supports formation,
retention, and later retrieval of episodic memories of specific
events that are spatially and temporally localized, as well as
self-referential, as evidenced by personal perspective on or eval-
uation of the experience. It need not be restricted to discrete,
one-time only or unique events: recurring events, such as “Sunday
dinners at grandma’s when I was a kid,” can be localized (albeit on
a larger temporal scale) and also are self-referential and defining
(e.g., Waters, Bauer, & Fivush, 2014). Moreover, Rubin and
Umanath (2015) argue that merged representations of recurring
events are the psychological equivalents of single events (see also
arguments by Brewer, 1986). Verbal expression is important to
investigation of autobiographical memory because it makes it
easier to determine whether representations of past events feature
evidence of self-reference, and whether retrieval is accompanied
by autonoetic awareness of the experience as having taken place in
the past. When these features are expressed verbally, we can be
confident that the underlying memory representation bears these
characteristics. However, verbal descriptions are not isomorphic
with memory representations. As such, the absence of verbal
expression of these features should not be taken as evidence that
memory representations are lacking of them. The criterion that
episodic memories must be long-lasting to be considered autobi-
ographical lacks specificity (how long is “long”?) and is poten-
tially circular, owing to the tendency to equate “long-lasting” with
“personally relevant”—if the memory is not long-lasting, then it
must not have been important to the self.
The final suggested definition of autobiographical memory in
terms of developments in narrative self expression in adolescence
is useful for understanding changes in narrative production that
occur at that time. However, I argue that it is not useful to the goal
of understanding childhood amnesia. As elaborated below, among
adults, childhood amnesia is dense for the first 3 to 4 years of life
and then begins to “lift,” as evidenced by a steadily increasing
number of memories that are available for recollection. In light of
this distribution, we must admit either that autobiographical mem-
ories are apparent well before adolescence, or that none of the
preadolescent memories retained by adults is autobiographical. If
one accepts the latter, then a necessary corollary is that autobio-
graphical memory has virtually nothing to do with childhood
amnesia. Given the substantial theoretical departure this would
represent, it seems better advised to view the developments taking
place in adolescence as reflective not of the emergence of autobi-
ographical memory, per se, but of construction of an autobiogra-
phy, life story, or life narrative, which takes autobiographical
memories as its raw materials. This perspective is consistent with
Rubin and Umanath’s (2015) view that narrative organization is a
characteristic of autobiographical memory, but it is not necessary
for it.
Discontinuity in the Personal Past: Childhood Amnesia
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the amnesia that adults
experience for early life events has been known as infantile or
childhood amnesia (Freud, 1905/1953). It is recognized as having
two phases (Pillemer & White, 1989; see Bauer, 2007, for updated
discussion), which are schematically depicted in Figure 1. From
the first phase—before age 3 to 4 years—most adults have few if
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any autobiographical memories (solid gray bars). From the second
phase—between the ages of 5 and 7 years—adults have a smaller
number of autobiographical memories than would be expected
based on forgetting alone (striped bars). It is only from later in the
first decade of life that most adults are able to recall a significant
number of past events that are spatially and temporally localized,
and which have some degree of personal relevance or significance
(solid black bars). Although this “peculiar amnesia of childhood”
(Freud, 1920/1935) is considered an adult phenomenon, as dis-
cussed in a later section, there is a small but increasing body of
evidence that by the end of the first decade of life, children also
begin to experience it. Before reviewing that literature, I elaborate
on the two major phases of childhood amnesia among adults.
Average Age of Earliest Memory
The earliest research on the phenomenon of childhood amnesia
among adults was published at the close of the 19th century. Miles
(1895) conducted a survey of adults’ childhood experiences and
among other things, asked them to think about the earliest event
they could remember, and how old they were at the time. This and
subsequent such surveys (e.g., Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933a,
1933b; Henri & Henri, 1895, 1896, 1898; Kihlstrom & Harackie-
wicz, 1982) have produced one of the most consistent and robust
findings in the psychological literature, namely, that the average
age of earliest memory among adults in Western cultures is age 3
to 4 years (see, e.g., Wang, 2006, 2014, for discussions of cross-
cultural differences in average age of earliest memory). Moreover,
the same average age of earliest memory is found whether the
source of data is a survey, free recall (e.g., Bauer et al., in press;
Waldfogel, 1948; Weigle & Bauer, 2000; West & Bauer, 1999), or
response to a cue word prompt (e.g., Bauer & Larkina, 2014;
Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; though see Wang, Conway, & Hou,
2004, for evidence that repeated probes can produce earlier esti-
mates). The effect also is impervious to age-cohort effects: the
same general pattern is obtained from individuals 20 years of age
at the time the memories are prompted and individuals 60 to 70
years of age at the time the memories are elicited (see, Rubin,
2000, for review), even though for older adults, many more years
have passed since childhood. The same average age of earliest
memory is found even when respondents are asked to remember a
specific event the date of which is clearly known, such as the birth
of a younger sibling (e.g., Sheingold & Tenney, 1982; Usher &
Neisser, 1993).
The robust nature of the average age of earliest memory among
adults obscures the substantial individual differences in the phe-
nomenon. From the beginning of research on the topic, individual
differences in the age of earliest memory have been apparent. In
reports that provide information on variability, most feature at least
a small number of instances of memories from before the age of 2
years (e.g., Bauer et al., in press; Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933a,
1933b; Henri & Henri, 1896, 1898; West & Bauer, 1999). Mem-
ories from at least some respondents from age 2 years are more the
rule than the exception (e.g., Eacott & Crawley, 1998; Usher &
Neisser, 1993). Conversely, some adults have earliest memories
from later in childhood: their “earliest” memories are from as old
as 6 to 9 years of age (e.g., Bauer & Larkina, 2014; West & Bauer,
1999). There also are individual differences among adults in the
density of early memories. Some adults recall many memories
from their childhood years, whereas others remember only a few,
with many months between them (Bauer, Stennes, & Haight, 2003;
Jack & Hayne, 2010; Weigle & Bauer, 2000; West & Bauer,
1999).
Characteristic Distribution of Early Memories
The second component of the definition of childhood amnesia is
that from the ages of roughly 3 or 4 to 7 years, the number of
memories that adults are able to retrieve increases gradually yet is
smaller than the number expected based on forgetting alone (Pil-
lemer & White, 1989). After age 7 years, a steeper, more adult-like
distribution becomes apparent. The underrepresentation of mem-
ories from before age 7 years was empirically demonstrated in a
seminal article by Wetzler and Sweeney (1986), using data from
Rubin (1982). Rubin asked young adults to think of past events
related to each of over 100 cue words (e.g., cup, chair, and tree),
and to estimate their age at the time of the event. To the data,
Wetzler and Sweeney fitted a power function that in many inves-
tigations (e.g., Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; Rubin & Wenzel,
1996; Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986) has been shown to capture
the distribution of memories across the life span. As discussed by
Rubin and Wenzel (1996), the power function (e.g., Wickelgren,
1974, 1975) implies that equal ratios of time (t1/t2  t3/t4) will
result in equal ratios of recall (recall1/recall2  recall3/recall4).
Thus, for example, if Time 2 recall was 90% of Time 1 recall, then
Time 4 recall would be 90% of Time 3 recall (i.e., assuming equal
ratios of time). As a result of the constant ratio, over time,
forgetting actually slows (i.e., smaller absolute numbers of mem-
ories are lost over each unit of time), presumably as a result of
memory trace consolidation (see, e.g., Wixted, 2004, for discus-
sion). Wetzler and Sweeney found that the power function was a
poor fit to data from birth to age 6 years, implying accelerated
forgetting of memories from ages 6 and below. Memories from age
7 years were excluded from the analysis because age 7 years was
considered the “inflection point” for childhood amnesia: after age
7 years, the rate of forgetting is assumed to be adult-like. Consis-
tent with this suggestion, Wetzler and Sweeney found that the
power function was a good fit to data from age 8 to adulthood (see
Bauer, 2007, for additional discussion).
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the distribution of memories across the
first decade of life from a traditional perspective, suggesting a gradually
increasing number of memories with age.
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Traditional Explanations of Childhood Amnesia
Given the relevance and importance of autobiographical mem-
ories to the self—and the robustness of the finding of a paucity of
such memories from the first years of life—it is fitting that child-
hood amnesia has received a great deal of theoretical attention.
Though there are a number of theories that differ in their specifics
(see Bauer, 2007, for a review), the explanations can be summa-
rized as belonging to two general categories (Bauer, 2014). As
introduced earlier, one category of accounts emphasizes the late
emergence of autobiographical memory. By these explanations,
adults experience amnesia for early childhood events because as
children, they lacked the fundamental capacity to form such mem-
ories. By these accounts, autobiographical memory is a later de-
veloping achievement, one dependent on general or specific cog-
nitive changes that permit personal memories to be formed,
retained, and later retrieved. It is only once the capacity emerges
that autobiographical remembering begins.
The second category of accounts of childhood amnesia empha-
sizes the functional disappearance of early memories—that is,
changes that render once accessible memories inaccessible to
recollection. By these explanations, autobiographical memories of
events from the first years of life are formed and presumably can
be recollected by children while they are in the period that even-
tually becomes obscured by childhood amnesia, yet the memories
later become inaccessible and thus functionally disappear.
Traditional explanations of childhood amnesia differ in their
emphasis, yet what they have in common is that they implicate one
or the other side of the mnemonic coin, but not both. That is, they
explain childhood amnesia either in terms of something that must
develop to permit the capacity for self-referential memories of past
events, or in terms of something that happens to make early
memories inaccessible to later recollection—they fail to take into
account the complementary mnemonic processes. That is, the
former category puts all of its explanatory eggs into a basket that
emphasizes late emergence of autobiographical remembering; the
possibility that autobiographical memories are formed early in life
but subsequently forgotten is not part of the explanation. The latter
category puts all of its explanatory eggs into a basket that empha-
sizes the later functional disappearance of autobiographical mem-
ories; there is no recognition of relative vulnerabilities in the
memory traces formed during the period eventually obscured by
childhood amnesia. After reviewing these traditional categories of
explanation of childhood amnesia, I advance a novel account that
integrates the complementary processes implicated in the expla-
nations, by emphasizing increases in the quality of autobiograph-
ical memories over the course of development, as well as decreases
in the vulnerability of autobiographical memory traces. The ac-
count emphasizes the essential continuity of the processes over
developmental time.
Emphasis on Late Emergence: Memories Are Not
Accessible Because They Were Not Formed
The first major category of perspectives on the source of child-
hood amnesia is that adults have few autobiographical memories
from before the ages of 5 to 7 years because during this period,
they lacked the capacity to form and retain them, because of
general or more specific cognitive deficits.
The suggestion that general cognitive deficits explain the rela-
tive paucity of memories from early in life is perhaps most notably
associated with Piaget (1962). Though Piaget did not advance a
theory of childhood amnesia, per se, his theoretical perspective
provided a compelling explanation for it nonetheless. He main-
tained that for the first 18 to 24 months of life, infants and children
did not have the capacity for symbolic representation. As a result,
they could not mentally re-present objects and entities in their
absence. Thus, they had no mechanism for recall of past events.
Beyond 24 months and through 5 to 7 years, children were
thought to lack the cognitive structures that would permit them to
organize events along coherent dimensions that would support
later retrieval. One of the most significant dimensions that Piaget
suggested preschool-age children lacked was an understanding of
temporal order. Specifically, he suggested that it was not until
children were 5 to 7 years of age that they developed the ability
to sequence events temporally (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Lacking
this organizational device, children were not able to form coherent
memories of the events of their lives.
A contemporary version of a general cognitive deficit account
has been advanced by Olson and Newcombe (2014). They suggest
that before the age of 2 years, children lack the ability to bind
together or relate elements of representations of events, a prereq-
uisite for formation of episodic memories (discussed in more detail
in a later section). Between the ages of 2 and 6 years, children may
bind elements of events together, yet do so in a manner that fails
to ensure persistence of memories over time. Consistent with this
suggestion, Olson and Newcombe highlight young children’s dif-
ficulties remembering the correct sources of their experiences
(so-called source memory, e.g., Drummey & Newcombe, 2002;
Riggins, 2014), and their difficulties creating conjunctions be-
tween items and their locations (e.g., Bauer, Doydum, Pathman,
Larkina, Güler, & Burch, 2012; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs,
2006; though see Bauer, Stewart, White, & Larkina, in press).
There also are suggestions that specific conceptual, linguistic, or
mnemonic changes play a role in the explanation of childhood
amnesia, rather than global cognitive change. By some accounts,
adults have few memories from infancy because for the first 2
years, infants lack the concept of a self around which memories
can be organized (e.g., see Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997, for
reviews). By other accounts, beyond a physical sense of self,
development of autobiographical memory awaits a subjective self
who evaluates and takes personal perspective on life events (e.g.,
Fivush, 2014). Absent these developments, there is no auto to lend
the autobiographical character to episodic memories. By other
accounts, for the first 5 to 7 years of their lives, children lack
autonoetic consciousness, rendering it impossible for them to
recognize that the source of their mental experience is a represen-
tation of a past event (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 1995), or to engage
in the subjective mental time travel that accompanies episodic and
autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Suddendorf, Nielsen, &
van Gehlen, 2011; Tulving, 2005; Wheeler, 2000). Each of these
explanations implicates a different specific component ability.
However, what the suggestions have in common is the perspective
that as a result of some deficit, although children may remember
past events, their memories are lacking in the qualities that typify
the autobiographical memories formed by older children and
adults. It is only once the general or specific cognitive or concep-
tual ingredients that are missing from early memories become
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available that children begin to form, retain, and later retrieve
memories that are autobiographical.
A well-articulated example of this perspective was provided by
Nelson and Fivush (2004). As depicted in Figure 2 (reproduced
from Nelson & Fivush, 2004), they suggested that it is not until 5
years of age that the many cognitive dimensions required for
encoding, retention, and later retrieval of memories have reached
a sufficient level of development to support autobiographical
memory. They noted the necessity for autobiographical memory of
developments in self concept, language and narrative, theory of
mind, understanding of time and place, subjective sense of self,
mental time travel, and autonoetic awareness, and others, all of
which undergo development from infancy through early child-
hood, culminating in the capacity to form autobiographical mem-
ories. Until that time, children may have semantic and perhaps
even episodic memories, but their memories are not autobiograph-
ical. In summary, what these perspectives have in common is the
assumption that the reason adults are unable to recollect early
childhood is because the memory system available to them as
children was lacking in ingredients essential for formation, reten-
tion, and later retrieval of autobiographical memories. As a con-
sequence, not only adults—but also children—lack autobiograph-
ical memories from the first years of life.
Emphasis on Functional Disappearance: Memories
Are Formed but Become Inaccessible
The second major category of perspectives on the source of
childhood amnesia is characterized by the assumption that young
children and perhaps even infants form memories of the events of
their lives, but that the memories subsequently become inaccessi-
ble. Perhaps the best known (and most infamous) of such accounts
is Freud’s (1905/1953) psychodynamic theory. He remarked that
“We forget of what great intellectual accomplishments and of what
complicated emotions a child of four years is capable . . . Yet, in
spite of this unparalleled effectiveness they (memories of early life
events) were forgotten!” (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 64). Freud sug-
gested that the memories became inaccessible as a result of re-
pression of inappropriate or disturbing content of early, often
traumatic (because of their sexual nature) experiences. Memories
of events that were not repressed were altered to remove the
offending content. Freud suggested that the negative emotion in
these memories was screened off, leaving only bland skeletons of
once-significant experiences (Freud, 1916/1966).
More contemporary accounts also makes the assumption that
memories of early life events are formed but become inaccessible,
but for cognitive or linguistic rather than emotional reasons. These
perspectives have in common the suggestion that different times or
phases of life are experienced through different cognitive struc-
tures or “lenses.” The structures of one life period are considered
sufficiently different from those for another that memories created
with one set of structures are inaccessible once new structures
become dominant. By some accounts the structures differ in the
extent to which they are reliant on language (e.g., Neisser, 1962).
Because infants lack language and very young children lack many
nuances of language, they encode memories visually or imagi-
nally, but not symbolically. The suggestion is that with the advent
of language skills, exclusively nonverbal encoding gives way to
primarily verbal encoding. As the system becomes more and more
saturated with language, it becomes increasingly difficult to gain
access to memories encoded without language (Neisser, 1962).
The result is that early memories become inaccessible.
Different lenses or cognitive structures may result not only from
the linguistic revolution, but from changes over life periods, each
of which has a distinctive sense of self, with different hopes, fears,
and challenges, for example. Life periods may correspond to
elementary versus secondary school versus college, or before
Figure 2. Depiction of contributors to and course of development of autobiographical memory provided in
Nelson and Fivush (2004). Autobiographical memory is characterized as emerging at 5 years of age, when
developments in requisite contributing domains reach criterial levels. From “The Emergence of Autobiograph-
ical Memory: A Social Cultural Developmental Theory,” by K. Nelson and R. Fivush, 2004, Psychological
Review, 111, p. 490. Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association.
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versus after marriage, or before versus after retirement (Conway,
1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Memories from prior
lifetime periods may differ from those from the current period not
only because time has passed, but because of the new sense of self
that is associated with changes in thinking or world view. Though
these perspectives differ in the specific causes of change in acces-
sibility that they invoke, they have in common the assumption that
the capacity to form memories of personally relevant events is
present, even early in development. Some emotional, cognitive, or
linguistic force renders the early memories inaccessible and func-
tionally forgotten. Thus, unlike the category of explanations dis-
cussed above, in these explanations, there is nothing lacking in
early memory. Instead, something happens later in development
that renders early memories inaccessible.
Explanation of Childhood Amnesia in Terms of
Complementary Processes
As just described, traditional accounts of childhood amnesia
make one of two assumptions—either that early life is devoid of
the ability to form autobiographical memories or that memories are
formed in childhood but later become inaccessible to recollection.
Thus, they emphasize either positive changes in memory (emer-
gence of a new memory system) or negative changes (loss of
accessibility), but neglect the complementary process. The result is
that each faces challenges to the adequacy of the explanation of
childhood amnesia that it offers. The category of explanations that
emphasizes positive changes in memory adopts the stance that
autobiographical memory is a developmentally later achievement,
one that emerges only with either general or specific cognitive
developmental changes. A corollary of the assumption is that
memories formed before the target development(s) are not “auto-
biographical.” Rather, they lack a feature or features considered
defining of the category. At issue for these accounts is the fact that,
as outlined below, features associated with autobiographical mem-
ories are apparent in memory behavior before the end of the
second year of life; they become more and more prominent over
the course of the preschool years. The challenge then becomes how
to explain why memory representations that look and feel autobi-
ographical, are not part of the autobiographical record.
The category of explanations that emphasizes functional disap-
pearance of memories makes the assumption—either implicitly or
explicitly—that autobiographical memories are formed, even early
in life. Its challenge is to explain why autobiographical memories
of early childhood become inaccessible to later recollection. Typ-
ical forgetting processes cannot be the answer because, as de-
scribed earlier, the distribution of memories from early childhood
is not well characterized by normal forgetting (Wetzler &
Sweeney, 1986). Rather, the rate of forgetting is accelerated.
Based on adult data alone—which is the empirical foundation from
which these accounts were advanced—there is not a ready expla-
nation for accelerated forgetting.
The perspective I advance in the balance of this review is that
elements of both of these perspectives are part of the explanation
of childhood amnesia. The amnesia can be understood in terms of
the complementary processes that improve memory traces and that
degrade them. The perspective highlights developments that result
in formation of memory traces that bear more, better elaborated,
and more tightly integrated autobiographical features. It also high-
lights developmental changes in the rate of forgetting associated
with normative neural, cognitive, and mnemonic processes that
result in decreases in the vulnerability of memory traces (i.e., at
least through young adulthood). When considered together, the
complementary processes—and their developmental dynamics—
provide a ready explanation for the characteristic distribution of
autobiographical memories across the life span and a more com-
pelling explanation of the phenomenon of childhood amnesia (see
also Bauer, 2007, 2008, for previews of this perspective).
The Quality of Memory Traces Increases
Over Development
There are pronounced changes in memory behavior over the
course of early childhood. There also are different perspectives on
the implications of the changes. In traditional accounts of child-
hood amnesia, one or more of the changes is considered criterial
for the emergence of autobiographical memory. A major source of
evidence as to whether the criterial element (or elements) is
present is children’s verbal accounts or narrative descriptions of
past events (e.g., Nelson & Fivush, 2004). For much of early
development, children’s memory reports omit some of the ele-
ments that are associated with autobiographical memory, leading
to the conclusion that the elements also are missing from the
underlying memory representations, thus rendering them nonauto-
biographical. The complementary processes perspective takes ex-
ception to these arguments on the bases that (a) verbal behavior
alone is an insufficient source of evidence as to whether children
“have” autobiographical memory; and (b) salient elements of
autobiographical memory are apparent early in development—in
verbal as well as nonverbal behavior—and that the capacity does
not await an hypothesized criterial feature that is late to emerge.
Rather than of late emergence of autobiographical memory, in the
complementary processes perspective, changes in both verbal and
nonverbal memory behavior are interpreted as evidence of gradual
increases in the quality of memory traces—including autobio-
graphical ones—over development, such that with development,
memory traces bear more, better elaborated, and more tightly
integrated personal-episodic or autobiographical features. These
perspectives are presented in turn.
Developmental change in children’s verbal behavior. A
full autobiographical report features a number of elements, includ-
ing who participated in the event, what happened, where and when
the event took place, and why the sequence of actions unfolded as
it did. It also features information about how the participants in the
event reacted to it in terms of their emotions, thoughts, or evalu-
ations of the event. The latter element is especially important to
establishing the self-referential nature of autobiographical memo-
ries. Furthermore, the elements are presented in a coherent manner,
allowing the listener (or reader) to understand the theme of the
event, the context in which it took place, and the chronology of
actions (Reese, Haden, Baker-Ward, Bauer, Fivush, & Ornstein,
2011).
There are marked changes in children’s verbal behavior
throughout early childhood. In their earliest verbal reports of past
events, young children frequently omit one or more elements of a
complete and coherent story. Instead, they typically merely confirm
or deny information provided by another. For example, an adult mentions
a recent visit to the zoo and offers the observation that the child
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enjoyed the animals, and the child responds with an enthusiastic
“Yes!” At around the age of 3 years, children begin contributing
memory content. However, they frequently include only the most
crucial elements such as who and what (“I played”). They omit
many of the elements that make for a good story, such as where
and when the event occurred, and why it happened as it did (see
Bauer, 2013, 2014; Nelson & Fivush, 2004, for reviews). Over the
course of the preschool and early school years, children take on
increasingly active roles in conversations. They contribute more of
the elements of a complete verbal report (i.e., the who, what,
where, when, why, and how of events), more descriptive details,
and more evaluative information, thereby adding texture and ob-
vious self-relevance to their narratives (e.g., Bauer & Larkina,
2014; Haden, Haine, & Fivush, 1997).
Traditional interpretation of omissions from children’s ver-
bal behavior. By traditional criterial accounts, because chil-
dren’s early memory reports lack some of the features associated
with autobiographical memories, their memories may be consid-
ered episodic (or even semantic, Nelson, 1993), but not autobio-
graphical. This provides a ready account for childhood amnesia:
memories formed in the first 5 to 7 years are not autobiographical,
thus explaining the relative paucity among adults of autobiograph-
ical memories from this life period. Autobiographical memory is
recognized only with verbal evidence that the event being recalled
is located in specific time and place and is self-referential, as
indicated by personal or evaluative perspective, or even that the
event is part of an extended life narrative (e.g., Fivush, 2012;
Fivush & Zaman, 2014).
Exception to the traditional criterial view. As previewed
above, the complementary processes account developed here takes
exception to the traditional criterial view on the grounds that
absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence. In
other words, the fact that young children’s verbal reports do not
feature all of the elements that are associated with autobiograph-
ical memories does not mean that the elements are missing from
the memory representations and does not license the conclusion
that the memory is not autobiographical. Moreover, though one or
more elements characteristic of autobiographical memory may be
missing from any given report that a young child provides about a
past event, there does not seem to be a single element or feature
that is missing from all reports. This calls into question the
suggestion that young children lack a criterial or defining feature
of autobiographical memory. In addition, as reviewed below, fea-
tures characteristic of autobiographical memory are apparent at
least by the end of the second year of life; they become increas-
ingly obvious over childhood, such that reports feature more
personal-episodic or autobiographical elements and the elements
are better elaborated and more tightly integrated with one another.
Based on this evidence, I suggest that autobiographical memory is
best conceived not as a classical concept with defining features,
but in terms of a prototype or family resemblance with character-
istic features (see also Bauer, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014). The es-
sence of the argument is that, as more and more of the features
associated with autobiographical memory are included in the
memory trace, memories become increasingly autobiographical.
Absence of features from verbal reports does not imply ab-
sence from memory. As just discussed, the fact that early verbal
accounts of past events typically omit features associated with
autobiographical memories—especially location in time and place
and a subjective personal perspective—has been interpreted to
suggest that these elements are missing from the representation
and thus that early memories are not autobiographical. Verbal
reports and memory representations are not isomorphic, however.
When elements of autobiographical memory are featured in verbal
reports, it is reasonable to conclude that the elements also are part
of the representation. However, memory representations may in-
clude features not expressed in verbal form. I offer two sources of
evidence to make the case—one from children and the other from
adults—as well as an argument regarding sufficiency.
One source of evidence that memory representations may in-
clude mnemonic features that are not expressed 2012 verbally
comes from a prospective study of children’s recall of early life
events (Bauer & Larkina, 2013). At the age of 3 to 4 years,
children were asked to recall a number of events from the recent
past. They featured an average of 3.59 narrative elements in their
reports (out of a possible of eight narrative features: who, what-
object, what-action, where, when, why, how-description, and how-
explanation). Seemingly consistent with the interpretation that
their memories were not autobiographical, they included only 1.10
mentions of where events occurred, 0.16 temporal markers, and
0.35 subjective evaluations. However, when the same children
recalled the same events at 9 years of age (6 years later)—to the
extent that they remembered the events (more about this in a later
section)—they included the features so saliently omitted from their
early verbal accounts. At 9 years of age, they more than doubled
the number of indicators of where events took place (to 2.29),
showed a fourfold increase in the number of temporal markers
included (to 0.72), and featured more than twice the number of
subjective evaluations (to 0.78). Thus, later in development (with
additional verbal competence), memories from the age of 3 years
were expressed with strong autobiographical flavor. This suggests
that the memory representations formed early in life included the
mnemonic features that render memories autobiographical, even
though evidence of them was missing from the relatively impov-
erished verbal reports produced earlier in development (see Tustin
& Hayne, 2010, for a consistent discussion of the episodic nature
of children’s early memories).
A second, and complementary, source of evidence that memory
representations may include mnemonic features that are not ex-
pressed verbally comes from adults’ narratives, which not infrequently
lack the features of autobiographical reports. For example, in Bauer
and Larkina (2014), college students and middle-age adults in-
cluded an average of only 5.32 and 5.88 of eight narrative features
(specific features mentioned above), respectively. They frequently
omitted information about where events took place and why they
happened as they did. Strikingly, college students and middle-age
adults provided a subjective perspective on the events only 46%
and 53% of the time, respectively. The fact that the verbal reports
of adults frequently omit information that clearly marks events as
autobiographical makes it difficult to justify an argument that
because children’s reports lack these features, the memory repre-
sentations that gave rise to them are not autobiographical. Indeed,
were we take the argument to its logical conclusion, then we would
“disqualify” many of the memory reports that adults provide as
well. We do not make this claim because—when adults are the
subjects—we recognize that verbal reports do not necessarily
convey the full richness of memories.
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A final source of concern with reliance on verbal reports as the
index of when event memories become autobiographical stems
from the fact that there are continuous changes in verbal and
narrative behavior throughout childhood and into adolescence.
This makes it challenging to identify a time in development when
verbal reports have “enough” autobiographical features to consider
them indicative of the memory type. The point here is that devel-
opmental changes in verbal behavior do not end at 5 to 7 years of
age. Throughout the school years there are changes in the breadth
of reports that children tell and in the coherence of their accounts.
For example, between the ages of 7 and 11 years, there are
increases in the length and complexity of children’s autobiograph-
ical reports (e.g., Habermas, Negele, & Mayer, 2010). The amount
of information that children include nearly doubles over this period
(Van Abbema & Bauer, 2005), as does the temporal organization
of the reports that children produce (Morris, Baker-Ward, &
Bauer, 2010). Ten- to 12-year-old children also produce verbal
reports that more effectively orient the listener to the time and
place of the event, and they maintain and elaborate on topics more
effectively than 7- to 9-year-old children (e.g., O’Kearney, Speyer,
& Kenardy, 2007; Reese et al., 2011). However, even at age 11 to
12 years, children’s reports still are lacking in the causal connec-
tions (e.g., because, so that) that characterize older adolescents’
and adults’ narrative accounts (e.g., Bauer, Stark, Lukowski,
Rademacher, Van Abbema, & Ackil, 2005; Habermas et al., 2010).
In adolescence, individuals use their autobiographical memories to
construct an extended life story or personal history (e.g., Bohn &
Berntsen, 2008; Fivush & Zaman, 2014; Habermas & Bluck, 2000;
Thomsen, 2009; see Bohn & Berntsen, 2014). The point of sum-
marizing these changes is to illustrate the seeming arbitrariness of
selecting any single development in verbal narrative behavior as
indicative of the “onset” of autobiographical memory. The evi-
dence is more consistent with characterization of autobiographical
memory as developing gradually and continuously.
Features of autobiographical memory are apparent early in
development. The inadvisability of relying exclusively on verbal
data as the source of evidence as to whether memories are auto-
biographical compels examination of other expressions of memory
by children, with special emphasis on whether they remember
specific past events located in place and time, and whether they
show evidence of the personal relevance of the events. As will
become apparent, they do; both behaviorally and verbally, the
features become more and more prominent over the course of
childhood. This pattern is part of the foundation upon which rests
the suggestion that rather than as a classical concept with defining
features, autobiographical memory is better characterized as a
family resemblance concept with characteristic features (e.g.,
Bauer, 2007). Another component of the foundation is the obser-
vation that although any single expression of memory may be
lacking in some features associated with autobiographical mem-
ory, there is no one element consistently missing from all expres-
sions of memory. In other words, though there is evidence that
some features are less frequently expressed, there is a lack of
evidence that any given criterial feature is missing from early
memory representations.
The ability to recall specific past events is readily apparent
before the end of the second year of life—well before children
provide verbal evidence of autobiographical memory. Some of the
strongest evidence of the capacity comes from studies using non-
verbal imitation-based tasks in which props are used to produce
novel actions or sequences of actions that infants are invited to
imitate (e.g., Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Bauer & Shore, 1987;
Meltzoff, 1985). As discussed in detail elsewhere (Bauer, 2007,
2013; Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, &Wewerka, 2000; Carver & Bauer,
1999; McDonough, Mandler, McKee, & Squire, 1995; Squire et
al., 1993), the task is an accepted analogue to verbal report. Using
this technique, researchers have found evidence of memory for
unique events even in the first year of life. Infants as young as 6
months of age reliably imitate novel actions they observe produced
by an experimenter (see Lukowski & Bauer, 2014, for a review).
By 9 months of age, they remember unique actions and sequences
of action over delays of at least 1 month (Carver & Bauer, 1999,
2001). By 20 months of age, the length of time over which recall
is apparent has increased to 12 months (Bauer et al., 2000). In the
same period, the robustness of memory increases such that infants
remember more, based on fewer experiences of events (Bauer &
Leventon, 2013; see Bauer, 2007, 2013, for reviews). In addition,
recall over long delays is more reliably observed. Whereas at 9
months of age only roughly 50% of infants show evidence of
long-term recall (e.g., Carver & Bauer, 1999), by 20 months,
individual differences in whether or not infants recall are the
exception rather than the rule (though there remain individual
differences in how much is remembered; Bauer et al., 2000).
Because the actions and sequences on which infants are tested
are novel to them, their behavior provides evidence that they
remember unique events. Moreover, several other features associ-
ated with autobiographical memories also are apparent in nonver-
bal behavior and even in early verbal behavior; the features are
evident well before children provide narrative evidence of autobi-
ographical memory. For example, because infants recall both the
individual target actions (what-action) and the temporal order in
which they occurred (when; e.g., Bauer et al., 2000), there is
evidence that they have some capacity for organization of event
representations. Infants under 1 year of age demonstrate temporal
organization for events that are logically (or causally) ordered
(e.g., Carver & Bauer, 1999, 2001); by 20 to 24 months of age,
they also reliably order events without this inherent structure (e.g.,
Bauer, Hertsgaard, Dropik, & Daly, 1998). One- to 2-year-olds
also remember the specific locations in which events occurred
(where), even over substantial delays (Lukowski, Lechuga, &
Bauer, 2011). Infants under 2 years of age also demonstrate that
they remember specific features of events, in that they reliably
select the correct objects from arrays including objects that are
different from, yet perceptually similar to, those used to produce
event sequences (i.e., what-object, how-description; Bauer & Dow,
1994; Lechuga, Marcos-Ruiz, & Bauer, 2001; see also Wiebe &
Bauer, 2005). At least by 20 months of age, memory for the
specific props used to produce an event is related to memory for
the event itself (Bauer & Lukowski, 2010). Infants under 2 years
of age also evidence behavior that indicates that they have some
understanding of why events unfold as they do (e.g., Bauer,
1992)—from their reproductions of event sequences they exclude
actions that are irrelevant to the outcome. Finally, as they approach
and enter the third year of life and gain the fluency to provide
verbal descriptions of events experienced in imitation-based tasks,
children spontaneously verbalize about who took part in the events
(who) and they provide evaluative comments on the activities in
which they engaged (how-evaluation; Bauer & Wewerka, 1997).
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These behaviors make clear that sometimes well before they
provide linguistic evidence, children encode, retain, and later re-
trieve memory representations that feature each of the individual
elements associated with autobiographical memory (see Bauer,
2007; Bauer & Leventon, 2013, for discussions).
Over the preschool and early school years, memory processes
improve to the point that children remember unique experiences,
even over substantial delays. Children also provide more frequent
and consistent evidence that they remember the events from their
own personal, self-referential perspective. For example, Hamond
and Fivush (1991) found that children who experienced a trip to
Disneyworld when they were 36 or 48 months of age remembered
the event even 18 months later. In Bauer and Larkina (2013),
children 3 years of age at the time of events remembered in excess
of 60% of them over delays of as many as 3 years. The preschool
and early school years also are marked by developments in the
ability to locate events in a particular time and place. Children
become increasingly accurate and reliable in determining which of
two events occurred earlier and in justifying their choices (Path-
man, Larkina, Burch, & Bauer, 2013). They also show growing
command of the use of conventional indices of time, such as
calendars (e.g., Friedman, Reese, & Dai, 2011) and seasons
(Bauer, Burch, Scholin, & Güler, 2007; Bauer & Larkina, 2014), to
locate when personally relevant event occurred. Such markers
serve as a timeline along which records of events can be ordered
(see Friedman, 2014; Pathman & St. Jacques, 2014, for reviews).
Children also become increasingly proficient at remembering the
location in which they experienced specific past events (Bauer,
Doydum, et al., 2012, Bauer et al., in press). These changes mean
that more events are stored with more, better elaborated, and more
tightly integrated elements of autobiographical memories: unique
events, with distinctive features, accurately located in time and
place.
For memories to be considered autobiographical, they also must
be self-referential. As such, a self concept is a necessary ingredient
for an autobiography (see Fivush & Zaman, 2014; Howe, 2014).
Children first begin to make reference to themselves in past events
at about the same time as they begin to recognize themselves in a
mirror, namely, between 18 and 24 months (Howe & Courage,
1993, 1997, for discussions). Children who recognize themselves
in the mirror have more robust event memories and over subse-
quent months, they make faster progress in independent autobio-
graphical reports, relative to children who do not yet exhibit self
recognition (Harley & Reese, 1999; see Reese, 2014). Throughout
the preschool years, children develop a more self-oriented or
subjective perspective on experience, as evidenced by increasingly
frequent references to their own (and others’) emotional and cog-
nitive states (see Fivush & Zaman, 2014). References to the
emotional and cognitive states of the experiencer indicate the sense
of personal ownership and unique perspective that is characteristic
of autobiographical memories.
Memory traces are increasingly autobiographical with
development. As this literature review makes clear, elements of
autobiographical memory are apparent before the end of the sec-
ond year of life. Indeed, review of the corpus of studies with infant
participants reveals evidence of memory for all of the features or
elements characteristic of autobiographical memory: who, what-
action, what-object, where, when, why, how-description, and how-
evaluation. In other words, even before the end of the second year
of life, memory behavior does not seem to be lacking any single
defining or criterial element of autobiographical memory, even
though, as represented in Figure 3, Panel a, no one memory may
feature all of the elements (subpanels i, ii, and iii, represent
separate memory traces, none of which features all of the elements
characteristic of autobiographical memory). As infants become
children, more and more representations feature all of the elements
associated with autobiographical memory (Figure 3, Panel b); the
features become better elaborated and more tightly integrated with
one another (Figure 3, Panel c). As discussed elsewhere (Bauer,
2007, 2012, 2014), the net effect is that over the course of devel-
opment, memory traces of past events become more and more
prototypical of the category—they become more and more auto-
biographical. Expressions of memory that feature many of the
elements we associate with autobiography (Figure 3, Panel c)—
and that are highly prototypical of the category—will be readily
recognized as members of the class (the “robins” of autobiograph-
ical memory). Expressions of memory that feature fewer of the elements
(Figure 3, Panel a)—and that are less prototypical of the category—are
less readily recognized as members of the class (the “ostriches” of
autobiographical memory). The argument put forth here is that,
just as ostriches are birds even though they cannot fly, many of the
memories formed early in life have a sufficient number of auto-
biographical features to merit recognition of them as members of
the autobiographical class. From this perspective, autobiographical
memory does not emerge at 5 years of age (Nelson & Fivush,
2004; or even later, as suggested by, e.g., Fivush, 2012; Fivush &
Zaman, 2014). Rather, over the course of development, memories
become more and more typical exemplars of the category—they
feature more and more of the attributes we associate with the
category and the attributes become better elaborated and more
tightly integrated with one another.
Summary. The developmental literature features extensive
evidence of changes in memory for personally relevant past events
over the course of early childhood. In traditional criterial accounts,
children’s early memories lack one or more defining features of
autobiographical memory and thus are not considered to be auto-
biographical. In a prominent traditional account, for example (Nel-
son & Fivush, 2004), autobiographical memory emerges at age 5
years, coincident with development of a number of features con-
sidered defining of autobiographical memory. The complementary
processes perspective developed in this review recognizes ele-
ments of autobiographical memory in the behavior of infants even
before the end of the second year of life; the number and variety
of elements increases over early childhood (and beyond) and the
elements become better elaborated and more tightly integrated
with one another. As a result, it becomes easier and easier to “see”
autobiographical memory.
The Paradox of Childhood Amnesia
If memory just gets better and better and more and more
autobiographical, why is it that so few memories from the first
years of life survive (i.e., memory seems to get worse and worse)?
I suggest that the solution to this paradox can be found by con-
sidering the complementary function of increases in the quality of
memories, namely, the vulnerability of memories, especially those
formed early in life (when the memories are of lower quality, as
just discussed). In effect, events are remembered, but they also are
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forgotten (even by adults), and children forget at a faster rate,
relative to adults. Essentially, youth is a risk factor for autobio-
graphical memories. More important, events are not functionally
forgotten because they are repressed (Freud, 1916/1966). Nor do
they become inaccessible because of the onset of language (e.g.,
Neisser, 1962), or different senses of self associated with different
life periods (e.g., Conway, 1996). Rather, early memories are
forgotten because of normative processes involved in transforma-
tion of labile representations of experience into enduring memory
traces. These suggestions are supported in the next section.
The Vulnerability of Memory Traces Declines
Over Development
The suggestion that patterns of what we remember can be
explained in part by patterns of what we forget is not new. There
is a long tradition of work on forgetting functions in the adult
literature (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996; Wixted
& Ebbesen, 1991, 1997) and in the developmental literature there
have been examinations of the variance in long-term recall that can
be explained by forgetting shortly after experience of an event
(e.g., Bauer, 2005; Bauer, Van Abbema, & de Haan, 1999; Howe
& O’Sullivan, 1997; discussed in more detail below). However,
until the beginning of the 21st century, there were virtually no data
that directly addressed the suggestion that the characteristic distri-
bution of autobiographical memories across the life span—includ-
ing the phenomenon of childhood amnesia—could be explained in
part by the relative vulnerability of memory traces formed early in
life. To do so requires documenting memories created in the period
eventually obscured by childhood amnesia and then prospectively
tracking them across the boundary of the amnesia, to determine
whether they are still remembered. However, throughout most of
the century-plus of research on childhood amnesia, virtually all of
the studies on the phenomenon were with adults; none of the
studies was prospective. Early reports involving child subjects
were retrospective—they asked what was retained from childhood,
but not what was lost. As a result, though the possibility that
memory trace vulnerability was part of the explanation of child-
hood amnesia had been implicated theoretically (Bauer, 2007,
2008; Olson & Newcombe, 2014; Peterson, Warren, & Short,
2011; Tustin & Hayne, 2010), there has been little opportunity to
evaluate its role empirically.
One of the small number of prospective investigations of child-
hood amnesia in childhood was conducted by Cleveland and Reese
(2008). To investigate the process of loss of (or loss of access to)
memories for early life events, they recorded conversations be-
tween mothers and their children about past events at each of ages
19, 25, 32, 40, and 65 months. The fact that, during these inter-
views, the children provided unique information about the
events—information that had not been given by their mothers—
provided evidence that they had formed memories of them (a
criterion of at least two unique pieces of information is typical in
this literature). When the same children were 66 months of age,
Figure 3. Depiction of course of development of autobiographical memory from the complementary processes
perspective. The elements characteristic of autobiographical memory include who (self), what, where, when,
why, and how (evaluative or subjective perspective). Early in development, individual memory representations
(represented in Panel a, subpanels i, ii, and iii) may feature only a subset of the elements characteristic of
autobiographical memories, yet no one element is missing from all memory traces. With development, memory
traces feature more elements (Panel b). The elements also become more elaborated (depicted with increases in
size and texture), and the elements become more tightly integration with one another (depicted with reduction
in the spacing between elements, Panel c). As a result, over the course of development, memories of personally
relevant specific past events take on more and more of the features of autobiographical memory.
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they were tested for memory for events from each of the prior data
collection points. Thus, at 66 months, children were asked for their
memories of events from 1, 26, 34, 41, and 47 months in the past.
The number of events that the 5.5-year-olds remembered de-
creased steadily as the retention interval increased. They recalled
roughly 80% of events from only 1 month in the past but fewer
than 40% of events from 47 months in the past. Fivush and
Schwarzmueller (1998) reported a similar trend, albeit higher rates
of retention, from 8-year-olds interviewed about events from ages
3.5 and 4 (77% of events remembered) versus 5 and 6 (92% of
events remembered) years of age. Both studies provide evidence
that as time goes by, forgetting (or loss of access) becomes more
pronounced. However, in both studies, events with the longest
delays between the initial and later tests also were events with the
earliest age of encoding (i.e., 19 months in Cleveland & Reese,
2008). Thus, it is not possible to determine whether forgetting was
a result of the length of the delay or the age of the children at the
time of experience of the events. Furthermore, only Fivush and
Schwarzmueller (1998) documented the fates of memories over
the boundary of childhood amnesia (i.e., beyond age 7 years).
In Bauer and Larkina (2013) and Van Abbema and Bauer
(2005), we held the age at encoding constant and varied the
retention interval, thereby allowing for examination of fates of
early memories over time. Specifically, we recorded conversations
of dyads of 3-year-old children and their mothers as they discussed
a number of events from the recent past. As for the studies just
discussed (Cleveland & Reese, 2008; Fivush & Schwarzmueller,
1998), children’s own unique contributions to the conversations
made clear that they had formed memories of the events. Thus, we
had documentation of memories from the age period correspond-
ing to that from which adults report their earliest memories. We
then tested different subgroups of the children again roughly 2, 3,
4, 5, or 6 years later, at the ages of 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 years of
age—ages at which, based on adult data, we would expect to see
evidence of childhood amnesia. The later interviews were con-
ducted by experimenters (rather than the children’s mothers). The
data are strongly suggestive of a role for forgetting in explanation
of the onset of the amnesia. Whereas the children 5 to 7 years of
age remembered more than 60% of the events from age 3 years, the
8- and 9-year-olds remembered fewer than 40% of the events. The
difference in levels of recall was apparent even though all children
were provided with prompts and cues to aid their memories, as
determined to be necessary when free-recall failed. Moreover, the
number of children who recalled none of the events from age 3
years also suggested a change in the accessibility of early memo-
ries after age 7 years. Whereas a maximum of 6% of children ages
5, 6, and 7 years recalled none of the events from age 3 years, 37%
of 8-year-olds and 25% of 9-year-olds recalled none of the early
life events. Again, the difference in levels of recall was observed
even though all children received prompts and cues, as necessary.
There also is evidence that younger children forget more rapidly
than older children. Morris et al. (2010) examined recall after a
1-year delay of events originally experienced at ages 4, 6, and 8
years. Children’s contributions to the experimenter-conducted in-
terviews made clear that they remembered the events. One year
later, when the children were 5, 7, and 9 years of age, children’s
recall was tested again. As in the studies just discussed (Bauer &
Larkina, 2013; Van Abbema & Bauer, 2005), children were given
prompts and cues to aid their memories, as determined to be
necessary when free-recall failed. The children who had been the
youngest at the time of the events remembered 70% of them 1
year later. In contrast, the children who had been the oldest at the
time of the events remembered 90% of them 1 year later. This
pattern is strong evidence that within the period eventually ob-
scured by childhood amnesia, the rate of forgetting is more accel-
erated among younger relative to older children.
Accelerated rate of forgetting. The facts that (a) even young
children form memories of early life events but then seemingly
forget them over time, and (b) younger children forget more
rapidly than older children, demand an explanation of childhood
amnesia that recognizes accelerated forgetting in childhood. Wet-
zler and Sweeney (1986) provided suggestive evidence of this
phenomenon based on adult data. As noted earlier, they fitted a
power function to data obtained by Rubin (1982) using cue word
elicitation. The power function was a good fit to data from age 8
to adulthood. In contrast, it was a poor fit to data from birth to age
6 years, implying accelerated forgetting of memories from ages 6
and below.
In two studies, my colleagues and I have provided direct evi-
dence of accelerated forgetting in childhood; the pace of forgetting
is accelerated well beyond age 6 years. In Bauer et al. (2007), we
used the cue word technique to examine the distribution of auto-
biographical memories in children 7 to 10 years of age. The
children successfully generated memories in response to the cue
words and accurately dated them, based on parental report. The
distribution of memories produced by the children was better fit by
the exponential than by the power function (see Table 1). The same
pattern was obtained in an independent study by Bauer and
Larkina (2014). We tested 20 children at each of the ages of 7, 8,
9, 10, and 11 years (100 children total), as well as two groups of
adults: college students and middle-aged adults. As reflected in
Table 1, the data from the children provided a replication of the
results of Bauer et al. (2007). For the entire sample of children and
for each group of children (7-, 8-, 9-, 10-, and 11-year-olds)
separately, the best fitting function to the distribution was the
exponential. In contrast, for both adult samples, the best fitting
function was the power. The relative fits are illustrated in Figure 4.
These data clearly suggest that as old as age 11 years, the distri-
bution of children’s autobiographical memories is not adult-like. In
contrast to adults, children experience exponential forgetting.
Functional outcome of exponential forgetting. The expo-
nential function implies a constant half-life. That is, over each unit
of time (e.g., a month) the number of memories in the corpus
decreases by one half. To use the earlier example, if Time 1 recall
was of 100 memories, then recall at Times 2, 3, and 4 would be of
50, 25, and 12.5 memories, respectively. This pattern implies that
the pool of memories available for recollection is ever-shrinking,
suggesting that memories do not consolidate (see Bauer, 2012;
Bauer et al., 2007; and Bauer & Larkina, 2014, for discussions).
The contrast between a distribution of memories characterized by
the exponential function relative to the power function is provided
in Figure 5. The distributions differ both in terms of the initial rate
of forgetting (also apparent in Figure 4), and in terms of the
number of memories lost from the corpus with each unit of time.
Consider that for both adults and children, many events are lost
from memory virtually immediately after experience of them (see
T2 in Figure 5). More important, for adults, the rate of forgetting
slows over time, with individual memories becoming less vulner-
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able to disruption and interference, resulting in a relatively stable
corpus (e.g., Wixted, 2004, for discussion). In contrast, children
experience a sharp initial decline in the number of memories in the
corpus (T2) and unlike for adults, for them, the rate of forgetting
does not slow down—it is exponential.
The apparent fact of the exponential form of forgetting in
childhood has two important implications for the fates of memo-
ries formed in the first decade of life. First, over a given unit of
time, children lose more memories than adults do. Second, because
the rate of forgetting is constant, the memories that survive the
initial ravages of time may nevertheless eventually succumb to
forgetting. Over time, the corpus or pool of memories of early life
events shrinks. Moreover, because the rate of forgetting does not
slow down, the pool of memories is ever-shrinking, contributing to
the appearance of a “childhood amnesia component” (Pillemer &
White, 1989)—a smaller number of memories than expected by
normal forgetting (i.e., with “normal” forgetting equated with an
adult rate, characterized by the power function). We may think of
the process as one that reduces “pools” of memories to isolated
“puddles” of memories, resulting in a sparse representation. More
isolated representational structures are more difficult to retrieve.
Understanding children’s “earliest memory” data. Thinking in
terms of “pools to puddles” of memories over the course of the
first decade of life aids in understanding of the patterns of recall of
early autobiographical memories by adults that is associated with
childhood amnesia. It also aids in understanding of the emerging
body of data on “earliest memories” of children. As noted above,
studies of children’s recall of their earliest memories are a rela-
tively new addition to the literature and the number of studies is
small. They reveal that by the end of the first decade of life,
children’s earliest memories show the same distribution as adults.
Specifically, queries about the age of earliest memory among
children as young as 6 years of age and as old as 19 years have
produced estimates of the average age of earliest memory at 38
months, with a range of 28 months to 45 months (Jack, MacDon-
ald, Reese, & Hayne, 2009; Larkina, Merrill, Fivush, & Bauer,
2009; Peterson, Grant, & Boland, 2005; Reese, Jack, & White,
2010). The estimates fit comfortably around the 3- to 4-year (36 to
48 month) range obtained from adults.
In contrast to the adult-like distribution of memories among older
children, younger children’s recall of their earliest memories differs
from the patterns seen in adulthood in at least two ways: age-cohort
effects and instability in the memory identified as “earliest.” First,
age-cohort effects are apparent in children but not in adults. Two
studies have revealed age-cohort effects within childhood, such that
the age of earliest memory is earlier for younger children relative to
older children. For example, in Tustin and Hayne (2010) the average
age of earliest memory among 5-year-old children was 1.7 years,
whereas the average age of earliest memory among 12- to 13-year-old
children was 2.5 years. Similarly, in Peterson et al. (2005), the average
age of earliest memory among 6- to 9-year-old children was 3 years,
whereas the average age of earliest memory among 10-year-olds was
3.5 years. In contrast, as noted earlier, among adults, there are not
age-cohort effects. Whether tested at 20 years of age or 70 years of
age, the average age of earliest memory among adults is 3 to 4 years
(Rubin & Schulkind, 1997).
There also is evidence of less stability in the “earliest memory”
among children relative to adults, both in terms of the memory
identified as the earliest and in terms of the age of earliest memory.
Peterson et al. (2011) interviewed children 4 to 13 years of age about
their earliest memories. Two years later, they asked the same children
to once again report their earliest memories. Strikingly, among chil-
dren 4 to 7 years of age at the first interview, there was little overlap
in the memories nominated at the two time points: only 7% of 4- to
5-year-olds and 13% of 6- to 7-year-olds nominated the same earliest
memory, whereas 12- to 13-year-olds were consistent 39% of the
time. When the events were the same, the children were inconsistent
in their estimates of their ages at the time of the events. Between
queries, the estimated age of earliest memories increased from 32 to
39.6 months. In contrast, over a 3-year period, 82% of adult women
identified the same memories as their earliest and they varied by only
0.3 months in dating the event that gave rise to the memory (38.9 vs.
38.6 months; Bauer et al., in press). Thus, there is substantially less
consistency in the corpus of earliest memories among children rela-
tive to adults. The pattern is to be expected of a pool of memories that
is ever-shrinking and ever-changing.
Summary. Throughout most of the history of research on child-
hood amnesia, the sole participants were adults. Without exception,
the studies were retrospective. As a result, the field lacked the most
relevant data on the source of the phenomenon, namely, documenta-
tion of memories formed in the period eventually obscured by the
amnesia, and tracking of the memories across the boundary. With the
Table 1
Fit Indices for Power and Exponential Functions of the Distribution of Autobiographical
Memories Elicited by Cue Words for Children 7 To 11 Years of Age and Adults
Study
Age group Fit by function
Overall Individual age groups Power Exponential
Bauer et al. (2007) Children 7 to 10 years .95 .98
Bauer & Larkina (2014a) Children 7 to 11 years .82 .94
7-year-olds .94 .97
8-year-olds .87 .92
9-year-olds .84 .89
10-year-olds .82 .88
11-year-olds .72 .86
Adults .91 .65
College students .84 .61
Middle-age adults .93 .70
Note. For each age group, the best fit function is highlighted by a box.
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advent of such data, it has become clear that childhood amnesia
emerges by middle childhood. Specifically, by the time children are 8
to 9 years of age, they have forgotten a substantial proportion of early
childhood events they once remembered (Bauer & Larkina, 2013;
Van Abbema&Bauer, 2005). The available data strongly suggest that
the amnesia emerges as a result of exponential forgetting in child-
hood, relative to adulthood. A consequence of exponential forgetting
by children is that the pool of autobiographical memories they have
formed eventually diminishes to isolated puddles of memories; iso-
lation makes the remaining memories even more difficult to retrieve.
Findings of exponential forgetting in childhood explain the emer-
gence of childhood amnesia in childhood. They also bring order to an
array of findings on children’s earliest memories, and help to explain
why in some cases they are different, relative to adults. In the next
section, I take up the question that now demands to be addressed,
namely, why childhood is a period of accelerated forgetting, in the
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Figure 4. The power function and exponential function fitted to the distribution of memories generated by
children 7 to 11 years of age as a function of the number of seasons since experience of the event (Panel a, based
on 1,995 memories). The power function and exponential function fitted to the distribution of memories
generated by college-age and middle-age adults (Panel b, based on 800 memories). For adults, the figure
represents adjusted data such that the horizontal axis is the time (the mean number of seasons to the middle of
the bin) since experience of the event, and the vertical axis is the percentage of data averaged across the seasons
included in the bin (see Bauer & Larkina, 2014, for discussion). Adapted from “Childhood Amnesia in the
Making: Different Distributions of Autobiographical Memories in Children and Adults,” by P. J. Bauer and M.
Larkina, 2014, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, p. 605. Copyright 2014 by the American
Psychological Association.
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face of salient increases in the quality of memory representations that
are formed.
The Dynamics of Increases in the Quality and
Decreases in the Vulnerability of Memory Traces and
Mechanisms of Developmental Change
The theoretical argument I have advanced recognizes the com-
plementary processes involved in the creation, retention, and later
retrieval of memories (glossed as increases in the quality of mem-
ory traces) and in the loss of representational traces from memory
(glossed as vulnerabilities in memory traces). In this section, I
make explicit the interaction of these processes. Specifically, I
highlight improvements in the quality of the representations that
are formed. Over developmental time, memory representations
include more of the features that characterize autobiographical
memories, and the features are better elaborated and more tightly
integrated. The result is mnemonic materials that are of higher
quality. At the same time, there are developments in the neural
substrate operating on the available representations, both in terms
of the structures involved and in the level of connectivity of the
network of structures. The developments herald more efficient and
effective cognitive and mnemonic processing, resulting in de-
creases in the vulnerability of memory traces to forgetting. Put
another way, over developmental time, less and less negatively
impacts the mnemonic representations that are formed. The net
effect is that with development, more and more memories of
higher and higher quality survive to be recalled at later points in
time, producing the characteristic distribution of autobiographical
memories across the life span. I first summarize the processes
involved in the formation of memory representations, before dis-
cussing the developmental interactions.
Processes Involved in the Formation of
Memory Representations
The layperson’s view of memory is of a file cabinet stuffed full
of file folders, the contents of each of which is a memory repre-
sentation. To recall, one finds the right folder, pulls it out of the
cabinet, opens it, and reads off what happened to whom and when.
In actuality, of course, memory is nothing like a file cabinet or
folder. Rather, memory representations are made up of individual
bits and pieces of experience that are encoded in synaptic connec-
tions between individual neurons distributed across the cortex.
They begin their lives as patterns of neural activity that give rise to
conscious experience of events. Their continued existence as
“memories” depends on subsequent processing carried out by a
multicomponent neural network that includes structures in the
medial-temporal lobe, as well as the neocortex. Their subsequent
retrieval entails recreation of the pattern of neural activity that
gave rise to the event in the first place. Each of these steps is
elaborated below (see Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Kandel &
Squire, 2000; Manns & Eichenbaum, 2006; Nadel, Samsonovich,
Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000; Rubin, 2005, 2006; Winocur & Mos-
covitch, 2011; Zola & Squire, 2000; for reviews of these pro-
cesses).
Memory begins with encoding of experience into a memory
trace. Encoding, in turn, begins with the initial registration of
information in the brain. The whole of experience does not im-
pinge upon the brain at once in the same time and place, but is
distributed across multiple cortical areas. For example, cell fields
in primary somatosensory cortex register object or event-related
tactile information from the skin and proprioceptive inputs from
the muscles and joints. Simultaneously, fields in primary visual
cortex register the form, color, and motion of the object or event,
and fields in primary auditory cortex respond to the various attri-
butes of the sounds associated with the object or event. Inputs from
these primary sensory cortices are sent (projected) to unimodal
sensory association areas where they are integrated into whole
percepts of what the object or event feels like, looks like, and
sounds like, respectively. Unimodal association areas in turn proj-
ect the information to polymodal (also termed multimodal)
posterior-parietal, anterior-prefrontal, and limbic-temporal associ-
ation areas. The coordinated activity of these cortical areas gives
rise to experience of a coherent event.
For the experience of an event to endure as a memory, the
pattern of neural activity giving rise to the experience must un-
dergo a process of stabilization into a memory trace and integra-
tion of the trace into long-term storage. This process—known as
consolidation—depends on neurochemical and neuroanatomical
changes that create a physical record of the experience (McGaugh,
2000). It results from the coordinated actions of structures in the
medial-temporal lobes and cortical association areas. Specifically,
inputs from the association areas are projected to structures in the
medial-temporal lobes, with inputs that specify the nonspatial or
“object” features of experience projected to perirhinal cortex, and
inputs that specify the spatial or “contextual” features of experi-
ence projected to parahippocampal cortex (see, e.g., Manns &
Eichenbaum, 2006, for a review). These cortices are thought to
hold the still-segregated streams of experience (i.e., nonspatial and
spatial) in an “intermediate-term memory” on which the hip-
pocampus proper operates. The information is held in the medial-
temporal cortices temporarily (over periods of at least several
minutes), presumably as a result of prolonged neuronal firing (e.g.,
Suzuki, Miller, & Desimone, 1997).
To be stabilized into a coherent memory trace, information must
make its way into the hippocampus proper. It does so via the
connecting link of the entorhinal cortex. Specifically, the perirhi-
Figure 5. Schematic depiction of the number of memories in the corpus
that survive over each hypothetical unit of time (T1-T5) in distributions
characterized by the exponential function (dark bars) and the power func-
tion (hashed bars).
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nal and parahippocampal cortices project their highly processed
sensory inputs to the lateral and medial aspects of the entorhinal
cortex, respectively. The entorhinal cortex projects these inputs
into the hippocampus proper where all of the different components
of the event are bound into a single representation (see Manns &
Eichenbaum, 2006, for additional discussion). This “binding” of
the elements of experience depends upon iterative processing of the
conjunctions and relations among the stimuli that gave rise to the
event. That is, the pattern is regularly “refreshed” by additional
neural signaling among the hippocampus, the surrounding medial-
temporal cortices, and the association areas. It also maintains and
strengthens the linkages between the distributed cortical represen-
tations that make up the entire event. As it does so, it strengthens
the intracortical connections between the different elements of the
event representation. By some accounts, representations may
strengthen to the point that, eventually, they no longer require the
activity of the hippocampus for their maintenance (Alvarez &
Squire, 1994; McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Reed
& Squire, 1998; Squire, 1992; Zola & Squire, 2000). By other
accounts, memory traces remain dependent on the hippocampus,
especially for retrieval (e.g., Moscovitch & Nadel, 1998; Nadel et
al., 2000; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011).
Iterative processing of the conjunctions and relations among
event-related stimuli in the medial-temporal structures not only
serves to stabilize new memory representations—it also supports
the integration of the new information with that previously stored
(e.g., McKenzie & Eichenbaum, 2011). The basis for integration is
overlapping or shared elements. To the extent that a new event
memory shares elements with memories already in storage, the
representations will be simultaneously activated. Neurons that are
repeatedly activated together (synchronous convergence) tend to
become associated. The result is an entire pattern of interconnec-
tion of new information with old.
Finally, the raison d=etre for the consolidation and storage of
memories is so that they can be retrieved at some later time.
Retrieval is, in essence, a reactivation of the neural network that
represents the event. Reactivation occurs because “An internal or
external stimulus, whose cortical representation is part of the
network by prior association, will reactivate that representation
and, again by association, the rest of the network” (Fuster, 1997, p.
455). Specifically, retrieval of information from long-term stores is
accomplished by the same circuits as were involved in initial
registration of the experience. In the case of autobiographical
memory, neuroimaging studies have revealed that retrieval is car-
ried out by a distributed network involving the hippocampus and
surrounding cortices, amygdala (for emotional events), retro-
splenial cortex, posterior parietal regions (including precuneus),
visual cortex, and lateral and medial prefrontal cortex (Addis,
McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Cabeza et
al., 2004; Greenberg, Rice, Cooper, Cabeza, Rubin, & LaBar,
2005; see Gilboa, 2004; Rubin, 2005, 2006; Shimamura, 2011, for
reviews; see Maguire, 2001; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine,
2006, for meta-analyses). During the initial phases of memory
search, the more anterior, frontal-temporal components of this
network are especially active, whereas in the later phases of
retrieval—as the trace is elaborated—the more posterior, occipital,
and parietal regions are especially active (e.g., Daselaar, Rice,
Greenberg, Cabeza, LaBar, & Rubin, 2008; McCormick, St-
Laurent, Ty, Valiante, & McAndrews, 2013; St. Jacques, Kragel,
& Rubin, 2011;).
Developmental Interactions Involved in Increases in
the Quality and Decreases in the Vulnerability of
Memory Traces
Recognition that memory traces are distributed representations
of loosely affiliated elements awaiting consolidating “glue” to hold
them together, aids in understanding of the importance of consid-
ering both the number and the richness of the elements of the
experience that are available for inclusion in the memory trace and
the efficiency and efficacy of the neural processes implicated in
memory formation—as well as their interaction—to explanation of
childhood amnesia. To the extent that the distributed representa-
tions become more complete, elaborated, and more intimately tied
to related constructs and representations, the larger and more
numerous the surfaces upon which to apply the consolidating glue.
To the extent that the glue that works to hold the representations
together become more efficient and effective, fewer of the ele-
ments of experience will escape the bonds and be lost from the
memory trace. I discuss each element of the equation, beginning
with the glue.
Development of the glue: The neural substrate of memory.
The glue is a metaphor for the stabilizing “efforts” of the medial-
temporal and cortical structures that work to transform transient,
labile representations of experience into enduring traces. The ef-
ficiency and efficacy of those processes is intimately tied to the
developmental status of the neural substrate responsible for them.
As explained in detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Bachevalier, 2014;
Bauer, 2007, 2009a, 2013; Ghetti & Bunge, 2012; Ghetti & Lee,
2014; Nelson, de Haan, & Thomas, 2006, for reviews), portions of
the neural network implicated in episodic and thus autobiograph-
ical memory develop early, whereas many of the structures (or
aspects thereof), as well as the connections between and among the
structures, undergo a protracted developmental course that contin-
ues well into adolescence. This leads to expectations of changes in
the way in which the network functions throughout infancy and
childhood (and even beyond). Early changes support the emer-
gence of the capacity to form, retain, and later retrieve self-
relevant memories of past events; later changes herald more effi-
cient and effective function and a concomitant reduction in the rate
of forgetting.
Early changes. As outlined above, over the first months of life
there are salient changes in the robustness, reliability, and temporal
extend of infants’ memories. The changes likely are related to
postnatal changes in brain that take place over the course of
infancy (as well as other influences, such as the social environment
in which early development takes place; e.g., Fivush, 2014; Reese,
2014). Whereas much of brain development occurs prenatally,
there also are pronounced changes in the first years of postnatal
life.
With regard to the structures implicated in memory for specific
past events, as summarized by Seress and Ábrahám (2008), in the
medial-temporal lobes, hippocampal cells are generated during the
first half of prenatal development and have migrated to their final
destinations by birth. Synapses are apparent by about 15 weeks
gestation. The number of hippocampal synapses and synaptic
density increases until about 6 months of age, at which time adult
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levels are reached. At this same time, glucose utilization (an
indicator of energy use) also reaches adult levels, likely in relation
to the increased number of synapses (Chugani, 1994; Chugani &
Phelps, 1986). By the end of the first year of life, the volume of the
hippocampus has doubled (Gilmore et al., 2012).
Within the hippocampus, the development of the specific region
of the dentate gyrus is more protracted (Seress & Ábrahám, 2008).
This area of the brain includes about 70% of the adult complement
of cells at birth; the remaining cells are produced postnatally
(neurogenesis in this region has been confirmed in childhood and
beyond; Tanapat, Hastings, & Gould, 2001). Morphologically the
structure is adult-like around 12 to 15 months after birth. Increases
in synaptic density also are somewhat protracted relative to what is
observed in other regions of the hippocampus; synaptic density in
this region increases starting around 8 to 12 months after birth and
peaks around 18 to 20 months (Eckenhoff & Rakic, 1991). Pre-
frontal cortex undergoes its early development at a similar pace.
Synaptic density in this region increases beginning around 8
months after birth and reaches its peak between 15 and 24 months
(Huttenlocher, 1979; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997). Synapses
appear adult-like in their morphology by 24 months (Huttenlocher,
1979).
Achievement of the peak number of synapses in both the hip-
pocampus and prefrontal cortex has important implications for
behavior. As argued by Goldman-Rakic (1987), with this devel-
opment, we should expect to see the emergence of what she termed
the “signatory” (or characteristic) functions of the neural substrate;
attainment of mature levels of function would coincide with the
period of synapse elimination in the network. Though Goldman-
Rakic made this argument with respect to cortical regions, exten-
sion of the suggestion to the entire temporal-cortical network leads
to the prediction of emergence of the signatory function of long-
term memory for specific past events by the end of the second year
of life, with continued development for years thereafter. Specifi-
cally, the cortical components of the network, and the connections
both within the medial-temporal lobe (i.e., those involving the
dentate gyrus of the hippocampus) and between the cortex and the
medial-temporal components, would be expected to reach func-
tional maturity over the course of the second year of life, coinci-
dent with estimates of achievement of the peak of synaptogenesis
by 20 months in the dentate gyrus, and by 24 months in the
prefrontal cortex. The expectation of developmental changes for
months and years thereafter stems from the schedule of protracted
pruning both in the dentate gyrus (until 4 to 5 years; e.g., Ecken-
hoff & Rakic, 1991) and in the prefrontal cortex (throughout
adolescence; e.g., Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997). These esti-
mates are consistent with the behavioral data summarized above,
which indicate the ability to recall multiple episodic features (e.g.,
what, where, and when) at least by the end of the second year of
life.
Later changes. Postnatal changes in the neural substrate that
supports memory for specific past events and thus autobiograph-
ical memory continue well beyond the first 2 years of life; the
changes have implications for memory behavior. At the level of
the brain as a whole, children’s brains have reached roughly 90%
of adult volume by the time they are 5 years of age (Kennedy,
Makris, Herbert, Takahashi, & Caviness, 2002). There are further
volume increases through puberty (Caviness, Kennedy, Richelme,
Rademacher, & Filipek, 1996). Beyond puberty, there is actually a
reduction in gray matter volume, likely associated with synaptic
pruning and other regressive processes (Gogtay et al., 2004; Hut-
tenlocher, 1990; Jernigan, Trauner, Hesselink, & Tallal, 1991). In
contrast, white matter volume increases linearly with age (Giedd et
al., 1999). The increases are associated with greater connectivity
between brain regions and with myelination processes that con-
tinue into young adulthood (e.g., Johnson, 1997; Klingberg,
Vaidya, Gabrielli, Moseley, & Hedehus, 1999; Schneider,
Il’yasov, Hennig, & Martin, 2004).
Different cortical structures undergo changes in gray matter
volume at different rates. Specifically, longitudinal data (e.g.,
Østby, Tamnes, Fjell, & Walhovd, 2011) indicate that the nonlin-
ear changes in cortical gray matter occur earlier in the frontal and
occipital poles, relative to the rest of the cortex, which matures in
a parietal-to-frontal direction. The superior temporal cortex is last
to mature (though the temporal poles mature early; Gogtay et al.,
2004). Prefrontal cortex undergoes an especially protracted devel-
opment, with adult levels of synapses not reached until late ado-
lescence or even early adulthood (Huttenlocher, 1979; Hutten-
locher & Dabholkar, 1997), and myelination processes continuing
well into adolescence or young adulthood (e.g., Johnson, 1997;
Klingberg et al., 1999; Schneider et al., 2004). It is not until
adolescence that neurotransmitters such as acetylcholine reach
adult levels (discussed in Benes, 2001).
The volume of the hippocampus also undergoes changes, with
gradual increases into adolescence (e.g., Gogtay et al., 2004;
Østby, Tamnes, Fjell, Westlye, Due-Tønnessen, & Walhovd,
2009; Pfluger et al., 1999; Utsunomiya, Takano, Okazaki, &
Mistudome, 1999). In addition, myelination in the hippocampal
region continues throughout childhood and adolescence (Arnold &
Trojanowski, 1996; Benes, Turtle, Khan, & Farol, 1994; Schneider
et al., 2004). It also is subregion specific, with some subregions
achieving mature patterns of myelination in infancy (i.e., in the
fimbria), childhood (i.e., CA1 and CA3 subfields), and after pu-
berty (i.e., hilus of the dentate gyrus; Ábrahám et al., 2010). There
also are marked developmental changes in connectivity between
the hippocampus and other neural regions (see, e.g., Schahmann &
Pandya, 2006, for a review).
Implications for behavior. Developmental changes in the
structures that subserve memory as well as in the connections
among them can be expected to have implications for memory
behavior (see Bauer, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2013, for other reviews).
Late development of aspects of the hippocampal formation may be
especially critical because of their role in stabilization and inte-
gration of memory traces into long-term storage. The immaturity
of these structures and connections between them would present
challenges to these processes. The challenges may be most pro-
nounced until 4 to 5 years of age, when the schedule of protracted
pruning of synapses in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus has
largely been reached (e.g., Eckenhoff & Rakic, 1991).
The suggestion that the processes involved in stabilization and
integration of memory traces into long-term storage are a source of
variance in recall in infancy and early childhood is supported by
behavioral and electrophysiological data. Specifically, using both
behavioral measures (e.g., Bauer, 2005; Bauer, Güler, Starr, &
Pathman, 2011; Bauer et al., 1999) and measures of recognition
obtained from event-related potentials (ERPs; Bauer et al., 2006;
Bauer, Wiebe, Carver, Waters, & Nelson, 2003), my colleagues
and I have probed the integrity of memory traces at various points
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post encoding, ranging from minutes after experience of an event
to 2 weeks later. We then examined the proportion of variance in
long-term recall explained by the measures obtained shortly after
encoding, as memory traces presumably are undergoing consoli-
dation. In these cases, the measure is not of forgetting, per se, but
of what is retained. However, because what is retained hours to
days after experience of an event is inversely related to the amount
forgotten, the logic holds. We have found that estimates of mem-
ory obtained hours to days after experience of events are predictive
of infants’ recall after subsequent delays of weeks to a month. The
measures account for significant unique variance above and be-
yond that explained by measures of encoding, and in some cases,
render encoding-related variance nonsignificant (Pathman &
Bauer, 2013). Similar effects are observed for children as old as 3
and 4 years of age (Bauer, Larkina, & Doydum, 2012). Indeed, as
summarized in Howe and O’Sullivan (1997), throughout child-
hood, memory failure at the level of consolidation and/or storage
accounts for the largest proportion of age-related variance in
children’s recall of laboratory stimuli.
The data discussed earlier on the distribution of autobiograph-
ical memories across the first decade of life (Bauer et al., 2007;
Bauer & Larkina, 2014) indicate that failure at the level of con-
solidation and/or storage extends beyond laboratory stimuli to
personally relevant events. They suggest that at least until the age
of 11 years, memories may be lost because they fail to consolidate.
Failed consolidation in turn provides an explanation for the accel-
erated rate of forgetting of autobiographical experiences in child-
hood (Bauer et al., 2007; Bauer & Larkina, 2014). Failed consol-
idation and exponential forgetting may stem not only from the
relative immaturity of the neural network involved, but also may
be linked with hippocampal neurogenesis, which is argued to play
a role in forgetting (e.g., Frankland, Köhler, & Josselyn, 2013).
Rates of neurogenesis decline with age (e.g., Kuhn, Dickinson-
Anson, & Gage, 1996), raising the possibility that higher rates in
the first years of life may contribute to exponential forgetting in
childhood. Consistent with this suggestion, in infancy, when rates
of neurogenesis are high, decreasing neurogenesis (either geneti-
cally or pharmacologically) after new memory formation mitigates
forgetting in the mouse model (Akers et al., 2014). We also may
speculate that consolidation processes would be impacted by sleep
parameters that change over the course of development (e.g.,
Ohayon, Carskadon, Guilleminault, & Vitiello, 2004). Changes in
slow-wave sleep, in particular, may have implications for memory
consolidation and the form of forgetting (e.g., Rasch, Büchel, Gais,
& Born, 2007). Conversely, data from Østby et al. (2011) and
DeMaster, Pathman, Lee, and Ghetti (2012) suggest that increases
in the reliability of consolidation processes may be related to
changes in hippocampal volume (see also Ghetti & Lee, 2014 and
Sowell, Delis, Stiles, & Jerningan, 2001, for discussion). Region-
specific activation in the hippocampus—specifically, in the ante-
rior region—has been linked with better memory for the types of
associations among stimuli that are part-and-parcel of episodic
memory (Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Donohue, Goodman, & Bunge,
2008; Ghetti, DeMaster, Yonelinas, & Bunge, 2010).
Cortical structures also are implicated in the consolidation pro-
cesses that effectively stabilize memory traces and accomplish
their integration into long-term storage, as well as in their initial
encoding and later retrieval. As such, protracted development of
cortical structures can be expected to be related to memory behav-
ior. Consistent with this suggestion, Østby and colleagues (2011)
found correlations between the thickness of left orbitofrontal cor-
tex and encoding success in children 8 to 19 years of age. Studies
of encoding-related activation indicate age-related increases in
recruitment of prefrontal cortical regions across childhood. For
instance, Wendelken, Baym, Gazzaley, and Bunge (2011) found
that among children 8 to 13 years of age, older children had higher
levels of recruitment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during
encoding of faces and scenes, which in turn modulated subsequent
memory (see also Ofen, Kao, Sokol-Hessner, Kim, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, & Gabrieli, 2007). Finally, though the necessary studies
have not been done, it is logical to assume that developmental
changes in medial prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and
precuneus would impact the efficiency with which autobiograph-
ical memories are accessed and elaborated (e.g., Cabeza et al.,
2004; Daselaar et al., 2008; McCormick et al., 2013).
Summary. The efficiency and efficacy of the processes by
which transient, labile representations of experience are trans-
formed into enduring memory traces is closely tied to the devel-
opmental status of the neural substrate responsible for them. In the
first several months of life, the substrate develops rapidly such that
as infants approach the end of second year, the neural structures
and network connections seemingly have reached a level of ma-
turity sufficient to support their signatory function. Though the
function is apparent, it is far from fully mature. Over the subse-
quent period of childhood and early adolescence, the structures and
network continue to develop, heralding increases in the efficiency
and thus the efficacy with which it glues or binds together the
elements of experience into enduring traces. The rate of progress
is relatively slow, such that at least for the first full decade of life,
effective loss from memory is faster than the rate in adolescence
and adulthood.
Development of the “surface”: The raw materials of memory.
Of course, the power of the consolidating glue is only as good as
the raw materials to which it is applied. In terms of memory
representations, simply put, if there is less available to start with,
less will survive the ensuing encoding and consolidation processes,
and less will be available for retrieval. As discussed above, the
elements associated with autobiographical memory are apparent in
memory behavior even early in childhood. That is, there does not
seem to be any one criterial feature “missing” from young chil-
dren’s representations of past events that would preclude them
from forming autobiographical memories. However, young chil-
dren’s memories nevertheless seem rather atypical of the category—they
are more ostrich-like than robin-like. They have this quality in part
because any given memory trace may lack information that is
prototypical of the category of autobiographical memories, such as
specific location in place and time, for example (Bauer, Doydum,
et al. 2012; Pathman et al., 2013, respectively). The net effect is
that within memory traces, there are fewer features to be associated
and between and among which conjunctions are formed. There
also are fewer features to differentiate one event or episode from
another. Seemingly paradoxically, there also are fewer opportuni-
ties for integration of new representations with memory traces
already in long-term storage. As memory representations become
more and more populated by temporal and spatial features, for
example, the number of distinct events and experiences repre-
sented in memory increases. As the memory traces become inte-
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grated with one another, they enable formation of a timeline of past
events.
Early in development, opportunities for integration of new
memory traces with those already in long-term storage also are
lessened by the relative immaturity—and lack of elaboration—of
the concepts upon which autobiographical memory depends. For
example, the self to which early formed memories are referenced
is not as elaborated or stable a construct as it will be later in
development (Fivush & Zaman, 2014; Howe, 2014). As such, it
provides a less coherent reference point for memories about the
self. As well, children’s relatively immature understanding of the
representational nature of the human mind may make it more
challenging for them to adopt a unique or subjective perspective on
events. As these concepts and understandings are elaborated, they
become ever-more integral elements of the memory representa-
tions that are formed of the distinct events and experiences that
make up the life timeline of events. Greater elaboration of the
concepts upon which autobiographical memory depends may even
operate to facilitate consolidation and reduce the vulnerability of
new memories to forgetting. In a mouse model, Tse and colleagues
(Tse et al., 2007) found that the rate of systems-level consolidation
of new learning was accelerated in mice that had previously
acquired a relevant “schema” to which the new information could
be assimilated. These findings indicate that the contents of long-term
memory may have functional consequences for the incorporation of
newmemories. Together, these suggestions imply that as the concepts
upon which autobiographical memory depends are more fully elabo-
rated and stabilized, they become more integral to mnemonic traces of
personally relevant events and simultaneously may work to accelerate
the incorporation of the new traces into long-term stores.
Finally, children’s less well developed verbal and narrative
skills also may negatively impact the quality of the raw materials
for memory. As discussed above, younger children’s verbal de-
scriptions of events feature fewer of the elements that make for a
good personal story, relative to older children. Their narratives
also are less well organized and coherent. Again, as discussed
above, this does not necessarily imply that their memory repre-
sentations suffer these same deficiencies. However, it does mean
that younger children miss out on the opportunities afforded by
verbal retelling of an event. Incomplete narratives also tend to be
less well organized (Reese et al., 2011), and retelling of them
affords less rehearsal benefit (Bauer & Larkina, 2013). Incomplete
narrative rehearsal may even result in retrieval-induced forgetting,
the phenomenon by which retrieving some elements of a memory
trace may result in forgetting of nonretrieved elements (e.g., An-
derson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994), with resultant further trace degra-
dation. Thus, developments in verbal and narrative skill herald
cognitive benefits of rehearsal and organization, which are advan-
tageous to memory. Beyond individual memories, developments in
narrative skills also make possible construction of a life story or
autobiography that weaves together the individual experiences of
one’s life into a sequence of temporally linked events (e.g.,
Brewer, 1980; Fivush et al., 2011; McAdams, 2001). Narrative
evidence of this development becomes apparent only in adoles-
cence (e.g., Bohn & Berntsen, 2008, 2014; Fivush & Zaman, 2014;
Habermas & Bluck, 2000).
Summary and implications. Memory representations are the
products of the activity of large populations of individual neurons
that are widely distributed across large tracts of neural tissue. Both
the number of elements of experience that are featured in the
representation and the extent to which the elements are success-
fully integrated with one another and with existing memory rep-
resentations influence the integrity of the traces and their longevity
and later accessibility. Early in development, any given memory
representation is less populated by the features that typify autobi-
ographical memories. The features that are represented are less fully
elaborated. Moreover, the representations that already exist in mem-
ory and are available for integration with newly formed traces are
themselves less well populated and elaborated. The result is that the
raw materials for formation of new memories are suboptimal.
Adding insult to injury is the fact that the less-than-optimal raw
mnemonic materials are operated upon by less-than-optimal neu-
ral, cognitive, and mnemonic processes. Many of the structures as
well as the network of structures that supports memory undergo a
protracted course of development lasting well into adolescence.
For much of the first 2 years of life, encoding, consolidation, and
subsequent retrieval of long-term memories of specific past events
are fragile processes owing to immaturity of the neural substrate
that supports these signatory functions. For years thereafter, the
substrate operates relatively inefficiently and ineffectively. The
result is that elements of experience that are the raw materials for
memory are not effectively stabilized or integrated into long-term
memory stores. Together, these forces create a dynamic such that
memories of the first years of life are formed and may survive over
some period of time, but they are challenged to survive for the long
term.
Over developmental time, individual memory representations
include more and more of the features that characterize autobio-
graphical memories and the features themselves are better elabo-
rated and more tightly integrated with one another. The result is
mnemonic materials that are of higher quality. At the same time,
there are developments in the neural substrate operating on the
available representations, both in terms of the structures involved
and in the level of connectivity of the network of structures. The
developments herald more efficient and effective cognitive and
mnemonic processing, resulting in decreases in the vulnerability of
memory traces and, thus, in the rate of forgetting. The net effect is
that more and more memories of higher and higher quality survive
to be recalled at later points in time, producing the characteristic
distribution of autobiographical memories across the life span.
Summary and Conclusions
Autobiographical memory is an important source of “evidence”
for continuity of self over time. It is with us virtually for our
lifetimes, even though, by late childhood, many memories of early
life events are obscured by childhood amnesia. Numerous studies
conducted with adults have revealed a relative paucity of memo-
ries of events from the first 3 to 4 years of life, with a seemingly
gradual increase in the number of memories until approximately
age 7 years, after which an adult distribution has been assumed.
Historically, the amnesia was attributed to late development of the
autobiographical memory system or to inaccessibility resulting
from repression or emergence of new cognitive structures. Because
they emphasized one or the other—but not both—sides of the
mnemonic coin, traditional theories had difficulty accounting for
all of the data. Theories that postulate late development of the
autobiographical memory system are challenged by data that in-
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dicate autobiographical memories within the period eventually
obscured by childhood amnesia. Theories that postulate an event or
change that renders early memories inaccessible to later recollec-
tion are challenged to explain why memories from the first years
of life are differentially forgotten.
The Complementary Processes Involved in Increases
in the Quality of and Decreases in the Vulnerability of
Memory Traces
The alternative complementary processes account advanced in
this review recognizes both sides of the mnemonic coin: processes
that contribute to increases in the quality of memory traces and to
decreases in their vulnerability to forgetting. Rather than defining
autobiographical memory in terms of criterial features, which
necessitates exclusion of seemingly appropriate members of the
category, it defines autobiographical memory in terms of charac-
teristic features. Over the course of development, memories bear
more and more of the features that are characteristic of the class
(see Figure 3). The perspective also recognizes that memory traces
weaken to the point of forgetting. However, forgetting is not an
event that renders early memories inaccessible to later recollection.
Rather, forgetting is the result of inefficient and ineffective cog-
nitive and mnemonic processes performed by an immature neural
substrate. The net effect is a perfect storm: the raw materials are
less-than-optimal and they are operated upon by a system that
itself is less than efficient and effective. The result is an acceler-
ated rate of forgetting relative to that which characterizes adult-
hood; the specific form of forgetting is exponential. Exponential
forgetting reduces the pool of early memories children have
formed to a few isolated puddles, making them even more difficult
to retrieve. Eventually, with concomitant increases in the quality of
the raw materials and the operating system, forgetting slows to the
rate observed in adulthood.
The complementary processes conceptualization prompts a
change in perspective on the distribution of autobiographical mem-
ories across the life span. In Figure 1 is the typical representation
of the distribution of memories over the first decade of life. It lends
itself to description in terms of a gradual increase in the density of
memories over the first 7 to 10 years of age. However, recognition
of early development of autobiographical memory (albeit in a less
prototyical, ostrich form) coupled with early vulnerability of those
memories in terms of exponential forgetting, prompts a change in
the perspective. A more appropriate characterization may be in
terms of a decrease in the number of memories as a result of
exponential forgetting associated with failed consolidation. This
perspective is depicted schematically in Figure 6, which is the
mirror image of Figure 1. For each year of life from ages 1 to 10
years, what is represented in the figure is the total corpus of
memories formed (100%, represented in light-gray bars) and the
percentage of the corpus that remains accessible to recollection.
The very short dark gray bar on the far right of the figure indicates
that only a very small percentage of memories formed in the first
year of life remains in the corpus—most of these very early
memories have been lost as a result of failed consolidation and
exponential forgetting. In contrast, the tall solid black bar on the far left
represents the large percentage of memories formed in the 10th
year of life that remain accessible. From this perspective, the tail
of the distribution apparent on the right of the figure is the small
residual after forgetting, not the start of remembering, as suggested
by the corresponding bars on the left side of Figure 1.
Thinking of the tail of the distribution in terms of the residual
after forgetting also helps to make sense of the small—yet criti-
cally informative—body of literature on childhood amnesia in
childhood. By the end of the first decade of life, the average age of
earliest memory among children is roughly on par with that among
adults—age 3 to 4 years. However, within the preschool years, the
average age of earliest memory is substantially earlier, with one
estimate as early as 18 months (Tustin & Hayne, 2010). Moreover,
children’s earliest memory also seems to be inconsistent both in
terms of the event nominated as the source of the memory and in
terms of the date of the event, which increases systematiclly over
time (Peterson et al., 2011). These patterns are different from those
observed among adults (Bauer et al., in press). They are precisely
what is to be expected from a pool of memories that is ever
shrinking, eventually diminishing to isolated puddles of memory
traces.
Directions for Future Research
By the measure of the ability of the perspective to bring order to
the existing literature, the value of the complementary processes
account outlined here is clear. Another index of heuristic value is
the extent to which a perspective guides future research. In this
regard, the message also is clear—future research should feature
measures of increases in the quality of memory traces over the
course of development, measures of the rate at which memory
traces are weakened and lost, and how they relate with one
another.
There have been numerous studies of increases in the quality of
memory traces over the course of development. Indeed, virtually
all of the research on the early development of autobiographical
memory involves assessment of changes in how adequately chil-
dren recall past events. However, most of the studies have asked
how the verbal reports or narrative descriptions of memories of
past events change with development. They have not asked
Figure 6. Schematic depiction of the distribution of memories across the
first decade of life from the complementary processes perspective, sug-
gesting a residual number of early memories remaining after forgetting. For
each year of life from ages 1 to 10 years, what is represented is the total
corpus of memories formed (100%, represented in light gray bars) and the
percentage of the corpus that remains accessible to recollection (dark gray
bars for ages 1–4 years, striped bars for ages 5–7 years, and solid black
bars for ages 8–10 years).
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whether with development, children’s memory representations
tend to include a larger number of event features, better elaborated
event features, more tightly related or integrated features, and so
forth. These two questions are related, to be sure. However, as
argued elsewhere in this article, verbal reports and memory rep-
resentations are not one in the same. Examinations of the integrity
of memory traces that do not rely on verbal expression would
inform the question of whether the strength of memory represen-
tations changes in the manner implied in this review. An example
of this approach from the infancy literature is available in Bauer
and Lukowski (2010). We tested infants’ recognition of the spe-
cific features of objects used to produce multistep sequences in an
imitation-based task and how the specificity of feature memory
related to recall of the events 1 month later. Infants who had higher
levels of accurate recognition of the particular objects actually
used—from among highly perceptually similar distractor ob-
jects—had higher levels of long-term recall. Analogous tests with
older children would provide valuable information on the nature
and pace of change in what is represented in memory—in this case,
the specificity of the representation—and how it relates to recall of
personally relevant past events over long delays.
Another promising line of research is suggested by studies of
developmental changes in children’s abilities to create conjunc-
tions between items and their locations (e.g., Bauer, Doydum, et
al., 2012; Bauer et al., in press; Sluzenski et al., 2006), or infor-
mation and the source from which it was acquired (e.g., Cycowicz,
Friedman, Snodgrass, & Duff, 2001; Drummey & Newcombe,
2002; Riggins, 2014). The ability to form these conjunctions is a
crucial step in the process of transition of labile patterns of neural
representation into enduring memory traces. Studies of various
conjunctions in memory find age-related differences across early
childhood (see Olson & Newcombe, 2014, for a review), suggest-
ing that memory representations strengthen in this manner. Be-
cause these studies typically are conducted with controlled labo-
ratory stimuli (e.g., pictures of common objects such as animals
and kitchen utensils; Cycowicz et al., 2001), the developmental
course for conjunctions among the elements of naturally occurring,
personally relevant past events is not known. Moreover, how the
ability to create and maintain conjunctions among the elements of
experience relates to developments in autobiographical memory
has yet to be examined.
Future research on developmental increases in the quality of
memory representations will tell only part of the story. There also
is need for future research on how developmental changes in the
rate of forgetting relate to autobiographical memory. To date,
relevant evidence comes primarily from the cue word technique
and findings that in childhood, forgetting is better characterized by
the exponential than by the power function (Bauer et al., 2007;
Bauer & Larkina, 2014). Such studies provide an estimate of
forgetting in a population; they are not revealing of the rate of
forgetting among individuals. Once again, a model for future
investigation is available in the infancy literature. As discussed
above, my colleagues and I have examined the rate of forgetting in
infancy and the preschool years by probing the integrity of mem-
ory traces at various points post encoding, ranging from minutes
after experience of an event to 2 weeks later. We then examine the
proportion of variance in subsequent long-term recall explained by
the measures obtained shortly after encoding, as memory traces
presumably are undergoing consolidation. We have found that
measures of memory obtained hours to days after experience of
events are predictive of recall after delays of weeks to months
(e.g., Bauer, Larkina, et al., 2012; Pathman & Bauer, 2013).
Similar designs could be used in tests of older children’s memories
of specific past events to determine how the rate of forgetting
relates to long-term recall.
Future research also is needed to more accurately pin-point the
transition from a rate of forgetting that it better characterized by
the exponential function to a rate that is better characterized by the
power function observed in adults. In Bauer and Larkina (2014),
we found that the power function provided a good fit to data
obtained from college students as well as middle age adults. In
contrast, the exponential function was a better fit to the data
obtained from children 7 to 11 years of age as a whole (see also
Bauer et al., 2007) and for each of the age groups separately.
However, there also was evidence of a deceleration in the rate of
forgetting even within childhood. Specifically, between 7 and 11
years, the rate of forgetting, represented by the b parameter of the
power function (e.g., Wixted & Ebbesen, 1997), decreased from
2.21 to 1.62; there was a further decrease to 1.01 by the college
years. A productive direction for future research would be to
obtain estimates of forgetting across the childhood years and use
the estimates to predict the rate of forgetting of events experienced
at different points in development.
Another direction for future research is to examine factors that
have been found to relate to increases in the quality of memory
traces and to declines in their vulnerability to forgetting, and
examine their influence on the complementary process. For exam-
ple, one of the most robust determinants of developmental im-
provements in autobiographical memory—as measured by the
quality of narratives about past events—is the conversational style
used by children’s parents. As summarized by Fivush (2014),
adults exhibit two different styles when they engage in memory
talk with their children. Parents who frequently engage in conver-
sations about the past, provide rich descriptive information about
previous experiences, and invite their children to “join in” on
memory conversations, are said to use an elaborative style. In
contrast, parents who provide fewer details and instead pose spe-
cific questions to their children (e.g., “What was the name of the
restaurant where we had breakfast?”), are said to use a repetitive or
low elaborative style. Numerous studies have found that children
of parents using the elaborative style report more about past events
than children of parents using the repetitive or low elaborative
style (see Fivush, 2014, for a review). Relations are observed both
concurrently and over time (e.g., Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1993).
In future research it would be informative to test whether maternal
narrative style also is predictive of changes in rates of the forget-
ting of memory traces.
Research on the complementary approach of examining deter-
minants of “forgetting” to see how they relate to developmental
improvements in autobiographical memory is underway. As out-
lined in this review, an important determinant of forgetting is the
integrity of the neural substrate responsible for memory trace
formation, consolidation, and subsequent retrieval. In the adult
literature, there have been numerous tests of relations between
neural function and episodic encoding and retrieval (e.g., Nyberg
et al., 2000) as well as autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g.,
Cabeza et al., 2004; Daselaar et al., 2008; McCormick et al., 2013).
There are even studies that test relations between the integrity of
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memory traces during the period of consolidation and subsequent
recall success (Bosshardt et al., 2005). The developmental litera-
ture on relations between neural structures and neural function and
episodic memory behavior is substantially smaller than that on
relations in adulthood (see Ghetti & Lee, 2014, for a review). The
literature on relations to recall of personally relevant past events is
nonexistent. Clearly, further research is needed.
Conclusion
The distribution of autobiographical memories across the life
span has been a matter of considerable scientific curiosity and
debate since the end of the 19th century. Typical depictions of the
distribution (see Figure 1) plot the event of birth on the left and
show what appears to be a gradually increasing number of mem-
ories from birth through the first 7 to 10 years of life, after which
an adult-like distribution is assumed. In the context of this article,
I have argued that from the perspective of development, a better
characterization is achieved by “flipping” the chart and plotting the
event of birth on the right of the distribution (see Figure 6). The
plot then shows the large number of autobiographical memories of
events experienced in older childhood (and adulthood, on the left
of the graph), and the relatively small residual number of memo-
ries of early life events that remain in the corpus. The residual are
the puddles of memories that are spared from the constant rate of
forgetting that characterizes mnemonic life during childhood. This
perspective assumes relatively early development of the ability to
form, retain, and later retrieve memories of personally relevant
past events. Early in life, the event memories bear relatively fewer
of the features that we associate with adult-like autobiographical
memory. Over the course of development, more and more mem-
ories take on more and more of the features of autobiographical
memory, rendering them both more obvious members of the class,
and more impervious to the ravages of forgetting. This perspective
recognizes the complementary processes involved in increases in
the quality of memory traces and decreases in their vulnerability to
forgetting, and the developmental dynamics of both. It accounts
for the distribution of autobiographical memories across the life
span, which forms the basis for construction of a personal past.
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